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Summary
The thesis combines genealogical investigation with an ‘analytics o f government’ to 
diagnose present reforms o f Australian Social Security. The Australian example poses a 
new diagram o f knowledge/power relations linked to early nineteenth century debates on 
pauperism and poor policy. Characteristic o f ‘advanced’ liberal government, social 
welfare is transformed from an income redistribution scheme to a behaviour modification 
regime. This raises serious implications for contemporary citizenship, subjectification 
and the apparent flexibility o f  wage-labour. By re-tracing modem welfare’s conditions of 
possibility, the present is reconstructed to breach the naturalness and self-evidence with 
which we accept the current crisis o f welfare as problems o f ‘community’, ‘dependency' 
and ‘participation’. The case is made that present control strategies rapidly recycle clients 
into flexible wage-labour via human technologies that seek the ethical and moral 
reconstruction o f  the poor. But diagnosis is a limited enterprise if  it fails to consult the 
experiences o f  those to which these reforms are applied. A discursive analysis o f 12 
interview participants deemed ‘at risk’ o f welfare dependency explores themes of labour 
market activity, welfare regulation and practices o f freedom to understand how welfare 
subjects manage and transform their lives. Interviews confirm the existence o f discourses 
that reinscribe distinctions between the deserving and undeserving poor, intensify stigma 
o f welfare receipt, and increase ambivalence about labour market security. Furthermore, a 
psychological subject emerges as one o f two positions: it reactivates the pathologies of 
abject sectors o f  the population, while shoring-up capacities for rational self­
management. Arguably, psychology has become a key technology for the ethical 
reconstruction o f  conduct and the calculated management o f risk. Discourses o f poverty 
are now recast as problems o f  ‘the excluded’ as welfare rationalities monitor and prevent 
behaviours that lead to market passivity. Like early nineteenth century statements on 
poverty, citizenship is now conditional upon moral improvement. And while neo­
classical solutions have succeeded in moving the welfare debate away from 
contradictions o f political economy, welfare reform risks producing a sector of the 
population that is low paid, casualised, under-protected from risk, insecure and 
desocialised.
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On the Medicalisation o f Welfare
Towards a genealogy of dependency
Introduction: medicalisation of welfare
In November 1999, the Australian Federal minister for Family and Community Services. 
Senator Jocelyn Newman, released a discussion paper on the Federal Government's 
proposal to reform the Australian welfare system. The paper, titled: The challenge of 
welfare dependency in the 21st century, signalled the Government's intention to combat 
the growing incidence o f ‘welfare dependency’ among people o f workforce-age. 
Statistical indicators outlining ‘the impact o f long-term dependency’ showed a steady 
increase o f the workforce-age population in receipt o f income support (from approx. 10% 
in 1978 to 18% in 1998). despite sharp falls in unemployment rates since 1993 (over 
10.5% in 1993 to 7.8% in 1998). Further, in June 1998. there was a reported four and 
three-quarter million Australians receiving income support payments, representing a five­
fold increase since 1965 (Newman, 1999a; 1999b). Excluding those in receipt o f payment 
above retirement age. or an additional 400,000 receiving student assistance, there were 
estimated to be over two and a quarter million people receiving some form o f income 
assistance in other categories. The most significant categories comprise o f those receiving 
unemployment allowances (35%). Disability Support Pension (24%) or Parenting 
Payment (27%). These three categories o f welfare assistance constitute the groups most 
‘at risk' o f long-term dependency, and form the main objects around which the future of 
Australia welfare is reformed.
The past few decades have witnessed a disproportionate expansion of these three 
target groups -  the unemployed, the chronically ill/disabled, and the lone parent -  where 
the number o f single parents receiving payments has increased by a factor o f tw elve since 
1965: those receiving the Disability Support Pension have increased fivefold: and those 
on unemployment allowances have increased by a factor o f sixty (ie. from 13.000 in the 
mid-sixties to 790.000 by 1998). At present, the commonwealth government spends 
approximately 50 billion each year on welfare payments, representing a third o f all 
government expenditure. However, since the 1960’s, welfare expenditure has risen much
faster than rates o f population, economy and government revenue. Peter Saunders. 
Research Manager for the Australian Institute o f Family Studies, provides a succinct 
summary o f the current problem facing the Howard Government:
Today, more than 18 percent o f  the population o f  workforce age is receiving income 
support payments as compared with just 3% in the early- and m id-sixties... GDP per head 
has doubled since 1960, the real value o f  taxes has tripled, but the real cost o f  welfare 
spending has gone up five-fold. It is not difficult to see why the government is worried 
about these trends (2000, p. 15).
For Senator Newman (1999a), these statistical indicators give existence to what she 
describes as 'our entrenched culture o f welfare dependency' which, despite being a 
burden to governments and communities, also diminishes one's capacity to 'participate 
fully in society'. Long term dependency leads to the 'erosion o f work skills, lower 
incomes, poorer health and risk o f isolation from the community’ (Newman. 1999a, p.6). 
For these reasons, the term ‘welfare dependency' has formed the centrepiece of 
government discussion and the central problematic by which to justify the Howard 
government's commitment to welfare reform.
Arguably, since the expansion o f eligibility in the 1960’s and 70's, and the wave of 
neo-liberal critiques in the 80’s and 90’s, the recent practices focused on 'welfare 
dependency' have achieved legitimacy by adopting a return to more traditional 
assumptions o f reform. Political rhetoric resurrects the old dichotomy o f the 'deserving' 
and 'undeserving poor' in a context where the distinction between the 'genuinely needy' 
and the 'incorrigibly idle' are increasingly blurred. As such, welfare dependency has the 
commonsense appeal o f conjuring immutable stereotypes o f a welfare system inundated 
with 'free-riders', 'dole-bludgers' and ‘single mothers’ who exploit the common good for 
their own selfish purposes. This is certainly the image Senator Newman conveyed in her 
speech for the launch o f the government's reform initiatives:
W here there is a genuine failure o f  the labour market and people are unable to find 
em ployment despite their best efforts, the community, must and should provide income 
support. However, there are examples around Australia where job opportunities are 
available and our entrenched culture o f  welfare dependency has meant that certain 
members o f  our community are not only prepared, but feel entitled to exploit the social 
safety net instead. In doing so, they abuse the essential decency o f  the Australian 
community and undermine public confidence in the integrity o f  the social security system  
(Newman. 1999b. p.5-6).
In the current climate o f reform, the re-emergence o f assumptions predating the 1960's 
clearly invoke a moral contempt for those whose reliance upon income support exceeds 
anything other than short durations o f assistance. In the new millennium, welfare 
dependency has become a keyword among government rhetoric, describing a universal 
deficiency, or more precisely, a chronic passivity that forms a self-destructive reliance on 
income support. The cost o f welfare dependency presents major social and economic 
consequences. Economically, the drain on government expenditure undermines the 
existing system o f assisting the genuinely needy, and, socially, it supports a sector of 
worklessness which leads to erosion o f work skills, lower incomes, poorer health and 
isolation from community7.
It is the conviction o f the following thesis that the appearance o f welfare dependency 
marks a distinct moment in contemporary strategies of advanced liberal governance, 
wherein a kind o f remoralisation o f the poor resurrects nineteenth century statements on 
the regulation o f poverty and idleness. There are numerous questions that can be raised in 
relation to this phenomenon, but the kind I wish to develop here concern a method of 
critique that is necessarily twofold in its application: it takes the ‘politics of the present' 
as the object o f diagnosis, and establishes the conditions o f political thought and action as 
a matter o f historical inquiry. We must therefore ask ourselves what political objectives 
and strategies do the production  o f welfare dependency serve? And. what are the 
conditions o f  possibility’ by which this form o f political argument is rendered intelligible? 
The remainder o f the introduction constructs both a platform and an overview o f how the 
thesis addresses these questions. The first task is to reconstruct problematisations of 
welfare reform in ways that make it amenable to empirical enquiry. Secondly. I provide 
an overview o f the form o f the argument as it relates to both parts o f the thesis: and. 
lastly. I give a brief sketch o f the contents o f each chapter.
Problematising welfare reform
The appearance o f welfare dependency in 1999 marks a tactical event in the history of 
Australian political thought inasmuch as it forecasts a strategy for restructuring the 
welfare system. This event is ‘tacticaf because it claims to discover a phenomenon that
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threatens to undermine the ethos o f ‘fairness’ that once defined the Australian way of life. 
Frank Castles (1985) once coined Australia the ‘wage earners’ welfare state’ to describe 
how welfare provision serves as a liberal reward offered in return for citizens' 
participation in the labour market (Thomson, 2000). Welfare dependency is antithetical to 
principles o f fairness and participation, but even more than this it constitutes a form of 
resistance to the principles o f freedom which, I will argue, increasingly define 
contemporary citizenship. The figure o f the welfare dependent is an aberration of 
freedom, a particular discovery o f an ‘anti-citizen’, which must be reformed and 
reintegrated back into the normal, moral circuits o f work, family and community . Beyond 
its natural and rhetorical appeal, the thesis begins by asking: what political rationalities, 
strategies and regimes o f intelligibility inform current initiatives of the Coalition 
government? If the discovery o f welfare dependency is a particular problematisation o f  
conduct then what is the solution? I will return to these questions later in the section, but 
for now I want to outline the empirical strategy for reconstructing this problematisation.
To be clear, the purpose o f the thesis is to conduct a kind o f interrogation of the 
present. This mode o f  interrogation draws from Foucauldian principles o f critical- 
historical reflection that refers to the present as an historical plane of thought and action. 
Foucault himself referred to this project as ‘an ontology of the present* (1986a. p.96). a 
decomposition o f those certainties that otherwise frame the self-evidence of our historical 
location in the present. An ontology o f the present begins by posing questions that allow 
us to detach ourselves from the naturalness o f these certainties, to disturb the normativ e 
terrain o f knowledge and interrupt the implicit seduction o f continuity, identity and 
teleology. But the present also forms an object of ‘diagnosis', that is. by taking the 
appearance o f welfare dependency as both a symptom and a point o f departure for 
interrogating our contemporary regimes o f truth.
With this project in mind, there are two questions addressed by the thesis: why do 
present reforms o f the Australian welfare system take the form  that they do? And. w hat 
are the effects o f these reforms? The first question demands an interrogation of the 
historical conditions through which it has become possible to invoke arguments of
dependency. The second question addresses the materiality o f these effects upon 
subjectivity and experience. The first question specifies current problematisations of 
social welfare as the basis for conducting an 'historical ontology'. The second question 
builds on the first by exploring the impact o f reform upon practices of 'subjectification'. 
The thesis is therefore composed o f two parts -  a history o f the present and an 
interpretive analysis o f subject-formation -  together they form the basis o f conducting a 
diagnosis o f the politics o f the present.
Nonetheless, if  diagnosis is what combines both thesis questions under one mode of 
inquiry , then what precisely are we diagnosing? On this point, I refer to the kind of 
Foucauldian sociology conducted by governmentality theorists, the most exemplary of 
which is the work o f Nikolas Rose. For Rose, the role o f diagnosis is a kind of empirical 
investigation that applies 'an analytics o f governmental ity' to investigate how various 
regimes o f truth constitute relations o f knowing and acting (1999a, p. 19). Rose draws his 
own sociology o f the present from Foucault's work on the history o f governmentalit\ 
which traces 'the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, 
the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise o f this very specific albeit complex 
form of power' (Foucault. 1991, p. 102). In other words, the diagnostic role o f empirical 
investigation is nothing less than an analytics o f political power.
The work o f  Rose and that o f other govemmentality scholars (Miller & Rose, 1990. 
1991: Osborne. 1994. 1996; Burchell, 1991. 1993; Castell. 1991: Dean. 1991. 1992. 
1994. 1995: Barry. 1996: Hindess. 1993. 1996. 1997: O'Malley. 1992. 1996. 1998: 
Walters. 1994. 1996. 1997) extends Foucault's hypotheses on govemmentality to show 
how the exercise o f modern forms of political power operate precisely through our 
freedom. In this sense, the concept o f 'government' is not. as it is normatively 
understood, the opposite o f  freedom. We should not think o f government as strictly 
repressive, dominating and constraining. Rather, freedom is an important precondition for 
the exercise o f political power.
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Having said this, there is a persistent tension between the two questions posed by the 
thesis which attempt to think through a presumed division between Foucault's earlier and 
later work. If the first part o f the thesis invokes a kind o f Foucauldian inspired historical 
sociology o f political power, the same cannot be said for the second part. Analyses of 
subjectification do not sit well with govemmentality studies since it is argued by the latter 
that subjectivity is merely the effect o f an ensemble of power, in which case analysis 
should privilege the apparatuses, assemblages and practices through which subjectivity is 
produced and regulated (Rose, 1996a). In line with those arguments extended by critical 
psychologists (Henriques. et al., 1984), the local and specific character of subjectivity 
also provides an important site for understanding ‘how people live and transform their 
lives' (Walkerdine et al., 2001, p. 15) and conceptualising strategies for political 
engagement and social change (Stephenson, 2003).
Critical psychology proposes that the subject is more than the sum total o f all 
positions in discourse since birth (Henriques et al., 1984). The issue, then, is how modes 
of subjection form the subject as an assemblage o f multiple and contradictory sites and 
relays o f power whereby subjects engage in complex practices and techniques of self­
management. In this sense, welfare reform is linked to what Foucault (1988a) described 
towards the end o f his career as the Technologies o f the s e l f 1. In Part II o f the thesis. I 
take the experiences o f twelve interview participants as the basis for investigating 
practices o f subjectification. Here, an analysis of subject-formation proceeds in two 
directions: it examines how contemporary welfare politics, with their principles o f mutual 
obligation and social participation, intervene in practices of subject-formation to promote, 
seduce or compel active citizenship; in another sense, I want to investigate the local and 
specific instances in which subjects, in the name o f various techniques o f the self, styles 
of self-reflection, aspirations o f autonomy, freedom and virtue, engage in practices of 
self-management for the active construction of ethical life. It is my argument that to full)
1 Technologies o f  the s e l f  are primarily techniques ‘which permit individuals to effect by their ow n means 
or with the help o f  others a certain number o f  operations on their own bodies and souls, thought, conduct 
and way o f  being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state o f  happiness, purity, 
wisdom, perfection, or immortality' (Foucault, 1988a, p. 18).
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understand the phenomenon o f ‘welfare dependency’, we need to combine genealogy 
with an account o f  the specific production o f welfare subjects.
Given that the thesis traces European events which led to the formation of state 
welfare, the following work assembles a unique collection o f scholarship -  from 
Foucauldian genealogies o f the social, to govemmentality studies and critical psychology 
-  all o f which are applied to a set o f policies and arguments made in the present. If there 
is an original contribution to be made here it is the way genealogy decomposes the 
certainty o f recent policy statements which seek to remoralise the conduct of the poor. 
Further, the thesis brings together historical arguments about pauperism, poor policy, and 
social medicine with a genealogy o f the social in a way not undertaken before. This 
allows us to trace the liberal transformation o f government and to show the place of the 
subject o f welfare within it. But genealogy is only a partial contribution if it cannot link 
these claims to contemporary problems o f experience. In a way that is quite unique for 
genealogical work, the thesis combines policy critique with a detailed investigation of 
subject-formation. By inviting subjects to make an object of their experience, narrative 
analysis reveals complex conditions o f subjectification which are themselves symptoms 
of broader processes o f social and economic change.
Form of the argument
In this section. I want to outline the form o f my historical argument undertaken in 
chapters 2 to 6. The point here is to construct the ‘event' o f welfare dependency in 
Australia as an assemblage -  a complex, polyvalent terrain o f diverse elements, 
personages, rationalities, practices and linkages -  an event that begins to lose its 
familiarity, necessity and identity. To put it succinctly: the event o f welfare dependency 
forms both an object and a question for which a method of decomposition investigates the 
antecedent conditions that frame the current intelligibility o f welfare reform.
Historical argument
I admit, it may seem odd to undertake genealogical work which takes the events of 
Europe and Britain as the basis o f critical historical reflection rather than those pertaining 
to nineteenth century Australia welfare. The reason for this is because the present work
traces an event in Britain which marks something of a revolution o f administration, a 
decisive break from the past, whereby new human and intellectual technologies were 
assembled for the purpose o f creating a utopian market economy. My argument is that the 
‘invention o f poverty’ is something that precedes the events of Australian welfare, and 
yet would later come to structure the field o f possibilities by which its own domain of 
state assistance emerged. In short, the thesis seeks to understand the liberal 
transformation o f  government as the conditions o f  possibility fo r  welfare reform in 
Australia. It is, I believe, the task o f  retracing these events that enables the genealogist to 
empirically engage in a diagnosis o f our present.
The historical argument I develop begins with a departure from those normative and 
conventional accounts o f the origins o f modem welfare. It is easy, for instance, to recover 
at least two kinds o f historical accounts that bear a common origin. The most natural and 
familiar accounts locate the birth o f modern welfare among liberal reforms of the 1830's 
and 1840's where centralised government systematically addressed the problem of 
poverty and industrialism with the Poor Law Amendment Act o f 1834 (Roberts. 1960; 
Bruce. 1968; Fraser. 1973). From these accounts welfare emerged as a domain of public 
assistance, the effect o f social policies that sought to intervene in the affairs of the state. 
In other accounts, these reforms were not attributed to any conscious formation of 
welfare which, after all, contained elements o f social and economic regulation that were 
decidedly non-welfarist. but nonetheless instrumental to the formation of the modern 
nation state with its stronger emphasis upon economic regulation and central governance 
(Gilbert. 1966; Clark. 1966. 1967; Richards, 1980).
Both histories presuppose the conjunction o f the state and welfare through centrally 
administered and professionally informed systems of health and public assistance. The 
origins o f social welfare, then, are thought to lie among those formative acts where the 
state intervenes in matters o f destitution, sickness and squalor. But as Hewitt (1991) 
observes, these dominant historical narratives also ‘presuppose a break between welfare's 
pre-history and its substantive history’ (p.236). Prior to the emergence of the modern 
state, social welfare lacks any clearly identifiable existence. This period is further
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occluded by a whole tradition o f post-war historical sociology which charted a somewhat 
smooth, uninterrupted passage from ancient poor law to modern welfare. For instance, 
Bruce (1968) locates the essence o f the welfare state among Elizabethan notions of the 
‘common weal*; Marshall (1943), the great champion of modern welfare, traces it to the 
evolution o f citizenship in which Elizabethan poor laws became the precocious 
embodiment o f modern social rights; Beales (1946), on the other hand, sketches a broad 
societal logic where the development o f social policy is thought to resemble an ‘organic' 
process o f industrialism. Each o f these arguments posit the arrival of the welfare state as 
the end product o f a determinative logic where teleology is thought to reveal an essential, 
global, ahistorical process played out among moral, political, economic and technological 
domains.
This functional and spontaneous relationship between state and welfare, and the 
suggestion o f some underlying continuity, essence or teleology are, as they stand, 
unsatisfactory points for mounting a critique because each of these assumptions preserves 
the naturalness and necessity o f our present institutions and social policies. A more 
decisive point o f departure is found in Karl Polanyrs The Great Transformation (1957) 
where the Poor Law Reform o f 1834 figures much less as a benevolent domain of public 
assistance than an attempt to create a utopian market economy (pp.77-110). The 
significance o f the latter demands a different understanding o f ‘economic liberalism' -  
not the kind that holds ‘laissez faire' and ‘interventionism' as mutually exclusive 
enterprises, but requires ‘the intervention o f the state in order to establish it. and once 
established, in order to maintain i f  (Polanyi, 1957, p. 149). Polanyi argues that it was not 
exclusively the concern for poverty that gave rise to the Poor Law Reform o f 1834. but 
the increasingly important relationship between poverty and the self-regulating market. 
The Poor Law had all the effect o f creating a national labour market by virtue of 
constituting a figure that represented an aberration to the free market economy -  it was 
not poverty itself that formed the proper object of regulation, but the haunting pathology 
and moral abyss o f pauperism. Thus, the object is not poverty but wealth.
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How did nineteenth century debate on pauperism establish the conditions of existence 
for modern welfare? A useful response is found in Mitchell Dean's genealogical 
treatment o f poverty that analyses the debate on pauperism as a key component in the 
transformation o f liberal governance. In The Constitution o f  Poverty {1991), Dean applies 
Polanyi's observation that poverty formed the basis o f a new reflection o f life in terms of 
‘society'; an emergent reality that placed pauperism and political economy in a new kind 
of relationship. By treating pauperism as an event, Dean sketches out a terrain of 
investigation w hich not only calls into question the assumptions o f contemporary political 
rationalities, but constructs alternative trajectories of events, discourses and practices to 
‘increase the intelligibility o f debate in our own period' (1991, p.6).
Drawing from the intellectual histories o f Polanyi (1957) and J. R. Poynter (1969). 
Dean specifies the temporal boundaries o f 1795 and 1834 as the ‘event of pauperism' 
which marks a dramatic transformation o f poor policy. The strategic implications of 
critique are twofold: firstly, it demonstrates the possibility o f undermining the paradigm 
of identity and continuity, the necessity o f which becomes all the more fragile if. for 
example, we contrast the debate on pauperism o f the late eighteenth century with the 
passing o f the Poor Law Reform in 1834; secondly, it assembles diverse and multiple 
elements, partial and competing references, along alternative trajectories which, in 
contrast to post-war accounts o f welfare, strictly oppose a determinative origin or 
teleology (Minson. 1985). Dean expresses this point clearly when outlining the purpose 
of his inquiry: ‘If this study seeks to ‘eventalise’ pauperism, it is because pauperism-as- 
event reveals something more than is found in inexorable logics which serve only to 
reassure us o f the necessity and virtue o f current forms o f state and its policies' (1991. 
p.5). By returning to debates on pauperism and re-constituting the complex conditions out 
of which a concept o f poverty emerged. Dean shows that the origins o f welfare are not 
reducible to histories o f ideology, morality or economics but transposed into a set of 
competing rationalities, practices and techniques for governing the poor. What he 
proposes is not a simple or uniform transformation of state assistance, but a complex and 
meticulous reconstruction in terms o f practices of government.
The historical argument I develop here revisits Polanyi’s thesis to show how the 
problem of poverty found temporary resolution among laissez faire principles o f free 
market economy. This was not a spontaneous or purely functional encounter between 
welfare and the state, but one that was systematically enforced by liberal techniques of 
government: ‘Economic history reveals that the emergence of national markets was in no 
way the result o f a gradual and spontaneous emancipation of the economic sphere from 
governmental control. On the contrary, the market has been the outcome of a conscious 
and often violent intervention on the part o f government which imposed the market 
organisation on society for noneconomic ends’ (Polanyi, 1957, p.250). The invention of 
pauperism was itself a tactic in the production o f economic life; the pauper was the anti­
thesis o f the new requirements for the free market economy -  independence, self- 
discipline and economic responsibility. The task is to therefore locate the origins of 
welfare at the intersection o f pauperism and political economy. For this reason it becomes 
absolutely necessary to reconstruct Dean’s event o f pauperism and investigate the 
administrative discourses and practices that sought to make the self-regulating market a 
utopian reality.
But where Dean eventalises pauperism to increase the intelligibility of welfare 
rationalities up to the early 1990’s, the argument I develop in part one of the thesis 
diagnoses more recent examples o f welfare reform. Each chapter begins with an event 
and a question formed in the present, and pertains to different policy aspects o f welfare 
reform in Australia. For example, chapters 2-6 explore the ‘governing statements' o f 
policy development since the mid 80’s, and focuses more closely on the arguments o f the 
‘McClure Report' which was recently commissioned by the present Howard government 
to explore future directions o f welfare reform. The strategic purpose o f each chapter is to 
identify and isolate key technologies, political rationalities and technical practices that 
form the present ensemble o f power relations as they pertain to current problematisations 
of Australian welfare reform. Contemporary welfare policy are used as points of 
departure with which to revisit Dean’s event of pauperism to illustrate the historical 
conditions by which these arguments are structured in the present.
Genealogy, however, must proceed with caution. Some policy experts and economic 
historians are keen to observe the strong parallels between the political arguments 
surrounding the establishment o f  social welfare in the early nineteenth century, and the 
current push by neo-liberal and neo-conservative politicians who now campaign for the 
de-regulation o f welfare and the privatization o f employment services by way o f moral 
and market-based arguments. Indeed, there would seem to be a strong case for stating that 
current welfare policies produce the same kind o f moral statements about the poor and 
unemployed as were made by poor law reformers in the first half o f the nineteenth 
century. This analogy is so compelling that some are tempted to view present welfare 
politics as a return to the principles o f 1834 (Block & Somers. 2003; Quigley. 1998; 
Kern, 1998). The present historical analysis eschews making the same kind of statements. 
Rather than resemblance, genealogy attends to a meticulous analysis o f the irreducible 
singularity and particularity o f  statements, discourses and practices relating to poverty. 
The argument made here is that what seems like a startling resemblance, or a return to 
nineteenth century politics, is in fact the reactivation o f arguments that were first 
established by utilitarian and laissez faire interventionism. We are not doomed to repeat 
the past, but rather forced to put into circulation the frames o f reference that were first 
established by classical liberal thought.
But in making the argument that present welfare rationalities are a reactivation of the 
past, there is a risk o f fabricating a continuity that is at odds with genealogy. Genealogy, 
after all. is concerned with dispelling the chimera of the origin and dislodging events 
from where there is a ‘temptation to invoke a historical constant, an immediate 
anthropological trait, or an obviousness that imposes itself uniformly on all' (Foucault. 
2000b. p.226). The problem is how does one think in terms o f discontinuities w hile at the 
same time analyse the present in terms of its conditions o f possibility. Again, genealogy 
must proceed with caution. In stipulating a reactivation -  a term that Foucault (1978) 
himself uses to conceptualise the limits and forms o f a discursive formation -  is not the 
same as stipulating an unalterable resemblance of statements from one historical event to 
another. It is not the same discourse o f the pauper, for instance, that reappears some one 
hundred and fifty years later in the form of the welfare dependent. So without invoking a
continuity, then, there must be a case for arguing that current strategies of power draw on 
an array o f discursive resources -  morality, economics, statistics, psychology -  to 
mobilise a politics o f conduct which draw from distant memories o f what is both 
loathsome and familiar. Reactivation is not a resemblance, a recurrence or a 'primitive 
foundation" but the recapitulation o f arguments which find their conditions o f emergence 
among nineteenth century debates on pauperism.
As it stands, the thesis is both a continuation of, and a departure from, Mitchell 
Dean's work in the sense that what I hope to achieve is the decomposition of a different 
problematic regarding the politics o f the present. The politics o f medicalisation. 
community, risk and dependency are expected to establish the conditions o f existence of 
those strategies which seek to de-emphasise poverty and assemble in its place 
programmes for the remoralisation o f conduct. The present investigation shows that the 
historical constitution o f poverty can be alternatively read in terms o f 'government', in 
which case the complex linkages between discourse, policies and practices o f poor 
administration are utilised to increase the intelligibility and contestability o f welfare 
reform in our own period. The work o f genealogy highlights the punitive, illiberal and 
unsavoury origins o f social policy in such ways that reject the putative assumption that 
rational mastery o f the human world was an inevitable and benevolent project. The case 
is made that the possibility o f  welfare resides among all those legislative and intellectual 
attempts to create a national labour market, and transform human labour into a 
commodity.
Reforming subjectivity’
In the first part o f the thesis, the aim is to investigate the conditions of existence by 
which the present politics o f welfare is transformed by medicalising technologies of 
administration. What I refer to as the ‘medicalisation of welfare’ is more or less a 
diagnosis o f a configuration o f power relations which take subjectivity as the basis of 
remoralisation and ethical reconstruction. In the second part, an analytics of 
subjectification examines the effects o f a new kind of conditionality that highlights the 
ethical formations and self-technologies found among narratives o f welfare recipients.
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It is important to stipulate that while an analytics of subjectification reveals certain 
ethical formations and self-technologies that are indeed manifestations o f contemporary 
political power, we cannot simply read off these narratives as general features of 
advanced liberal democracies. Rather we should understand these narratives as symptoms 
of a particular sector in which ethical forms o f self-governance and self-management are 
posed as solutions to problems o f security, well-being, autonomy and responsibility. In 
the Australian case o f reform, welfare recipients reveal a range o f techniques and 
procedures that mix coercion, exhortation and constant surveillance to produce active 
forms o f citizenship. But income support presupposes a position where ethical activity is 
already precarious or impossible to achieve, in which case narratives confirm an 
intensification o f moral management, self-blame, ambivalence, and psychological 
reconstruction. We should therefore understand these ethical practices of self-formation 
as a sector in which subjects are governed through their freedom.
The group o f welfare recipients comprised those who. from the point o f welfare 
authorities, are. or have been, at risk o f welfare dependency. The group falls into three 
governmental categories o f assistance: those receiving unemployment benefits in the 
form o f Newstart Allowance, women in receipt o f Parenting Payment, and those whose 
incapacity qualifies them for Disability Pension. The ages o f the sample range from 19 
years to 50 years, and cover a range o f practices in which the nature of work and welfare 
has undergone considerable change. Six female and six male participants were recruited 
for the study, reflecting a range o f differences in educational attainment, demography (ie. 
whether they lived in the country or the city), ethnicity and duration of welfare receipt. 
With the exception o f ‘M ike’, a 50 year old male whose educational trajectory marked a 
professional career as a successful and celebrated journalist, the sample conformed, in a 
quite striking way. to personal histories o f low-skilled, casual employment2.
: I am mindful that w e might think o f  the commonality o f  recipient experiences in terms o f  social class. 
And while such a classification would enable us to theorise historical, cultural and structural differences in 
the way that subjectivity is experienced and managed, the present work does not draw on class analysis. 
But this is not to ignore a growing body o f  post-foundational, feminist scholarship which investigates the 
discursive production o f  experience precisely in terms o f  class (Blackman, 1996; Skeggs, 1997; Lawler. 
1999; Walkerdine, Lucey & M elody, 2001). The genealogical dimension o f  the present work, however, 
attempts to show how the historical category o f  ‘the poor’ is just as effective in making sense o f  the 
experiences o f  w elfare recipients.
So. what kind o f effects would medicalisation have on the production o f subjectivity? 
We know, for instance, the radical overhaul o f the Australian welfare system since 1993 
has meant that welfare recipients have to perform certain kinds o f activity in order to 
remain eligible for income support. The writing o f job diaries, regular interviews with 
case managers, and the development o f ‘soft skills’ that encourage recipients to improve 
relationships skills, to engage in career counselling and manage self-presentation, are 
consistent with new preventive strategies for accessing the self-regulating capacities of 
individuals. Again, this is expected to elicit forms of responsibility, moral and 
psychological adjustment, to cultivate forms o f motivation and self-esteem, and develop 
an ethic o f work to increase one’s employability. Arguably, the present conditions of 
assistance are designed to elicit the self-managing capacities for whom psychological 
training ensures the moral reformation o f self, the ethical reconstruction of will, so that 
recipients might be reinserted into relations o f family, work and community.
In another sense, the medicalisation o f welfare is expected to produce its own highly 
medicalised forms o f resistance, in which case welfare recipients are left no other option 
but to identify themselves as sick and in need o f medicalised treatment so as to meet the 
eligibility requirements o f income support. Welfare recipients are therefore encouraged to 
assemble themselves in such ways that are intelligible to medical and psychological 
inquiry . In terms o f subjectification, these effects may either be repressive or constitutive. 
meaning that medicalising discourses are either met by forms o f resistance that imitate 
and exploit medical discourses, or recipients literally reconfigure themselves as medical 
and psy chological subjects. Whatever the reason for reproducing medicalising discourses, 
the medicalisation o f welfare becomes a self-legitimating phenomenon: the
medicalisation o f eligibility reproduces the very object it claims to resolve.
There are three themes that are explored in terms of the production and regulation of 
welfare subjects. The first relates to ‘activity’, in which case analysis seeks to answer the 
following question: ‘How are neo-liberal subjects transformed into welfare dependents?' 
Analysis o f subjectification draws from different familial, demographic, educational and
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labour-market statements that are expected make up the experience o f active citizenship. 
Rather than taking the theme o f activity as a taken-for-granted category of socially 
responsible participation, the strategy is to show how activity is at times rendered 
contradictory, problematic, or even fails to conform with the life-conduct of rational, 
enterprising subjects. The strategy is to re-politicise the domain o f labour-market activity 
to show how subjectivity is capable o f being read in ways that refuse the kind of 
autonomous and rational decision-making implied by welfare policy.
The second theme addressed in this section examines the forms of 'regulation' 
employed by welfare programmes to elicit ethical conduct as well as the kinds of 
technologies individuals utilise to manage their experiences. The questions addressed 
here are: ‘How are subjects regulated as welfare dependents?' and 'How do welfare 
recipients manage their subjectivity?’ The point is to show that transformation is effected 
by various practices which solicit and compel individuals to realise their obligations to 
community and restore the kind o f self-regarding behaviour synonymous with economic 
participation. The domain o f welfare regulation employs a range o f preventive techniques 
that embody the deterrent functions o f nineteenth century poor-relief. But beyond the old 
enclosures o f ‘disciplinary7 society’, we find modern welfare programmes also operate 
through techniques o f 'm odulation’, where control is designed into new circuits of 
obligation and activity. The recent turn towards more Deleuzian inspired conceptions of 
modulation are perhaps better suited to explaining contemporary forms o f power which 
increasingly function via information technology and electronic network surveillance 
(Hardt. 1998: Massumi. 1998; Rose. 1999a). We are no longer simply 'disciplined' 
according to the fixed confines o f institutional spaces, but controlled among open 
networks o f information and through continuous practices o f transformation. In the case 
of welfare, new networks o f  electronic surveillance, lifelong learning and continuous 
obligation are designed to make the conditions of welfare less tolerable than that of 
independent conduct. In the words o f one participant commenting on their welfare 
experiences: 'They  [the government] are trying to intimidate people to get them off 
unemployment benefits'.
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The third, and final, theme in this section investigates subjectivity from the point of 
‘freedom’. If neo-liberalism takes the liberty o f individuals as central to the project o f 
governance, then notions o f freedom are expected to operate as potent fantasies of self­
formation. Notions o f ‘autonomy’, ‘independence’, ‘self-determination’ and ‘self- 
realisation' exemplify aspirational fantasises o f a self projected into the future, the kinds 
of persons we are expected to become or in a state o f becoming. This notion of fantasy3 is 
central to understanding how ‘government o f the se lf  -  whether by external authorities, 
via cultural norms, or through forms o f  governance exercised by the self over the s e l f -  
operates through certain fictions, expectations and demands to be free subjects. Welfare 
is almost certainly the domain where subjects are thought to lack the capacity to be free. 
The thesis raises a number questions that address the tension between fantasies and 
counter-narratives o f freedom. For instance, ‘what is the price paid by those who, for one 
reason or another, are incapable o f autonomous activity? ‘How do fantasises of welfare 
subjects demonstrate the impossibility o f freedom in a context where freedom, through 
secure and reliable work, is no longer guaranteed?' These questions approach the new 
conditionality o f citizenship: that one must be free in order to gain full citizenship rights, 
and for those who are disadvantaged, who bear the signs o f personal failure and 
pathology, are subject to continuous monitoring and obligation. In this sense, participant 
statements are expected to reveal some o f the value judgements implicit within welfare 
regulation, and demonstrate the structural difficulties in which labour-markets, 
communities and mentors o f participation fail to deliver the promise o f freedom.
As subjects are increasingly caught up in the machinery o f the new welfare 
administration, medical discourses are expected to have a constitutive effect on 
subjectivity; that is to say. medical discourses may well succeed in reinscribing the 
invidious distinctions o f  medical and psychological pathologies. In this case, 
medicalisation will reinscribe the marginal status of low-income persons and
3 The term fantasy is used here within very particular conceptual limits. Rather than the expression o f  
unconscious material via a psychodynamic conception o f  the subject, 1 take fantasy to mean the discursive 
production o f  an imagined and temporally projected self. In other words, what imagined relation to the self  
are we capable o f  maintaining and through which technologies do we imagine ourselves as possible selves? 
This, to me, does not require a psychoanalytic account o f  hidden motivations or latent desires, but a 
discursive account o f  how different relations to se lf  emerge as practical possibilities for subjectification.
communities as incapable o f providing for themselves. While these discourses are 
expected to integrate subjects in post-industrial society, they are also expected to mark 
the points o f exclusion and endless regulation. Among the accounts o f the excluded, 
marginal and abject, we find that pathology is the departure from freedom par excellence. 
becoming the fate o f those who lack the resources to practice freedom. The following 
analysis o f interview data is expected to provide a range o f events, practices, and 
experiences that refuse to be fully reconciled by governmental discourses o f participation.
Contents
The remainder o f the thesis will set out to decompose the problem presented in the 
Introduction. Chapter 1 assembles the methodological tools o f historico-critical 
reflection. The task is to elaborate the principles o f genealogy, to examine its theoretical 
and philosophical underpinnings as a mode o f interrogating the present. “Producing the 
present' refers to the productive and positive characterisation of critique as a way of not 
only re-writing the history o f social policy, but generating new ways o f rethinking the 
relation between political power and being. The task, then, is to establish links between 
genealogy, governmentality and a coherent analysis o f subjectification. The argument 
made here is that an historical ontology o f the present is rendered effective insofar as left 
critique is capable o f diagnosing the modes o f regulation through which subjectivity is 
produced. In terms o f the given problem, this involves understanding a two-way process: 
the transformation o f neo-liberal subjects into welfare dependents, and the subsequent 
transformation o f welfare dependents into active citizens.
Chapter 2 examines the invention o f “society' as a domain o f institutions, practices 
and political processes that sought to act upon individual and collective conduct in the 
name of the social (Rose, 1999a; 1996c). By tracing the art o f government from 
sovereignty up until the end o f the eighteenth century, society emerges as the invention of 
liberal political thought. The formation o f the welfare state in Britain is linked to the birth 
of biopolitics -  the emergence o f a political rationality that attended to the problems that 
were characteristic o f a population , its birthrate, health, mortality, sanitation, economy, 
public safety, poverty, etc. The problem that confronted liberalism was one of
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establishing the limits o f government, and rationalising the practice o f political rule in 
such ways that were ‘anxious to have the respect of legal subjects and to ensure the free 
enterprise o f individuals’ (Foucault, 1997c, p.73). This rationalisation marked a departure 
from the totalising forms o f administration characterised by a ‘reason o f state'. What is 
unique to liberal thought is not the government o f a state, but that o f a society existing as 
an independent realm o f semi-auto no mo us processes. State intervention no longer 
conformed to a universal logic, but a series o f haphazard interventions deployed locally 
around issues o f poverty, disease, economy, criminality, etc. which increasingly assume a 
‘social’ character. Under this new schema o f governing in terms o f the social, poverty is 
associated with epidemics, idleness, hygiene and sanitation, all o f which emerged as a 
potent form o f ‘social danger’.
There are two sets o f arguments that are developed here. First, the invention of 
poverty is understood as a solution to the legislative paralysis o f poor-relief between 1795 
and 1834 in that moral technologies o f discipline sought to transform pauperism and 
indigence into the ethical conduct o f the independent labourer. That is to say, the virtues 
of civil society were now embodied in the logic o f economic liberalism (Dean. 1992). 
Under the new administration o f the Poor Law o f 1834. pauperism and indigence would 
symbolise everything that was anti-social, a transgression of the natural laws of 
subsistence and civility, and subject to a new regime o f control and assistance. 
Everything that resembled dependency, contingency, pauperism, idleness and 
transgression would be consigned to the domain of pauper administration. The second 
argument attends to transformation o f the social in the present. Here, a new space of 
governance is said to have emerged as a solution to the recent ‘crisis o f the welfare state'. 
The appearance o f ‘community’ among contemporary policy constitutes a reshaping of 
the very territory o f government, delineating a moral domain of family, work, and 
responsibility. It is argued that the social has neither diminished nor disappeared -  
whether from globalisation, post-industrialisation or moral decline -  but is currently 
undergoing a process o f mutation and reinvention.
2 0
Chapter 3 deals with the part that medical knowledge has played in making up the 
social, examining in particular the medicalisation of the poor in early nineteenth century 
Britain. The ‘birth o f social medicine' traces the development o f medicalisation and its 
relation to the administration o f life. There are three stages in the formation o f social 
medicine: first, state medicine, then urban medicine, and finally, labour force medicine. 
As this trajectory o f medicalisation implies, the body was not the first object to be 
subjected to medical power, rather it was the administration o f the state, and the health of 
populations under which this administration applied. Under state medicine that developed 
primarily in Germany in the beginning o f the eighteenth century, we find the conditions 
under which the doctor assumes the power o f an administrator of the state. The 
appearance o f the ‘medical police', for instance, illustrates the close links between 
medical and political knowledge. The poor, which had long been an object of the police, 
become subject to medical observation insofar as it was an object o f the state. It was not 
until the development o f the city and the expansion o f urban structures, however, that the 
problem o f poverty was associated with overcrowding, epidemic phenomena, and sources 
of urban disturbances.
The transformation o f  ‘the poor’ into objects o f poverty is made complete with the 
final development o f social medicine: Tabour force medicine’. Under labour force 
medicine ‘the problem o f  the sickness o f the poor’ emerges from the relationship of 
labour supply to the demands o f production. The argument is made that the 
medicalisation o f the poor served two purposes: it guaranteed the health and wealth of the 
nation by optimising the health o f  the labour force, but in another sense it ensured that the 
poor would no longer constitute a medical danger to the rest o f the population. This was 
the objective o f the Poor Law o f 1834: the medicalisation of the poor would enforce a 
system o f obligatory medical controls. The Poor law o f 1834 essentially converted 
English medicine into a social medicine insofar as this law implied a medical control of 
the destitute (Foucault. 2000d, pp. 151 -4). The direction taken here is to show how the 
event of pauperism is linked to the medicalisation of the poor, whereby medical 
knowledge specifies the sickness o f the poor as a legitimate condition o f poverty. The 
purpose o f this argument is to illustrate the historical conditions out o f which it is now
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possible to install around the poor a preventive regime for the medicalisation of conduct. 
Medical knowledge is therefore an ideal technology for problematising subjectivity in 
terms o f pathologies o f will, and thereby monitoring and reshaping the ethical capacities 
of citizens.
Chapters 4 and 5 attend to the historical constitution o f ‘poverty’ as a discursive 
category' that paves the way for the establishment o f a system of social welfare. First, the 
architecture o f a ‘discourse o f the Poor’ is traced in terms of how an object of ‘the poor' 
featured among debates over the increasing numbers o f the poor, and in relation to 
practical matters o f transforming idleness into forms of industry and employment. The 
problem o f the poor remained a stubborn paradox for the discourse of political 
oeconomy4 which operated under the assumption that increasing the numbers o f the 
population would increase the ‘wealth, strength and greatness o f the nation'. ‘Setting the 
poor to work* formed a practical solution for preventing idleness, and disciplining the 
habits o f the poor, but the mechanism of the workhouse remained a continued source of 
criticism and failure. This was incisively illustrated by Daniel Defoe who saw in the 
workhouse not a solution to poverty, but a displacement o f the existing system of 
manufacturers. For Defoe, it was not the transformation o f idleness into industry, but of 
industry into idleness that had become ingrained in the customs and habits of the 
labouring poor. Various attempts were made to regulate the idleness o f the poor -  the 
doctrine o f low wages, the campaigns against recreation, the proletarianisation o f the 
labouring classes -  all o f which attempted to fix the poor to the apparatus o f production.
In chapter 5. I discuss the emergence o f a concept o f poverty which marks a break 
with patriarchal relations o f political governance, with a mercantilist tradition o f political 
oeconomy and. more importantly, with a discourse of the poor. Poverty would emerge 
from the conceptual elaboration o f ‘population’, ‘economy’, ‘pauperism’, and ‘police' to 
define ‘a particular condition o f individuals and groups' resulting from the ‘general
4 Political ‘oeconom y' applied to a patriarchal form o f  household government (derived from Aristotelian 
accounts o f ‘good’ management) (Tribe, 1978; Dean, 1991). For Foucault, this concern, which develops 
more fully in the late eighteenth century, marks the beginning o f  the conceptual shift towards our 
contemporary use o f  the word ‘econom y’ to designate an autonomous region o f  social relations (Curtis, 
2002).
condition o f humankind’ (Dean, 1992). Here, I argue the constitution o f poverty 
supported the new economic discourse, ‘political economy’, in creating a national labour 
market which sealed o ff poverty from pauperism, and promoted the ethical ideals o f the 
independent labourer as the exemplar o f rational, moral conduct. These objectives were 
framed by the Poor Law o f 1834, which abolished out-door relief for able-bodied men. 
and signalled the State’s responsibility for assisting those legitimately excluded from 
wage-labour (eg. women and children). The new Poor Law would incorporate principles 
of Malthusianism — poverty was a natural and inevitable consequence o f population and 
subsistence -  and principles o f Benthamism -  pauperism was an aberration o f the self­
provision o f subsistence afforded by labour. Together, Bentham’s hyper-administration 
and Malthus' anti-administration become composite principles in the new liberal mode of 
government. In the current climate o f welfare administration, it is argued that 
technologies o f ‘advanced’ liberal government reactivate arguments about pauperism and 
indigence to constitute dependency as a form of ‘post-industrial idleness', and thereby 
transform the life-conduct o f the poor into active citizenship.
Chapter 6 continues the work o f diagnosis by investigating key legislative events that 
trace recent transformations o f Australian welfare policy. The argument made here is that 
the production o f an ethical space and o f technologies for accessing the relations by 
which the ‘self maintains a relation to the se lf  is crucial to grasping key shifts in 
Australian policy. The aim is to identify the emergence of control strategies whereby 
reform assumed a new direction in mid-80’s. Social welfare would adopt the ethos of an 
‘active society' in order to encourage active participation rather than passive income 
support. This strategic direction was extended when the Coalition Government 
commissioned a Reference Group to outline a framework for the reorientation of 
Australia's social support system in 2000. The new blueprint for reform, the McClure 
Report, is subject to a detailed examination of the discourses and control strategies that 
frame ‘mutual obligation' as the centrepiece for driving the new conditionality of welfare 
support. The claim is made that mutual obligation principles aim to produce a sector of 
the labouring population that is casualised, under protected against risk, insecure and 
desocialised. Arguably, the contemporary politics of welfare reform is conceived as a
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new organisation o f power operating in the field o f ‘life-politics’. Contemporary politics 
of welfare is not to be understood as a return to these principles, but more a reactivation 
of arguments that were first established within a liberal framework of political 
governance. Part one o f the thesis aims to show how nineteenth century debates about 
pauperism established the conditions o f a liberal framework o f social welfare through 
which it became possible to pathologise the conduct of the poor, and activate moral 
distinctions between the deserving and undeserving.
Chapter 7 discusses the various forms o f labour-market participation among the 
sample o f interview participants. The theme o f activity seeks to understand how neo­
liberal subjects are transformed into ‘welfare dependents', in which case an analysis of 
discourse and subjectification problematises the kind o f rational, autonomous conduct 
that underpins much o f contemporary welfare policy. Chapter 9 discusses the theme of 
'regulation' from the point o f view o f control technologies that seek to integrate, monitor 
and adjust the conduct o f welfare recipients. The regulation o f subjectivity is also 
examined in terms o f various hybrid technologies o f the self, in which case an analysis of 
subjectification seeks to understand how interview participants manage their subjectivity, 
and act on the self in the name o f certain ideals, aspirations and objectives. Chapter 10 
examines practices o f subjectification from the point o f 'freedom’. Analysis o f ethical 
practices o f self-formation serve as the basis for assessing the kinds o f difficulties and 
contradictions subjects face in transforming themselves as free subjects. In this case, the 
possibility o f social and economic participation, o f secure, reliable and interesting work, 
is measured against those experiences in which subjects either exceed or fall-short of 
their own expectations o f freedom.
The thesis embarks on unravelling the present condition o f neo-liberal governance to 
show that the precepts upon which welfare reform are founded are neither natural nor 
self-evident. I am unconvinced that the active promotion o f free market economy at the 
expense o f social welfare is the only solution to the problem of wealth and freedom. From 
the point o f view o f history and subjectivity, I think it is entirely possible to mount a 
critique that questions the founding assumptions by which we are enjoined to manage
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ourselves as responsible and free. The following is a work o f thought that challenges the 
kind of political rationalities that constitute an ethical subject in the face of those 
uncertainties and contradictions that now characterise the competitive game o f freedom. 
In the next section, I assemble and discuss the theoretical tools by which this challenge is 
undertaken.
1 Producing the present
...criticism  is no longer going to be practiced in the search for formal structures with 
universal value but, rather, as a historical investigation into the events that have led us to 
constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects o f  what we are doing, 
thinking, saying. In that sense, this criticism is not transcendental, and its goal is not that 
o f  making a metaphysics possible: it is genealogical in its design and archaeological in its 
method. Archaeological-and not transcendental-in the sense that it will not seek to 
identify the universal structures o f  all knowledge or o f  all possible moral action, but will 
seek to treat the instances o f  discourse that articulate what we think, say, and do as so 
many historical events. And this critique will be genealogical in the sense that it will not 
deduce from the form o f  what we are w hat it is impossible for us to do and to know: but it 
will separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility o f  
no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think. It is not seeking to make 
possible a metaphysics that has becom e a science; it is seeking to give new impetus, as 
far and wide as possible, to the undefined work o f  freedom (Foucault, 1997b, pp.315-6).
In What is enlightenment? Foucault presents what I think is an exemplary statement on 
the direction and purpose o f critique. He develops this position by citing an event in 
eighteenth century Germany where Kant offers an original way o f engaging philosophical 
problems. In posing the question Was ist Aufklarung? Kant presents a reflection on the 
present that neither refers to an epoch nor an omen of the future, but establishes an 
entirely new relationship between thought and the present. He poses the question of 
Aufklarung in a rather negative way, as a ‘way out’, an ‘exit’, from the present, to 
establish a relation o f difference: How can we escape the present and by doing so change 
our very relation to it? For Foucault this event marks an important direction for the 
possibility o f thought; he transforms Kant’s question thus: ‘What difference does today 
introduce with respect to yesterday?’ (1997b, p.305). Where Kant establishes the problem 
in terms o f the immaturity o f  thought and its dependency on authority, for Foucault, it is a 
matter o f working at the limits o f ourselves, of establishing an ‘attitude' rather than an 
epoch, that opens up historical inquiry to reflect upon the limits of contemporary 
existence. This is a practical critique insofar as it eschews the problem of transcendental 
values, and a positive ethos insofar as the relationship between thought and the present is 
transformed. Foucault summarises this project as follows: T shall thus characterize the 
philosophical ethos appropriate to the critical ontology o f ourselves as a historico- 
practical test o f the limits we may go beyond, and thus as work carried out by ourselves
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upon ourselves as free beings’ (p.316). A ‘critical ontology o f ourselves’ provides an 
important basis for mounting a critique o f political power. Historical investigation not 
only engages in the forms o f authority that make up our present, but also the myriad 
events o f which we come to recognise ourselves as particular kinds o f subjects. If the role 
of critique takes the present as the basis o f historical problems it does so by linking 
complex relations o f authority to problems o f experience. What is at stake here is the kind 
of analysis that might otherwise intervene, transform or modify these relations of 
authority through which we become ethical subjects. Ethics is therefore central to my 
present inquiry.
Before launching into the theoretical framework, I want to briefly elaborate why I am 
using genealogy. I think there are aspects about the rationalities o f contemporary welfare 
reform which work to remind us o f what we should think, say or do about poverty and 
unemployability, as well as exclude and forget other explanations or solutions. If ‘welfare 
dependency' has emerged as a recent crisis o f the welfare state it is because certain 
authorities draw upon historical discourses and arguments that render these problems 
familiar -  dependency, like nineteenth century arguments about pauperism, remind us 
that ‘the problem o f the poor’ stems from an individual failure, an immorality or idleness 
that warrants popular solutions o f remoralising the conduct of the poor. The prominence 
and familiarity with which these problems are raised and their solutions proposed are like 
so many tactics that persuade us to think only o f the moral history o f poverty. Genealogy 
is therefore a ‘counter-memory’ (Colwell, 1997), a technique that helps us recover all 
those minor arguments and statements o f which, in our contemporary moment of 
government, we are at risk o f forgetting. In calling this chapter ‘Producing the Present'. I 
want to demonstrate the possibility o f assembling the present differently, along 
intelligible and entirely plausible trajectories that might show a ‘way out’ from our 
contemporary regimes o f truth.
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Genealogy
What is genealogy? And what is genealogy against? Before proceeding to elaborate 
its technical and stylistic principles, I want to first establish some distance from the 
conventional mode o f historiography that genealogy displaces.
It is well known that Foucault’s shift to genealogy is an appropriation o f Nietzsche's 
‘campaign against morality’ through a revaluation o f all values. This was the direction 
that Nietzsche sought in Daybreak, that is, to undertake an evaluation of the existence of 
moral motivations (Owen, 2003). The most commonly recognised use o f the genealogical 
method is found in On the Genealogy o f  Morals, where history is put to work as a 
revolutionary critique, an examination o f the origin o f moral preconceptions, a mode of 
questioning values in terms o f whether ‘values have been progressive or regressive, 
whether values have contributed to our advancement and prosperity’ (Mahon, 1992, 
p.95). Apart from problematising the conditions o f existence o f morality, Nietzsche's 
genealogical legacy can also be seen as problematising the place o f language alongside 
the ‘problem o f man’: ‘By throwing into question the subject-object grammatical 
structure o f our language, he removed human consciousness from its exalted place at the 
source o f activity and dismantled the doer-deed model for understanding any event' 
(Mahon, p. 100). Morality, language, power, and the subject are crucial targets of 
Nietzschean genealogy. Genealogy overcomes the obstacles presented by metaphysical 
thought and establishes the minor, relational, and concrete conditions o f existence for any 
object or thing.
These themes are picked up and developed in Foucault’s essay Nietzsche, Genealogy', 
History' where he signals his explicit adoption o f Nietzschean critique. For Foucault, 
genealogy principally rejects the pursuit o f the origin (Ursprung): ‘the meta-historical 
deployment o f ideal significations and indefinite teleologies. It opposes itself to the 
search for ‘orig ins'’ (1977a, p. 140). This is an important departure from the kind of 
essentialism that metaphysical philosophies o f history presuppose; the search for origins 
is ‘an attempt to capture the exact essence o f things, their purest possibilities, and their 
carefully protected identities, because this search assumes the existence of immobile
forms that precede the external world o f accident and succession’ (p. 142). The 
genealogist turns away from metaphysics and ‘listens to history’; there is an altogether 
different movement animating historical processes: ‘not a timeless and essential secret, 
but the secret that they have no essence or their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal 
fashion from alien forms’ (p. 142). The history o f reason is neither an original identity nor 
an essential logic structuring the instantiation o f events, it is fashioned by chance, 
devotion to truth, from the passion o f scholars, their unending conflicts, discussions and 
spirit o f competition. Having turned to the history o f things, the genealogist finds ‘not the 
inviolable identity o f  their origin’, but rather ‘the dissension o f other things' (p. 142).
There are two remaining postulates o f the origin that genealogy seeks to disrupt. 
Firstly, history would have us think that the origin refers to a lofty beginning, a moment 
of perfection and dazzling creation. Rather than a metaphysical beginning of divine 
creation, origins are lowly, even derisive events. Secondly, the origin assumes an 
absolute, transcendental vantage point, untouched by positive knowledge; it marks a field 
o f knowledge whose end is to recover the origin. Foucault argues for a ‘new cruelty of 
history' that effects an overturning o f the origin to show not the repetition o f its recovery 
but ‘the ancient proliferation o f errors’. Genealogy dispels the chimera of the origin to 
reveal not the identity, essence and continuity o f history, but its vicissitudes and 
heterogeneity, its irreducible difference and particularity -  ‘its jolts, its surprises, its 
unsteady victories and unpalatable defeats’ (1977a, p. 143-4).
While genealogy distances itself from metaphysics and turns to history, it likewise 
rejects history in its traditional form. Traditional history assumes a suprahistorical 
perspective; its point o f view is eternal, outside of time. The traditional historian's 
suprahistorical perspective, desires total knowledge; he avoids the exceptional and 
reduces it to the lowest common denominator, and dominates those of the present with 
his pretensions o f knowledge; he is a demagogue masked under the cloak of universals. 
Divided against himself, he discloses an eternal will in his object o f study, rejecting his 
subjectivity for a higher objectivity: ‘As the demagogue is obliged to invoke truth, laws 
of essences, and eternal necessity, the historian must invoke objectivity, the accuracy of
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facts, and the permanence o f the past’. To turn history to it genealogical uses, Foucault 
argues we must first return to the conditions o f its birth, and release it from a 
suprahistorical perspective (Foucault, 1977a, pp. 152-8).
Genealogy maintains its anti-foundational stance by dispensing with metaphysical 
assumptions that maintain the idea o f the transcendental subject and the correspondence 
theory o f truth (Owen, 1994); this move requires "perverting Platonism' and therefore 
opposing three Platonic modalities o f history:
The first is parodic, directed against reality, and opposes the theme o f  history as 
reminiscence or recognition; the second is dissociative, directed against identity, and 
opposes history given as continuity or representative o f  a tradition; the third is sacrificial, 
directed against truth, and opposes history as knowledge. They imply a use o f  history that 
severs its connection to memory, its metaphysical and anthropological model, and 
constructs a counter-memory-a transformation o f  history into a totally different form o f  
time (Foucault, 1977a, p. 160).
Foucault's attack on Platonism systematically dislodges genealogy from the primacy of 
origins, the doctrine o f progress and development, and the discovery o f ideal 
significations and original truths. The genealogist is opposed to a perspective that seeks 
to totalise history , to trace its internal logic o f development, to recognise ourselves in a 
comfortable relation to the past, to offer the reassurance of an end towards which history 
moves (Dreyfus & Rabinow. 1983). In short, there are no constants, no illusions of 
identity, no absolute certainties: ‘Nothing in man -  not even his body -  is sufficiently 
stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition or for understanding other men' (Foucault. 
1977a. p. 153).
Once released from traditional history, what is left for history to do? In other words, 
what is genealogy? Genealogy, in contrast, is ‘effective history? Foucault invokes a 
different sense o f ‘origin’ (Herkunft) as ‘stock’ or ‘descent’. Genealogy as the analysis of 
descent identifies a trait3, ‘the subtle, singular and subindividual marks’ that form "a 
network that is difficult to unravel’ (Foucault, 1977a. p. 145). Through the analysis of 
descent, genealogy reveals the miscellaneous and discontinuous nature of beginning
5 A ‘trait’ is not a category o f  resemblance, species, or family that might otherwise fabricate a coherent 
identity; rather the genealogist’s analysis o f  descent effects the dissociation o f  the self, ‘its recognition and 
displacement as an empty synthesis, in liberating a profusion o f  lost events’ (Foucault, 1977a, pp. 145-6).
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(Prado, 1994). Instead o f unifying in terms o f continuity or evolution, genealogy 
maintains events in their dispersion. Its task is ‘to identify the accidents, the minute 
deviations -  or conversely, the complete reversals -  the errors, the false appraisals, and 
the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value 
for us; it is to discover that truth or being did not lie at the root o f what we know and 
what we are, but the exteriority o f accidents’. In the Nietzschean sense, exteriority allows 
the object o f analysis to be composed in terms o f its relations, as opposed to some hidden 
principle o f unity. Where Herkunft describes the birth o f things in terms of a "heritage', 
we are not to think o f a unity that grows, progresses and solidifies, but rather "an unstable 
assemblage o f faults, fissures and heterogeneous layers’ which are as fragile as they are 
diffuse in composition (Foucault, 1977a, p. 146). An analysis o f descent therefore replaces 
foundation and determination with assemblage and chance.
For Nietzsche, “ Reason’ is the cause o f our falsification o f the evidence of the 
senses’, we are destined to persist in error to ‘the extent that our prejudice in favour of 
reason compels us to posit unity, identity, duration, substance, cause, materiality, being' 
(Nietzsche, cited in Mahon, 1992, p.l 11). Reason’s denial o f sensory evidence directs us 
to attach genealogy to the body. ‘Genealogy’, according to Foucault, ‘is thus situated 
within the articulation o f the body and history. Its task is to expose a body totally 
imprinted by history and the process o f history’s destruction o f the body’. Genealogy 
therefore attaches itself to the body since the body is ‘the inscribed surface of events 
(traced by language and dissolved by ideas), the locus of a dissociated Self (adopting the 
illusion o f a substantial unity), and a volume in perpetual disintegration’ (Foucault. 
1977a. p. 148). Genealogy, as the analysis o f descent, exposes all the "tiny influences' on 
a body that produce the illusion that a subject is a substantial, autonomous unity.
Foucault translates Entstehung as emergence, ‘the moment o f arising' (1977a. p. 148). 
When genealogy searches for emergence it must take care to avoid the metaphysician's 
temptation to impose present needs and the present state o f affairs at the point of arising, 
allowing one to point out the discovery of a continuous, teleological development 
culminating in the present. The genealogist, in contrast, ‘seeks to reestablish the various
systems o f subjection: not the anticipatory power o f meaning, but the hazardous play of 
domination’ (Foucault. 1977a, p. 148). The genealogist views the present not as the result 
of a meaningful development, but as the resultant formation o f struggle and relations of 
force and domination6. The analysis o f emergence denies historical progressive evolution 
by showing that what comes-to-be is not the result o f teleological processes but ‘is 
always produced through a particular stage o f forces’ (pp. 148-9). But because genealogy 
circumvents the tendency to impose meaningful intentions onto what are otherwise 
relations of force, means ‘no one is responsible for an emergence; no one can glory in it. 
since it always occurs in the interstice’ (p. 150). This is an important and rather unique 
point developed by Foucault: ‘The play o f  forces in any particular historical situation is 
made possible by the space which defines them. It is this field or clearing which is 
primary' (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. 109). In The Archaeology o f  Knowledge. we are 
told that such a space is governed by a system o f rules, a network of practices, meticulous 
rituals o f power, through which these rules are discontinuously applied. The elaboration 
of practices, the movements that take place on this field, is not decided by what is 
meaningful and intelligible, but rather by what is strategically and tactically possible7.
Effective history, wirkliche Historie, is therefore the recourse o f the genealogist who 
seeks to place everything in historical motion, and place it beyond the objectivity o f the 
historian. Effective history avoids metaphysics by refusing any absolutes that might 
pertain to a tradition that establishes immutable feelings, a constant instinctual being, and 
a body governed by the laws o f physiology; instead, it ‘distinguishes, separates and 
disperses'. Foucault characterises effective history as ‘the kind of dissociating view that 
is capable o f decomposing itself, capable o f shattering the unity o f man's being through 
which it was thought that he could extend his sovereignty to the events of the past' 
(1977a, p. 153). By eschewing the categories of continuity, teleology and destiny 'History
6 ‘The domination o f  certain men over others leads to the differentiation o f  values; class domination 
generates the idea o f  liberty; and the forceful appropriation o f  things necessary to survival and imposition 
o f  a duration not intrinsic to them for the origin o f  logic’ (Foucault, 1977a, p. 150).
7 ‘The genealogist does not seek to discover substantial entities (subjects, virtues, forces) or to reveal their 
relationships with other such entities. Rather, he or she studies the emergence o f  a battle which defines and 
clears a space. Subjects do not preexist and later enter into combat or harmony. In genealogy subjects 
emerge on a field o f  battle and play their roles, there and there alone. The world is not a play which simply 
masks a truer reality that exists behind the scenes. It is as it appears. This is the profundity o f  the 
genealogist’s insight’ (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. 109).
becomes ‘effective’ to the degree that it introduces discontinuity into our very being' 
(p. 154).
But there is one last trait that affirms the ethos o f genealogical inquiry: knowledge as 
perspective. Effective history is perspectival in that it eschews the kind o f grounding on 
which historians reveal ‘a particular time and place, their preferences in a controversy, 
the unavoidable obstacles o f their passion’ (Foucault, 1977a. p. 156). Genealogy avoids 
the search for depth, and by doing so, views things from a distance: ‘the moment of 
interpretation is like an overview, from higher and higher up, which allow the depths to 
be laid out in front o f him in a more and more profound visibility; depth is resituated as 
an absolutely superficial secret’ (Foucault, 1967, p. 187). From such a vantage point, the 
interpreter o f effective history seeks out the surfaces o f events, their meticulous 
arrangement, their shifts and subtle contours. In short, the perspectival gaze of the 
genealogist seeks out a vision o f particularity and complexity as opposed to the kind of 
objectivity that dissolves the “singular event" into a deep or hidden meaning.
The historical a priori
A discussion o f genealogy is, I think, somewhat incomplete without integrating some 
of the methodological principles o f Foucault’s earlier work. While some claim that 
genealogy and archaeology are completely different enterprises, I want to show that 
archaeology elaborates a methodological framework that is still retained within
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genealogy, and deserves consideration .
To understand more clearly the relation between genealogy and archaeology, I refer 
to an interview with the historian Martin Jay, where Foucault is asked about this shift in 
methodological focus: ‘Is this a significant and radical break in your work, or can we 
conceive o f genealogy as basically similar to archaeology...? How would you describe
8 Some critics claim archaeology was abandoned by Foucault in favour o f  the discovery o f  the role o f 
power played in discourse. The concepts and categories he carefully constructed in The Archaeology o f  
Knowledge were, according to Barry Smart, ‘almost totally subverted’ by Foucault’s shift to genealogy, 
leaving the reader the choice o f  ‘archaeologist o f  ideas or genealogist o f  power’ (1985, p.42). Jeffrey 
Minson, on the other hand, claim s that the reader o f  Foucault’s later genealogies must return to The 
Archaeology o f  Knowledge  to put genealogy back on course (1985, p .l 15). For Minson, genealogy would 
have been a blind endeavour had he not archaeology to help it find its way.
the difference between archaeology and genealogy as an historical method?' Foucault 
asserts that the difference between archaeology and genealogy is that between method 
and goal:
What I mean by archaeology is a methodological framework for my analysis. What 1 mean by 
genealogy is both the reason and the target o f  analyzing those discourses as events, and what I 
am trying to show is how those discursive events have determined in a certain way what 
constitutes our present and what constitutes ourselves-either our knowledge, our practices, 
our type o f  rationality, our relationship to ourselves or to others... the genealogy is the finality 
o f  the analysis, and the archaeology is the material and the methodological framework (cited 
in Mahon. 1992, p. 105).
For genealogy, the analysis o f ‘discursive events’ frees up a new field o f study: 'this field 
is made up o f the totality o f all effective statements (whether spoken or written), in their 
dispersion as events and in the occurrence that is proper to them ’. The task entails 'a pure 
description o f  discursive events as the horizon for the search for the unities that form 
within (Foucault, 1972, pp.26-7). This is precisely the project of ‘archaeology' -  a term 
Foucault borrows from Kant who used it ‘to designate the history o f that which renders 
necessary a certain form o f thought' (1971b, p.60). Archaeology, like genealogy, 
interrogates the conditions o f existence by which these events are composed. But to 
properly understand its potential, I want to examine more carefully archaeology's 
elementary unit o f analysis: the statements o f discourse. The purpose is to explain the 
positivity o f discourse in terms o f an historical a priori that serves as the condition of 
reality for statements.
A central theme developed in The Archaeology o f  Knowledge (1972) is the function 
of the statement (enonce). The statement is a unique formulation because it is not a 
sentence, a proposition nor a speech act -  the typical objects o f linguistic analysis. 
Rather, it pertains to the threshold o f an existential function o f signs: i t  is a function that 
cuts across a domain o f  structures and possible unities, and which reveals them, with 
concrete contents, in time and space’ (1972, p.87). The conditions o f the statement are 
found among its enunciative function  whereby signs group as statements which can be 
identified according to several criteria, each o f which emerges from Foucault's 
suspension o f the categories o f continuity, a consistent focus in his historical work.
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The relation between the statement and what it states, first, is a unique one, not to be 
confused with the relation between signifier and signified, between proposition and 
referent. Searle, for example, calls a ‘referring expression’ any utterance that ‘serves to 
pick out or identify one ‘object’ or ‘entity’ or ‘particular’ apart from other objects, about 
which the speaker then goes on to say something or ask some question, etc.’ (1969. p.26). 
But Foucault argues that a statement’s ‘referential’ is not a permanent object, thing or 
fact, but a set o f ‘laws o f possibility, rules of existence for the objects that are named, 
designated, or described within it, and for the relations that are affirmed or denied in it' 
(1972, p.91). Dreyfus and Rabinow observe this production o f statements in a manner 
that is similar to, yet distinguished from, the production of speech acts. The kinds of 
speech act that statements refer to are those that ‘gain their autonomy by passing some 
sort of institutional test, such as the rules of dialectical argument, inquisitional 
interrogation, or empirical confirmation’ (1983, p.48).
What we are to understand as the referential o f a statement is the set of historical, 
practical and institutional conditions that account for the existence o f the objects of 
discourse^. Foucault is not interested in the kind o f statements that specify the ‘internal' 
conditions governing commentary and exegesis, but what is actually said or written and 
how the regularities exhibited by their relations with other statements fit into a relatively 
autonomous system, that is to say, a distinguishable formation o f statements in which 
they are produced (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, pp.48-9). A methodological precaution of 
archaeology, then, is that statements are not interpretations of things as such; truth claims 
must be neutralised or ‘bracketed’ since statements are not intrinsically true or false -  
what is of greater concern is how they function as the effects o f truth.
A second methodological precaution refers to the relation between the statement and 
the subject. This relation is equally peculiar yet consistent with the decentring operation
Q For instance, in M adness an d  C ivilization  (1965), Foucault shows how a set o f  rules functioned whereby 
the objects o f  psychiatric discourse were constituted through an ensemble o f  factors -  economic, political, 
religious, medical, moral -  which brought about the formation o f  the object, madness. The analysis o f  its 
rules o f  formation entails mapping its surfaces o f  emergence -  the heterogeneous arrangement o f  elements, 
authorities, and practices -  that grant this object coherence, the truth o f  which brought about serious social 
consequences, confinement.
Foucault insists on effecting. Firstly, the subject o f a statement is not equivalent to the 
author o f its formulation; rather, the position o f the subject determines the relation 
between statement and subject; the changing position of the physician in the houses of 
confinement or the medical clinic exemplifies this: 'To describe a formulation qua 
statement does not consist in analysing the relations between the author and what he says 
(or wanted to say, or said without wanting to); but in determining what position can and 
must be occupied by any individual if  he is to be subject o f it’ (Foucault, 1972, pp.95-6). 
This suggests that the interpreter interprets neither the signifier nor the signified, but the 
one who imposes the interpretation. Interpretation is always ‘interpretation for the 
“w ho?"10 (Foucault, 1986b, p. 191).
Far from indicating the synthetic function of a unitary subject, Foucault's analysis 
reveals the speaker’s dispersion in status, the institutional sites they occupy, and their 
position within a network o f relational functions11. The practical, material, historical and 
discursive conditions constitutive o f madness, the domain of medical objects, life, labour 
and language make it apparent to Foucault that statements only operate in conjunction 
with their associated domain o f conditions. This space o f relationality and exteriority 
characterises the third criteria o f the enunciative function. Refusing to assume that 
concepts are the organising principles o f discourse, archaeology treats concepts as 
elements dispersed throughout discourse that are ordered and whose relations are 
governed by systems o f rules peculiar to the type of discourse in question. These rules 
account for the formation o f concepts. The organisation o f concepts, objects, and
10 In The Birth o f  the Clinic (1973), for example, Foucault became aware o f  the importance o f  the position 
o f  the subject o f  discourse, and the rules governing this subjective position calls for analysis. W ho has the 
qualification, the prestige, the status or em inence to speak a certain type o f  discourse, and from what 
institutional site does he or she speak? ‘Medical statements cannot come from anybody; their value, 
efficacy, even their therapeutic powers, and, generally speaking, their existence as medical statements 
cannot be dissociated from the statutorily defined person who has the right to make them, and to claim for 
them the power to overcom e suffering and death’ (Foucault, 1972, p.51).
11 ‘The enunciative m odalities o f  a discourse is linked to the discontinuity o f  the planes from which he 
speaks. And if  these planes are linked to a system o f relations, this system is not established by the 
synthetic activity o f  a consciousness identical with itself, dumb and anterior to all speech, but by the 
specificity o f  a discursive practice. I shall abandon any attempt, therefore, to see discourse as a 
phenomenon o f  expression-the verbal translation o f  a previously established synthesis; instead, I shall look 
for a field o f  regularity for various positions o f  subjectivity. Thus conceived, discourse is not the 
majestically unfolding manifestation o f  a thinking, knowing, speaking subject, but, on the contrary, a 
totality , in which the dispersion o f  the subject and his discontinuity with him self may be determined' 
(Foucault. 1972, pp.54-55).
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statements into themes, theories and intellectual strategies is similarly governed by sets of 
rules which account for the formation o f these strategies.
Finally, a repeatable materiality is constitutive o f the statement. While it is true that 'a 
statement must have a substance, a support, a place, and a date’, its spatio-temporal 
character bears less importance than the institutional character it carries (Foucault, 1972, 
p. 101). A formulation’s institutional setting, whether asylum, clinic, university, or 
parliamentary floor, is constitutive o f its efficacy as a statement. Archaeological analysis 
investigates the formulation o f signs as statements in their social historical existence. 
Statements never function in isolation; its social and historical character implies its 
embedded-ness in a system o f statements which Foucault describes as a ‘discursive 
formation'. Statements governed by the same ‘rules of formation’ belong to a single 
discursive formation. In accordance with these rules, the objects, concepts, and 
theoretical strategies with which we are familiar are constituted; these rules are their 
conditions o f existence. A central task o f archaeology is to make these conditions explicit 
in their historical and practical functioning.
Archaeology is therefore concerned with the historicity o f statements, their rules of 
formation through which objects, subjects, concepts and strategies are produced. With the 
analysis of rules o f formation, Foucault seeks to specify the conditions of existence of a 
discursive formation, this is what he calls the ‘historical a p r io r i . Since his concern is 
with statements actually made -  i.e. actually written and spoken -  the historical a priori 
does not reveal the conditions o f validity for judgments, but the conditions of reality for 
statements: *An a priori not o f truths that might never be said, or really given to 
experience; but the a priori o f a history that is given, since it is that o f things actually 
said’ (Foucault, 1972. p. 127). Foucault’s archaeological focus is not interested in the 
formal possibilities o f  a language but the real existence o f discourse; his object is not
language but the accumulated existence of discourse, the practical analysis of which he
1 ^calls the archive
i: The archive is first the law o f  what can be said, the system that governs the appearance o f  statements as 
unique events. But the archive is also that which determines that all these things said do not accumulate 
endlessly in an amorphous mass, nor are they inscribed in an unbroken linearity , nor do they disappear at
37
It is beyond the scope o f the present discussion to consider the methodological 
shortcomings o f archaeology, but it would seem that by integrating the rarity of 
statements (effected by rules o f formation), and the effective formation o f discourse by 
non-discursive practices (effected by power relations) overcomes Foucault's initial 
methodological difficulties regarding the autonomy o f discourse and the archaeologist's 
own detachment. Foucault's revised methodological enterprise effectively reverses the 
polarity o f archaeology and genealogy13. Genealogy now takes precedence over 
archaeology, and discourse is now secondary to ‘a whole technology of power' (Foucault, 
1977b. p.30).
Producing the present
What I have elaborated so far is the philosophical underpinnings of a critical approach 
that assembles an epistemological history o f a contemporary problem. If genealogy 
serves as the basis o f historico-critical reflection it is because there is something 
recoverable from the past with which to view the present differently. To recover a history 
of chance, o f unsavoury origins, brutal oppression and intellectual imagination, produces 
an altogether different lesson from history; that our arrival is not structured by some 
underlying, identity, continuity or teleology; that the present is not the necessary outcome 
of human rationality. This has important implications for how we think about 
contemporary7 forms o f neo-liberal governance which maintain, by popular persuasion, 
that free market economics, the devolution o f state responsibilities and the reinvention of 
self-sufficiency are natural and self-evident solutions to the problems o f freedom, wealth 
and security. Genealogy disrupts and disperses these fictions.
the mercy o f  chance external accidents; but they are grouped together in distinct figures, composed together 
in accordance with multiple relations, maintained or blurred in accordance with specific regularities... it is 
that which, at the very root o f  the statement-event, and in that which embodies it. defines at the outset the 
system o f  its enunciability (Foucault, 1972, p. 129).
13 This new combination between genealogy and archaeology is, however, a strange one because from the 
archaeological side we have the bracketing o f  truth (and while the truth function o f  statements are 
neutralised, they are still taken seriously by the archaeologist). On the other side, we have a lighthearted 
analysis o f  the positivity o f  discourse: ‘This leads to a strange and complex attitude: one has to take the 
world o f  serious discourse seriously because it is the one we are in, and yet one can’t take it seriously, first 
because w e have arduously divorced ourselves from it, and second because it is not grounded' (Dreyfus & 
Rabinow, 1983. p. 105).
‘Producing the Present’ is the work o f thought that not only endeavours to produce 
the present differently, but performs a diagnosis o f contemporary problems. Diagnosis is 
both genealogical and  ethical in that subjects are constituted through relations o f power 
as they are constituted by their own practices o f freedom. What is needed now is a 
method o f diagnosing the domains in which subjects are made up: ‘the ensemble formed 
by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that 
allow the exercise o f [a] very specific albeit complex form o f power’ (Foucault, 1991. 
102). In the next section, I elaborate how the concept of ‘governmentality’ undertakes a 
diagnosis o f the ethical dimension o f power.
Governmentality
I am saying that “governmentality” implies the relationship o f  the se lf  to itself, and I 
intend this concept o f  “governmentality” to cover the whole range o f  practices that 
constitute, define, organize, and instrumentalize the strategies that individuals in their 
freedom can use in dealing with each other. Those who try to control, determine, and 
limit the freedom o f  others are them selves free individuals who have at their disposal 
certain instruments they can use to govern others. Thus, the basis for all this is freedom, 
the relationship o f  the se lf  to itself and the relationship to the other... I believe that the 
concept o f  governmentality makes it possible to bring out the freedom o f  the subject and 
its relationship to others-which constitutes the very stuff o f  ethics (Foucault, 1997, 
p.300).
O f all the descriptions Foucault offers on ‘governmentality’ I prefer the one above 
because it stresses an ethical relationship in the way that government acts upon relations 
of self on self. If governmentality applies to the practical regulation o f individuals -  
through various techniques, instruments, strategies and procedures o f knowledge and 
power -  this is because it is formulated as a way of thinking about how power is capable 
o f governing free individuals. Freedom is essential for the exercise o f contemporary 
political power inasmuch as it is essential for the possibility o f self-formation. In this 
section. I want to elaborate the work o f diagnosis as a particular ethos ‘marked by a 
desire to analyse contemporary political rationalities as technical embodiments of 
mentalities for the government o f conduct’ (Barry, Osborne, & Rose. 1993, p.265). This 
kind o f analysis pursues two methodological directions. Firstly, it renders thinkable the 
technologies of domination and subjection, the practical systems and disciplines, through 
which individuals are governed; we might call this direction an analysis of the axis of 
power/domination. Secondly, the government o f individuals attends to certain techniques
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o f  the se lf  we might call this an analysis o f the ‘axis of self-formation' (Dean, 1995). In 
what follows. 1 will elaborate a number of conceptual tools for analysing relations 
between techniques o f self-government and techniques o f the government of 
individuals14.
'Governmental rationality' refers to a relatively new domain of investigation13. Colin 
Gordon (1991) reminds us that Foucault employed the concept o f government in both a 
wide and a narrow sense. In the case o f the former, ‘government’ was defined generally 
as 'the conduct o f conduct’, that is, the forms o f reflection and action that aim to shape, 
guide, regulate, or modify the conduct o f persons. Government is not only the relations of 
subjection, domination and discipline, but also the private interpersonal relations in which 
a principle o f control is exercised over the self. In the narrower sense, government 
specifies 'relations concerned with the exercise o f political sovereignty' (Gordon, 1991. 
p.3), that is, the kinds o f problematisation, reflection and calculation o f the means and 
ends o f political rule (Rose, 1993). In this latter sense, governmental rationality 
specifically addresses the concerns o f a political domain; the ordering and maintenance of 
a territory and population subject to specific kinds of authority and administration. In 
both senses. Foucault was interested in government as practices. and rendering the 
activity o f government thinkable and practicable not only to its practitioners, but to those 
subject to this form o f rationality.
Governmentality marks an important departure from the realism that has defined 
much historical and political sociology (Mann, 1986; Hall. 1985). The concept of 
government is nominalistic in its application since it does not seek to discover an 
underlying necessity or functionality of the state; nor does it seek to reveal the 'actual 
configurations o f persons, organisations and events at particular historical periods' (Rose,
14 'I think that if  one wants to analyze the genealogy o f  the subject in Western societies, one has to take 
account not only techniques o f  domination, but also techniques o f  the self. Let’s say one has to take into 
account the interaction o f  these two types o f  techniques’ (Foucault. 1980, cited in Burchell. 1993. p.268).
15 Foucault developed his analysis out o f  two annual courses delivered in 1978 and 1979. entitled 
respectively ‘Security, territory and population', and ‘The birth o f  biopolitics’. From these lectures series, 
the governmental theme became the focus o f  an intellectual enterprise that combined a genealogical 
treatment o f  certain ‘techniques o f  power’, or o f  ‘power/knowledge’ relations, to a number o f  historical 
domains that were opened to ethical and political consideration (Gordon, 1991).
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1993. p. 188). Rather, the state itself appears as a discursive device for rendering the 
‘political’ or ‘non-political’ sphere amenable to certain forms o f regulation. The 
vocabularies o f the state are historically variable devices for articulating, discriminating 
and specifying the functions, realities, institutions and problems that belong to a specific 
domain o f governance. This kind o f political discourse exceeds the function of ideology 
and rhetoric, and, as Rose suggests, should be viewed as an ‘intellectual machinery for 
rendering reality thinkable in such a way that it is amenable to political deliberations' 
(p. 189). This re-description o f political power allows diagnosis to engage in ‘the 
problematics o f government in the present’, to diagnose changes in the domain o f power, 
and to evaluate the constitutive effects o f contemporary technologies of government
(p.200).
Once we eschew a normative understanding o f government, an analytics of 
government formulates new concepts to investigate the exercise o f political power. An 
alternative approach considers the complex and variable strategies o f political rule that 
sought to organise and arrange, regulate and calculate, the capacities o f a population in 
terms o f what Foucault called a ‘microphysics o f power’; that is. the kind o f power 
functioning at a capillary level within a multitude of practices and locations that extend 
across a territory. In contrast to classical notions of power that function by way of 
domination and repression. Foucault observes the shift from sovereign power to 
disciplinary power as no longer a matter o f deciding between life and death. Beginning in 
the seventeenth century, political power had ‘assigned itself the task o f administrating 
life' (1979. p. 139). What Foucault describes as biopow er16 emerged in the form o f a 
general technology o f  rationalities that rendered visible and intelligible the forces, 
dimensions and capacities o f a target population. The task was not to promote life by 
virtue of taking it away, but o f assuming increasing responsibility over the biological
16 Foucault’s genealogy o f  political authority locates the specific concerns o f  the human sciences alongside 
transformations in medical practice and government policy. He describes these distinct distributions o f  
knowledge and their converging relations as governmentality or ‘bio-politics’. Despite their different 
emphases, both terms are interchangeable in describing the mode by which power functions in modem  
western societies. That is to say, modern power is characterised by the increasing significance o f  
spatialising knowledges and the use o f  immanent techniques for disciplining and administering a 
population (McHoul & Grace, 1993; Curt, 1994).
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processes o f the population17. The government of life itself, in both its individual and 
composite forms, constitutes the defining feature of modern western society: biological 
existence was reflected by political existence to the extent that power was invested in life. 
Strategies o f government became a series o f interventions that converged around 
questions o f life: births, deaths, sexuality, infirmity and disease, sanity and bodily 
hygiene.
An analytics o f government does not offer a new theory of power as such, but a 
perspective with which to investigate events and domains in which power is exercised. A 
particular concern for the present thesis is that o f interrogating the problematisations 
through which ‘■being’ has been shaped and rendered thinkable and manageable among 
various sites from which these problems emerge, and through various authorities whose 
statements assemble techniques and mechanisms for shaping conduct, for establishing 
modes o f subjectification and technologies for ethical life. An analytics of government 
takes various instruments and mechanisms o f power -  vocabularies, policies, legislation, 
institutions, programmes, initiatives, calculations, surveillance, expertise -  as the proper 
objects o f diagnosis as they relate to an individual, a family, an economy, a community. 
Lastly, this form o f diagnosis is interested in how these technologies o f power took shape 
among liberal societies from the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century which can 
be reorganised in terms o f the field o f governmentality.
Political rationalities
In Omnes et Singdutim , Foucault (1981) investigates the links between rationalisation 
and political power by grounding his analysis in certain experiences such as madness, 
illness, death, crime, sexuality, etc. The task is not to establish whether these problems 
conform to principles o f rationality, but rather to evaluate which kind of rationality is 
being used. How do these rationalities come to bear on the problems of experience? How 
are they linked to practices o f confinement, exclusion; techniques o f repression or
17 ‘The disciplines o f  the body and the regulations o f  the population constituted two poles around which the 
organisation o f  power over life was deployed. The setting up, in the course o f  the classical age. o f  this great 
bipolar technology-anatom ic and biological, individualizing and specifying, directed towards the 
performances o f  the body, with attention to the processes o f  life-characterised a power whose highest 
function was perhaps no longer to kill, but to invest life through and through’ (Foucault, 1979, p. 139).
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correction; the multiple functions o f the workhouse, the hospital, the prison, the asylum? 
Foucault argues that through analysis o f various coherent systems o f thought, we find 
evidence o f rationalised ways o f thinking and acting that were embodied in particular 
texts and were linked to a range o f regulatory practices for the purpose o f organising 
authority and maintaining the order o f an inhabitants, a flock, a community, a state.
Rose and Miller (1992) extend this thesis by arguing that political discourse refers to 
a domain o f idealised schemata for representing, analysing and modifying reality. They 
argue that this discursive domain can be discerned in terms of ‘political rationalities'. 
Firstly, political rationalities are characterised by their moral form: political discourse 
embody certain conceptions regarding the legitimate use and distribution of authority 
across different domains and sectors o f governance which conform to principles that 
ought to guide the exercise o f political power: freedom, justice, equality, responsibility , 
citizenship and autonomy. Political rationalities also possess an epistemological character 
in that they are ‘articulated in relation to some conception o f the nature of the objects 
governed -  society, the nation, the population, the economy’ (Rose & Miller, 1992. 
p. 175). The objects o f political rationalities embody intrinsic characteristics, qualities, 
assumptions and presuppositions which account for the way that power is exercised over 
governable phenomena. Lastly, they are articulated within a distinctive idiom or 
language. They confer to the objects o f government a knowledge o f the field of reality 
upon which it is to intervene and calculate in ways that bring these objects, elements and 
processes into being (Gordon, 1980).
The emergence o f political liberalism, for instance, signals a particular formula of 
governance that no longer refers to a ‘reason o f state’ {raison d'etat) whereby a sovereign 
exercised a totalising control over a national territory. By the late eighteenth century, 
political power had abandoned the dream of producing a totally administered society and 
was instead confronted with a separate domain, whose interiority and naturalness 
disqualified the use o f sovereign power. Liberalism coincides with the emergence of
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'civil society’, designating a natural domain of independent norms and freedoms18. 
Between the sovereignty o f free individuals and the principle o f free enterprise between 
individuals, power must instead draw from disciplinary technologies with the aim of 
achieving the optimum functioning o f civil society. Liberal mentalities of rule must 
therefore assemble a mode o f power that is capable of acting upon the actions of this non­
political sphere o f conduct by acting at a distance (Callon & Latour, 1981; Rose & 
Miller. 1992).
Technologies o f  government
One of the characteristics o f power is its coextension with social space and its relation 
to forces: ‘power has no essence; it is simply operational’ (Deleuze. 1988. p.27). As it 
applies to government, power assumes a governmental form at which point it becomes 
technical. Power/knowledge relations are distributed, circulated and operationalised by 
virtue of a technology that achieves its practical realisation. Here, the term ‘technology' 
has a specific application: the constitution o f knowledge is not exclusively the production 
of ideas, concepts or truth, but formed in relation to what is knowable and practicable 
(Rose. 1996a). It is the practical constitution o f epistemology that distinguishes between 
scientific thought that merely ‘works on the world as it finds it’ (Bachelard, 1984) or ‘an 
active process o f intervening in the world’ (Danzinger, 1990). Technology recognises the 
presuppositions o f social practices -  the political objectives o f techniques, instruments 
and mechanisms -  and the conditions which are immanent to the formation of 
knowledge. That is to say, all technologies are underpinned by presuppositions which not 
only occupy transcendental grounds for claiming knowledge, but also immanent causes 
whereby power is realised, integrated and distinguished in its effects (Deleuze, 1988).
Technologies of government are therefore a complex and heterogeneous assemblage 
of rationalities, techniques for programming the real, mechanistic devices, practical 
objectives, architectural forms, through which knowledge/power relations are rendered
18 As Burchell (1993) observes, liberalism is characterised by the mode o f  power which is confronted, on 
the one hand, by rights and freedoms o f  subjects that must not be restrained by government while, on the 
other hand, government addresses a domain o f  processes that it cannot govern through direct, overt and 
explicit intervention. A key characteristic o f  modem government is the designation o f  a realm beyond 
‘politics’ which it seeks to manage without undermining its naturalness and autonomy.
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effective. A technology o f government will seek the practical inculcation o f conduct, the 
reshaping o f forms o f life, the modulation and regulation o f behaviour through such 
inscriptions, devices, programmes and techniques that render government possible and 
effective19. In this sense, a technology does not conform to any single will to govern; it 
has no essence. Rather, it is a strategy o f power that finds utility among the conditions of 
its own operation -  to manage, inculcate, modify, aggregate and separate forms of life -  
according to principles o f normalisation, moralisation, amelioration, productivity, 
efficiency, etc.
An important argument developed in the thesis is the diagnosis o f ‘advanced'20 liberal 
rationalities which target subjectivity as the basis of moral and ethical transformation. 
The new technologies o f welfare seek to promote active forms o f citizenship by not only 
problematising subjectivity at the level o f pathology and individual capacity, but by 
inserting welfare recipients in programmes o f activity, surveillance, mentoring and 
confidence-building to promote useful forms o f labour market participation. A whole 
range of devices and mechanisms are installed to meet these governmental objectives -
|g For example, ‘D iscipline’, writes Foucault, should be ‘identified neither with an institution nor with an 
apparatus; it is a type o f  power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set o f  instruments, 
techniques, procedures, levels o f  application, targets; it is a ‘physics’ or an ‘anatomy’ o f  power, a 
technology' (1977b, p.215).
:0 ‘Advanced’ or ‘neo-liberal’ government can be contrasted with liberalism in a number ways. Firstly, 
liberalism establishes its proper mode o f  government by conjoining the rationalisation o f  governmental 
activity with the rationality o f  the free conduct o f  governed individuals. As Burchell observes, ‘the rational 
conduct o f  government must be intrinsically linked to the natural, private interest... o f  free, market 
exchanging individuals because the rationality o f  these individuals’ conduct is, precisely, what enables the 
market to function optimally in accordance with its nature’. Neo-liberalism, on the other hand, expresses a 
different formula o f  governance. Here, ‘the rational principle for regulating and limiting governmental 
activity must be determined by reference to artificially arranged or contrived forms o f  the free. 
entrepreneurial and com petitive conduct o f  economic-rational individuals. Like liberalism, the rationalitv 
o f government must be grafted to a form o f  ‘rational self-conduct o f  the governed', but unlike liberalism, 
neo-liberalism is tied to ‘a form which is not so much given o f  human nature than a consciously contrived 
style o f  conduct’ (1993, p .271). Rose diagnoses the difference between liberalism and neo-liberalism in 
similar ways but stresses the transformation o f  control technologies. Neo-liberalism, for example, embodies 
a kind o f “de-governmentalisation o f  the state’ via a double movement o f  strategies that seek the 
autonomisation and responsibilisation o f  entities. These strategies are realised by three key transformations 
for the conduct o f  conduct: (1) a new relation between expertise and politics; territories o f  governance are 
now inscribed by new calculative regimes for the conduct o f  conduct; (2) a new pluralisation o f  social 
technologies; control technologies now seek to shape the conduct and powers o f  autonomous entities, and; 
(3) a new specification o f  the subject o f  government: strategies o f  governance reshape individual conduct in 
terms o f  activity whereby actors are transformed into agents who are supported by a whole ensemble o f  
medical, psychological and prudential technologies which circulate among reversible  relations o f  authority 
(1993. pp.294-6).
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statistical calculations, continuous monitoring, counselling and activity testing, risk 
assessments and computer modelling, psychological profiling and training -  with the 
outcome of reconstructing the moral and ethical capacities o f those excluded from the 
labour market. The general technology power in which welfare recipients are captured 
and 'reformed' demonstrates how the freedom of individuals to be autonomous, self- 
sufficient and self-directing is the outcome of a whole ensemble of human technologies.
Programmes and strategies
Foucault at times distinguishes between programmes, strategies and tactics of power. 
Programmes are ‘sets o f calculated, reasoned prescriptions’ through which institutional 
mechanisms are recognised in the way they arrange space and regulate conduct (Foucault. 
2000, p.230). In terms o f government, programmes are fixed to. and aligned with, 
problematic aspects o f an object; they specify ‘a problematising activity’ in the sense that 
the ideals o f government are intrinsically linked to the appearance o f problematisations 
which they seek to rectify and modify by restoring them to some state of normality, 
productivity or efficacy (Rose & Miller, 1992). But apart from problematising objects, 
programmes possess the ingenious facility o f ‘positing a real mechanism which itself 
'programmes’ the appropriate form o f intervention upon it’ (Gordon, 1980, 249). That is 
to say, the efficacy o f power is the ability to bring into being certain objects which are 
amenable to specific kinds o f regulation. For example, the constitution o f the ‘welfare 
dependent' as a problematic object o f reform is conferred the kind of qualities that 
necessitate contractual obligation. As Rose and Miller points out. 'programmes 
presuppose that the real is programmable, that it is a domain subject to certain 
determinants, rules, norms and processes that can be acted upon and improved by 
authorities' (1992, p. 183).
In the 1976 lectures Foucault had experimented with the ‘hypothesis of war' -  the 
idea that the conditions o f war and struggle might serve as a tool for political analysis"1. 
The efficacy o f this analogy is to underline the attributes o f power as a moving substrate 
of multiple force relations, most visible among struggles, confrontations, contradictions,
:i These ideas were further developed in Discipline and Punish wherein Foucault proposes a reversal o f  
Von Clausewitz's maxim that politics is war pursued by other means.
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inequalities, transformations and reversible force relations. Strategies are concerned with 
the formation of the real, and characterise the artificial and improvisational nature of 
power relations as they seek to: achieve a certain goal or end (objective); designate a 
method for achieving that end (means); anticipate the actions of others that might block 
or thwart a manoeuvre (tactics)22. Often there is a risk of conflating programmes with 
strategies, the difference being that unlike the programme, strategies o f power are 
essentially a non-discursive rationality. It is particularly among instances where power is 
described as an ‘anonymous’ practice that most reflects the functionality of strategy.
Government and ethical self-formation
Given the general definition o f government as the ‘conduct of conduct', rationalities 
and technologies tend to focus on the first term o f this phrase by underlining the 
centrality o f the axis o f truth and power. The axis o f self-formation, however, would 
seem to point to the latter sense o f this phrase in that conduct is construed as human 
action and behaviour. If we understand government as the form of power involving some 
degree o f calculation and regulation o f human conduct, there is a deliberate implication 
then that power is not strictly determining, but invokes the possibility o f acting otherwise; 
it is this flexible and relational definition o f power that leads to the consideration of 
freedom. In contemporary forms o f ‘advanced’ liberalism, the object of government is. 
among other things, the conduct o f the ‘free subject', but we should be cautious about 
how we make this formulation. The conduct o f the free subject needs further qualification 
about what is meant by ‘free’, and certainly what is meant by the ‘subject' o f self­
formation.
If government is more or less the calculated and rational means of directing human 
action, this does not necessarily presuppose a ‘free subject' if we take this to mean a self­
determining agent existing as the autonomous centre o f consciousness, will and action. 
The liberal government o f conduct presupposes a free subject, only if a free subject is
Gordon gives a more rigorous description o f  strategy as ‘the minimum form o f  rationality o f  the exercise 
o f  power in general which consists in the mobile sets o f  operations whereby a multiplicity o f  heterogeneous 
elements (forces, resources, the features o f  a terrain, the disposition and relation o f  objects in space-time) 
are invested with a particular functionality relative to a dynamic and variable set o f  objectives' (1980, 
p.251).
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defined in terms o f a self-governing agent replete with a repertoire o f choice, and a free 
subject as one whose condition o f subjection operates "through the promotion and 
calculated regulation o f spaces in which choice is to be exercised’ (Dean, 1995, p.562). 
Freedom is a precondition o f governance and eschews those libratory utopian conceptions 
of a state o f illimitable freedoms existing independently of historically contingent norms 
and regulations. A history o f the subject of government would discriminate different 
forms of government by examining the multiple objectifications through which human 
beings are governed by discourse, and the modes of subjectification they give rise to 
among diverse practices and techniques o f subject-formation23 (Rose, 1999a).
What we take to be the ‘subject’ o f government is a culturally and historically 
variable category we call the se lf-4. But diagnosis is not particularly interested in the 
category o f self, but more the kind o f work performed on the self by the self. From 
Foucault’s ‘On the Genealogy o f Ethics’ (1997e) we can draw upon a formal analytic of 
this work on the self by elaborating four dimensions o f self-formation: ethical substance, 
asceticism, mode o f subjectification, and teleology. The ethical substance refers to that 
part o f the self or others we seek to govern, the material worked upon through acts linked 
to pleasure or aphrodisia in Greece, the flesh in Christianity, sexuality in contemporary 
ethics. Ascetics refers to the practices through which we seek to govern ourselves, the 
self-forming techniques o f meditation, prayer, documentation, recollection, self- 
examination. confession, etc. Deontology specifies the mode o f subjectification. the 
position we occupy in relation to rules and norms, and how we are obligated to put these 
into practice. Teleology constitutes the end or goal o f these practices, the mode of being 
we hope to become through acts o f self-mastery, moderation, renunciation or
There is a case for distinguishing between ‘the government o f  the s e l f  and ‘practices o f  ethical self- 
formation’. The former concerns ‘the ways in which authorities and agencies seek to shape the conduct 
aspirations, needs, desires and capacities o f  specified political and social categories, to enlist them in 
particular strategies and to seek definite goals’; the latter concerns ‘practices, techniques and rationalities 
concerning the regulation o f  the se lf  by the self, and by means o f  which individuals seek to question, form, 
know, decipher and act on them selves’ (Dean, 1995, p.563). But Dean and Rose both caution that this is not 
a discrete or absolute distinction. To specify what Foucault (1988) calls the ‘techniques o f  the s e lf  is not to 
exclude the possibility that self-formation is already sanctioned by particular authorities and therefore 
mediated through historically specific practices.
24 The term ‘s e l f  is used here in the neutral sense o f  distinguishing a particular space that is the locus o f  
conduct and capacities; it is a ‘thin’ conception o f  the subject as a material form composed o f  forces and 
endowed with capacities (Patton, 1992, cited in Dean, 1995, p.563).
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emancipation (Foucault, 1997e, pp.265-7). Rather than think of these relations as 
confined to practices o f self on self, it becomes possible to analyse government through 
these practices o f self-formation (Dean, 1995; Rose, 1994a).
Diagnosis
An analytics o f government is reflection that engages in a different kind of 
empiricism. Governmentality does not subscribe to positivist inquiry where the truth of 
discourse is determined by the truth o f its object. It is perhaps a symptom of our times 
that the human sciences can no longer guarantee the production of facts, the neutrality of 
investigation, or the objectivity o f the empiricist. All observations are theory-laden, all 
facts are interpretations, and objectivity is the rarity of value by techniques that would 
otherwise claim to remove value. The empirical is not the valorisation of experience, that 
is. if we take empiricism to mean the transparent correspondence between the observer 
and the observed. But governmentality studies are perhaps too cautious in avoiding 
experience on the grounds that it is simply an effect o f power, in which case analysis is 
consigned to the ‘apparatuses' (dispositifs) through which these effects are produced. 
While it is agreed that experience is not a stable foundation from which to discriminate 
the truth of discourse and its objects, it remains essential to the project of diagnosis.
Where diagnosis is effective in treating a domain of phenomena as symptoms of 
force-relations, it gives very little attention to the axis of self-formation, the domain of 
subjectivity and ethics. In other words, analyses o f government are reluctant to link 
historical problems to symptoms o f experience, and investigate how subjects conduct and 
manage themselves. Following Deleuze (1988), we might think o f practices of self­
formation as the ‘folding’ and ‘doubling’ o f relations of power, in which case it is not the 
category o f the self we are directly concerned with but ‘the practices of enfolding 
themselves, the forms o f authority they enfold, the material they seek to work with and 
upon, and the results they prom ise’ (Dean, 1995, p.564). The domain of subjectification 
is itself a condition and an effect o f power; it is less an entity than a series of foldings in 
which the outside is interiorised as a space of conduct and action. This notion of folding 
is a novel approach for thinking o f self-formation by way of a spatial metaphor to explain
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how power relations are ‘folded back to create a doubling [which] allows a relation to 
oneself to emerge, and constitute an inside which is hollowed out and develops its own 
unique dimension’ (Deleuze, 1988, p. 100).
The productive relationship between government of the self (subjection) and practices 
of ethical self-formation (subjectification) presents a strong case for diagnosing power in 
terms o f subjectivity"5. This is the case I make for including interview material in the 
corpus of empirical data. If diagnosis cannot consult subjects, if it cannot take the 
problems o f experience as the basis o f historico-critical reflection then governmentality is 
itself a partial enterprise. Experience is not simply evidence o f the real (Scott, 1992) or 
confirmation o f a theory; it does not seek to ‘prove’ genealogy, or give testimony to the 
effects o f political power. Rather, the work o f diagnosis seeks to elaborate experience as 
the site of singularity, contestability and endless ethical work.
Unlike positivist traditions, the empirical work conducted here is informed by a whole 
tradition o f French thought on the history o f the sciences. This involves meticulous re­
description and evaluation o f historical events, and practices a kind o f ‘field work' in 
history that disturbs the naturalness o f our contemporary regimes o f truth. Historico- 
critical reflection demonstrates how thought itself is capable o f intervening in the real, 
and has therefore a stake in its production. Genealogy is not simply an act of 
‘deconstructing’ or ‘levelling’ truth, but re-describing the procedures through which 
contemporary objects o f the real have been fabricated. If empiricism is an interpretative 
enterprise, we should not think o f it as a form of hermeneutics; it is not a matter of 
decoding or interpreting hidden motives, of discovering latent truths or class interests; nor 
is it an endless re-description o f forms o f thought. Against this kind o f interpretation we 
might say empirical work is that o f symptomatology26. ‘Genealogies o f government seek
25 This case seems all the more important if  we consider Deleuze's reading o f  Foucault's later work as 
concerned with a relation to on ese lf that is both derivative and independent o f  power: 'Foucault's 
fundamental idea is that o f  a dimension o f  subjectivity derived from power and knowledge without being 
dependent on them' (1988, p. 101).
26 In The Birth o f  the C linic , for exam ple, Foucault shows us that nineteenth century medicine ceased to be 
problematised in terms o f  species, typologies or essences, but that disease could be diagnosed in terms o f a 
lesion that formed part o f  the body; disease formed a singularity within a whole set o f  relations by means o f  
new techniques o f  visualisation, touch and symptomatology.
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to establish the singularity o f particular strategies within a field o f relations of truth, 
power and subjectivity by means o f a work on symptoms’ (Rose, 1999a, p.57). This is not 
a new idea but similar to the role Nietzsche adopted when he called himself 'physician of 
culture’. Finally, diagnosis is a meticulous reconstruction of problematisations in ways 
that demand new solutions. The key to generating these solutions lies among the 
conditions o f possibility o f symptoms.
Empirical framework
In the last two sections, I gave a broad and schematic view o f the role o f critique, 
elaborating what a history o f the present eschews, and demonstrating the inventiveness of 
historical thought that treats the present as symptoms of power and freedom. In what 
follows, I give an overview o f how I executed my historical analysis, showing how 
principles o f genealogy are translated into a formal set o f procedures for problematising 
Australian welfare policy. Furthermore, I discuss the methodological framework for 
analysing a corpus o f participant statements which are treated as symptoms of individual 
experience, and which are considered alongside transformations o f work, welfare and 
freedom. My interest is to investigate ‘ethical problematisations' o f experience, the 
techniques o f self-management, the possibilities of self-formation and the constraints in 
which free subjects desire autonomy, success, fulfilment and self-realisation.
Genealogy begins by asking a series o f questions about the present: how did it 
become possible for welfare dependency to problematise subjectivity? Why does welfare 
reform take the present form that it does? And, more generally, if w^ e take reform as a 
symptom o f advanced liberal government, how do problems of welfare relate to problems 
of freedom? These are questions addressed by the first part of the thesis. The second part 
broaches questions o f effectivity: what are the specific effects o f welfare reform? Again, 
this question forces us to return to the problem of the subject: given recent 
transformations o f welfare administration, what kind of subjects do we take ourselves to 
be? Who are we required to become? If liberal rationalities govern individuals through 
their freedom, then what is the price for failing to govern ourselves responsibly? These 
questions form the parameters o f the thesis. It is only by asking a series of related
questions about the politics o f the present that we can narrow the domain o f investigation 
and seek its conditions o f existence.
Historical analysis
Historical analysis begins with decomposition of a recent event of Australian welfare 
politics. The appearance o f ‘welfare dependency’ in 1999 is treated as a symptom and a 
point o f departure for genealogical investigation. Analysis begins by asking ‘what kind of 
object does the problem of dependency presuppose?’ ‘What solutions does it propose?' 
And Avhat strategies and programmes do authorities seek to install?' The language of 
dependency not only confers the existence of social and individual pathologies, but 
programmes the existence o f an object that becomes the target of certain ethical and 
moral interventions. Welfare policies are articulated in the language of pathology and 
prevention. in the language o f society and risk, for the purposes of reconstructing the 
capacities of the poor, and reinserting ‘the excluded’ into work and community. A whole 
ensemble o f human technologies are designed to achieve this -  medicine, statistics, 
epidemiology, psychology, political philosophy, economics -  together they form a 
'diagram' o f advanced liberal government. The task is to investigate the conditions of 
possibility and the lines o f descent that make up this present configuration o f control.
Genealogy begins by investigating the origins o f social welfare but in terms of which 
displace conventional historiography. The historical argument traces marginal histories of 
the welfare state, placing it at the intersection o f the discovery o f society and nineteenth 
century debates on pauperism. The intellectual histories of Karl Polanyi (1957), J. R. 
Poynter (1969). and Mitchell Dean (1991) provide a clearing with which to construct 
intelligible trajectories o f discursive events, and locate modern welfare systems among 
transformations o f liberal government. Following Polanyi's lead, it is possible to displace 
the putative origins o f social welfare as a functional domain o f state responsibility by 
linking the events preceding the Poor Law of 1834 to the creation and calculated 
management o f a self-regulating market system. Debates on pauperism, for instance, had 
the effect o f distinguishing the undeserving from the deserving poor, and effecting a 
reversal of good and bad forms o f dependency. It was not the 'natural' sphere of poverty
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that became the object o f governmental concern, but the invention of pauperism that 
established the ‘less eligible’ conditions of the workhouse. Pauperism would serve to 
deflect the able-bodied male onto a national labour market, while absorbing women and 
children bereft o f a male breadwinner. The reforms of 1834 sought to replicate a natural 
order in which men were responsible for their families, and thus define the family as a 
natural unit o f private economic responsibility.
Using Foucault’s technique o f eventualisation27, it is possible to delineate the 
temporal boundaries o f 1795 and 1834 to specify what Dean (1992) calls the ‘event of 
pauperism’ -  a phase of peculiar intensity, contradiction, systemic failure, and eventually, 
a break from existing historical continuities insofar as practices o f poor administration 
were radically transformed. Aside from food shortages, the increasing poor rate and 
vigorous legislative activity, 1795 also marked the appearance of major statements on 
poor policy made by such English intellectuals as Thomas Malthus, David Ricardo, 
Jeremy Bentham, F. M. Eden and others. Cast within this milieu o f problematisation, the 
concept of poverty emerged with all the clarity and urgency o f an invention which, after 
having been first naturalised by social and political economy, now described ‘a particular 
condition o f individuals and groups that results from a general condition of population, 
subsistence and capital’ (Dean, p.235). Once released from its fixed juridical 
classification, the concept o f poverty gave rise to a new object that warranted even 
greater specificity and intervention, pauperism.
In the first part o f the thesis, each chapter begins with an event and a question formed 
in the present which relate to different policy aspects of Australian w elfare reform. 
Chapters 2-6 explore the governing statements of policy development since the mid 80’s, 
and focuses more closely on the arguments o f the ‘McClure Report’, which was recently 
commissioned by the Howard government to explore future directions of welfare reform.
27 Foucault describes his genealogical treatment o f  events as a technique o f  eventualisation which differs 
from conventional historiography in that it attempts to understand its object in terms o f  a singularity. 
Singularity implies the possibility o f  establishing difference and individuation at the heart o f  an event, and 
serves as a means by which self-evidence about the nature o f  present social arrangements may be breached. 
Eventualisation lends itself to the multiplication o f  causes, a concern for complex conditions o f  emergence 
and existence, and seeks a partial understanding o f  aspects o f  the past rather than a reconstruction o f  a 
social totality (Foucault, 2000b, pp.223-38).
Contemporary welfare policy are used as points o f departure with which to revisit Dean's 
event of pauperism for ‘rediscovering the connections, encounters, supports, blockages, 
plays o f forces, strategies, and so on, that at a given moment establish what subsequently 
counts as being self-evident, universal, and necessary’ (Foucault, 2000b, pp.226-7). The 
strategic purpose o f each chapter is to isolate key technologies, political rationalities and 
technical practices that form the present ensemble of power relations as they pertain to 
current problematisations o f Australian welfare reform.
Finally, historical analysis must distinguish the kind of materials used by genealogy. 
This methodology proceeds by way o f case-histories and case-studies which replace 
conventional historiographic criteria o f exhaustiveness with those of intelligibility (Dean. 
1992). The intelligibility o f historical thought, the meticulous analysis of an archive 
(taken here to mean the totality o f  discursive practice falling within the domain of the 
research parameters) is always partial and open to continuous revision and extension. 
Furthermore, genealogy distinguishes between primary and secondary material. Primary 
material is preferred over secondary since analysis seeks the construction of events 
expressed in its own terms, that is, in terms of its own discourses, practices and 
statements as opposed to secondary material which is subject to the filtration and 
interpretation o f an author from a later period. However, where primary material is 
unavailable certain decisions are made about whether discursive samples are typical or 
representative o f a certain practice or period (Fairclough, 1992). The genealogist is 
critically selective o f authors’ interpretations, presuppositions and objectives. This is not 
to say that secondary material is at risk o f constructing right or wrong observations, 
reliable or unreliable interpretations, but such material will, as a matter o f course, reflect 
the ethos, values and knowledge-assumptions of its own period. For these reasons, the 
genealogist must assess whether discursive samples are consistent with the aims of 
exegesis, whether samples reflect, for instance the diversity and transformation of 
practice across different domains, speakers, disciplines and institutions.
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The empirical corpus refers to a number of documentary sources, namely, recent 
policy documents, key legislative events, primary and secondary materials28. Where 
primary statements o f a particular period were unobtainable, I had to acknowledge the 
context in which these secondary texts were written, and establish a critical distance in 
such ways that remained consistent with the aims of my analysis. In its ideal setting 
genealogy is, as Foucault claims, ‘grey, meticulous and patiently documentary' (1977a, 
p. 139), and where my own experience has, at times, not necessarily reflected this kind of 
archival work, it has required reading against the grain a whole tradition of conventional 
historiography.
Subjectification
It is true, genealogical research rarely considers the subject from the point of view of 
their own statements or even the micro operations o f power whereby individuals submit 
themselves to their own domination, or transform themselves in accordance to ethical 
ideals or objectives. The first part o f the thesis is certainly faithful to the objective of 
tracing various technologies o f domination by which human beings are made subjects. 
From this view, we should think o f subjectivity as the effect o f power relations inasmuch 
as apparatuses assemble technologies o f subjection. But what specifically are these 
effects? Here, the awkward term ‘subjectification' (assujettissement) invokes the double 
meaning ‘to produce subjectivity’ and ‘to make subject' in order to outline the condition 
o f being a subject (Henriques, et. al., 1984). In this section. I want to investigate 
subjectivity in terms o f the effectivity o f power. This is not a genealogical enterprise. I 
am not concerned here with producing a history o f how individuals act upon themselves, 
but to extend the work o f diagnosis. If welfare reform is understood as an ensemble of 
technologies, rationalities, strategies and programmes that can be analysed along 
dimensions of truth and power, then the task of this section is to continue this analysis 
along an ethical dimension: what kind o f subjects are we to become? And what forms of 
self-authority and resistance to authority might we identify from narratives of experience?
:8 Given the bulk o f  historical analysis was conducted in Australia, the difficulty in obtaining primary 
documents meant cautiously selecting what might be described as ‘authoritative" texts on English poor 
policy, public health, welfare history, medical history and academic literature.
Discourse analysis
Before outlining a methodological approach for analysing participant statements, I 
want to briefly clarify the epistemological conditions that inform the present analysis. 
Firstly, participant statements and narratives are treated as an instance o f discourse. and 
thereby require a form of ‘discourse analysis’. Contemporary discourse analysis has a 
diffuse history and may be undertaken in a variety o f different ways29. The manner in 
which discourse is applied here signifies a reversal of traditional approaches in that it 
eschews theories o f representation, structural linguistics or communication models of 
language. In fact, reducing discourse to language runs the risk of reintroducing a formal 
linguistic analysis though, as McHoul and Grace (1993) argue, not all formalist versions 
of discourse can be dismissed out o f hand. Nonetheless, a minimum level of concern is 
that approaches such as ‘social semiotics’ or ‘critical linguistics’ are articulated at the 
level of ideology and therefore miss the kind o f material and epistemological analysis 
carried out by Foucault. A more extreme concern is that formal linguistic methods are 
mechanistic in that they attempt to establish general underlying rules of linguistic or 
communicative function. Because Foucault is more interested in the conditions of 
discourse, the formation o f objects, and the position o f statements, we are not to conflate 
discourse analysis with a formal, logical, linguistic or even language-like system’0. 
Rather, our concern is that o f investigating the techniques for what can and cannot be
2q ‘Discourse analysis’ has emerged from Anglo-American and French traditions to refer to a field of 
analyses that is conscious o f  the production o f  knowledge. However, the types o f  discourse analysis which 
examine utterances have generally emerged from the Anglo-American tradition o f  ethnomethodologv 
(Garfinkel, 1967), conversation analysis (Sacks & Schelgoff, 1973), and cognitive linguistics (Chomsky. 
1957). A common criticism o f  this tradition is their tendency to emphasise language structures at the 
expense o f  content or meaning. For instance, psycholinguistic and sociolinguistic approaches often over­
emphasise the role o f  the individual, presupposing a rational subject who produces knowledge as if  
unconstrained by a social context. More recently, French critical discourse analysis has presented an 
interesting reversal o f  traditional studies o f  language: discourse is not an instance o f  language use. rather, 
language use is an instance o f  discourse (Pennycook, 1994). This reversal has been taken up in the work o f  
critical linguistics (Hodge & Kress, 1988, Fairclough, 1992; Poynton, 1993; Threadgold, 1998) and critical 
social psychology (Henriques et al., 1984; Hollway, 1989; Parker, 1990) to show how discourses produce 
social realities and objects o f  social regulation.
30 Foucault specifically rejected both formal and empirical approaches to discourse as they privilege what 
he referred to as the side o f  enunciation (enonciation), meaning, the ‘techniques, the structures, the forms o f  
know-how' by which people are able to produce and recognise an utterance’ (McHoul & Grace. 1993, p.35). 
Such an approach to language accounts for only the ‘surface’ effects o f  its usage. Foucault proposes a 
different view o f  discourse, where the analysis o f  institutional or disciplinary statements must work at the 
level o f  the enounced (enonced), emphasising the positioning effects o f  utterances and practices. Rather 
than think o f  discourse as an instance o f  language, we should think o f  language as an instance o f  discourse.
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stated. The appearance o f an utterance, no matter how official or mundane the setting, is 
already constrained by certain historical limits of what is statable, thinkable and 
knowable.
Foucault’s position on discourse is unique in the way he eschews foundational ism 
without necessarily sliding into nihilism, relativism or realism. This raises a curious 
ambivalence in relation to discourse and ‘the real’. It is often assumed that because 
objects only exist within discourse that truth is merely an illusion, an empty effect of 
power, in which case we might deduce that nothing is true (nihilism), or even worse, the 
status o f "hard truth’, like science, is no more true than the haphazard beliefs of the public 
domain (relativism). We could extend this kind o f thinking further by saying that if truth 
is merely the effect o f power then power itself is responsible for distinguishing between 
true or false propositions, in which case truth is simply a conspiracy of domination (false 
consciousness). Methods o f guaranteeing rational knowledge through techniques of 
neutrality and objectivity are simply an elaborate ruse, a contrived procedure for 
obfuscating reality in ways that serve the interests o f the powerful. All these positions 
misinterpret the relation between discourse, power and truth because they are informed 
by the same rationalist tradition that assumes the existence o f an independent reality, the 
access o f which is regulated by power. All these positions (enlightenment, humanism and 
Marxism) misinterpret the productivity o f power and its relation to the real. If discourse 
eschews the possibility o f apprehending a reality independent o f discourse, it is because 
there are no foundational certainties (whether in truth itself or within the subject) for 
guaranteeing knowledge. But at the same time we must avoid the kind of universal 
suspicion that maintains that truth is consciously concealed. The productivity of power 
insists that truth, or what we confer as ‘the real', is in fact produced, contested and 
regulated in such ways that maintain a positive plurality. If the relation between discourse 
and truth is plural, positive and transformative, then this is not to say that our faith in 
truth is fundamentally undermined, but that the positivity and contestability o f truth is 
affirmative -  this new relation between discourse and the real suggests an open future that 
is continuously variable and changeable.
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Having briefly outlined some o f the epistemological criteria o f discourse analysis, I 
want to clarify the proper object o f analysis, participant statements. The epistemology 
that governs genealogy must somehow be adapted to the analysis of participant talk. The 
problem, however, is that statements o f ‘discursive formations’ are not the same kind of 
statements issuing from an interactional context like an interview. Again, the difference is 
between ‘enunciation’ (enonciation) and the ‘enounced’ (enonce), the difference between 
the mode o f articulation and the position  o f articulation. Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) 
liken this to a difference between ‘serious speech acts’ and ‘everyday speech acts', in 
which case it is the former that seems to delineate what Foucault means by a statement. 
Rose (1996a) expresses a similar kind o f reservation when stating that a study of 
subjectification cannot be reduced to an understanding o f language, meanings and 
narratives since they themselves are part o f the very regimes of self that must remain the 
object o f genealogical inquiryj l . While I partly agree with Rose’s pronouncement that 
subjectification requires a rather technical analysis o f the relations of power through 
which subjects are constituted, I am not so sure whether critical psychology is actually 
engaged in the kind o f ‘phenomenology’ or ‘ethnography’ he seems to be referring to. I 
am also unconvinced by those arguments that claim subjectivity has little to offer a 
critical history of the present. Such statements are perhaps indicative of the reluctance of 
some enclosures o f sociology to theorise political power from the point of view of 
experience. The view put forward by Foucauldian inspired analyses of ‘government’ 
quite rightly claim that subjectification is embedded among the ‘complex of apparatuses, 
practices, machinations and assemblages’ which are prior to the formation of subjects 
(Rose. 1996a). But I think this kind o f sociology also risks a partial critique if it seeks to 
historicise subjectification without actually consulting subjects, or directing critique to 
the problem o f  experience.
31 ’And while there is much o f  value in the attention directed by critical psychology to the conditions o f  the 
birth and functioning o f  the discipline, the focus on language and narrative, on the subjectification as a 
matter o f  the stories we tell ourselves about ourselves, is, at best, partial, at worst misguided. 
Subjectification is not to be understood by locating it in a universe o f  meaning or an interactional context o f 
narratives, but in a com plex o f  apparatuses, practices, machinations, and assemblages within which human 
being has been fabricated, and which presuppose and enjoin particular relations with ourselves’ (Rose, 
1996a, p. 10).
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If governmentality implies a relationship between the government of others 
(subjection) and the government o f self (ethics) then I cannot see how diagnosis can 
overlook the links between political power and individual practices o f self-formation. 
There are indeed different kinds o f statements that can be recovered from a biography of 
discursive practices, from a personal history of transformation, from the ethical 
techniques and private aspirations that are linked to wider processes of social, political 
and economic change. Other authors have also explored the possibility of combining a 
Foucauldian analysis o f ethics, subjectivity and power to analyse experience from the 
point o f view o f the subject’s own statements (Bordo, 1993; Nixon, 1996; Blackman. 
2000; Hodges, 2002). In view o f this possibility, I propose a kind of narrative analysis 
that takes the appearance o f statements as indicators of shifting discursive practices and 
positions within practices. With this in mind, there is a strong case for recovering 
statements from the stories people tell about themselves, the kind o f positions they 
assume in telling these stories, and the appearance of statements they call upon to render 
these stories intelligible. All these features are located in talk and texts, and mark out a 
domain of experience that can be linked to the effects of political power. Everyday 
speech and narratives are certainly not the site for the production o f statements, but the 
site for their reactivation and resistance. Narratives reveal complex investments and 
resistances, and specify an ensemble o f  discursive practices which, I think, re-present the 
subject's engagement in force relations.
Case-studies and recruitment
Selection o f participants did not conform to ‘representative’ sampling techniques^2. It 
is neither experience nor talk that form the proper object of analysis, but the position 
from which discursive statements are produced and the discursive practices through 
which experience is constituted. A discursive analysis o f 12 in-depth interviews was 
carried out to establish the effectivity o f ‘official’ as well as ‘counter' discourses of 
different subject positions -  the jobseeker, the dole bludger, the single mother, the
The number o f  participants is small in comparison to representative forms o f  social research, where 
positivist techniques are thought to guarantee research-validity by forming samples that represent larger 
cohorts. This is not, however, the purpose o f  the current research. While each participant was considered 
representative o f  governmental categories o f  welfare assistance, they were not recruited to represent the 
population at large, but rather to share testimonies and experiences relevant to diagnosing social change at 
the level o f  political governance and subjectification.
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chronically ill, the wage-labourer, the free citizen, etc. The criteria for recruiting 
participants were based on labour market experience and welfare receipt. Participants 
were recruited from each o f the following governmental categories o f assistance:
(i) ‘unemployed’ recipients receiving Newstart Allowance
(ii) ‘disability’ recipients receiving Disability Support Pensions
(iii) ‘lone parents’ receiving Parenting Payment
Narrative case-studies were designed to reflect what government authorities attest as the 
three largest groups most at risk o f welfare dependency -  the unemployed, the disabled 
and the lone parent. Unlike positivist techniques which position the researcher as 
revealing the truth o f the researched, post-structuralist techniques attend to the 
participant's view o f truth, and, therefore, the discursive resources or statements they use 
to articulate experiences regarding welfare receipt, work history, practices of self­
management. personal transformation. In this sense, the research is pluralist and 
descriptive. Rather than represent the world as ‘it really is', post-structuralist techniques 
endeavour to describe and differentiate the way discourses are taken-up in participant 
narratives and how they materialise through social practice.
Formal guidelines were formulated for contacting prospective participants through 
formal organisations and community groups. These procedures were designed to ensure 
the ethical, responsible and professional conduct o f the researcher, and to ensure that 
interview participants were recruited free from coercion or psycho-social harm. As a 
matter of course, however, participants were recruited through more informal contacts 
among the researcher’s social network, or by several degrees o f separation. By ‘informal 
techniques’ I mean contacting people by word-of-mouth and snowballing, in which case I 
invited participants who were known to me, or those who were unknown, were contacted 
via a third party who would pass on their consent. For reasons that remain unclear, female 
participants were easier to contact than the men. The difficulty o f recruiting men was 
perhaps related to the invisibility o f the marginal and the poor.
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Interviewing
Interviewing techniques renounce the hope o f producing data that is free of 
contamination. In fact, the very idea o f ‘contamination’ implies that the researcher's 
subjectivity is an intrusion, threatening to undermine the neutrality and objectivity of any 
rational, well-formulated methodology. These are certainly the concerns of positivist 
research that otherwise fantasise about the purity and authenticity of a research context. 
The critical psychologist is well rehearsed in the problems of experimental ism, demand 
characteristics, experimenter bias, and the elaborate attempts to create artificial 
conditions with which to suppress subjectivity and investigate human behaviour ‘as it 
really is’. Rather than view subjectivity as a problem, critical psychology recognises 
subjectivity as a resource (Bannister, et al., 1994). Once we overcome the anxieties of 
suppressing and deceiving subjectivity, interview techniques emerge from a space in 
which the subjectivities o f ‘the researcher’ and ‘the researched’ enter into a relational and 
dynamic process o f mutually constituting the thing we call ‘data’. In this case, data is the 
‘talk’ issuing from a context, the conditions o f which are deliberately manufactured by 
the researcher’s desire to invite the researched to speak about their experiences. There is 
neither contamination nor deception, but a relational encounter that varies according to 
social circumstances.
What does the researcher bring into this context? Firstly, a desire to know, but more 
specifically, a set o f questions, prompts, careful interventions so as to co-produce a story 
in relation to experiences surrounding the conditions o f welfare receipt. In this sense, my 
own desire was not to interrogate the research subject, but prompt them to produce a 
biography o f themselves. This is not to say the researcher occupies a passive role in this 
process; there is a strategic dimension. To use the language o f research methods, the 
interviews were ‘semi-structured’ in that I wanted people’s narratives to conform to a 
loose template or form. In each o f the interviews, I asked participants to describe their 
background in terms o f class, education, family context, early working experiences. I 
wanted subjects to build a context, as rich or as detailed as they were prepared to give, so 
as to place the event/s o f welfare and work within a broader context o f social practices, 
conditions and relations. My own questions and desires were certainly interventions that
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would, apart from managing how stories were told, focus on minute events relating to 
employment history, the conditions o f leaving or finding work, as well as the subject’s 
encounters with welfare authorities and institutions.
It would be naive to dismiss my own involvement as a kind o f tactical intervention in 
the narrative about which I wanted my participants to say more or less. But aside from the 
power of asking a question, or prompting a subject to say more, the ability to listen to a 
subject’s story, to carefully track a time-line o f events, to jot down terms, dates and 
places, was indispensable to the task o f building a narrative. At times, based on my 
interview notes, I would ask participants to backtrack and elaborate, always keeping in 
mind an artificial sense o f trajectory. The notion of trajectory allowed me to impose a 
chronological organisation on events, to capture the instantiation of experience, and place 
key events along a continuum o f social practice. Lastly, the interviews concluded with 
questions o f fantasy -  a sense o f hope, longing, and freedom -  the rationale of which is to 
evaluate how subjects project themselves into a future, to investigate an ethical dimension 
of becoming ‘other than oneself or even transcending one’s material circumstances. The 
fantasy o f freedom would serve as an important device for describing how subjects work 
on themselves through the very fictions and real obligations o f modem neo-liberal 
governance.
Transcription
Interviews were documented using audio equipment to translate talk into text. I use 
the term translate here in two senses. Firstly, I borrow from Latour and Callon (1981) the 
notion of technically transforming an event into an object, the text. By means of 
inscription, a reality is made stable, concrete and transferable so that concepts and 
techniques o f analysis can perform diagnosis from a distance. Secondly, I refer to 
translation as an interpretation, an act o f force, by which an event is transformed into a 
work of thought.
Transcription is itself a technology of qualitative social research that takes many 
different forms. An acute form o f transcription is found among ethnomethodological
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research for encoding ‘fme-grain’ details and nuances o f social interaction. The recording 
of turn-taking, pauses, the meticulous documentation of overlapping speech, intonation, 
stress, etc., locates the emerging rules for managing ‘accounts’ and accomplishing social 
actions. I do not subscribe to this method o f analysing talk as it seeks to encode a level of 
detail that captures the accuracy and authenticity of what is said. Like positivist methods, 
ethnomethodology seeks to guarantee validity by claiming to reproduce a context and 
reality ‘as it really is’. As Walkerdine, et al. (2001) argue, this tradition of research 
deletes subjectivity by appealing instead to the realism of a context that is bracketed and 
analysed in terms o f its own rules and specificities o f interaction. At the other extreme, 
we have a method o f transcription that is suitable for ‘content analysis’ (Burns, 1997). 
Content analysis is more or less concerned with the ‘nominal’ and surface features of 
language, and follows a tradition o f quantitative research whereby texts are treated as a 
transparent medium of thought, and consigned to enumerating the frequency of linguistic 
categories (Lupton, 1992). Because this is not an interpretive exercise, content analysis 
finds little or no need to encode specificities other than distinguishing the semantic 
features of text.
The kind o f transcription used here establishes a middle ground in the detail encoded 
in text. This is not to say that fine grain transcription used in formal textual analysis is 
superfluous, but I am unconvinced that this level o f detail is necessary for an analysis of 
subjectification. The approach taken here is less concerned with the minute breakdown of 
turn-taking, and more concerned with the larger organisation of talk. By clearly 
demarcating ‘chunks’ o f  talk (cf. Halliday, 1992), transcription encodes patterns of 
coherence and organisation o f themes which privilege the continuity o f talk. As a matter 
of course, this approach privileges the monologues of participants and illustrates the 
contours o f ‘natural’ breaks characteristic o f the interview context whereby modes of 
speech are governed by ‘question’ and ‘answer’. When, for instance, research participants 
are speaking and the interviewer makes minor interventions which do not disrupt the flow 
of talk, then the interviewer is embedded in the former. Furthermore, specific variables or 
differences within modes o f speech are encoded -  intonation, stress, pausing, tempo, false 
starts or repairs, and non verbal directions -  to provide the minimum indication that
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speech is embodied by particular speakers. As such, transcription attempts to strike a 
balance between accuracy and valid social knowledge (Silverman, 1993).
Coding and analysis
Coding and selecting samples from the corpus of interview material is a way of 
managing a rich volume o f data. Coding and selection is a strategic exercise since the 
researcher is organising material to find instances of narration that are illustrative of 
practices o f subjectification, styles o f self-management and an ethos o f subjectivity. One 
way o f organising the material was to encode specific instances of ‘official" and 
“unofficial" discourses. As mentioned earlier, I arranged the interview chapters under 
three thematic headings: ‘activity’, ‘regulation’ and ‘freedom’. These themes are broad 
demarcations for conjoining political and personal practices under which 1 identify 
instances o f counter discourses', statements o f resistance, counter normative practices and 
reflections, examples o f problems and contradictions. One selection strategy 1 used 
focussed on problematisations -  moments o f crisis, contradictions, ruptures or 
“disfluencies" in the production or continuity o f talk (Fairclough, 1992). Another strategy 
focussed on binary relations, in which case participants would express patterns of 
difference and opposition, inclusion and exclusion. I should mention, however, that the 
purpose of selecting these binaries is not to reproduce these distinctions, but to show how 
they are used, in some cases systematically, to articulate patterns o f difference, similarity 
and equivalence. One last comment about coding and selection is that they are used 
flexibly rather than rigidly. Interpretive work is not necessarily a systematic procedure, 
but one that uses a range o f different devices and strategies to guide analysis and draw 
out aspects o f the data that address the research question.
Previously, I attempted to show how the statements of discourse specify a mode of 
subjectification by linking political power with subject positions and discursive practices. 
To express this relation simply, the task is to somehow link the personal and political in 
such ways that extends the project o f critique. To achieve this, analysis proceeds within a 
framework comprised o f  three levels of investigation: narrative-mapping, statement 
analysis and subjectification.
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At the first level, analysis emphasises ‘mapping’ the subject’s narrative by tracing 
chronology, place and event, as well as the use o f metaphor to construct a story as a 
particular version o f reality (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). In other words, this initial level of 
analysis examines the individual narrative at face value, to estimate what kind of story is 
being told (Walkerdine, et al., 2001; Silverman, 1993). The understanding developed here 
is that the structure o f a narrative provides orientation for the analysis o f statements; it 
provides a particular narrative context of how discourses are utilised, the significance of 
their presence and absence, and what kind o f speaking positions they give rise to. The 
assumption is that narratives provide a broader structure for the instantiation of talk -  
encoding a sense o f time, place, events and relations — which are composed of discursive 
statements.
The second level o f analysis refers to the appearance and function of statements 
themselves. The criteria o f a ‘statement’ used here is similar to that of Foucauldian 
analysis: they are functional in the sense they do things rather than ‘represent’ states of 
affairs; they act to constrain or enable what it is possible to know, and are therefore 
linked to systems o f knowledge; and they occur within particular social technologies, and 
within historical limits, and form part of the techniques for the production of human 
subjects (Foucault, 1972). The statement is designed to circumscribe a position from 
which the subject speaks and acts; it might be from within a particular social technology 
-  psychology, biology, spiritualism, etc. -  which are linked to a broader field of 
statements from which they are produced, the discursive formation. But statements are 
never purely singular positions, knowledges or practices, but may arise in multiple and 
contradictory ways; they may converge around the emergence o f a problem or 
contradiction, or comprise a hybrid formation in which a number o f discourses are 
combined or mutated. Finally, statements are linked to systems o f subjection, the 
technologies o f power and forms o f regulation that produce subjectivity under a specific 
form, for a specific purpose, according to specific strategies and objectives. In this sense, 
statements perform an intermediary relation (savoir) between systems of knowledge that 
give a narrative its coherence and the subjects to which it produces.
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The third level o f analysis refers to the ethical mode of subjectification, and ties 
together the preceding levels o f analysis by identifying technologies through which the 
self establishes a relation with itself. The purpose is to identify at the level of practice the 
various ways subjectivity is managed, modified and transformed. Where a political 
diagnosis performs analysis o f the mode o f subjectification -  the moral obligations, 
norms, rules o f practice that subjects are enjoined to -  an analysis of subjectification 
examines how, and by what means, we are to become ethical subjects. An important 
aspect of linking the domain o f subjectification to a diagnosis of political power is to 
examine the manner o f being to which individuals aspire: what does the subject desire to 
become? In other words, analysis endeavours to understand the telos o f which certain 
practices and knowledges are applied to oneself. Drawing from Valerie Walkerdine's 
work on subjectivity (1988, 1989, 1991), I use the concept o f fantasy  to examine the way 
individuals project a sense o f becoming-a-subject into the future -  an aspiration, desire, 
hope or longing -  the implication o f which being subjects work on themselves to be free, 
autonomous, financially independent, secure, happy, etc. An important theme of the 
ensuing analysis is that notions o f freedom, now more than ever, operate as potent 
fantasies and fictions among contemporary regimes o f self-formation.
In the next section, I examine how notions of civil society figure among 
contemporary Australian welfare politics and, more specifically, how they are taken up in 
the ‘McClure Report' to argue for the ethical reconstruction of welfare recipients. The 
‘rise of the social' explores both primary and secondary literature and aspects of 
Foucault's argument on the ‘art o f government’ to show how political thought assembled 
a territory amenable to rule. The case is made that debates on pauperism rested upon the 
‘idea of society' which structured the terms of the Poor Law o f 1834. This event is 
contrasted with contemporary transformations of political rule. For instance, advanced 
liberal rationalities are consistent with a transformation of political territory; it no longer 
makes sense to regulate the conduct of welfare recipients in the name o f ‘civil society', 
but upon a certain conception o f a domain comprised of social obligations. This new 
space of government has recently emerged in the form of community.
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PART ONE
HISTORY OF THE PRESENT
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2 Rise of the social
In this chapter, I examine the kind o f policy statements that constitute a ‘social’ domain 
as a political object o f thought and action. What kinds of territory do political rationalities 
assemble in the name of security and freedom? And how are these linked to the present 
moral and ethical reconstruction o f the poor? Neo-liberal strategies of welfare reform, 
like those proposed by the Howard government, are historicised in terms of the 
relationship they pose between unemployability and notions of ‘social obligation' and 
‘community’. Contemporary welfare politics are interrogated alongside early nineteenth 
century debates that placed pauperism and society in a new kind of relationship. The task 
is to show how the liberal discovery o f society emerged as a moral-political solution to an 
economic problem. The problem o f poverty emerges not from the scarcity and inequality 
of a nascent free market economy, but from the moral aberration o f those who were unfit 
to take part in the project o f society. The pauper would serve to distinguish and sharpen 
the values o f economic responsibility upon which the whole of society depended. The 
recent appearance o f welfare dependency is considered in terms o f a similar project, 
though what is at stake is no longer ‘civil society' but the moral and ethical spaces of 
community.
Language of the social
On 29th October 1999. Senator Newman commissioned a Reference Group to outline 
possible directions for reforming Australia’s social support system. The Reference 
Group, chaired by Patrick McClure, and comprised of welfare leaders, academics and 
public servants, tabled the Final Report, Participation Support for a More Equitable 
Society. in July 2000. Unlike Senator Newman’s scare campaign on ‘welfare 
dependency' the year before, the ‘McClure Report’ is moderate in tone and, in certain 
instances, sympathetic to claimants’ interests. Nonetheless, its key recommendations are 
widely received as ratifying the Federal Government's strategy for expanding a 
framework o f ‘mutual obligations’.
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For the moment, I want to refrain from engaging in those ethical and political debates 
which either view the McClure Report as endorsing the Howard Government’s ‘war on 
welfare’ or whether it constitutes a serious rethinking of a system that has failed to keep 
pace with recent economic, social and demographic changes. What is of more interest 
here is the shift in focus from ‘simply meeting people’s immediate financial needs to 
helping them maximise social and economic participation over the longer term' (2000b. 
p. 12). The term social participation demonstrates a curious shift in the present politics of 
welfare reform in that ‘a framework o f reciprocity’ emerges as a solution to 'passive 
income support’. The renewed awareness o f reciprocity, responsibilities, obligations 
presuppose a view o f ‘free’ political culture -  a society comprised of ‘dense, reliable 
networks o f mutual expectations’ (Mead, 1986, p.6). The rhetoric of 'mutual obligation' 
and 'participation’ is a positive reworking o f these ideas: a particular moral formula given 
a new ethical gloss.
For now. the point o f departure is not the ethical and moral mode of activity 
suggested by discourses o f participation, but the terrain of activity they mark out. 
Consider the following statement cited in the Report’s Introduction:
The Reference Group considers that a broad concept o f  economic and social participation can 
provide a positive underpinning for the Participation Support System [ ...]  One o f the 
important principles that underpin our approach to welfare reform is that there are social 
obligations that apply to everyone. Alongside a growing emphasis on individual choice, we 
must also recognise the importance o f  obligations and responsibilities... The Reference 
Group has used the social obligations framework to develop a wide concept o f  mutual 
obligations. Obligations are reciprocal and they extend across the whole community, not just 
between government (on behalf o f  the community) and the individual in receipt o f  income 
support (McClure, 2000b, p.4).
And consider this statement on the Key Features of Mutual Obligation:
Within the social support system these social obligations are defined as mutual obligations, 
whereby the whole o f  the society  has an obligation to provide assistance to those in most 
need. Similarly, those who receive assistance and opportunities through the social support 
system have a responsibility to them selves and the rest o f  society  to seek to take advantage o f  
such opportunities. The Reference Group believes that the mutual obligations o f  
governments, business and community are o f  no less importance than the obligations o f  
individuals. In our view, the w hole social support system, with its various components, is a 
very tangible expression o f  the mutual obligations o f the community as a whole towards its 
more vulnerable members. Thus, the whole o f  this report should be seen as addressing the 
respective responsibilities o f  all sectors o f  society  (2000b, p.34, emphasis added).
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In the first statement the Reference Group argue for the expansion o f participation to 
include one's moral responsibility to others. Obligation is a reasonable expectation if we 
accept that community is already comprised o f emotional and moral allegiances. In the 
second statement, society is the embodiment of state responsibility over its members -  
pluralism bounded by natural moral responsibilities -  but the language of mutual 
obligation assembles a non-hierarchical field o f relations between stakeholders and 
communities. Since the mid 80’s ‘community’ has emerged as a sector^  of society -  a 
quasi-autonomous domain, an ‘ecological’ utopia -  capable of generating its own 
solutions to the problems o f welfare and security.
If we take ‘the social’ to mean not an abstract and independent domain, but a plane of 
thought and action that was central to political thought since the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century, then how are we to diagnose this new configuration of government? 
In the context o f the McClure Report, what are we to take the social to mean? I will argue 
‘the social' is no longer synonymous with the ‘civil state of society' but, in line with 
advanced liberal rationalities, has shifted to ‘community’. In this chapter, I want to 
interrogate the conditions under which this shift occurs. The present task is to explore the 
historical relationship between political economy and society, and show we cannot 
consider the origins and subsequent problems o f modem welfare without historically 
revisiting the problem of wealth and poverty. In the following sections. I begin to develop 
some themes for thinking about the mode o f political reason that gave rise to the 'idea of 
society'.
A rt of governm ent
In this section, I apply aspects of Foucault’s analysis of political rationalities to 
explore the theme o f the art o f  government and trace the conditions in which it was first 
possible for the social to appear as a distinctly new and ‘liberal’ phenomenon. The rise of 
the social must first be considered in terms of a new spatialisation o f knowledge which,
” If community specifies a particu lar sector  o f  phenomena it is because it forms a grouping o f  diverse 
problems, programmes, and relations which are ascribed a social character (Deleuze. cited in Donzelot. 
1979, ix). Though it is true community is not a new invention, the way it has been recently posed as a 
solution to the welfare state corresponds to the devolution o f  state responsibility whereby 'community' 
emerges as an ethical and moral space comprised o f  associational bonds and reciprocal obligations.
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from the seventeenth century onwards, came to regard population as a particular object of 
thought. It was out o f diverse concerns regarding the health, wealth and greatness of a 
population that gave rise to ‘the idea o f society’ as a complex and independent reality.
In his essay ‘Governmentality’, Foucault (1991) observes that from the middle o f the 
sixteenth up until the end o f the eighteenth century there emerges a series of diverse 
questions and political treatises which no longer serve as technologies for the advise of 
the prince, but are marked by new concerns regarding the ‘art of government'. During the 
sixteenth century, the problem of government appears at the intersection of two 
movements: one, having broken with the structures of feudalism, led to the establishment 
of territorial and administrative states, and the other, a certain liberal interpretation of 
Christian (Protestant) conduct, questioned the means of spiritual salvation. Foucault 
describes this ‘double movement’ as the tendency towards state centralisation, and the 
distribution o f religious dissidence, which together produce with ‘peculiar intensity' the 
problem of how to be ruled. The problem of government was also framed by its 
opposition to Machiavelli’s The prince, which was criticised not only for its scandalous 
and amoral rationality, but because it took the prince as the sole object and principle of 
rationality^4. The art o f government was differentiated from the capacities of the prince, 
to find ‘a plurality o f forms o f government and their immanence to the state: the 
multiplicity and immanence o f these activities distinguishes them radically from the 
transcendent singularity o f Machiavelli’s prince’ (p.91).
Among the various forms o f government that emerge in opposition to 
Machiavellianism there also emerged ‘one special and precise form' of question 
regarding the form of government which can be applied to the state as a whole (Foucault. 
1991, p.91). The key questions raised in this period are: What are the principles and 
methods which should be applied to govern a state? How to introduce the economy
34 Foucault argues The Prince is characterised by one principle: the prince ‘stood in a relation o f  singularity 
and externality, and thus transcendence, to his principality’. The prince is a single and separate source of 
power pursuing a single objective: exercising power to reinforce, strengthen and protect his principality, not 
for the benefit o f  the principality in itself, but in order to secure his own relation with what he owns, the 
territory he has inherited: ‘one can say that Machiavelli’s The Prince, as profiled in all these implicitly and 
explicitly anti-Machiavellian treatises, is essentially a treatise about the prince’s ability to keep his 
principality’ (1991, pp.80-90).
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governing the family to promote wealth into the management o f the state? Political 
treatises of this period poured over the minutiae of different forms of government, 
producing a typology o f governable forms -  governing the self, the family, the state -  but 
it was in response to questions o f how to introduce economy that became essential to the 
art of government. Where in the eighteenth century 'economy' acquires its modern 
meaning as an independent domain o f complex processes, in the sixteenth century 
oeconomy refers to a form of government.
By the sixteenth century, government moves away from feudal state forms towards 
the ‘administration o f the state’. It was during this period that a theory of the art of 
government would assemble more specific instruments for the management of the state. 
For instance, Foucault claims that a theory o f ‘managing things’, and the introduction of 
economy into political practice, allowed the development of more specific instruments 
for the tactical intervention o f processes and relations. This view would by-pass the old 
problematic whereby the good o f sovereignty was determined not by the public good, but 
the good of obeying sovereignty -  this circularity had remained a constant problem for 
theories o f sovereignty from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries^3. It was the shift 
from imposing law to employing tactics, from deriving knowledge o f the state that 
pertained to the complex relations o f men and things internal to a territory, which enabled 
the art o f government to be linked to the administrative apparatuses of the territorial 
monarchies^6. The art o f government, then, ceased to establish its operation on the 
external boundaries o f the state; it was now inside the state, and referred to those 
elements, factors and forces that would later form the objects for ‘a science of the state' 
in the form of statistics.
”  ‘In every case, what characterises the end o f  sovereignty, this common and general good, is in sum 
nothing other than submission to sovereignty. This means that the end o f  sovereignty is circular: the end o f  
sovereignty is the exercise o f  sovereignty. The good is obedience to the law, hence the good for sovereignty 
is that people should obey i f  (Foucault, 1991, p.95).
36 Foucault observes knowledge o f  the state assumes increasing importance during the seventeenth century 
-  eg. the analy ses o f  different elem ents and dimensions o f  power, the use o f  statistics and the appearance o f  
a science o f  the state -  the emergence o f  governmental apparatuses became increasingly linked to 
‘mercantilism and the Cameralists’ science o f  police’ (Foucault, 1991, p.96).
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From the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the art o f government began 
to organise itself around the theme of ‘reason of state’. Rational principles were no longer 
derived from natural or divine laws, but were now intrinsic to the state. However, it was 
this same reason o f state which, up until the eighteenth century, acted as an obstacle to 
the art o f government, blocking it within the pre-eminence of the problem of exercising 
sovereignty. The art o f government could not acquire autonomy while the problem of 
sovereignty remained the central question. Foucault suggests it was ‘mercantilism’ that 
became the first rationalisation o f the practice o f government: ‘for the first time with 
mercantilism we see the development o f a savoir of state that can be used as a tactic of 
government’ (1991, pp.97-8). With mercantilism we find a knowledge of the state 
reinserted through a consciously conceived art of government, but the expansion of 
mercantilism was itself blocked by the might o f the sovereign who, rather than increase 
the wealth o f a country, would accumulate wealth and raise armies in order to carry out 
his own policies.
The appearance o f contract theory sought to reconcile the art o f government with 
theories of sovereignty by deriving general principles o f government from the shaping of 
public lawj7. Though contract theory played an important role in theories o f public law 
and deriving the origins o f government, it still took sovereignty as its point of departure 
and was thus confined to the development o f public law in order to derive the ruling 
principles o f government:
On the one hand, there was this framework o f  sovereignty which was too large, too 
abstract and too rigid; and on the other, the theory o f  government suffered from its 
reliance on a model which was too thin, to weak and too insubstantial, that o f  the family: 
an economy o f  enrichment still based on a model o f  the family was unlikely to be able to 
respond adequately to the importance o f  territorial possession and royal finance 
(Foucault, 1991, p.98).
The art o f government finds an outlet from these obstacles as a new problem begins to 
emerge in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the problem of population. 
It was the perception o f specific problems of the population which allowed a science of 
government to recentre the theme o f the economy around a wider realm of processes as
■1? Contract theory, though logically indefensible, was rhetorically effective in insisting that the authority o f  
rulers rest not on the will o f  god or mere custom, but on being used to defend the interests and rights o f  the 
people (Plamenatz, 1963).
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opposed to the model o f the family. Foucault proposes that the development of ‘statistics' 
which, during the mercantilist tradition functioned according to the juridical framework 
of sovereignty, now functioned outside this framework in the form o f a new technology 
for the government o f populations. For instance, statistics rendered a whole new set of 
observations regarding specific attributes o f the population -  rates of birth, death and 
disease, cycles o f scarcity, increments o f labour and wealth -  together they portrayed a 
range of phenomena which were not only intrinsic to a population, but irreducible to the 
family. The population was shown to possess its own regularities specific to the 
dimension of the family. For this reason, Foucault argues that the emergence of 
population, the realignment o f economy and the irreducibility o f the family, are essential 
to showing how the family is no longer a model for government, but ‘a privileged 
instrument for the government o f the population’ (1991. p. 100). By the middle of the 
eighteenth century, the family appears as an instrument for reducing mortality, promoting 
marriage and implementing vaccination (Foucault, 1979, 1980, 1991).
Quite different to the structures o f sovereignty, the art o f government by the 
eighteenth century was no longer concerned with deriving abstract rights and formulating 
public laws to consolidate sovereign power, but referred to the welfare o f the population 
-th e  optimisation o f its capacities, the improvement o f health, the increase of wealth -  as 
conditions immanent to a population. Beginning from the sixteenth century, what became 
known as the scn’oir o f  government was by the eighteenth century conflated with the 
processes of population, now referred to as economy. The science o f political economy 
emerged precisely from a savoir o f government, marking out a field o f ‘continuous and 
multiple relations between populations, territory and wealth', thereby allowing the 
transposition of elements o f economy and population into objects that were amenable to 
techniques of intervention (Foucault. 1991, p. 101). One should not assume, however, that 
sovereignty was swept aside as the art o f government rose to become a political science. 
Rather, the problem of sovereignty was now posed with even greater intensity as to how 
juridical and institutional forms might superimpose the foundations o f sovereignty upon 
this new differentiated field o f processes. Nor was discipline eliminated either; all the 
institutions in which discipline was organised -  schools, protoindustries, armies, etc. -
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were based on the great administrative monarchies of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. Yet as the art o f government shifted its attention to a complex economy of 
processes, 'discipline was never more important or more valorised than at the moment 
when it became important to manage a population’ (ibid: 102). Population was more than 
simply knowing and regulating the surface-effects of collective phenomena, but required 
a network of apparatuses that could penetrate the depths o f 'a  complex and independent 
reality’ that was now thought to comprise ‘its own laws and mechanisms of reaction' 
(Foucault, 2000c).
Though we have not quite reached the stage at which the social begins to emerge. 
Foucault presents a history o f government as a series of specific transformations which 
lay down its conditions o f existence. The overturning of the structures of sovereignty and 
the transformation o f government into an ensemble of institutions, tactics and 
calculations find their fullest expression not within the ‘problem of the state’38 but the 
problem of population. In the next section, I want to demonstrate how the invention of 
society was linked to liberal thought, a technology o f government that begins to establish 
the limitations o f political rule. Society is the discovery o f liberalism, a newly emerging 
territory distinguished in terms o f its own complexity and independence of political 
power.
Discovery of society
What remains an issue is how the activity of government transformed space to create 
a clearing for the emergence o f society. How did government rationalities apply to a 
whole territory? In the 1982 interview, Space, knowledge and power, Foucault (2000c) 
provides a clue as to how technologies of government came to think o f territory as the 
object of various concerns. For instance, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, 
political discussions regarding the government of large states converged around the 
question of the city: should not a territory be governed in much the same way as one
Foucault suggests that one might avoid over-valuing the ‘problem o f  the state' as if  it were a looming 
entity (monstre fro id ), or a reduction o f  social and economic functions which are said to find their essential 
expression in the state. The state possessed neither an imposing unity, nor a reduction o f privileged 
functions; rather, it was a ‘mythical abstraction’ o f  only limited importance within the field o f  government 
(Rose & Miller, 1992).
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would govern a city? The model o f the city emerged as a clearly formulated idea: one 
could understand a city as a spatial metaphor or symbol which could be applied to a 
whole territory: ‘The city was no longer perceived as a place o f privilege, as an exception 
in a territory o f fields, forests and roads. The cities were no longer islands beyond the 
common law’ (pp.350-51). The characteristics o f the city and the problems to which they 
referred served as models for governmental rationality. By the eighteenth century, the 
effects of urbanism, the use o f collective facilities, precepts of hygiene, public and private 
architecture, areas o f squalor and disease, were now subject to governmental techniques 
whereby phenomena were rendered visible and calculable according to temporal and 
spatial dimensions (Foucault, 1980, 1997d; Rose, 1994b).
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the effective administration o f a state was 
considered well organised when a system of policing cities extended across the entire 
territory. The notion o f ‘police’ (polizeiwissenschaft), a corp of governing personages and 
qualified personnel, applied to those forms o f regulation that assured the strength of the 
state and the tranquillity o f the city (Foucault, 1997d, 2000c). But the police also 
embodied the very type o f governmental rationality capable of regulating the whole 
territory: 'The model o f the territory became the matrix for the regulation that apply to a 
whole state' (Foucault, 2000c, p.351). No doubt, the police functioned as a centralised 
mechanism for the surveillance and discipline o f a field of differences (Foucault. 1977b. 
1980). During the eighteenth century, the deployment of police magistrates and the 
method with which they radiated from the periphery of a city to the administrative centre 
-  the magistrate-general -  was not specific to sovereignty itself, but more the exercise of 
power which functioned coextensively with an entire state: ‘Police power must bear 'over 
everything’: it is not however the totality of the state nor of the kingdom as visible and 
invisible body o f the monarch; it is the dust of events, actions, behaviour, opinions -  
'everything that happens”  (Foucault, 1977b, p.213).
The disciplinary function o f the police did not operate in a single direction, nor did it 
function unilaterally from a single source o f power. Rather, the police function resembled 
a system o f ‘double-entry’, a lateral distribution of functions mediating between the
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desires of the king, the reports and registrations of the juridical machinery, as well as the 
concerns o f families, priests and nobles. The police was a complex function linking the 
absolute power o f the monarch with the lowest levels of power disseminated among the 
state; it enabled power to extend to the discipline of spaces exceeding the intervention of 
the monarch. In fact, it was the multiplicity o f its functions -  the myriad of visibilities it 
generated and the immense network o f spaces to which it extended -  that engendered 'a 
society o f the disciplinary type’ (Foucault, 1977b, p.215). It was the transformation from 
sovereign to disciplinary power that led to one of the great political discoveries o f the late 
eighteenth century, the very idea o f society’ (Foucault, 2000c).
With the discovery o f ‘society’ -  an independent realm possessing its own natural 
freedoms and activities — political rationalities began to engage in new questions that no 
longer required an absolute penetration o f the body politic, but formed questions around 
the limits o f government. Between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the type of 
questions responsible for shaping political thought no longer asked what is government, 
but rather how is government possible? Why must one govern? (Foucault, 2000c, 1997c). 
The answer could not and did not lie within the apparatus of the police, whose degree of 
interpenetration and field o f ‘policies’ might render the functions o f society automatic’9. 
Rather, the questions o f the late eighteenth century approached the possibility o f 
government by establishing its own limits -  one must govern without governing too 
much: ‘that if one governed too much one did not govern at all’ (Foucault; 2000c. p.352). 
Liberalism -  the political discovery o f the limitation of governmental actions as they 
apply to the phenomenon o f population -  is the form of reflections, practices and 
problems that is ‘anxious to have the respect of legal subjects and to ensure the free 
enterprise o f individuals' (Foucault, 1997c, p.73).
Liberalism emerges from a critique o f  government by ‘police’ -  not to be confused with its modem, 
negative meaning, but one that applied to seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe. Police, in this sense, 
was responsible for the detailed regulation o f  collective life with the purpose o f  maintaining the good  order 
o f a territorial community. I think it would be a misnomer to assume that with the advent o f liberalism a 
system o f  policing had disappeared altogether, rather we might cautiously state that a practice o f  policing 
had mutated at which point it became tied to principles o f  population growth and economic activity. As 
Barry Hindess observes, liberalism does not dispute the view that the task o f  police should discipline the 
production and maintenance o f  good order, but rather ‘the workings o f  society could not be known in the 
manner supposed by the theory o f  police, and therefore... could not be governed entirely in accordance 
with police prescriptions' (2001, p.96).
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So, what marks the beginnings o f liberalism is not a theory o f state, the functions of 
police nor founded upon a definition o f government. Rather, with the notion of society 
liberal thought finds it expression within the complex relations of interioritv and 
exteriority of the state:
Society, as both precondition and a final end, is what enables one to no longer ask the 
question: How can one govern as much as possible and at the least possible cost? Instead, 
the question becomes: Why must one govern? In other words, what makes it necessary 
for there to be a government, and what ends should it pursue with regard to society in 
order to justify its existence? The idea o f  society enables a technology o f  government to 
be developed based on the principle that it itself is already “too much,” “in excess” -  or at 
least that it is added on as a supplement which can and must always be questioned as to 
its necessity and its usefulness (Foucault, 1997c, p.75).
For Foucault, liberalism is both a principle and a method of rationalising the exercise of 
government by restricting itself to ‘the internal rule of maximum economy’. That is to 
say. the process by which government maximises its effects and minimises its costs is 
only possible inasmuch as it is never an end for itself, but rather a multiplicity of ends for 
which the idea o f society became its principle object. Political power abandoned the 
dream of a totally administered society and was instead confronted with a separate 
domain, whose interiority and naturalness disqualified the use of sovereign power.
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault (1977b) poses the question ‘How will power, by 
increasing its forces, be able to increase those of society instead o f confiscating them or 
impeding them?’ Again, the problem is one of freedom; power cannot reside within the 
body of the king whose ‘strange material and physical presence' can only resort to 
‘sudden, violent and discontinuous forms’ of regulation (p.208). The form of power 
synonymous with liberal technologies must refer to that ‘whole lower region', the 
heterogeneous forces, the multiple movements, the irregularities and contingencies, found 
among populations. Liberalism refers to both the period and practice where the exercise 
of power no longer requires the expansion of a force that either overwhelms a collective 
or dissolves an individual, but exemplifies the intensification o f pow>er itself -  the art of 
increasing the production o f force-relations circulating throughout a social body. For 
these purposes:
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...what are required are mechanisms that analyse distributions, gaps, series, 
combinations, and which use instruments that render visible, record, differentiate and 
compare: a physics o f  relational and multiple power, which has its maximum intensity 
not in the person o f  the king, but in the bodies that can be individualized by these 
relations (Foucault, 1977b, p.208).
That a population must be free in order to be governed is not only a condition for the 
exercise of liberalism, but also a precondition of disciplinary power, since no relationship 
of power can exist outside o f freedom. The art of liberal government, having freed itself 
from sovereignty, came to elaborate the subjective conditions for which liberalism could 
install a more ‘contractual’ notion o f freedom, and articulate the fabric of the social as the 
aggregate of mutual relations between ‘citizen’ and ‘society’ (Rose & Miller, 1992).
The social emerges at which point it becomes possible to problematise the behaviour 
of individuals on the basis o f having rejected their responsibilities to liberal society. For 
instance, the social would come to describe ‘unnatural’ or wanti-social’ forms of conduct 
around which converged a number o f apparatuses -  medicine, law, psychology, pedagogy 
-  to calibrate a field o f differences in the name of the social; it would come to naturalise 
the contractual consensus o f civil society while at the same time problematise behaviour 
in ways that demanded intervention: medicine cured the sick; law reformed the criminal; 
legislation assisted the destitute; education inculcated the dull and ignorant. In short, the 
emergence of liberal society would arrange a new order o f problems and concomitant 
programmes for optimising the freedom and productivity of populations.
In raising the capacities o f life and governing population from a distance, the rise of 
the social was the effect o f  early liberal practices of problematisation. The social 
becomes a means of programming space according to its relative functions, vectors and 
capacities as they take shape around certain problems, failures and concerns. By attaching 
themselves to these problem-events, programmes would seek to configure specific locales 
and relations for the purpose o f optimising the latent and manifest capacities of the 
population. The art o f government, and the liberal technologies they deploy, would come 
to organise space so that individuals conducted themselves freely, and embodied the 
liberal vocation of acting rationally, healthy and normal (Rose & Miller, 1992).
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In this section, I briefly traced how the discovery o f society was linked to the 
principle o f limited government at which point liberal political thought begins to govern 
through the idea o f population. Political rationalities were confronted by an independent 
domain of autonomous, self-regulating processes, the likes o f which prepared a clearing 
for the new economic discourse. So far I have only described aspects of Foucault's 
historical argument; in the next section, I want to examine both primary and secondary 
sources to take my historical argument further, and show how the discovery of society 
was tied to discourses o f pauperism and economy.
Pauperism  and society
By the nineteenth century practices o f government are confronted by the complexity 
o f a domain that begins to assume the contours of a self-regulating system. Arguably, 
there are many heterogeneous formulations, disciplines and practices that were 
responsible for this complex and autonomous view of society, but for now I want to 
examine two examples that form part o f a general thesis o f liberal political thought: the 
principles o f population and political economy. These formulations did not form part of a 
single logic of ‘state intervention’, but were deployed around, and attached to, a series of 
problematisations. In this section, I explore how together the problem of population and 
political economy transformed nineteenth debates on pauperism. I want to show how an 
emergent social science placed the lowly figure of the pauper alongside one of the 
greatest events of the nineteenth century, the discovery of society40. Before elaborating 
how classical political economy featured among debates on pauperism, it is worth 
considering what the new economic discourse displaced.
From oeconomy to economy
Adam Smith's, An inquiry into the nature and causes o f the wealth o f  nations (1776). 
is considered the first comprehensive system of economic and social development, and 
the birthplace o f social science (Tribe, 1981; Tribe and Mizuta, 2002). As much as the 
Wealth o f  Nations formed a treatise on economic development and of policies that either
40 This argument is partly a rehearsal o f  a similar thesis put forward by Polyani, who, in The Great 
Transformation states: ‘The problem o f  poverty centred around two closely related subjects: pauperism and 
political economy. Though we deal with their impact on modern consciousness separately, they formed part 
of one indivisible whole: the discovery o f  society’ (Polanyi, 1957, p. 103).
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hindered or promoted wealth, it was also partly an exposition of a much larger scheme of 
historical evolution. We can place Smith’s analysis of wealth alongside the dominant 
themes of enlightenment, which viewed principles of economic growth as consistent with 
the historical progress o f society. Insofar as Smith elaborates a theoretical conception of 
economy as a natural and independent sphere of exchange, the Adamite economy had to 
first break with the ‘mercantile system’.
Mercantilism was economic nationalism for the purpose o f building the 'wealth, 
strength and greatness o f the nation’. Smith coined the term ‘mercantile system' to 
describe the system of political oeconomy that sought to enrich the country by restraining 
imports and encouraging exports. This system dominated Western European economic 
thought from the sixteenth to the late eighteenth century. The goal of these policies was 
to achieve a 'favourable’ balance o f trade that would bring gold and silver into the 
country. In contrast to the agricultural system o f the Physiocrats, or the laissez-faire 
doctrine, the mercantile system served the interests of merchants and producers such as 
the British East India Company, whose activities were protected by the state (Appleby, 
1978; Tribe, 1978).
Political ‘oeconomy’ and political ‘economy’ are distinguishable in that the latter is 
rendered conceptually autonomous from the political order (Tribe, 1978). In political 
oeconomy41, national wealth is not equivalent to the aggregate of value produced within 
definite political boundaries, but a process of circulation within the polity of trading 
households (Dean, 1991). As Bruland and Smith observe, economic operation is domestic 
finance in which 'households of the oeconomy trade with each other, realising circulatory 
gains in so far as they can buy cheap and sell dear’ (1981, p.475). A strong nation, 
according to mercantilist theory, is a large population that can guarantee a supply of 
labour, a market and soldiers to protect against competing foreign markets. The
41 There are four assumptions under which the salient features o f  political oeconomy are recognised: (1) it 
relies upon a householding conception o f  proper economic management; (2) it presupposes the absolute 
agency o f  a sovereign or statesman prior to economic activity; (3) it assumes a patriarchal system o f  
relations among monarch and subjects, between the heads o f  a households and their wives, children, 
servants, and labourers; (4) and it presupposes a distributional problematic insofar as a wise administration 
refers to the proper maintenance o f  all objects (population, persons, and things) internal to a territory 
(Tribe, 1978; Dean, 1991; Bruland & Smith, 1981).
consumption o f luxuries were considered an anathema to prosperity and therefore 
minimised by tariffs on imported goods. The protection o f domestic markets were 
maintained by a ‘sumptuary police’ to ensure that human wants were kept to a minimum; 
good order o f a territory was realised by laws, ordinances and customs that regulated the 
profligate and dissolute tendencies o f the population: frugality, thrift and even parsimony 
were considered virtues for the creation and accumulation of wealth (cf. Steuart, 1767).
Smith was strongly critical o f the protectionism and aggressive foreign trade of 
mercantilist policies. Like the French Physiocrats, he argued there was no substantive 
difference between domestic and foreign trade, and that all forms of exchange were 
beneficial to the trader and to the public. Furthermore, the aggregate of bullion that a state 
required would be automatically adjusted, and that money, like any other commodity, 
could exist in excess. Lastly, he denied the idea that a nation could accumulate wealth 
only at the expense of another. Political economy begins to displace mercantilism by 
asserting that wealth operated autonomously, among relations of supply and demand, the 
value and division of labour, and the benign effects of the competitive market -  all of 
which posited a separate and distinctive form of economics known as laissez-faire. This 
new conception o f the economy believed wealth operated ‘naturally’ through internal 
mechanisms that should, in any wise polity, be left alone by government.
In the early nineteenth century, the appearance of ‘classical political economy' was 
responsible for separating a domain of ‘economic’ events, with its own laws and 
mechanisms, from a moral domain (Rose, 1999a). Economic events effectively opened a 
space that was amenable to political rule, to which mechanisms of governance were 
grafted onto a national space with its own customs, borders, functional relations, its own 
system of manufacturers, as well as those relations that applied to an extra-political space 
of international economies. The utility of nineteenth century economic thought was the 
tracing out o f a plane to which ‘economic policies' were applied, and its labour force 
optimised by the language o f supply and demand (Rose, 1999a).
Historians o f English poor policy such as E. P. Thompson (1971) and Himmelfarb 
(1984) argue that political economy in fact displaced a pre-existing ‘moral economy'. 
That is to say, a foundational morality based on principles of compassion, pity and the 
natural distress o f inequality were motivating principles behind poor policy prior to the 
emergence of political economy, which later insisted upon a legal-economic foundation 
of reform. Dean, however, carefully argues that such moral statements exemplified by 
Bishop Woodward (1768) and William Paley (1794) who, after all, maintained that relief 
based on natural justice ought to be guaranteed by legislation, were in fact a response to 
the failure o f a ‘police o f the Poor’. In other words, it was the collapse of oeconomic or 
mercantilist forms o f police towards the end of the eighteenth century that led to the 
ensuing crisis in poor administration (Dean, 1991, pp. 118-121).
We should not think, then, that political economy simply displaced or overturned a 
previous administration o f moral governance. Rather, by the first half of the nineteenth 
century, the emergence o f an economic order was both related to and distinguished from 
a ‘moral’ dimension o f collective existence. Practices o f government were not only 
limited to laws, principles and causalities o f the newly discovered ‘economy’, but applied 
to a moral domain of social behaviours (Rose, 1999a, pp. 102-3).
If we cannot look for an opposition between moral and economic conceptions of 
poverty to understand transformations of English poor policy, then how did moral and 
ethical themes feature among economic arguments? For this purpose, we must look for a 
discursive reference point within classical political economy that was critical of its own 
precepts. In the next section, I show how Malthus’ discussion o f population opened up a 
new space for the inspection and discipline of conduct. It was ‘social' and not political 
economy that would provide a moral-political framework for grafting moral arguments 
onto an economic domain o f quasi-autonomous processes. This new linkage between the 
social, the moral and the economic would provide the conditions for formulating new 
problematisations o f conduct. Malthus’ ‘social’ analysis o f economy would have two 
important effects on poor policy: it would naturalise the sphere o f poverty as a general 
condition o f populations, and link everything that was unnatural and anti-social under the
term pauperism. Like welfare reform in our own period, problematisations of conduct 
were enjoined to a project o f socialisation that attempted to create a utopian market 
economy.
Social economy
Giovanna Procacci (1991) observes that it was the minor field of analysis known as 
social economy42 which provided a critical reference point for understanding how the 
‘social question’ was turned against the economic by drawing its central arguments from 
the discourse o f pauperism. Thus, among the form of arguments that take population as 
an object of thought, we discover not a rejection of ethical and moral themes but 
precisely their emplacement within what might be described as the bioeconomic laws of 
population and subsistence (Dean, 1991). Through the problem of overpopulation, the 
poor become both the target o f moral restraint and the source of wealth. In Britain, the 
clearest example o f social economy was Thomas Malthus’ An Essay on the Principle o f  
Population (1798).
Malthus recapitulates earlier arguments about population and subsistence, repeating 
the familiar eighteenth century proposition from the likes of Robert Wallace (1761) and 
Joseph Townsend (1786): ‘It is an obvious truth which has been taken notice of by many 
writers, that population must always be kept down to the means o f subsistence' (1798. 
/'//). However, Malthus breaks with the utopian opinion of mercantilists who claimed in 
any properly organised society progress was consistent with the level of population, since 
population was itself the principal factor determining the amount of resources. The 
utopian view held that population and subsistence was governed by a natural self- 
adjusting mechanism as demonstrated by Townsend’s fable about the island of goats4L
42This ‘vulgar* field o f  knowledge refers to a marginal branch o f  economic theory which, by the mid to late 
nineteenth century, became known as Sozialpolitik  in Germany and economie sociale in France; for 
German examples, see Carl M enger’s Grundsatze der Volkswirtschaftslehre (1871) and Friedrich Von 
Weiser's Grundriss der Sozialokonomik  (1914) both o f whom are regarded as the key figures o f the 
‘Austrian School’ o f  econom ics. French examples o f  economie sociale include Jean Sismondi’s Nouveaux 
principes d ’economie politique  (1819), Antoine Buret’s Revue mensuelle d'econom ie politique (1833), and 
Firmin Marbeau’s Du pauperism e en France et des moyns d ’y  rem edier au principes d ’economie charitable 
(1847).
43 This story refers to a South Sea Island whereby Spanish seafarers were said to have placed a couple of 
goats that subsequently multiplied under plentiful conditions. The number o f  goats increased until they
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But Malthus introduces a fundamental disequilibrium at the heart of the natural order, an 
insurmountable scarcity, which had not yet appeared among discussions of population. 
For instance, where Townsend locates the problem of overpopulation within the fragile 
relations between population and subsistence, exacerbated by the compulsory provision 
o f the poor laws, Malthus locates such tendencies within nature itself. Malthus therefore 
recasts the problem o f poverty to create a linkage between political economy and 
population (as opposed to labour) providing more varied and flexible instruments that 
were otherwise absent in political economy.
The political significance o f Malthus’ discourse on poverty ‘resides in the double 
meaning of poverty, as both the limit to economic discourse and the key to economic 
conquest’ (Procacci, 1991, p. 153). In Smith’s discourse of political economy, for 
example, there is only an implicit poor policy, in which case the capacity of the poor to 
exchange their labour makes them beneficiaries of a progressive state of society. Apart 
from this wide gesture, however, poverty is merely the underside of wealth44. In Smith's 
labour theory o f value, poverty possesses no independent meaning other than serving as a 
counterpoint from which abundance is theoretically and practically realised. Poverty 
found no other utilisation insofar as ‘classical political economy did not discover the 
utility of a politics o f  poverty’ (Procacci, 1991, p. 155). Even the Poor Law Amendment 
of 1834 never examined the poor in Britain beyond the aims o f protecting the labour
began to suffer hunger. Under these new conditions o f  relative scarcity, the weakest died and the rest 
restored to harmony. Townsend concluded that, for the goats, there was a constant fluctuation between 
happiness and misery and that except in periods o f  famine or human intervention, their numbers were 
“nearly balancing at all times their quantity o f  food’ (1786, p.37). A second event, however, upset this 
equilibrium. Some “English privateers’ who were using the island for their provisions, set out to destroy the 
population o f goats by setting on shore a pair o f greyhounds who likewise multiplied by preying on the 
goats. In turn, the number o f  goats diminished until a certain number were able to escape the predations of 
the greyhounds by occupying the craggy rocks o f  the island. As a result, a new equilibrium between 
greyhounds and goats were established. Townsend concludes: ‘The weakest o f  both species were among 
the first to pay the debt o f  nature; the active and most vigorous preserved their lives. It is the quantity o f  
food which regulates the numbers o f  the human species’ (Townsend, 1786, p.38).
44 “Is this improvement in the circumstances o f  the lower ranks o f  the people to be regarded as an advantage 
or as an inconveniency to the society? The answer seems at first sight abundantly plain. Servants, labourers 
and workmen o f  different kinds, make up the far greater part o f  every great political society. But what 
improves the circumstances o f  the greater part can never be regarded as an inconveniency to the whole. No 
society can surely be flourishing and happy, o f  which the far greater part o f  the members are poor and 
miserable. It is but equity, besides, that they who feed, cloath and lodge the whole body o f  the people, 
should have such a share o f  the produce o f  their own labour as to be themselves tolerably well fed, cloathed 
and lodged’ (Smith, 1.8.35).
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market, beyond easing the burdens of the taxpayer or endorsing wage-labour as a means 
of subsistence. Poverty, as an object o f economic thought, never presented itself as the 
basis of administrative knowledge other than providing the conditions of its negation and 
elimination43.
If poverty was a natural consequence of economic activity, then the poor's stubborn 
resistance towards the expansion of needs was unnatural and subversive. In the lesser- 
known text. Principle o f  Political Economy, Malthus cites the example of the Irish who 
serve *to show how poverty is not the external limit of the economy, but rather its internal 
limit' (Procacci, 1991, p. 155). The poor Irish peasant ‘who lives on potatoes and dresses 
in rags’ is a model o f subversion to the expanding market of needs, and testifies to the 
futility o f producing goods if  there has been no previous attempt to ‘create the consumer'. 
The Irish peasant embodies the figure of subversion as well as the privileged subject of 
political economy insofar as he is the ideal model for the expansion of needs. Poverty. 
Procacci argues, begins to figure as ‘the territory o f unfulfilled needs, or of needs not yet 
invented; a territory that extends indefinitely, the symbol of a market without limits' 
(p. 154). Social economy must demonstrate the moral and  economic fact that poverty 
threatens the production o f wealth. Hence, the problem of economic equilibrium is 
embedded in the problem o f social equilibrium, in which case wealth is merely a 
constituent within a wider, more complex, field of scientific inquiry46.
The new problem which surfaces with Malthus in Britain and Sismondi in France is 
the emplacement o f a moral discourse within political economy for the proper
45 This economic effacing o f  poverty as an object devoid o f any independent or useful meaning is also clear 
when Ricardo calls for the abolition o f  all Poor Laws: ‘The clear and direct tendency o f  the poor laws, is in 
direct opposition to these obvious principles: it is not, as the legislature benevolently intended, to amend the 
condition o f  the poor, but to deteriorate the condition o f both poor and rich; instead o f making the poor 
rich, they are calculated to make the rich poor; and whilst the present laws are in force, it is quite in the 
natural order o f  things that the fund for the maintenance o f  the poor should progressively increase, till it has 
absorbed all the net revenue o f  the country, or at least so much o f  it as the state shall leave to us, after 
satisfying its own never failing demands for the public expenditure. This pernicious tendency o f  these laws 
is no longer a mystery, since it has been fully developed by the able hand o f  Mr Malthus; and every friend 
to the poor must ardently wish for their abolition’ (1821, Chapter V).
40 ‘The theory o f  wealth neither can nor should constitute an independent science because the facts on 
which it rests are connected indissolubly to facts o f  a moral and political order, which determine its 
meaning and its value’ (Buret, 1840, cited in Procacci, 1978, p. 157).
8 6
management of population. We find evidence of this in Malthus' discussion on 
‘preventive’ and ‘positive checks’. Given that population has the capacity to increase in 
geometrical ratio while subsistence is said to actually increase only in an arithmetical 
ratio, there is a fundamental tendency for population to outgrow the means of subsistence. 
Where the preventive check arises from ‘a foresight of the difficulties attending the 
rearing of a family’ (1798, pp. 19-20) ‘... and the fear o f dependent poverty' (1798, p.39) 
its operation applies to all ranks o f society. The positive check ‘by which I mean the 
check that represses an increase which is already begun’ operates chiefly among lower 
classes in providing proper food and care for their children (1798. pp.23).
According to Malthus, it is the poor who conspire in their own fate, their manner and 
customs making them peculiarly susceptible to misery and vice. Though he does not 
attribute to the poor a more primitive and brutish nature than the upper classes, the 
principle o f population and the universality of the laws of human nature are more acutely 
felt among the lower classes47. In terms o f easing or preventing these burdens, Malthus 
advises methods o f ‘moral restraint’, which in later editions of the Essay he defines as *a 
restraint from marriage from prudential motives, with a conduct strictly moral during the 
period of this restraint’ (1872, p.8). It was the responsibility of male breadwinners, 
earning low wages, to exercise moral restraint for fear that improvidence led to poverty 
and dependence. By corollary, the existing poor laws undermine this moral imperative by 
eradicating the ‘spirit o f independence’:
If men are induced to marry from a prospect o f  parish provision, with little or no chance o f  
maintaining their fam ilies in independence, they are not only unjustly tempted to bring 
unhappiness and dependence upon themselves and children, but are tempted, without knowing 
it. to injure all I the same class with themselves. A labourer who marries without being able to 
support a family in som e respects be considered as an enemy to all his fellow-labourers 
(Malthus, 1798, p.27).
The management o f population must therefore proceed along new and careful lines; 
first it must counter the socialists who would abolish private property (like William 
Godwin to whom Malthus’ Essay is a rejoinder), and approach the problem of assistance
47 Similar to the observations made by Hume, Malthus argues it is the habits or behaviours o f  the labouring 
poor that require moral restraint: ‘The labouring poor, to use a vulgar expression, seem always to live from 
hand to mouth. Their present wants employ their whole attention, and they seldom think o f  the future. Even 
when they have the opportunity o f  saving they seldom exercise it, but all that is beyond their present 
necessities goes, generally speaking, to the ale-house’ (1798, p.27).
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without resurrecting the old type o f charity. Malthus’ genius was to discriminate the poor 
by banishing all forms o f dependence outside the economic responsibility o f the family48. 
The social economists, like Malthus, Sismondi, Gerando, Chevalier, Dunoyer. Villerme. 
Dupin. and others, would uphold the family as the site of economic independence. In The 
Policing o f  Families (1979), Donzelot draws attention to how the transformation of 
public assistance from material aid to that of giving ‘advice’ coincided with the 
rehabilitation of the family in becoming a cornerstone o f ‘moral advisability’49. By the 
early nineteenth century, ‘morality was systematically linked to the economic factor' 
which, in the form o f policies, performed the dual discursive function of inventing a 
politics o f poverty, calling for the elimination of pauperism, while conceding a natural 
state of inequality.
Beyond the abstract gaze o f economic analysis, morality became a novel technique of 
investigating the habits and circumstances surrounding the ‘life of the poor* if for no 
other purpose than to distinguish genuine poverty from artificial indigence^0. This 
grafting of morality onto economics opened poverty, and more particularly pauperism , to 
a whole set o f examinations and descriptions. Philanthropy was the first to perform the 
dual function o f surveillance and remoralisation, and, hence, supplement a politics of 
poverty by constituting an independent domain of social behaviours. Where classical 
political economy could only render ‘poverty’ as a deficiency of labour and the limits of 
wealth, social economy, by contrast, relocates the object within a field o f relationships 
upon which intervention is possible (Procacci, 1991, pp. 156-7). Social economy would
4S 'Hard as it may appear in individual instances, dependent poverty ought to be held disgraceful" (1798. 
p.27).
4g This is most clearly seen in Malthus’ conviction that marriage implied an absolute limitation on the 
responsibility o f  the state for all w ives and their children. The dependence o f  w ives and children upon the 
breadwinner was consummated by the state, while the independence o f  the breadwinner was paramount to 
his responsibility to the family. To encode the solemnity o f  these principles, Malthus insisted that every 
marriage include a sermon on the evils o f  matrimony without adequate means, a suggestion that was widely 
ridiculed by his critics (Dean, 1991, pp.84-5; Poynter, 1969, p. 157).
30 'Since it was a matter o f  giving advice, o f  not giving material aid except insofar as it would make for the 
penetration o f  these pieces o f  advice, the displacement o f  the old form o f  charity in favour o f  philanthropic 
benevolence was to rely for the most part on the perfection o f  new modes for allocating assistance, on the 
search for a procedure that would make it possible both to discriminate between 'artificial indigence" and 
genuine poverty’, and to incorporate into social assistance the demand for its elimination ... In order to 
distinguish between genuine poverty and artificial indigence, it is preferable to probe into the life o f  the 
poor rather than being moved by the sight o f  ragged clothing and open sores’ (Donzelot, 1979, pp.68-9).
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therefore open space to a whole range of moral technologies for the inspection and 
discipline of pauperism.
By the nineteenth century, pauperism was distilled from poverty; it became associated 
with mobile and indiscernible acts of dissension and nuisance. Social economy provided 
a moral-political framework for linking pauperism directly to the spectre of the mob and 
the threat o f ‘social danger’. The new problem was one o f preventing poverty from 
deteriorating into pauperism:
Poverty... derives from inequality o f  conditions... It is humanly impossible to destroy 
inequality. There will always therefore be rich and poor. But in a well-governed state, 
poverty must not degenerate into indigence... It is in the interests o f  the rich as much as 
o f  the poor that this should be so (Marbeau, 1847, cited in Procacci, 1991, p. 159).
Again, Procacci cites only the French example when illustrating the distinction between 
poverty and pauperism: the former was a lamentable consequence of the development of 
wealth, while pauperism was an unnatural deformity o f civilised society51. The discourse 
on pauperism did not seek to eliminate poverty, but distinguish difference, rather than 
inequality, among the poor: ‘And here ‘moral’ language finds its exact meaning. By the 
term ‘difference’ I want to underline that the essential significance of the term 
‘pauperism’ consists in indicating a series o f different forms o f  conduct, namely those 
which are not amenable to the project of socialisation which is being elaborated' (1978.
p. 160).
A discourse o f pauperism applied a more discriminating gaze over the behaviour of 
populations; indeed, poverty became a favoured site of observation. It was no accident 
that the factory had not yet emerged as the privileged site o f inspection; instead, it was 
the myriad reports o f squalor and disease that provided the optimum conditions for
” Though Procacci cites examples specific to the kind o f  social investigation in France known as 
I'economie sociale  they share a striking resemblances with the problem o f  pauperism posed in Britain. 
There are nonetheless important differences between the notion o f  pauperism in I ’economie sociale and 
early nineteenth century debates on pauperism in Britain. For example, in France, pauperism was usually 
defined as an urban phenomenon, while the poor law debate construed pauperism as an agrarian problem 
‘associated with the stagnation in the mobility o f  labour caused by poor-relief practices and the law o f  
settlement’ (Dean, 1991, pp. 199-200; Chevalier, 1973, pp. 139-144). However, for the purpose o f  
constructing the present argument both groups o f  statements, despite their contextual differences, employ 
similar strategies o f  posing the ‘social question’ as a means o f  problematising pauperism as a set o f  anti­
social behaviours.
89
developing techniques for bringing these sectors under management. In response to these 
challenges, various instruments and experts would be deployed -  the statistician, the 
public hygienist, the educator -  together, these figures were responsible for constructing a 
grid of observations from which disorder was given an orderly and decipherable form. By 
the late nineteenth century such instruments became indispensable for the good 
administration of the newly formed object o f the social sciences, society.
Malthusianism would introduce two useful principles to the debate on pauperism: first 
it naturalised the domain o f poverty as a fundamental condition of scarcity; and second, it 
advocated moral restraint as the basis for exercising economic responsibility. Political 
economy was able to separate poverty from the question of need and transpose it into a 
problem of social integration. But if  all these programmes of medicalisation, education 
and remoralisation sought to prevent pauperism, they also wanted to constitute the poor 
as politically responsible subjects. Procacci (1991) reminds us that these technical 
interventions also had another more positive function: to elicit forms of participation and 
association. Moralisation could only succeed if the dangerous classes were recruited into 
the political machinery o f representation52. Participation would ensure property 
ownership became a ‘liberal reward’ for labour and self-discipline; in political activity it 
would act as an instrument for co-opting decisions, for diffusing political conflict, and 
constructing useful forms o f association. Practices of differentiation (pauperism). 
solidarity' (society ) and wealth (economy) were the organising principles for the invention 
of society, and the birth o f state welfare.
The point o f this historical detail is to show how, by the early nineteenth century, 
liberal rationalities had stumbled upon a unique solution to the problem of the poor. With 
the collapse o f the mercantilist police of the poor, we find through the principle of limited 
government that liberalism sought to govern collective life through population; that is. in 
terms o f a territory that began to assume its own complex and autonomous reality. It was 
not the opposition between morality and political economy that radically transformed
After all ‘an institution is not stable unless sanctioned by public opinion’ (Alexandre de Laborde, 1821. 
cited in Procacci, 1991, p. 166).
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English poor policy, but the grafting o f morality onto economic factors, the clearest 
example o f which is found among the minor field o f analysis known as social economy. 
By taking population as an object o f thought, Malthus was exemplary of those liberal 
solutions which recast the problem o f poverty by establishing a link between 'moral 
restraint' and the new economic discourse. A new field of intervention emerged: the task 
was not one of eliminating poverty -  poverty was, after all, a natural and lamentable 
consequence of population and subsistence -  but preventing poverty from degenerating 
into pauperism. The origins o f welfare are therefore found among the myriad 
programmes that sought to remoralise and reintegrate the pauper into the liberal project of 
society.
I think we can apply this formula o f government to increase our understanding of 
contemporary welfare politics in own period. For instance, current neo-liberal reforms 
reactivate discourses o f pauperism to propose new forms of solidarity based on 'social 
partners and individual citizens, new procedures for the acceptance and sharing of 
responsibilities (permanent retraining, self-management, decentralization)' (Donzelot, 
1991. p. 178). Where nineteenth century discourses o f pauperism were enjoined to a moral 
project of 'society', the discovery o f modern welfare dependency is enjoined to an ethical 
project of 'community’. In the next section, I want to examine how notions of community 
emerged within Australian welfare politics, and show how contemporary practices of 
government now act on an ethical space of relational responsibilities.
Governing through com m unity
The concept o f 'solidarity’, to use the language of Jacques Donzelot. emerges in a 
distinct way from that o f sovereignty; it specifies the framework and scope of state 
intervention that begin to mark out the foundations of social welfare. In the name of 
solidarity, the state acts in accordance to principles of social advancement, and 
establishes The welfare state’ as a means of standing outside society to become the 
guarantor of its progress. The emergence of society accords with a breaking down of 
antagonisms and hostilities between liberals and communists, traditionalists and
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revolutionaries, finding its mode o f legitimation in the realisation of a 'consensus 
society03.
By the 1960’s, there begins to emerge in the West a ‘crisis of governmentality' that 
draws new lines regarding the mutual roles of state and society34. Right wing reformists 
attacked the extrinsic position o f the state which had shifted away from the role as 
external guarantor o f the progress o f society to that of manager directly responsible for its 
destiny: the state had become an entity enlarged by its own bureaucratic logic and made 
redundant by its separation from society. The left would denounce the very principle of 
the reality o f progress in which change becomes increasing more nebulous and difficult to 
control for those disaffected and excluded by progress: the state is denounced for 
usurping the sovereignty that properly belongs to society. On one side, we have the 
argument that the expansion o f the state underlies the inflation o f social expenditure, 
hence the increasing benefit function o f the state. On the other, we have a critique of the 
technocratic nature o f social intervention -  the unitary language o f statistics -  insisting on 
new categories and distinctions with which to estimate the deleterious effects of elitism, 
exclusion and coercion.
By the early 80’s the debate between neo-social democracy and neo-liberalism had 
come to frame the ‘crisis o f the welfare state’ where themes o f change were substituted 
for that of progress. The breakdown o f social democracy’s utopian ideal o f a society that 
was both democratic and socialist implied that we can no longer place our faith in the 
future prospect o f social harmony, instead solidarity and sovereignty are forced to 
coincide in the present which ‘implies a new relation of society and time'. It is the 
breakdown o f this promise that signalled the crisis o f the welfare state. But at the very
The welfare state, according to Donzelot, emerges out o f  two operations: that is, 'by enlarging 
opportunities, by the social promotion o f  the individual, it acts as a force for emancipation, and creates 
freedom'; and ‘by reducing risks, by the promotion o f the social and the corresponding limitation o f the 
irrationalities o f  the econom ic, it acts as a force for socialization, and creates collective security' (1991. 
p. 174).
54 Donzelot summarises the debates as follows: ‘given that the state has changed from a guarantor to a 
manager o f  destiny, charged with providing a form o f security whose cost w eighs ever more heavily on the 
economy, w hile being faced with a citizenry whose liberty has been widened by the decline o f  traditional 
forms o f  authority which the state itself has helped to displace, and yet been emptied o f  content by the 
state's monopoly o f  the levers o f  change -  what is the state to do?’ (1991, p. 176).
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moment politicians, economists and intellectuals began to speak o f this crisis, the events 
of May 68 announced the end o f socialist revolution -  a turning away from communism, 
and the renunciation o f revolution as a technique for effecting change. Debates between 
right and left no longer threatened any direct and decisive confrontation of the structure 
of society; instead, their opposition converged around ‘the best way of utilising conflicts 
to make society more dynamic’. Hence, with the breakdown o f utopianism, and the 
falling away o f socialist revolution, Donzelot argues that the debate between left and 
right is now conducted on the terrain o f social democracy: ‘it has to do with the forms to 
be taken by the social bond, not with the structure of society itself (1991. pp. 176-7).
It is precisely the notion o f the ‘social bond’ that marks the entry, in a rather 
unexpected way, o f a new theme regarding the governability of liberal democracies and 
market-based economies since the collapse o f state socialism. With the rise of neo­
liberalism in the 1980’s, it was argued that far from promoting social cohesion and social 
justice, modem welfare systems created social fragmentation and fostered a ‘dependency 
culture’ (Murray, 1984; Moore, 1987). In the United States, debates on welfare reform 
effectively shifted from the ‘war on poverty’ in the 60’s to the ‘war on welfare’ in the 
90’s (Gilder, 1981; Katz, 1989). Nonetheless, the kind of market-based individualism 
executed by the New Right governments o f Reagan and Thatcher were not met without 
sustained criticism from both left and right. Some claimed that market-based solutions to 
the social and economic problems addressed by welfare effectively hollowed out the state 
and eroded social bonds (Fukuyama, 1995). Ironically, where the classic welfare state 
was thought to undermine an ethic o f solidarity and self-reliance, market individualism 
produced an ethos o f isolation and passivity (MacIntyre, 1981), and contributed to the 
‘demoralisation’ (Himmelfarb, 1995) of traditional norms upon which the social order 
and the functioning o f free-markets presumably depends. By the closing decades of the 
twentieth century a new solution claimed to identify a ‘third way’ (Giddens, 1998; Blair 
and Schroder, 1999). Now, the problem of the classic welfare state is that it was ‘passive' 
rather than ‘active’; it offered a ‘hand out’ rather than a ‘hand-up'. Contemporary 
rationalities o f government revitalise the social bond in the form of community to restore
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civic participation and foster a new ethic of self-governance (Bauman, 1993; Rose, 1996. 
1999a).
O f course, community is not a new idea but one that has emerged at various points, 
and in different ways, to specify a natural, extra-political space of positive human 
relations (Rose, 1999a). The innovation that lies in this novel conception of community is 
its peculiar spatial and technical relation to power. If community is said to counter 
market individualism and exceed direct political intervention, this is not say it is a remote 
or artificial space o f society55. The idea o f ‘community’ is both spontaneous and real in 
the sense that political rationalities bring into existence the very vectors, forces and 
relations through which processes o f identification, self-management and responsible 
conduct are assembled. We might think o f community as a strategy to simultaneously 
collectivise and autonomise a sector in terms of its own intrinsic, relational properties.
So to what is community a solution? As the territory o f political power shifts from 
centralised forms o f governance, liberal government finds in the principle of the social 
bond the means o f relieving political power of its obligations and responsibilities. The 
state is no longer the sole guarantor o f progress, and no longer required to answer all 
society's needs for order, security, health and productivity. Individuals, families, 
organisations and businesses are now recruited to take on as much o f the responsibility as 
possible for the management o f these issues. Together these new ensembles of agencies, 
authorities and individuals are to form their own ‘partnerships’, to assemble their own 
‘social coalitions' with which to engage in issues that were once the charge of civil 
society. In response to fluctuations and downturns of the labour market, individuals are 
now expected to undertake life-long learning, permanent retraining and constant self­
management. In response to the risks of working and living, families, workers and 
communities are expected to shoulder some of the burden for managing these risks
" The particular notion o f  community diagnosed here breaks from conventional meanings. For instance, it 
is not a geographical domain — defined by its neighbourhood, its demography or social services, though it 
may be realised by any one o f  these -  but a domain reconfigured in terms o f  the naturalness o f  its own 
networks, capacities and contours. At best, community is a plane o f  thought and action, a schema for 
understanding the processes o f  objectification and instrumentalisation through which individuals are 
morally and ethically bound to a project o f  autonomous and responsible conduct.
94
through private insurance, community development, not-for-profit organisations, 
volunteering and charity. As Rose (1999a) points out, community forms the technical 
embodiment o f a space that is fabricated out of the purpose of realising its own autonomy 
and responsibility56. Community emerges as a solution to the problems of the social 
insofar as these ‘third sectors’ are constituted as new domains of knowledge and action. 
New authorities, distinctions, visibilities and boundaries are made up to assemble new 
forces in the government o f conduct. It is certainly the contention of this thesis that 
Australian welfare reform draws from the same kind of technologies which, in line with 
Rose's observation, seek to govern in terms of community (Rose, 1996, 1999a). Before 
discussing how notions o f community feature in Australian welfare reform. I want to 
firstly examine some o f the statements and arguments that frame this sector as a solution 
to welfare.
Politics o f  comm unity
The peculiar resolve o f community is the way it responds to the difficulties of 
pluralism and difference37. Communitarians like Amitai Etzioni (1993, 1997) have 
responded to these difficulties by affirming moral codes o f diverse 'cultural' 
communities. It is not the unitary, authoritative idea that must reconcile difference, but 
something approximating ‘core values’ and ‘moral voices’ that emerge from different 
sectors of the social38. To avoid the fragmentation and excessive relativism of unbound
56 ‘Organizations and other actors that were once enmeshed in the complex and bureaucratic lines o f  force 
o f the social state are to be set free to find their own destiny. Yet, at the same time, they are to be made 
responsible for that destiny, and for the destiny o f  society as a whole, in new ways. Politics is to be returned 
to society itself, but no longer in a social form: in the form o f individual morality, organizational 
responsibility and ethical com m unity’ (Rose, 1999, p. 174).
57 Alistair Macintyre in After Virtue (1981) reflected on community as a way o f  reconstructing the virtues 
o f citizenship. Using Aristotelian principles to make his case, he argued for the return o f a single 
authoritative conception o f  the g o o d  which might be agreed upon and exercised within a community to 
counter the effects o f  liberal individualism eroding civil society. The problems encountered by this neo- 
Aristotelian account is that it seemed unable to reconcile the civic republican idea o f  consensual political 
virtues among the diversity o f  qualities exemplified by multi-racial, multi-cultural and multi-religious 
groups o f  society .
58 On this point, Etzioni claims: ‘som e concepts o f  multiculturalism do not favor maintaining one 
overarching community, in which various subcultures will find a legitimate place. I speak not o f  the 
constituent communities -  neighborhoods, ethnic groups, and so on -  but o f  the community o f  
communities, o f  the American society. Without a firm sense o f  one supra-community, there is considerable 
danger that the constituent communities will turn on one another. Indeed, the more one favors  
strengthening communities, a core o f  the Communitarian agenda, the more one must concern oneself with 
ensuring that they see them selves as parts o f  a more encompassing whole, rather than as fully independent
pluralism, Etzioni insists that different communities are capable o f being unified around a 
shared core and a common constitutional framework.
Often citing Alexis de Tocqueville’s nineteenth century observations of America, the 
communitarian thesis contends that a ‘moral vacuum’ has followed the challenge to 
traditional mores in the 1960’s and greatly weakened the social fabric of contemporary 
America (Bellah, 1985). In support o f his argument, Etzioni cites family breakdown, 
malingering at work, drug and alcohol abuse, public scandals, insider trading and other 
unethical business dealings (1996, pp.27-8). His solution lies in a return to a site of moral 
regeneration since it is ‘through communities that individuals and groups in a good 
society encourage one another to adhere to behaviour that reflect shared values’ (Etzioni, 
1997, p. 124). The 1970’s and 1980’s witnessed a return of coercion as means of 
restoring order which, Etzioni maintains, only fuelled further increase in social disorder 
and anti-social behaviour. The ‘new communitarian’ formula is one that strikes a balance 
between autonomy and community, individual rights and social responsibilities. The aim 
of good governance is not to block individual freedom, but utilise it to restore the ‘good 
society beyond state or market’ (Etzioni, 2000, x-xii). Community is therefore sustained 
and guided by the informal web o f social bonds and moral voices that encompass a stock 
of shared meanings and values. More importantly, it is an active network, a responsive 
and self-adjusting mechanism, always seeking the balance between responsibility and 
freedom.
The main set o f statements endorsing an ethic of obligation and participation are from 
arguments put forward by associationalists. For example, it is the version of 'social 
capital' developed by Robert Putnam (1993, 1995, 2000) that most exemplifies the term's 
recent popularity among contemporary political thought. In Making Democracy Work 
(1993), Putnam uses the term social capital to compare political reform in Northern and 
Southern Italy. He found that regions with strong democratic and economic institutions
and antagonistic... there is the even more important matter o f  a set o f  shared core values, especially the 
commitment to democracy, the Bill o f  Rights, and mutual respect among subgroups. Constituent 
communities can follow  their own subsets o f  values without endangering the social body, as long as they 
accept these shared values, they provide the frame o f unity to contain the “plurals” from falling out 
(Etzioni, 1993, pp. 155-7).
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were ‘blessed with vibrant networks and norms of civic engagement’, while those with 
weak institutions were ‘cursed with a vertically structured politics, a social life of 
fragmentation and isolation, and a culture of isolation’ (Putnam, 1993, p. 15). Societies 
‘rich’ in social capital are said to possess dense networks and cultures o f association (esp. 
voluntary association) exemplified by sporting, religious, community and neighbourhood 
activity. These various memberships sustain trust and an ethos of reciprocity and 
cooperation.
Where Putnam develops his account about the creation and destruction of social 
capital from James Coleman (1988), he tends to theorise it as an attribute of collective 
life, specifying the resources a collective draws on to overcome ‘dilemmas of collective 
action'. The main thesis is that a whole range of social ills -  drugs, crime, unemployment, 
alienation, education and family breakdown -  are more readily and effectively addressed 
in these natural settings. The assumption is that public policies should act upon 
supportive norms o f civic engagement embedded in community networks: ‘the quality of 
life and the performance o f institutions (and not only in America) are indeed powerfully 
influenced by norms and networks o f civic engagement ... successful outcomes in 
education, urban poverty, unemployment, the control of crime and drug abuse, and even 
health... are more likely in civically engaged communities’ (Putnam, 1995, p.66).
So how does social capital imagine the space of economic life? Firstly, it combines 
the very contemporary language o f networks, with the much older register of community: 
its rationality assembles a much different political territory from that of the 
'macropolitical' or the ‘hierarchical’. Instead, it seeks to enhance the 'performance of 
democratic institutions’ (Putnam, 1993, p.3). The performative aspects of 'bridging' and 
‘bonding’ social capital are not merely concerned with achieving agreement, but 
achieving purposes59. Performance renders processes intrinsic to social activity 
measurable and calculable, translating them into objective criteria -  rates of participation 
and distribution, performance auditing and accounting. Internal to performance is a self­
59 'We want government to do  things, not just decide things -  to educate children, pay pensioners, stop 
crime, create jobs, hold down prices, encourage family values, and so ’ (Putnam, et al. 1993, pp.8-9).
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interested, self-maximising agent much closer to the methodological individualism of 
rational choice theory, but whose ontological position is enhanced by the mutual benefits 
of cooperation and reciprocity. Social capital enhances performance in two ways: through 
skills and practices o f cooperation acquired through active forms of participation; and, 
through patterns of self-governance that emerge from expectations of trust and 
cooperation. In other words, social capital is a regulatory mechanism immanent to 
practices o f  interaction and networks o f  community. Community is affirmed via a 
different conceptual route: it enjoins us to perceive cooperation, trust and community as 
instruments for improving the performance and competitiveness of society (Walters. 
2002).
Reform
The idea of ‘community’ as a new political space begins to creep into Australian 
welfare debates in the mid 90’s. In a speech accompanying the release of a position paper 
outlining recent policy directions, Alexander Downer committed a Coalition government 
to restoring ‘basic community networks o f action and responsibility built on the 
commitment of individuals, families, neighbourhoods, small and medium size businesses, 
and governments which are accountable as directly as practicable to the communities 
they serve’ {The Things that Matter, 1994). After winning office two years later, the 
Coalition government, under the leadership o f John Howard, announced their proposal 
for a ‘work-for-the-dole’ scheme. When the legislation was introduced by Dr Kemp 
(Minister for Vocational Education and Training), the obligations of the young 
unemployed were further stressed in terms of obligations to community: ‘Many 
Australians believe that it is fair and reasonable that those being supported by the 
community should make a contribution in return’ (1997a, p.2459). In the debates that 
followed the introduction o f the Bill, the government was assiduous in its defence of 
mutual obligation and the responsibilities of welfare beneficiaries. According to Kemp, it 
was ‘fair to require the person receiving that support to put something back into their 
community’60 (1997b, p.4097). In response to Kemp’s endorsement o f mutual obligation.
60 He went onto to say: ‘A lot o f  people in this community are working very hard to provide support for 
unemployed people to assist them in gaining worthwhile work experience. Families are giving up money to
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the Leader of the Opposition, Kim Beazley, intervened to point out that these were 
originally Labor policies that had been picked up in turn by ‘New' Labour in Britain 
under Tony Blair (Beazley, 1997a, p.9205). The difference in the Parties’ policies was, 
according to Beazley, that ALP offered a genuinely mutual set of responsibilities between 
government and people whereas, under the Coalition ‘mutual obligation is self-provision' 
as the government withdraws from ‘its role as partner in the community’ (Beazley. 
1997b).
Communitarianism and associationalist themes also find their way into Mark 
Latham’s deliberations over policy options for Labor. In Civilising Global Capital 
(1998). he makes the case for policies based on the ‘reciprocation of responsibility’ 
because only a ‘genuine sharing o f responsibility’ will provide members of the 
community with the social capabilities required for ‘active citizenship". For Latham, 
mutual obligation can only work if  there is an acceptance by the government of its 
‘positive responsibilities’ towards the community to deliver welfare that ‘enhances labour 
force skills and personal capabilities and, through them gives a degree of social mobility 
that will enable escape from a cycle o f poverty and dependency’ (Latham. 1998. p.205). 
Since 1998, Latham was also active in reworking much of the ALP’s economic policy 
using Third Way principles for the ‘renewal of social democracy’61. Often citing Putnam, 
Latham goes on to argue that a ‘strong society’ with bonds of trust and mutuality between 
citizens leads to a ‘strong economy’. The rationale being that people in a society with 
dense networks o f respect and cooperation tend to value interdependence as much as self- 
interest, thereby facilitating economic transaction (1998. pp.262-273, pp.309-12).
Pre-empting the recommendations o f the McClure Report, Jocelyn Newman also 
links the problem o f welfare dependency to ethical solutions o f 'partnership' and 
'participation':
do that and this government believes that the principle o f  mutual obligation is a very important principle 
which should underlie programs in this area’ (Kemp, 1997c, p.600).
61 ‘The recasting o f  social democratic ideology draws from the most attractive aspects o f  liberalism and 
socialism: liberal in the sense o f  selectively pursuing state powers for the creation o f  social and economic 
freedoms; socialist in the sense o f  wanting to foster a dense web o f  social responsibility and respect for the 
common good’ (Latham, 1998, p.326).
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We need to build new partnerships between all levels o f government, business and local 
communities. This social coalition is essential to expanding available opportunities for 
economic and social participation and to providing many o f the supports that people need to 
maximize their potential and contribution to society (Newman, 1999a, p.7).
This accent on community and collaboration is greatly strengthened in the Report, 
becoming more central than either ‘self-sufficiency’ or ‘giving something back to 
community’. The authors of the Report stress the importance of social capital as 'the 
bonds o f trust and relationships and shared norms that communities build and renew 
when people interact with each other in families, workplaces, neighbourhoods, local 
associations'. In these nostalgic settings social participation helps 'people grow and 
flourish as human beings and be full members o f Australian society’ (McClure. 2000b, 
p. 13).
We could apply these ethical themes of ‘community’, ‘participation' and 
'responsibility’ to give several overlapping readings of the concept of mutual obligation. 
Firstly, the contractual features o f mutual obligation are pluralised and expanded to a 
whole framework o f mutual obligations. Secondly, the concept of ‘social obligations' 
redefines the social in terms o f ‘all obligations that everyone has to the rest o f society' 
(McClure, 2000b, p.51). Third, the social/mutual obligations framework endorses a wide 
range of participation activities through a philosophy that ‘recognises, supports and 
validates voluntary work and caring, without prescribing any particular form of social 
participation’ (McClure, 2000b, p.9). Finally, the Report argues for a widened concept of 
mutual obligations to include all forms of ‘responsibility for economic and social 
contribution’:
The Reference Group believes that the mutual obligations o f  governments, business and 
community are o f  no less importance than the obligations o f  individuals. In our view, the 
whole social support system , with its various components, is a very tangible expression o f  the 
mutual obligations o f  the community as a whole towards its more vulnerable members. Thus, 
the whole o f  this report should be read as addressing the responsibilities o f  all sectors of  
society (McClure, 2000b, p.52).
What if we resisted the implicit seduction of thinking of these communities, 
associations and responsibilities as the actual descriptions o f states of affairs, and thought 
of them in terms o f government? If political rationalities have a characteristically moral 
form in that they seek to encode the proper principles of relations between the governing
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and the governed, then communitarians and associationalists offer the promise of a new 
moral contract, a new partnership between the state and the responsible citizen. By 
targeting the social bond, they locate the problem of the welfare state in the breakdow n of 
solidarity; the ‘culture o f welfare dependency’ is symptomatic of the erosion of 
community and collective identity. The moral programme of community seeks to give 
civility a definite shape by prescribing ethical forms o f conduct -  autonomy, 
responsibility and activity. The rise o f community ensures that governance is naturalised 
and remoralised in terms o f both the social bond and the autonomy of individuals: ‘the 
self must govern itself communally in the service of its own liberty, autonomy and 
responsibility’ (Rose, 1999a, p. 186).
To understand how the politics of community remoralises the welfare dependent in 
the name o f the social bond we must revisit the politics of poverty that begins to emerge 
in the early nineteenth century. Earlier, I argued that under classical political economy the 
poor were implicitly beneficiaries o f a progressive state of society in that they could 
exchange their labour for subsistence, but poverty possessed no independent meaning 
other than specifying the underside o f wealth. A politics of poverty begins to reformulate 
the ‘social question’ by turning to a discursive reference point that was critical of 
classical political economy, social economy. It was by making population a specific 
object of thought that Malthus was able to prescribe principles o f moral restraint to able- 
bodied males and breadwinners, thereby naturalising the economic responsibility of the 
family while at the same time making poverty a natural condition o f human struggle6^ . 
The remoralisation o f the poor emerged from the political significance of Malthus' 
double meaning o f poverty: poverty was not simply the limit o f political economy but the 
key to its expansion. In the case o f social economy, morality was systematically linked to 
political economy claiming it was pauperism, and not poverty, that threatened the 
production of wealth.
02 ‘Essentially, econom ic society was founded on the grim realities o f  Nature; if man disobeyed the laws 
which ruled that society, the fell executioner would strangle the offspring o f  the improvident. The laws o f  a 
competitive society were put under the sanction o f  the jungle’ (Polanyi, 1957, p. 125).
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Under social economy notions o f pauperism were distilled from poverty. Pauperism 
signalled not the economic contradiction of the free market system -  this was apparently 
a natural and lamentable consequence o f the human condition -  but it was the unnatural 
conduct of the pauper who represented an aberration to the project of socialisation. We 
can say that a politics o f poverty coincides with a politics of conduct at which point the 
pauper emerges from the intersection of political and social economy. The steadily 
emerging view o f ‘complex society’ -  a domain possessing its own naturalness and 
independence -  was an economic project in that society coincided with the establishment 
of the free market system, but it was also a moral project in that pauperism formed the 
limits of the market. The remoralisation o f pauperism was therefore a moral-political 
solution to the problem of wealth, and it was the production of the latter upon which the 
whole of society depended. The project o f ‘society’ would therefore follow two 
concomitant courses: the conversion o f poverty into wealth, and the prevention of poverty 
degenerating into pauperism.
Politics o f  the present
So, the antecedent conditions for the remoralisation of the poor can be located among 
a politics of poverty that begins to emerge from the early nineteenth century. The crucial 
difference, however, is that the production o f wealth and the politics of conduct we now 
find among advanced liberalism is no longer based on the project of civil society. 
Certainly Thatcherism in the early 80’s begins to signal the death knell of this project. 
With the elimination o f society as an abstract entity in which the state played the role of 
guarantor and upon which the welfare state was founded, we find a new political game 
emerging, one that must satisfy two principal concerns: how does political power increase 
its capacities for governing at a distance without at the same time undermining the 
security and liberty o f the state? Community would emerge as a novel solution to these 
problems.
The problem faced by Australian welfare politics is that of enhancing both security 
and liberty without increasing the powers of the state. I think an important dimension to 
this problem is the politics o f risk. If it is true that welfare is no longer concerned with
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meeting needs but o f managing risks63 (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1994), then the call to 
community is a strategy of re-distributing and re-individualising social risk (Braithwaite, 
et al., 2002). The sharing o f risk accords well with these programmes of solidarity and 
collaboration which appeals to us to absorb some of the personal and social cost of 
health, productivity and unemployment. From the point of view of risk, it is possible to 
pose a new diagram between security, authority and liberty. In the name of community, 
security is partly transferred to the natural responsibilities of community: risk is no longer 
shored up by the state, but dispersed among micro-cultures of value and meaning. And in 
the name of security, we find a different set of control strategies strongly resembling 
Mead’s ‘new paternalism’. In both the American and Australian example, welfare 
authorities are to assume direct responsibility for the management o f the most risky, 
subjecting those at risk o f dependency and unemployability to behavioural controls which 
are widely recognised as moralistic and punitive (Schram, 2000; Moss, 2001; Harris. 
2002; Braithwaite, et al., 2002; Shaver, 2002).
In each o f these diagrams, liberty is ‘not merely the active exercise by each individual 
of authority over themselves, but, at the same time, the voluntary acceptance of the 
authority o f particular moral code as the basis for the government o f our own conduct' 
(Rose. 1999a. p. 187). Either way, the generalisability o f mutual obligation lends itself to 
authoritarian and liberal interpretations, communitarian and paternalistic perspectives: it 
is capable of specifying the control feature o f individual obligations, while at the same 
time specifying a communal framework of obligations. But as policy, mutual obligation 
runs the risk o f offering a vague solution to even more vaguely posed questions ranging 
from concerns about perceived growth o f welfare dependency through to concerns about 
meeting social obligations to care for vulnerable citizens (Harris. 2002).
63 Beck's work offers som e insight to a range o f  new risks arising from increasingly global and complex 
societies -  risks which the current welfare state is manifestly unable to deal with, and is constantly being 
stretched to accommodate (Beck, 1992). An example o f  these new risks range from increasing breaks in 
employment continuity; dealing with the uncertainties arising from casual employment; the possibility o f  
becoming a sole parent or a primary care provider during prime earning years; and the possibility that 
wage-earners may have to re-train or re-skill more than twice in their lifetime (Mitchell, 2001, cited in 
Braithwaite et al., 2002, p. 229).
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In terms o f mapping the future direction of welfare reform in Australia, the McClure 
Report is a bland document. Despite its generous tones of community, its rhetorical 
appeal remains ambiguous and troubling. While the term ‘community’ is cited some 256 
times in the report, ‘poverty’ is mentioned only 8 times. This numerical flourish is by no 
means offered as persuasive evidence but simply to direct our attention to what is being 
produced. By deflecting attention from the national and structural towards the local and 
individual, the appeal to community suggests that the problem of welfare resides in the 
affected communities themselves, rather than in the economic forces which have 
dramatically altered the nature and distribution o f work (Harris, 2002). But what is 
unambiguously and correctly represented in the report is the widespread concern and 
anxiety over issues of responsibility, security and risk (Braithwaite et al., 2002). The new 
risk politics o f post-welfare regimes and the future management of security and 
autonomy form part o f a new game o f power. Rose suggests this new game of advanced 
liberal democracies operate in a field o f ethico-politics64. It would seem that in the 
absence o f any guarantees for the security and freedom, we are all obliged to think and 
act ethically.
In this chapter, I take a critical historical view of Australian reform initiatives to 
demonstrate how advanced liberal solutions to problems o f participation and dependency 
are a reworking o f an older problem. Using Foucauldian themes o f governmentality. it is 
possible to reconstruct classical liberalism as a particular conception o f civil society that 
emerged from the failure o f total government (police & oeconomy), and the discovery of 
an independent domain possessing its own complex and autonomous reality (population 
& economy). The rise o f the social was not so much the discovery of an abstract and 
independent domain, but the formation o f a plane of thought and action that begins to 
express a new kind o f relationship between moral, economic and political 
problematisations o f human conduct. Among nineteenth century debates on pauperism, 
the idea of society forms a tactic o f remoralisation which, according to principles of
64 This is quite different to Foucault’s schema o f  bio-power which socialises and collectivises its objects. 
Rather, the shift from society to community is understood as ‘the self-techniques necessary fo r  responsible 
self-government and the relations between o n e’s  obligation to oneself and o n e’s obligations to others' 
(Rose. 1999, p. 188).
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population, begins to distinguish a natural domain of scarcity from the class of social 
behaviours which are incompatible with the new economic discourse. Malthus' 
innovation was to show that the failure o f poor policy and the crisis of dependent poverty 
stemmed from the lack of moral restraint which posed a threat to society. It was not 
political economy that radically transformed English poor policy, but a field of social 
analysis known as ‘social economy' which succeeded in grafting morality onto a domain 
of economic processes. The figure o f the pauper served to distinguish the values of 
economic and familial responsibility upon which the whole o f society depended.
The recent emergence o f ‘community' constitutes a relatively new plane of thought 
and action which responds to the presumed threat o f fragmentation and dependency by 
setting politics free of the social state to find its own solutions to problems of security and 
freedom. As the state retreats from its role as sole guarantor o f progress, community 
emerges as a new terrain o f government, one that revitalises the social bond in a context 
where political authorities seek to autonomise and stabilise free markets. Since the mid 
80's, the idea o f community has steadily emerged within Australian politics as a popular 
moral and ethical solution, signalling a tactical advance in the liberal tradition of limited 
government. Community responds to the dual problems of enhancing security and 
freedom with the politics o f risk. Beyond its benign rhetorical appeal, we might think of 
community as the technical embodiment for re-distributing and re-individualising social 
risk. Community emerges as a new space in the game of ‘ethico-politics' where 
obligations to oneself and others enjoin individuals to engage in private calculation of 
risk and rational self-governance. But for those unable or unwilling to manage their own 
risk, the politics of mutual obligation ensures that the most risky are subjected to 
paternalistic control. Like the remoralisation programmes of the nineteenth century, 
welfare reform construes the irresponsibility o f others as a social danger. In the next 
chapter. I explore how a medical perception of populations gave rise to new technologies 
for the management o f conduct.
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3 Birth of social medicine
In this chapter, I explore the conditions of which it is now possible to problematise the 
conduct of the poor through a collective medical perception of populations. The ‘birth of 
social medicine’ traces a history o f medicalisation at the intersection of medical and 
political rationalities, and begins to constitute a liberal mode of administration that 
systematically linked poverty to a moral topography of control. But rather than reproduce 
a conventional history o f medicalisation, it becomes necessary to recover from the 
margins a notion o f ‘medical police’ as a way o f thinking about contemporary politics of 
conduct. The theme o f social medicine describes how, since the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, the biological and political formed specific alignments and arrangements for 
the calculated management o f life. The present task is to demonstrate how medical 
knowledge transformed the poor as an object o f regulation.
To make this argument, it is necessary to link contemporary welfare strategies of 
‘long-term prevention' and ‘early intervention’ to a Foucauldian history of bio-power, 
and show how a form of social medicine was responsible for linking the conduct of the 
poor to nineteenth century debates on pauperism. Here, medical knowledge would serve 
two purposes: to prevent poverty from degenerating into pauperism, and to render 
poverty more useful by fixing it to the apparatus o f production. Where ‘public health' 
emerged as a liberal technology for controlling the conduct o f the poor, the post-welfare 
regime draws from a medical perception o f populations for the continuous supervision 
and differentiated management o f the poor. As we shall see, the ‘language of prevention' 
emerges as a solution to welfare in the event that the social is already constituted as a 
moral topography o f pathological behaviours.
Language of prevention
In The Challenge o f  Welfare Dependency in the 21st Century (1999a), Senator 
Newsman outlines the Government’s commitment to reducing welfare dependency by 
suggesting four ‘initiatives and strategies’: Tong term prevention, early intervention.
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improved incentives for self-reliance, and active assistance to help people get off 
welfare’. Examples o f preventive programmes include ‘improving relationship skills', 
‘domestic violence prevention’, ‘youth suicide’ and ‘youth homelessness prevention'. 
Newman also cites the National Families Strategy and the Stronger Communities 
Strategy as responsible for the guidance and development o f ‘further initiatives to prevent 
the emergence o f social problems’. Early intervention programmes seem specifically 
geared towards youth: the Illicit Drugs Strategy and the new Youth Pathways Action Plan 
aims to ‘help young people at risk cope with the transitions in their lives and to become 
independent and active community members’ Newman, 1999, pp.8-9).
Under improved incentives for self-reliance, again, the target group is young people. 
For example, the introduction o f Youth Allowance in July 1998 replaced Youth Training 
and Newstart Allowances, thereby ending ‘the situation where unemployment was a more 
attractive option than staying on in education’. Furthermore, the introduction of the 
Mutual Obligation Initiative and Work for the Dole in 1997 would ensure ‘younger 
unemployed people undertake economic or community activity in return for taxpayer 
support. This builds their self-confidence and labour-market contacts, improves their 
employability and should, in the longer term, reduce their reliance on income support'. 
Lastly, the improvement o f education and training systems, including $143 million to 
‘improve literacy and numeracy, especially among young people’ will enhance skills 
development. Despite Newm an’s ‘dependency rates’ indicating people between the ages 
of 55 to 64 are ‘much more likely than younger people to be dependent on income 
support', it seems reducing welfare dependency begins with the young (Newman. 1999a. 
p.5).
Implicit to Newm an's prevention regime are certain pathological characteristics of 
welfare dependency. For instance, welfare reform in the US -  particularly after Clinton's 
1992 campaign promise to ‘end welfare as we know it’ -  reflects increased interest in the 
idea that welfare dependency is ‘intergenerational’ and ‘transmittable like a virus 
spreading from mother to daughter’ (Schram, 2000, p.84). Though reference to 
intergenerational dependency is scarcely mentioned in Newman’s Discussion Paper.
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these concerns are more explicitly stated in her Press announcement, The Future o f  
Welfare in the 21st Century, on 29th September 1999. With regard to modernising the 
social safety net, she argues the previous Labor government made it more attractive for 
young people to be unemployed than to undertake education or training: ‘Persevering 
with Labor's system in a modern, global, knowledge-based economy would have been 
plain lunacy, abandoning youth to a cycle o f inter-generational welfare dependency’ 
(Newman, 1999b, p.3). Furthermore, she observes:
We are also starting to see the transfer o f  welfare dependency across generations. For 
example, teenage children o f  people on welfare are more than twice as likely to depend on 
welfare themselves by age 19. And they are much more likely to leave school early. All these 
figures and trends tell us w e must do something more to stem the tide o f  growing dependence 
on welfare. An important part o f  the answer lies in strengthening families and communities, 
so they can becom e more self-reliant. This, more than anything, will build a strong social 
foundation for the next century (Newman, 1999b, p.4).
The term ‘intergenerational dependency’ is a reworking of the left wing conception of the 
‘culture of poverty’ that emerged among American welfare debates in the 60’s. Michael 
Harrington (1962), Oscar Lewis (1966) and a small group of left-liberal intellectuals 
concerned with explaining the causes o f poverty in America argued that poverty in the 
1950’s and 1960’s differed significantly from that of the Depression. To explain its 
persistence in the post-war era, they contended that the poor were often trapped in a 
culture of poverty that consigned them to intergenerational destitution (O’Connor, 2001). 
In Britain during the 70’s the now popular ‘cycle of poverty' proposed by Sir Keith 
Joseph also gave support to the thesis that multiple deprivation and social disadvantage 
could be intergenerationally transmitted65 (Joseph, 1972 cited in Dean & Taylor-Gooby, 
1992, pp.34-7). In the United States, The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act o f 1996 (PRWORA) extended the ‘welfare addiction’ thesis, stating 
as if it were undisputed fact that daughters who grow up in families that take welfare are 
three times as likely to receive welfare themselves as adults, compared to women who 
grew up in families that did not take welfare (Blank, 1997).
65 Dean & Taylor-Gooby (1992) point out that extensive research on the possible recurrence o f  poverty 
commissioned by the Department o f  Health and Social Security and the Social Science Research Council 
found nothing to support Joseph’s thesis: ‘The intergenerational cycle o f  Joseph’s popular imagination, if it 
could be said to exist at all, was in reality frequently broken by individuals and families alike: the evidence 
suggested that there is no single, simple explanation o f  deprivation and that the transmission o f deprivation 
is influenced, not by any one cultural or structural factor’ (p.35).
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Breaking the ‘cycle o f poverty’ is now replaced by ‘stopping the spread of welfare 
dependency’ from one generation to the next. This language of ‘disease’, ‘transmission', 
‘addiction’ and ‘dependency’ are less significant for the mixture of popular stereotypes 
and quasi-scientific metaphors than the procedures of monitoring and controlling they 
invoke. In other words, there is a case for investigating the historical links between a 
‘language of social pathology’ and a ‘language of prevention’. If, in the name welfare 
dependency, regimes o f prevention target the younger, risky population, then what kind 
of control technologies do they entail? One o f the central arguments I want to pursue in 
this chapter is that welfare vocabularies and control strategies of reform are now 
produced through a highly medicalised idiom. The reform agenda is framed as if welfare 
dependency were a public health problem, that is, a medical reality that must be 
supervised and regulated in much the same way one might control epidemic phenomena. 
And while the term ‘welfare dependency’ may have slipped from public debate since 
Newman’s alarmist swan song, the forms o f surveillance and behavioural control it 
helped to install have not disappeared.
If indeed contemporary Australian welfare politics is understood as a preventive 
regime for the supervision and reconstruction o f conduct, the historical work of this 
chapter is to retrace the conditions in which a medical perception o f populations became 
an efficient technique o f government. In the following sections, I explore Foucauldian 
themes o f bio-power, medical police, noso-politics and, finally, the nineteenth century 
medicalisation o f the poor, in order to better understand strategies of welfare reform in 
Australia. The first task is to carefully distinguish a history of ‘social medicine' from 
existing analyses o f medicalisation.
History of m edicalisation?
The birth o f social medicine traces the emergence of a ‘socialised’ medicine that later 
formed part o f the great edifice o f nineteenth century public health. In some respects this 
entails retracing a history o f medical knowledge though what I mean by medicalisation 
requires some qualification. The term ‘medicalisation’ emerges from a tradition of
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medical and historical sociology that had come to place the history of medical reason 
alongside a Weberian thesis o f disenchantment. Enlightenment found within the idea of 
the medical model the utopian dream o f an instrument that would eventually eradicate 
disease and liberate the social body, even to the point that medical truth would result in 
its own elimination. But the persistence o f disease and poverty, and the gradual 
professionalisation and institutionalisation o f the medical system, suggested a trajectory 
that progressed without regard for persons (Illich, 1977; Pelling, 1976). Medicalisation 
forms part o f an ethos grounded within a critique o f medicine that finds within the 
hospital, the biomedical model and the rise o f medical expertise an underlying principle 
of despotism (Osborne, 1994). I think a discussion o f medical power benefits from 
breaking with this negative connotation o f power that governs repressively or 
despotically. Furthermore, a diagnosis o f medical knowledge refrains from positing a 
totalising conception o f medical power, and instead traces the emergent techniques and 
complex linkages between medical and political rationalities.
A discussion o f social medicine is partly an attempt to break with this negative thesis 
of medical power, but also to refigure the relation between medical reason and what we 
have come to know as the social66. Medicalisation was not a ‘movement' driven by 
means of its own internal unity, nor was the social a kind of transcendental domain that 
was passively structured by the activities of medicine. Rather, one must show how the 
practice of medical truth is constitutive of the social (Rose. 1994b). An epistemological 
history of modem medicine proceeds, then, without totalising its social function or 
simplifying its conditions o f existence. For instance, it is fallacy to suggest that by the 
late eighteenth century medicine had become more individualised, or that modern 
medicine extended from some generative principle or pivotal unity. Rather, modern 
medicine is, and has always been, a ‘social medicine' inasmuch as the private, individual 
relation of doctor and patient is only one aspect of a political technology of power that
66 There are in fact a number o f  epistemological traps that must be avoided. The critical historian must be 
careful not to imply an origin, as if  to say social medicine spontaneously emerged as a socialised discipline. 
Nor should one set out to locate a single principle anterior to medical knowledge, as if  to say the individual 
medical relation was gradually socialised by the demands o f  the collectivity (Foucault, 1980). Also, one 
must eschew the common tendency o f  placing medicine and the social within antinomical relations, as if 
both were opposing realms o f  activity whereby the former is thought to colonise the latter (Osbome. 1996).
bears on a social body67. Thus, from the beginning of the eighteenth century, medical 
knowledge defined a new distribution of functions and problems regarding the well-being 
of European states.
At the intersection of ‘medicine’ and ‘the social’ we find a complex, reciprocal 
process: medical knowledge formed the basis of an increasingly dense field of relations 
from which ‘fewer things could escape’; the intervention of poverty, disease, epidemics 
and hygiene linked new domains o f activity, transformed old spaces of interaction and 
grouped life on the basis o f biological and geographical concerns (Foucault, 2000d. 
p. 135). On the other hand, the social became a striated space upon which certain 
problems would appear -  the family, the factory, the slum, the hospital -  providing 
visibilities from which a technology of populations would regulate the health of its 
citizens, govern new relations between doctor and patient, health visitor and family, 
politician and community. The birth o f modern medicine, then, is neither characterised by 
an individual, ‘liberal’ medicine, nor an apparatus o f social control (Zola, 1975; Conrad. 
1979), but a kind o f political organisation o f health and disease wherein specific 
questions are raised about the sickness of the poor in relation to the general problem of 
the health of populations (Foucault, 1980). The wise administration of the population and 
the socialised medical apparatus formed a unique diagram by the nineteenth century 
wherein the social body was constituted in the vocabulary of medicine (Rose, 1994b).
So, one cannot simply tease apart ‘medicine’ and ‘the social’ as if their opposing 
relations somehow provided an adequate understanding of social medicine. Rather, one 
must collapse these distinctions among the multiple functions and dispersed locations of 
eighteenth century bio-power. That is to say, the birth o f social medicine lay not among 
transformations of medicine alone, after all, the sphere of health, the demands of 
production, welfare and security extended beyond the medical relation; nor can we 
identify these conditions as having emerged from the contours o f the social, as if the
67 Though it is often assumed that clinical medicine became centred upon the individual medical relation. 
Foucault’s analysis in The Birth o f  the Clinic shows its conditions o f  possibility were inseparable from 
those governing the appearance o f  social medicine. That is to say, the techniques that converged around the 
collective administration o f  bodies were also preconditions for an individual, clinical medicine.
social spontaneously generated its own forms of regulation. Rather, an historical analysis 
of social medicine must consider the epistemological transformation of political power 
inscribed within general concerns about the health of populations.
Bio-power
In The History o f  Sexuality Vol. 7, Foucault reminds us that only recently life had 
come into view as an historical value, one that presupposes a system of power whose task 
has been to ‘take charge o f life’, though it does so by no longer invoking death as the 
naked symbol o f sovereign power. This ancient right of seizing life, taking life away, was 
eventually replaced by a power that fosters life on the basis of enhancing its positive 
utility: ‘The old power o f death that symbolised sovereign power was carefully 
supplanted by the administration o f bodies and the calculated management of life. During 
the classical period, there w as... an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for 
achieving the subjugation o f bodies and the control of populations, marking the beginning 
of an era of'b io-pow er”  (Foucault, 1979, p. 140-1). Biopower68 emerged not as the result 
of power having discovered the value o f ‘discipline’ as its most efficient technique of 
governance, but the discovery o f life as the basis for which techniques of discipline are 
capable of qualifying, measuring and increasing its value.
This 'profound transformation’ o f power had dislodged the old structures o f medical 
practice and opened up the hospital to new functions and visibilities. Medicine would no 
longer find itself entrenched within structures of assistance; no longer would treatment 
constitute the practice o f simply deferring death; nor would hospitals serve as repositories 
for the circulation o f poverty and disease. As medical knowledge became increasingly 
conflated with political imperatives o f health, the practical objectives of policy were less 
concerned with offering support to the destitute margins of the population than of raising 
the health of the whole population. The eighteenth century -  aside from establishing the 
extensive programmes and urban policies that would later crystallise into the 'public 
health movement' o f the nineteenth century -  also marked a period in which the hospital
68 Here Foucault em ploys the term biopower to ‘designate what brought life and its mechanisms into the 
realm o f explicit calculations and made knowledge-power an agent o f  transformation o f  human life’ (1979. 
p .143).
became increasingly problematised as an obsolete structure69. The hospital structure 
became the object o f intense political scrutiny, whereby liberal reformers claimed a new 
v ision of the doctor -  the problem was not a matter of confining medicine to the task of 
curing disease, but o f curing all the forms o f bad administration that prevented the proper 
management o f disease: ‘The first task o f the doctor is therefore political; the struggle 
against disease must begin with a war against bad government. Man will be totally and 
definitively cured only if he is first liberated’ (Foucault, 1973, p.33).
The reorganisation o f the medical apparatus and the new specification of the medical 
profession presupposed a vision o f liberal reform in which the discovery of a political 
consciousness reinscribed the space o f disease within a new field o f liberties and 
equalities. That is to say, once liberated from its classical enclosure, medical knowledge 
was considered indispensable to realising the ‘destinies o f the state’, of fixing a positive 
role with which to embrace a knowledge o f healthy m a n 0. With the appearance of social 
medicine, we find an explosion o f medical techniques which, like techniques of 
government, shared the institutional epistemology o f investing power in life, the purpose 
of which was perhaps less concerned with optimising the capacities o f the human body, 
or integrating its powers into systems o f production71. The utility of social medicine 
remained within its capacity for providing supervision over life as a species, of enhancing 
biological processes ‘without at the same time making them more difficult to govern' 
(Foucault, 1979, p. 141).
In France, for instance, the failure o f  poorhouses and hospitals were attributed to the ‘closed' space of 
medical activity, which only succeeded in harbouring idleness and poverty, o f  ‘multiplying the ills in its 
interior without preventing their outward diffusion’ (Foucault, 1980, p.l 77).
70 ‘The doctor becomes the great advisor and expert, if  not in the art o f  governing, at least in that of 
observing, correcting and improving the social ‘body’ and maintaining it in a permanent state o f health' 
(1980, p. 177).
71 Through ‘socialised’ medicine, bio-power would become an indispensable strategy for the development 
o f  capitalism; after all, Foucault argues ‘the latter would not have been possible without the controlled 
insertion o f  bodies into the machinery o f  production and the adjustment o f  the phenomena o f  population to 
economic processes’ (1979, pp. 140-1). This point is reinforced in an earlier essay titled. The birth o f  social 
medicine, where he suggests the development o f  capitalism proceeded by ‘socialising a first object, the 
body, as a factor o f  productive force, o f  labour power’. Medicine, as an ideological instrument o f  the state, 
or as a strategy o f  political power, operated by and through the body. ‘For capitalist society', wrote 
Foucault, ‘it is the bio-political which was o f  first importance, the biological, the somatic, the bodily. The 
body is above all a bio-political reality; medicine is a bio-political strategy' (Foucault, 2000d, 136-7).
This transformation between the political and biological was certainly a factor in the 
emergence o f a nascent liberalism. For instance, Foucault describes the development of 
bio-power as increasingly relying upon the action of the norm as opposed to the juridical 
system of the sword. Thus, a characteristic of power ‘whose highest function was perhaps 
no longer to kill, but to invest life through and through’ was the need for ‘continuous 
regulatory and corrective mechanisms’:
It is no longer a matter o f  bringing death into play in the field o f sovereignty, but o f  
distributing the living in the domain o f  value and utility. Such a power has to qualify, 
measure, appraise, and hierarchize, rather than display itself in its murderous splendour; it 
does not have to draw the line that separates the enemies o f the sovereign from this obedient 
subjects; it effects distributions around the norm (Foucault, 1979, p. 144).
This ‘normalising society’ o f the classical period provided the conditions for life to 
become a principle of self-governance, that is, for a domain to take shape not around the 
sovereignty of laws or codes, but around the potential of life itself. For freedom to 
become the principle o f modern liberal government, first the ‘right’ to life had to be 
recognised as the political object upon which freedom was based. Having shifted away 
from the old values o f sovereign power -  right, death, justice -  political rationalities no 
longer required repressive means o f eliciting obedience, but productive techniques for 
cultivating useful forms o f discipline. This shift from the repressive to the positive 
function o f power marks the existence o f bio-politics: the cluster of practices and 
knowledges which signify the interface o f political reason with a knowledge of biological 
processes, and which opens an epistemological impasse for a kind o f liberal rationality to 
emerge. That is to say, the possibility o f liberalism emerged from the reversal of the 
utility of life and death, and the overturning of sovereign power. For the first time in 
history, biological existence was reflected in political existence \
Only recently then has life become a precondition of political power. And yet, the 
historical insertion o f biology into ‘the sphere of political techniques’ was not a liberal 
invention; liberalism was not the only political technology, nor was it the first, to practice
72 ‘...this was nothing less than the entry o f  life into history, that is, the entry o f  phenomena peculiar to life 
o f the human species into the order o f  knowledge and power, into the sphere o f  political techniques... 
Western man was gradually learning what it meant to be a living species in a living world, to have a body, 
conditions o f  existence, probabilities o f  life, an individual and collective welfare, forces that could be 
modified, and a space in which they could be distributed in a optimal manner’ (Foucault, 1979, pp. 141-2).
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a kind of bio-politics. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, even before the 
question of liberalism was posed, there existed a governmental rationality which, by 
casting the question of population, marked a break with Christian and judiciary traditions 
(Divine Law and Natural laws), observing instead the nature of what is to be governed. 
The model of the city, the spectre o f the mob, the surfacing domains of squalor, malady 
and disorder, emerged as newly formed objects for a savoir of government. It was not 
social medicine that discovered these diverse observations, but a ‘science of police’ that 
was called upon to respond to new, and predominantly urban, problematisations. This 
required an exact knowledge o f life -  its capacity, productivity, growth -  through 
mechanisms and techniques designed to increasingly bring life into view. In the next 
section. I show how a technology o f ‘police’ was integral to the birth of social medicine, 
enabling both medical and political rationalities to coincide with a knowledge of social 
space.
Medicine o f  epidemics
In The Birth o f  the Clinic, Foucault discusses the eighteenth century transition from a 
‘medicine of species' to a ‘medicine o f epidemics’ at which point significant changes 
take place surrounding not only the control and documentation of epidemics, but the 
general circulation o f medical power. Unlike the abstract and botanical epistemology of 
Sydenham's classificatory thought, a medicine o f epidemics derives the constitution of 
disease from a ‘nucleus o f circumstances'. Historically, Foucault is unconcerned whether 
eighteenth medicine had grasped the contagious nature of disease, for an ‘epidemic is 
more than a particular form o f a disease’, but ‘all those that attack, at the same time and 
with unalterable characteristics, a large number o f persons’. Hence, there is no difference 
between the nature or species o f an individual disease and an epidemic, it is simply 
defined by the frequency o f the ‘sporadic malady’. This is precisely a mathematical 
problem. The sufficient conditions for the perception of an epidemic are no longer 
essential and ordinal, like the medicine o f species (denoting an order within a sequence), 
but ‘quantitative and cardinal’ (denoting how many within a given set of occurrences). 
For this reason, an epidemic is rarely named according to a species, form or essence, but 
more its occurrence or event: ‘...Marseilles in 1721, or Bicetre in 1780’ (1973, pp.23-4).
Foucault claims that an epidemic has a kind o f ‘historical individuality’, meaning, it is 
spatially and temporally specific, requiring a complex method of observation. Since an 
epidemic is never singular, but multiple and unexpectedly heterogeneous, it requires a 
multiple gaze in which the ‘regularity o f symptoms’ are described among the irregular 
circumstances o f its appearance:
The event must be described in detail, but it must also be described in accordance with the 
coherence implied by multi-perception: being an imprecise form o f knowledge, insecurely 
based while ever partial, incapable o f  acceding o f  itself to the essential or fundamental, it 
finds its own range only in the cross-checking o f  viewpoints, in repeated, corrected 
information, which finally circumscribes, where gazes meet, the individual, unique nucleus of 
these collective phenomena (Foucault, 1973, p.25).
By the end o f the eighteenth century, this experience of circumscribing the qualities, 
forces, frequency and specificity o f epidemics was institutionalised. According to each 
region, a physician and several surgeons were appointed to the task of studying 
epidemics, thereby conferring their knowledge to a chief physician in the event of an 
outbreak.
Foucault argues that documentation and analysis of epidemics could only succeed if 
'supplemented by constant, constricting intervention’. That is to say, a medicine of 
epidemics could only achieve its function if supported by a police to supervise, advise 
and intervene upon the disposal o f the dead; the purity of produce; the isolation of 
houses; the deployment o f preventive measures; and the passing of health regulations. 
Only then would it be possible for a Corp of ‘health inspectors’ to be summoned for the 
purposes of advising departments, collecting information relevant to domains of 
‘medicine, physics, chemistry, natural history, topography and astronomy', and 
supervising the work o f doctors. Nonetheless, this unity of the medical gaze could not be 
achieved by the old enclosures o f medical knowledge. The conditions upon which 
modern medicine achieved this unified perception ‘relate as much to a police as to the 
field of medicine proper’ (1973, pp.25-6).
The technology o f police formed the basis of a ‘new style of totalisation’, no longer 
enclosed within the stale, encyclopaedic accumulation of knowledge, but replaced by the
theme o f ‘constant revision’ whereby information was derived, revised and calibrated 
upon the basis of ‘totalising events and their determination’. This required a gaze that not 
only established subtle interconnections, the infinite openness of events, but among the 
complexity o f these connections recognised the ‘genius’ of observation73. The complex 
and totalising function o f police coincided with an epistemological transformation of 
medical consciousness. For instance, the Societe Royale de Medecine no longer consisted 
solely of doctors and ‘experimenters’, but now operated at the level of a political 
consciousness in which the fundamental act o f medical knowledge worked towards the 
construction o f a kind o f ‘map’. By the end of the eighteenth century, the new experience 
of medical truth was a question o f ‘carving up’ the social field via multiple intersections, 
observations and interventions. In short, medical space came to coincide with social 
space by traversing and wholly penetrating it (Foucault, 1973, pp.29-31).
A medicine o f epidemics seemed to provide a clearing for medical and political 
reason to converge around a rationality o f police. During this period, we find the 
construction of ‘a politico-medical hold on a population hedged in by a whole series of 
prescriptions relating not only to disease but to general forms of existence and behaviour 
(food and drink, sexuality and fecundity, clothing and the layout of living space)' 
(Foucault, 1980, p. 176). The appearance o f police rationality within medical activity was 
not the invention o f eighteenth century medicine, but the outcome of a political 
consciousness that transformed medical knowledge into an instrument of government; 
policing became that primary technology by which political power assigned itself to the 
administration o f life74.
73 As Foucault observes, this unity and coherence o f  the medical gaze became established among that 
‘open, infinite, m oving totality, ceaselessly displaced and enriched by time, whose course it began but 
never be able to stop -  by this time a clinical recording o f  the infinite, variable series o f  events. But its 
support was not the perception o f  the patient in his singularity, but a collective consciousness, with all the 
information that intersects in it, growing in a complex, ever-proliferating way until it finally achieves the 
dimensions o f  a history, a geography, a state’ (Foucault, 1973, p.29).
74 Again, we must appreciate an ‘epistemological contrast’ as the basis o f  somehow explaining this 
eighteenth century transformation o f  European medicine. For instance, in its classical form, medical 
practice was firmly entrenched within structures o f  assistance, and therefore consigned to the charitable 
care o f  individuals. The production o f  medical knowledge as an institutional practice became preoccupied 
with the development o f  classificatory and experimental thought, producing through its procedures o f  
medical training and scholarship, a medical knowledge and experience that was relatively ‘closed’ to the 
possibilities o f  performing what would later be its wider tertiary and political functions. It was this
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Though the eighteenth century marks a period in which institutions undertake the 
important role of organising power over life, it was more the procedures of power they 
deployed -  the disciplines o f an ‘ anatomo-politics of the human body', and the regulatory 
interventions o f a wbio-politics o f the population’ -  that allowed power to circulate among 
diverse institutions, and appear at every level of the social body (Foucault, 1979, p. 139). 
It was not the discovery o f these techniques that gave modem medicine a political status, 
nor a unified medical consciousness. Rather, it was the art of government itself that 
gradually assumed a scientific knowledge o f life, in which case medical practice was 
transformed for no greater purpose than to fabricate life as the inexorable target of 
political strategies. In concrete terms, the object o f political power was no longer centred 
upon the sovereignty o f a territory; it no longer figured within a ‘reason of state’, nor 
among the great institutions o f state. Rather, power found its optimum expression among 
the forces of life itself, among the diverse conditions relating to the growth, health and 
longevity o f a population. Population came to describe new phenomena that connected 
the strength, wealth and greatness o f a nation with knowledge of biological existence, the 
political intervention o f which became both the model and end o f government. In the next 
section, I want to examine the notion of ‘medical police’ as an apparatus of eighteenth 
century ‘state medicine’. The purpose here is to verify not only the intricate links between 
medical and political reason in the government o f the state, but also recover some sense 
of how bio-politics are presently engaged in the supervision and regulation of the poor.
Medical police
Bio-politics first appears among the paternalistic regimes of seventeenth and 
eighteenth century Germany, from the source of reflections known as the ‘science of the 
state', Staatswissenschaft1:>. By the eighteenth century, the political technology of police 
and a science o f populations would together embrace a totalising vision of government, 
subjecting all facets o f a domain to a system of continuous administration. For instance,
systematic enclosure o f  medical truths that allowed medicine to assume its institutional mantle as a natural 
and enlightened science o f  man.
75 This form o f ‘political science’ constituted a savoir  o f  state; the state was the first object o f supervision 
and analysis concerning itself with not only increasing the numbers o f  the population, or improving its 
living conditions, but identifying and systematising the growing functions o f  the state (Foucault, 2000d).
in Germany the development o f the polizeiwissenschaft -  a vast body of literature, 
ordinances and codes — was already dominated by the principle of the 'reason of state', 
engaging in what was considered to be the natural order of problems relating to the 
strength of the state, and the growth o f its biological forces (Foucault, 2000d). According 
to the instrumental and interventionist programmes of police science, everything that 
lacked order or form was subject to administration: birth rate, health, morality, sanitation, 
urban design, economy, public safety, production, poverty, etc. (Pasquino. 1991: 
Osborne, 1996). Indeed, the concept o f police (policey) was considered as far back as the 
sixteenth century as an important mechanism of good administration76.
Long before the practice o f social medicine in France and England, the emergence of 
what Foucault (2000d) calls ‘state medicine’ developed from a German science of state at 
the beginning of the eighteenth century77. Bio-power first emerges via the systematisation 
of medical knowledge which, under the concept o f Medizinischepolizei, ‘medical police', 
set about disciplining and standardising medical practice. Quite unique to cameralism78 -  
a German version o f European mercantilism — we find the organisation of medical 
practice and knowledge through the registration o f indicators and factors which not only 
outlined the growth o f population, but the general improvement of public health79. In
76 Early proponents o f  the police concept from the sixteenth century up until the development of  
seventeenth and eighteenth century cameralism include: Melchior Von Osse (1506-1556); Georg Obrecht 
(1547-1612); and Veit Ludwig von Seckendorff (1626-1692) who was regarded by some as the Adam 
Smith o f  cameralism. Johann Joachim Becher (1668), the great German philosopher, scientist and 
politician, Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646-1716), Christian Thomasius (1655-1728), and Christian 
W olff (1679-1754) who pointed out the close relation between the general welfare o f the state and the 
health o f  the people.
77 The only real or practical interest expressed by England and France concerning the strength of 
populations were measured by an axes o f  administration and statistics which, from the seventeenth century, 
deployed the great census surveys o f  births and deaths. The only health interest shown by the state appeared 
in relation to the drawing up o f  tables detailing birthrate and mortality which, at the time, were considered 
the only real indicators o f  a population’s health and growth. Thus, before the late eighteenth century, both 
England and France, showed little or no interest in raising the health o f  populations (Foucault, 2000d).
8 According to George Rosen (1953), German cameralism presents two connotations: ‘On the one hand, it 
designates the ideas that appeared to explain, justify, and guide the centralizing tendencies and practices in 
administration and econom ic policy o f  the absolute monarchy in the German states during the later 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. On the other hand, it refers to the various attempts o f the same period 
to work out in terms o f  emerging contemporary political and social science a systematic account o f the 
functioning o f  the various administrative services as a basis for the training o f  public officials’ (p.24).
7Q Peculiar to cameralism was how the state as an object o f  thought developed more rapidly in Germany 
than in England or France. Whereas explanations for this have not received a great deal o f attention, they
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particular, it was the work o f Frank, Rau and Daniel who were considered exemplary to 
this field between 1750 and 1770. In 1779, Johann Peter Frank published the first o f six 
volumes o f his System einer vollstandigen medicinischen Polizey which is regarded as the 
highest expression o f a comprehensive system of medical police. By 1782, Ernst 
Gottfried Baldinger, one of the best know physicians of his time, would describe 
medicine as a ‘political science’, requiring the training of physicians and the 
enlightenment o f the people to support effective medical legislation (Rosen, 1953).
The term ‘medical police’ first appeared in Wolfgang Thomas Rau’s seminal text.
Gedanken von dem Nutzen und der Nothwendigkeit einer medicinischen Policeyordnung 
80in einem Staat (1764) . Based largely on political theory, Rau argued that the health and 
care of the people was a responsibility o f the state, in which case the obligation of a 
medical profession was not merely to treat the sick, but to ‘supervise the health’ of the 
population. Flowever, the value with which a medical profession might be realised as an 
instrument o f amelioration and supervision was problematised at the outset by acts of 
charlatanism and quackery. Hence, the first target of a medical police was the untrained 
physician whose prevalence was considered more harmful than the discovery of 
gunpowder. In order to establish the competence of medical personnel, Rau argued for a 
medical police ordinance to regulate ‘medical education, supervise apothecary shops and 
hospitals, prevent epidemics, combat quackery, and make possible the enlightenment of 
the public' (Rosen, 1953. p.43). Together Rau and Frank’s conception o f ‘medical police' 
achieved rapid popularity, reaching its highest point of political prominence during the 
late eighteenth century wherein a technology o f social medicine had ‘encouraged itself 
fully within the rationalities o f government’ (Rose, 1994b, p.55).
Firstly, medical police comprised o f a general system of observation that applied the 
somewhat negative analyses o f health by collating information on the sickness of 
populations. Among local levels o f surveillance, records of sickness were derived from 
census statistics, and medical records gathered from neighbouring hospitals and doctors.
are said to relate to the size and instability o f  Germany as a collection o f smaller states, as opposed to larger 
European states, like England and France, which adhered to older, more stable structures (Foucault, 2000d).
80 Thoughts on the utility and necessity o f  a medical police ordinance for a state.
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The compilation o f statistics measured rates of sickness across geographical regions, 
mapping the incidence o f births and deaths, calculating rates and types of morbidity, and 
charting topographies of longevity and urban density. At the state level, observation 
consisted of recording epidemic and endemic phenomena, supervising food supplies, 
reviewing the sanitary conditions o f urban spaces, and observing codes of public and 
moral hygiene (Rosen, 1977). More generally, the observation of the state required 
methods of grouping the inhabitants of geographical space, linking different domains of 
activity, and locating individuals within specific collective arrangements. Secondly, there 
was the matter o f standardising medical practice and medical knowledge. Prior to the 
medical police, the authority o f universities, and more particularly, the medical guild 
regulated medical education and the awarding o f diplomas. With the emergence of a 
medical police ordinance, we find the gradual standardisation o f medical instruction, the 
public supervision o f training programmes, and the granting of medical degrees. Foucault 
claims that in Germany, unlike other European states, ‘medicine and doctors became the 
first objects of standardisation’. In fact, the standardisation of doctors preceded that of its 
objects: ‘the doctor was the first standardised individual in Germany’ (2000d, p. 140). 
Thirdly, in Prussia and in other German states, an administrative organisation for 
supervising the activity o f doctors was established at the level of ministry81. An office 
was assigned to the collection o f cases, diagnoses and medical activities of district 
doctors; observing the manner in which medical investigations were performed; verifying 
methods of treatment; describing the effects of epidemic disease; and issuing directives 
based on the centralisation o f all its data. In addition to monitoring the horizontal 
activities of the medical profession, we also find a vertical segregation and polarisation of 
the medical profession, guaranteeing relations o f subordination among district doctors, 
health inspectors, medical officers and public authorities. Finally, the medical police 
consisted of ordinances for regulating the government appointment of medical officers 
according to regional jurisdictions.
81 By the early nineteenth century, Prussia had arranged the medical profession in a pyramid formation: 
district doctors occupied the bulk o f  the profession who were responsible for 6,000 to 10,000 inhabitants 
each, while the responsibility o f  medical officers comprised o f  35,000-50,000 inhabitants (Foucault, 2000d, 
p .141).
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These four programmes o f the medical police -  the radiation o f techniques for 
observing and collecting medical knowledge, the standardisation of the medical 
profession, the subordination/incorporation of ‘district’ doctors -  led to the emergence of 
a state-controlled medicine which effectively assembled a diffuse and nebulous medical 
profession into a centralised instrument o f the state. As a product of this reorganisation. 
German medicine produced a series of new phenomena. The appearance of 'state 
medicine’, which preceded the anatomo-clinical localisation/normalisation of individual 
pathology, was not interested in the body o f the worker or of forming a labour force that 
might be adjusted to the needs o f industry: ‘It was not the worker’s bodies that interested 
this public health administration but the bodies o f individuals insofar as they combined to 
constitute the state’. State medicine brought into increasing view not the problem of 
labour power, but the strength o f the state as a matter o f bureaucratic and collective 
organisation. Unlike any other European system of social medicine, the state-dominated 
models of German cameralism implied a certain ‘economico-political solidarity’82, in 
which case the medical regulation o f public health was systematically treated as an index 
of political and economic strength. It was under these conditions that the doctor first 
appeared, on a large scale, as a health administrator, a hygienist, and an advisor of 
government (Foucault, 2000d. pp. 141-2).
Despite its popularity and its strong emphasis upon ‘effective administration’, the 
concept of medical police was entirely exhausted by the mid-nineteenth century, the 
circumstances o f which are consistent with the liberal critique of police. Despite its broad 
administrative imagination, medical police never acquired the status of an integral code 
of law but circulated among political, institutional and community relations -  the 
teaching o f medical legislation in universities, the reorganisation of the medical 
profession, the prevention and control o f communicable disease, the maintenance of 
hygiene and public health. Outside official circuits o f production, however. 
Medizinischepolizei was contained to the opinion of writers and educators who
8: For instance, in Germany in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, concerns over increasing the 
numbers o f  the population were commonly justified on political, economic and military grounds. See 
Phillip Wilhelm von Hom igk Oesterreich iiber Alles, Warm es nur w ill... (1684), and Wilhelm Roscher, 
Geschicte der National-Oekonom ik in Deutschland  (1924).
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contributed more to the edification o f medical ordinances than the actual creation of 
social policies and laws. For this reason, it was primarily confined to a ‘technical’ 
revolution within German social medicine. The promise of any broader application, like 
governing aspects o f health that apply to a whole territory, was never realised, and never 
established beyond a relatively narrow domain o f practice83 (Rosen, 1977).
Though falling short of its legislative mandate, it is perhaps a misnomer to suggest the 
practice o f medical police disappeared entirely. Under the aegis of "public health' -  a 
term that later acquired its modern definition from the health revolution of nineteenth 
century Britain -  medical police continued to function, albeit in different forms, at 
various levels o f intervention, though by no means assuming the administrative scope 
envisaged by Frank and Mai. It is true, however, the practical effect of medical police 
was largely inhibited by its authoritarian and paternalistic character which ‘did not keep 
pace with the example set by England and France’ (Rosen, 1977, p. 143). Outside of 
Germany, the concept o f medical police enjoyed only limited application to health 
problems, and even then was adopted by communities where government was easily 
accepted in order to control communicable disease and provide sanitation of the 
environment. By the end o f the eighteenth century, Western Europe had found a path 
leading away from the old edifice o f absolutism and mercantilism. Britain, for example, 
already enjoyed a sense o f individual freedom that was almost entirely absent in 
Germany. By the mid-nineteenth century, Medizinischepolizei was considered a sterile 
formula, relying on a conception o f administrative government that was no longer
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capable o f responding to the effects o f industrialisation and rapid urbanisation .
8’ Various attempts were made to enact health legislation with limited success. The most notable o f these, 
according to Rosen, are Christoph Ludwig Hoffman’s proposal to reorganise the medical profession in two 
o f the smaller German states: the MUnster medical ordinance o f  May 14, 1777 in the Bishopric o f Munster, 
and a similar ordinance implemented in the Bishopric o f Hessen-Kassel on July 11, 1778. Various German 
states and cities enacted medical ordinances during the later eighteenth and nineteenth centuries which were 
mostly concerned with ‘the qualifications and duties o f  medical personnel, control o f epidemics, 
supervision o f  food supply, control o f  prostitution, and supervision o f  hospitals’ (1977, p. 147).
84 Rosen observes that medical police was ‘grounded on a primary calculation to augment the power o f  the 
state rather than to increase the welfare o f  the people’ (1977, p. 155). Despite emphasis upon public health, 
education, and larger populations, the first objective o f  medical police was the establishment o f a 
comprehensive administrative framework; after all, the standardisation o f  the medical profession in 
Germany preceded  the standardisation o f  its medical objects, characterising the tendency o f  absolute 
government towards servicing the mechanisms, not the objects, o f  social policy.
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According to Rosen, who is perhaps the only English-speaking historian to dedicate a 
detailed assessment o f this period, the decline o f medical police is characteristically allied 
to the demise o f the great administrative monarchies. With the dissolution of absolutism. 
Medizinischepolizei became increasingly dislocated from the administrative framework 
that gave it form and existence, and was therefore unable to respond to the political 
exigencies o f the period. Ironically, its broad social application and unique 'awareness of 
the social relations o f health and disease’ provided little resources for political adaptation. 
Consequently, medical police lost much of its creative appeal in Europe, the idea was 
completely ‘drained’ prior to the health problems of the new industrial order. Though it 
remained in circulation in Britain, Germany and Italy, it was not until the final decades of 
the nineteenth century that more liberal expressions like ‘public health’ and “social 
hygiene’ eventually replaced the concept o f medical police (1977, pp. 144-53).
The phenomenon o f medical police verifies the role that state medicine played in the 
optimisation o f state processes, an innovation that becomes possible once political 
rationalities conceive its domain in terms o f population. In the German example, the 
practice o f social medicine signals a pre-liberal form of bio-politics in which the state 
begins to assume the biological characteristics o f a social body -  not only in terms of the 
sickness of its inhabitants, but more positively, the health and wealth of the nation. 
Though the concept o f medical police would become a sterile formula, the administration 
of state power was now fully conceived in medical terms. In eighteenth and nineteenth 
century Britain, this relation between medical and political rationalities was to 
problematise the sickness o f the poor as the means of inserting the body into the 
apparatus of production. In the next section, I argue that it was the global strategy of 
‘noso-politics’ that provided the conditions for transforming poverty into a useful labour 
force.
Noso-politics
At this point we might ask: what is the relationship between the development of 
social medicine and the constitution o f poverty? On this matter, Foucault’s discussion on
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the global strategy o f ‘noso-politics’ provides some useful insights on how the 
medicalisation o f governmental rationalities played a part in the ‘utilitarian 
decomposition o f poverty’. By the eighteenth century systematic attempts were made to 
distil ‘the sickness of the poor’ from the conditions and traditional statutes of the poor. 
Medical rationalities were called upon to help transform the somewhat nebulous category 
of ‘the poor’ to make poverty more useful, that is, ‘to set the ‘able-bodied' poor to work 
and transform them into a useful labour force’ (Foucault, 1980, p. 169).
Foucault pinpoints the eighteenth century as the period in which a ‘medico- 
administrative’ knowledge begins to develop around a general politics of health. Here, 
administration acts as a point o f support and sometimes a point of departure for an 
ensemble of medical inquiries into the health o f populations. The technologies from 
which these governmental inquiries emerge correspond to a ‘common global strategy’ 
that begins to prescribe new rules and practices for problematising the health and sickness 
of populations. The new noso-politics begins to inscribe the sickness of the poor in terms 
of the general health o f populations, marking a break from charitable aid for the ‘sick 
poor' to the deployment of a general police o f health. The basis for this transformation, 
despite arising from concerns for conserving an efficient labour force, also originates 
from a new political rationality where the problem of governing the population required 
more subtle and heterogenous interventions. State intervention in medical matters was 
not. as one might assume, a uniform activity, but attached to a multitude o f problems and 
locations regarding the health and physical well-being of the social body (1980. pp. 167- 
171).
One such problem converged around the age-old relation of poverty and disease. 
Foucault describes the general ‘displacement o f health problems relative to problems of 
assistance' as the most distinctive feature o f eighteenth century noso-politics (1980. 
p. 168). Prior to this period, the problem of poverty and health were largely the 
responsibility of charitable and benevolent associations, ranging from the parish bureaux
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to the philanthropic societies, which served to distribute various forms of outdoor relief83. 
Under the old programmes of assistance, medical treatment was merely a component of 
assistance. However, by the late eighteenth century, these arrangements were modified by 
the creation of parish workhouses where ‘indoor relief now converged around the figure 
of the ‘deserving pauper’. In Britain, the local establishment o f parochial and municipal 
authorities transformed the traditional figure of the poor into three distinct categories: the 
idle poor (vagabonds and beggars), the industrious poor (the destitute and unemployed), 
and the impotent poor (the old, infirm and disabled). In fact, this disentanglement of 
various forms of assistance from what was otherwise a new medicalisation of poverty, 
took place alongside a more detailed inspection of the ‘sick-poor’. During the eighteenth 
century, the figure o f the pauper was subject to a much finer scrutiny, discriminating 
whether the poor were good or bad, able or disabled, or whether they were voluntarily or 
involuntarily unemployed86. An analysis o f idleness begins to replace global, charitable 
conceptions of the poor, the practical objectives of which is ‘to make poverty useful by 
fixing it to the apparatus of production’, and to relieve as much as possible the burden of 
poverty from the rest o f society. Not unlike the present climate in which a discourse of 
dependency functions to place the burden o f responsibility upon the ‘able-poor’ and the 
wilfully idle, the ameliorative programmes of the eighteenth century aimed to transform 
the able-poor into a useful labour force, and further ensure that the poor themselves 
absorbed the burden o f their own incapacity. Foucault describes these ‘functional 
discriminations’ o f the poor as the moment in which the problem of the sickness of the 
poor emerges from the relationship o f labour supply to the demands of production (1980. 
p. 169).
85 Plagues and epidem ics were o f  course exceptions to assistance. In the event o f ‘collective crisis', 
authoritarian methods o f  medicalisation were more often implemented, like enforcement o f quarantine 
measures around ports, and the notorious cordon sanitaires among plague-towns (Slack, 1991; Watts, 
1997). Outside these cases, the emphasis on ‘outdoor’ relief referred to forms o f  assistance for the able- 
bodied poor, so they might continue living in their own homes. In another sense, charitable and benevolent 
institutions functioned as forms o f  surveillance o f  one class over another whereby the most vulnerable and 
desperate o f  classes were regarded as likely sources o f  collective danger (Foucault, 1980; Evans, 1992).
86 ‘An analysis o f  idleness -  and its conditions and effects -  tends to replace the somewhat global 
charitable sacralisation o f ‘the poor’. This analysis has its practical objective at best to make poverty useful 
by fixing it to the apparatus o f  production, at worst to lighten as much as possible the burden it imposes on 
the rest o f  society' (Foucault, 1980, p. 169).
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The basis for this medico-political transformation should not be reduced to economic 
explanations regarding the conservation and maintenance of a labour force, though 
certainly economic management was an important factor. Rather, these economico- 
political effects related more generally to concerns regarding ‘the accumulation of men’, 
in which case a technology o f population would install more refined mechanisms for 
allowing population to emerge as an object of surveillance, analysis, adjustment and 
intervention. Eighteenth century noso-politics begins to mark out a new field in which 
medicine plays an increasingly important role in assembling a political knowledge of the 
‘body’ for the calculated management o f new variables -  the sick and healthy, the rich 
and poor, the idle and industrious. More central to the present inquiry, however, is 
showing how the biological characteristics o f a population became relevant factors for 
economic management under classical liberalism. To establish a national labour market 
and to set the conditions for the appearance o f modern welfare required an apparatus that 
organised around the problem o f the poor a means o f constantly increasing their utility. In 
the next section, I examine the final development o f social medicine; the nineteenth 
century medicalisation o f the poor would form the last object of social medicine. Indeed, 
the ‘return o f the medical police’ would assemble new mechanisms for transforming 
human labour into a commodity.
Medicalisation of the poor
So far, I have mainly redescribed Foucault’s position on the history of bio-power and 
medicalisation. There are two reasons for this move. Firstly, it is important to assemble 
different conceptual tools with which to treat the event of pauperism as a matter of 
government. Secondly, it is necessary to assemble a perspective for linking nineteenth 
century medicalisation o f the poor to the preventive regime o f contemporary welfare 
politics. In quite a unique way the reconstruction o f the problem of the poor during the 
nineteenth century is linked to a politics of conduct. But in order to sharpen these debates 
on the moral habits o f the poor, it is necessary to link these back to themes of urban 
squalor, epidemic disease and social danger. In this section, I want to examine more 
closely how social medicine was recruited as a liberal technology for not only subjecting 
the poor to medical control, but reinserting the poor into the apparatus of production. In
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what follows, I examine both primary and secondary texts to show how English social 
medicine was systematically linked to debates on pauperism.
Return o f medical police
The noso-politics of the first half o f the nineteenth century is characteristic of a liberal 
mode of government that problematises its population in the language of prevention, 
theories of miasmic contagion and correlations o f ‘vital statistics’. Knowledge of the poor 
now formed an interplay between the character and conditions of the labouring 
population. ‘Pauper management’, as conceived by Benthamite administration, signals 
the practice o f acting on the character o f the poor by placing them in circumstances 
‘congenial to the natural constitution o f man, and the well-being of society’ (Owen, 1818. 
p. 13). But before this field o f knowledge became subject to social -  and later sociological 
-  investigation, a medical discourse would unite this field by linking the character of the 
poor to the squalid conditions and circumstances that were thought to produce pauperism. 
The social question only begins to emerge at which point a new form of medical 
vigilance and prevention reveals the environmental and personal conditions of the 
labouring population. Medical police, in its liberal form, would problematise populations 
in the name of ‘public health’, and reintegrate the poor into the project of ‘society’.
One of the important characteristics o f nineteenth century English noso-politics is the 
double theme of moral and physical degeneration of the labouring population. James 
Phillip Kay (later Kay-Shuttleworth), who became an Assistant Poor Law Commissioner 
in 1835. is perhaps best known for his publication of The Moral and Physical Conditions 
o f the Working Classes Employed in Cotton Manufacture in Manchester (1832). Kay 
argued that an investigation o f his statistical findings concerning Manchester showed the 
‘concomitance o f pauperism with moral and physical degradation’, and that pauperism 
spreads most rapidly and perniciously among ignorant and demoralised populations (Kay. 
1832, p.29). Pauperism is not simply the effect o f dependence on relief but the 
culmination o f the degenerative effects of the conditions o f life among the labouring 
population. While Kay mentions the debilitating effects of industrial production, his 
problem was more specifically an urban one. For instance, the Manchester working
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classes live in densely packed houses, have inadequate diet, display a 'barbarous 
disregard to forethought and economy’ and spend their gains in debauchery in the tavern. 
Their houses are crowded upon ‘narrow, unpaved, and almost pestilential streets; in an 
atmosphere loaded with the smoke and exhalation of a large manufacturing city'. 
Furthermore, the working-class districts are unsewered, and the houses are without proper 
ventilation or cleanliness. The effect o f these conditions is twofold: not only do they 
depress the physical strength and mental constitution of its inhabitants, but also destroy 
their ‘moral dignity’ as they sink into ‘sensual sloth’ or revel in 'degrading 
licentiousness’. This kind o f moral degeneration propagates the ill effects of physical 
agencies upon the population, leading to a predisposition of contagious disease (Kay, 
1832. pp.6-13).
Indeed Kay’s professional career stood at the intersection o f ‘statistical’, ‘educational' 
and ‘sanitary’ ideas, among which it was his conviction that the conditions of 
manufacturing populations were intimately associated with cholera and typhus epidemics: 
'The state of the streets powerfully affects the health of their inhabitants. Sporadic cases 
of typhus chiefly appear in those streets which are narrow, ill-ventilated, unpaved, or 
which contain heaps o f refuse, or stagnant pools. The confined air and noxious 
exhalations, which abound in such places depress the health of the people, and on this 
account contagious diseases are most rapidly propagated here’ (Kay, 1832, pp. 14-15). 
Public health reformers would draw on arguments linking the insanitary conditions of the 
labouring class and epidemic disease over the next two decades. For instance, the best­
selling 1842 Report on the Sanitary Conditions o f  the Labouring Population reiterated 
these concerns by illuminating the ‘unknown country’ of pauperism that remained largely 
hidden from the sensibilities o f the middle-class public. Chadwick’s report would argue 
that various forms o f epidemic and endemic disease were caused by ‘atmospheric 
impurities produced by decomposing animal and vegetable substances, by damp and filth, 
and close and overcrowded dwellings’ (1842, p.422).
Hence, the aetiology o f epidemics was linked to the pauperising conditions of the 
labouring classes. Contagion was thought to propagate through olfactory nerves, and
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proponents of contagionism such as Southwood-Smith argued that putrefaction of animal 
and vegetable matter emanated a compound called ‘miasma’ which entered the human 
constitution through smells. It was possible to argue, then, as did Chadwick, that this 
miasmic contagion was produced under those conditions in which ‘atmospheric 
impurities’, ‘poisonous exhalations’ and the ‘constant emanation of effluvia' were created 
by 'dampness and lack o f ventilation in dwellings’, 'the decaying vegetable substances' 
and refuse which accumulated in the streets and houses, the open sewers, and the lack of 
proper drainage, as well as the lack o f cleanliness, poor domestic economy and ‘the filthy 
habits of the inhabitants’ (Chadwick, 1842, pp.93-4).
Although the major epidemic outbreaks o f 1832 and 1848 revived the familiar theory 
that cholera was the ‘disease o f the poor’, the medical statistics did not always bear this 
out. As one o f the medical inspectors o f the Board of Health observed: ‘The epidemic 
was no respecter o f classes... Rich and poor suffered alike or escaped alike, according as 
they lived in the observance or violation o f the laws of their physical well-being' (cited in 
Himmelfarb, 1984, p.360). Nonetheless, this theory of contagion, which stood in 
opposition to other medical explanations, would become an ally for political authorities. 
Chadwick himself reproached the medical controversy inspired by anti-contagionists, 
which he thought were ‘prejudicial in diverting attention away from the practical means 
o f prevention' (cited in Finer, 1952, p.218). In Chadwick’s estimation it was not doctors 
as such, but civil engineers who he considered to be the most important agents of change 
in the health o f town populations. Along these lines the sanitarian theory of contagion 
accorded well with broader concerns about the mode of life of the labouring population, 
particularly, the character and conditions of the poor. The aetiology of epidemics would 
establish a direct and deleterious link between poverty and disease; the conception was 
not held to demonstrate the necessity for overcoming poverty, but for corrective 
interventions of certain habits and conditions found among the poor, in quite a striking 
way, this theory o f the aetiology o f epidemics isolated precisely the conditions and 
behaviours that were constitutive o f pauperism.
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The sanitary idea, popularised by the 1842 Report, 'burst on a startled middle-class 
public' and formed part o f a veritable wave of public health reforms (cited in Finer. 1952. 
p.209). The Report o f  the Select Committee on the Health o f  the Town (1840) similarly 
exposed the squalid conditions in many industrial areas and recommended the institution 
of district boards of health. No fewer than three associations were formed in 1844 to 
propagate the ‘sanitary gospel’: the Association for Promoting Cleanliness among the 
Poor, the Society for the Improvement o f the Conditions o f the Labouring Classes and 
Health of Towns Association. Amid the crisis of typhus and cholera and the increasing 
visibility of the poor as probable causes of epidemic phenomena, we find a great flurry of 
information mediated through meetings, sponsored lectures, and issued reports which 
were duly publicised in the press. The climax of this intellectual and administrative 
activity came with the passage o f the Public Health Act o f 1848, and a supplementary 
health bill for London, which formed, perhaps, a belated response to the enormous 
casualties of the cholera epidemic o f the same year87 (Himmelfarb, 1984, pp.359-60).
Among this field o f noso-politics, we find that pauperism is no longer simply the 
source of moral contagion, but the cause and effect of physical disease. The relation 
between disease and poverty is now mutually constitutive. On the one hand, typhus and 
cholera epidemics were conceived to have their origins among the most pauperised 
sectors o f the labouring populations. On the other, disease was recognised as a factor 
which led to pauperism through the premature death of some breadwinners and the 
diminished productivity o f others through the creation of widows, orphans and by 
throwing families onto poor-relief and leading them to a life o f vice and crime 
(Chadwick. 1965, pp.254-257). This relationship between poverty and disease would be 
further concretised by the elaboration of ‘vital statistics', over which political 
intervention and debate increasingly took hold. It was William Farr who, from the
87 The Public Health Act o f  1848 introduced new powers to the sanitary minded official, the ‘medical 
officer’, and municipal inspectors. A new central department, the General Board o f  Health, under a 
nominated president, and provided for local boards o f health was established; in municipal boroughs these 
were to be the town councils, elsewhere they were to be special boards elected by the rate payers on the 
same footing as the election o f  boards o f  guardians. Each board o f health was empowered to appoint a 
surveyor, an inspector o f  nuisances, a treasurer, a clerk and an ‘officer o f  health’ who had to be a legally 
qualified medical practitioner. The act contained numerous sanitary clauses including the cleansing o f  
sewers, sanitation o f  houses, supervision o f  lodging houses and slaughterhouses, and maintenance o f  
pavements. This was the first act in which the term ‘public health’ appeared.
Registrar General’s Department, pioneered a form of knowledge that classified causes of 
death in a ‘statistical nosology’ (Flinn, 1965, pp.26-28). Together, administrators and 
statisticians envisaged a government over the conditions of life through the 
documentation and calculation o f vital statistics that would lead to numerous social 
investigations into the correlates o f poverty among the labouring classes.
It was these investigations into the conditions of the labouring poor, instigated by the 
medical officer, the sanitary engineer and the moralistic chronicler, that gave rise to a 
new field of observations and rationalities that might be distinctively called ‘social’. 
Henry Mayhew (1985), for instance, the vigorous ‘social and political’ commentator on 
the conditions o f the labouring classes, would draw from the same style of statements and 
observations made by Chadwick’s Sanitary Conditions. He would give light to the 
‘residuum’, the ‘great undiscovered country o f the poor’, by attending not to political and 
economic issues as such, but the ‘immediate influences’ affecting the life of the worker. 
It was only a matter o f time before others would link observations of poverty to numerous 
contradictions o f political economy. For instance, Angus Reach, a ‘special correspondent' 
in Manchester, would link this new manner of social investigation to the evils of political 
economy, which he blamed for exacerbating the relations between rich and poor. But 
rather than invoke the romantic nostalgia which yearned for an idyllic solution for the 
abominations o f the factory and city, Reach recognised the paradox of a man with a 
family ‘who preferred to earn twelve shillings in noisy, smoky Manchester rather than six 
shillings in the dewy fields o f Wiltshire. To purify the air of Manchester was to quench 
its furnaces and deprive its inhabitants of their dinners’ (cited in Himmelfarb. 1984. 
pp.315-6).
The growth o f political economy, with its rapid industrialisation, overcrowding and 
squalid conditions, formed an industry that was, after all, the source of prosperity and 
happiness. But political economy said very little about the hidden conditions of the poor, 
of husband and wife who died in obscurity, unnoticed for days, or even the class of 
‘bone-pickers’, ‘mud-rakers’, people living on the produce of ‘dung-heaps’ (Chadwick, 
1842, pp. 164-5). On the basis o f this absence of observation into the detailed character
and conditions o f the poor, Reach concluded: ‘Now it is for Social Economy to play its 
part -  to investigate diligently into the condition, the comforts, the mode of work and of 
life, of our factory population, and to devise and to urge every possible means for the 
amelioration o f their lot’ (cited in Himmelfarb, 1984, p.317). But before turning its 
attention to the conditions o f labour, social economy was primarily concerned with 
documenting only the most shocking and primitive conditions of the poor, the likes of 
which succeeded in intensifying public concerns o f ‘social danger’. Under the new mode 
of social investigation, social economy gave the previous formlessness of pauperism a 
subsequent moral form, the aberrant life-conduct of which was rendered intelligible in 
terms o f its deviation from civil society.
By linking pauperism to disease, a politics o f conduct would probe into the character 
and conditions o f those who threatened the health and security of social life. The solution 
was not to level the inequality o f these conditions, but to form a sanitary cordon between 
the dangerous and wealthy classes through medical legislation. The Poor Law of 1834 
effectively sealed o ff poverty from pauperism, ensuring obligatory medical control of the 
latter, while subjecting the former to a preventive medical police o f those moral habits 
and physical conditions in which poverty degenerated into pauperism. It is this matter to 
which I now turn.
Social medicine and Poor Law
One of the objectives o f the Poor Law, then, was the obligatory medicalisation of the 
poor. The medical legislation contained within the Poor Law was consistent with liberal 
concerns for maintaining the security o f the population by enforcing two kinds of control 
strategies: policies o f protection-assistance and control-assistance. These were the first 
components of an English social medicine. Following the Poor Law, there was a plethora 
of inquiries into the medical and sanitary conditions of the populace, leading to a series of 
major Public Health Acts in 1848, 1866 and 1875. It was largely the efforts o f John Snow 
who developed this medical legislation by organising not so much as medical assistance 
but medical control o f the population. The Health Service was expressly intended for the 
poor, aiming to achieve at the collective level the same measures of control that were
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guaranteed by the Poor Law itself -  the control o f vaccination, the documentation and 
analysis of epidemics and the localisation o f unhealthy spaces -  all o f which were aimed 
at controlling the labouring classes.
During the first two thirds o f the nineteenth century, the kind of problematisations 
addressed by this liberal mode o f government are clearly visible from the medical 
legislation: How is one to guarantee political security? How does a rationality of 
government withdraw from poor-relief without giving free reign to the very conditions 
that create pauperism? How do we promote self-responsibility and familial duty? The 
solution proposed by social medicine is to establish various measures of prevention, a 
‘police of the poor', not only capable o f detection and surveillance o f crime, but medical 
diagnosis, statistical correlation and social investigation of the character and conditions 
that fixed a medicine o f spaces to the physical conditions and moral habits of the poor. 
Pauperism is therefore eliminated by acting on the circumstances that produce poverty.
By the second half o f the nineteenth century, social hygiene coupled with education 
programmes would make these preventive policies complete. The space of individual 
discipline, self-responsibility and familial duty would become the mechanism par 
excellence for the medicalisation o f the population; the minimisation o f state action, and 
the prevention o f idleness and disease. Above all, social medicine, as an apparatus of 
liberal governance, effects an ethical transformation -  the vital conditions of a population 
are no longer exclusively the responsibility o f political authorities but the personal and 
familial responsibility o f all. In other words, the principles of prevention are to be 
thoroughly collectivised and individualised. Finally, the argument is made that English 
social medicine exercised considerable influence over the events that led to the 
constitution o f poverty as a set o f conditions requiring continuous surveillance and 
control: the emergence o f the public health movement in Britain, the establishment of the 
Health Service in 1875, and the development of a science o f social pathology, 
epidemiology, would together assemble the language of prevention now found among 
contemporary welfare policies.
Medicine of conduct
In this section. I return to the politics of the present to show how the bio-political 
legacy of social medicine remains instrumental to the post welfare regime. The remainder 
of the chapter explores two key aspects o f how medical knowledge continues to inform 
neo-liberal approaches to welfare administration: that is, the role of supervision in the 
reconstruction o f conduct, and the use o f risk assessment systems for the calculated 
management o f welfare populations. The case is made that Australian reforms draw from 
a range of clinical and therapeutic technologies that target the moral and ethical capacities 
of the poor. This becomes all the more possible once the crisis of welfare is recast in 
terms of conduct.
By now it is clear the coalition Government’s rhetoric of welfare dependency 
resurrects nineteenth century notions o f pauperism ; the difference being, however, that 
instead of acting on a set of conditions that were thought to transform poverty into 
indigence, contemporary control strategies act on the conditions of a behavioural 
syndrome located in biology, psychology, socialisation, culture, etc. What is nonetheless 
common between nineteenth century conceptions of pauperism and contemporary 
vocabularies o f dependency is an attempt to remoralise the habits and capacities of 
individuals who remain excluded from labour and wealth. It is possible to trace this 
moral/psychological dimension o f dependency as far back as the New Right governments 
of the 80's, and more recently, to Third Way politics which seek to reconstruct the 
autonomy of claimants.
In Australia, we find a curious admixture of Third Way policies seeking to reinvent 
community as a domain o f human interdependency and solidarity, while also enforcing 
an array o f behavioural controls which share clear links with Mead's new paternalism. 
Despite Giddens' insistence that the Third Way is an ‘alternative political philosophy' -  a 
new knowledge-based, globalised economy with the values o f a humane society 
(Giddens, 2000, pp.32-3) -  the argument made here is that Third Way politics are a form 
of neo-liberalism continued by other means. Third Way approaches are based on the 
peculiarly Anglo-American assessment of the failure of welfare and have, more recently.
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become something o f a ‘Trojan horse’ for the introduction o f new control mechanisms 
(Basham, 1999; Rose, 1999a). Though these mechanisms and strategies o f control are 
quite varied and rely on different technologies and agencies, the case 1 want to make is 
that recent welfare reform installs a medicalising regime for the control of conduct. In the 
first instance, I examine how Australian welfare politics draw from American solutions, 
namely, the importation o f new paternalist techniques o f supervision and advice-giving.
Supervising the poor
Despite aspects o f mutual obligation that clearly seek to revitalise communitarian and 
solidaristic responsibilities, it also enables a close supervision o f the poor. The new 
paternalism that informs obligation based policies in Australia explicitly assume that 
welfare recipients are passive and childlike, they lack self-discipline and basic self­
competence. and are prone to idleness and selfish indulgence. This is not unlike the 
‘blight of indolence', the ‘taint o f slothfulness’, or the lack o f ‘forethought and economy' 
observed by commentators o f the poor during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
The new culture o f welfare administration signals a return to paternalistic authority in the 
sense that it is about explicitly ‘telling welfare recipients what to do’ (Mead, 1998. 
p. 104). Lawrence Mead, the main proponent of new paternalism writes:
...m any welfare recipients seem  to need pressure from the outside to achieve their own goals.
They seem to be looking for structure. The idea o f  case managers monitoring people easily 
strikes the better-off as severe. They compare that relationship with authority to the warmer, 
more affirmative relationships they have known. For the poor, however, supervision is often 
new and w elcom e... Thus m ost recipients respond favourably to oversight... Said one 
supervisor in Riverside: ‘It reminds them that you care, and that you’re watching  (Mead,
1997. p.65).
The innovation o f new paternalism is the middle ground approach it assumes between 
the classic welfare state and neo-liberalism: ‘It accepts the orthodoxies of neo-liberalism 
but hopes to patch society together again with a mix of exhortation and intervention into 
the lives o f the poor and the deviant’ (MacGregor, 1999, p.93). To counter welfare 
dependency, new paternalism advocates controlling patterns of behaviour rather than 
merely helping those in need (Mead, 1997, p.7). As such, new paternalism supports 
‘workfare' programmes, supervisory service providers, greater emphasis on programme 
administration and efficiency, privatization and the enforcement o f social values. It 
proposes a form o f surveillance that, in the name of caring for the disadvantaged, applies
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continuous techniques o f case management and ‘checking’ in order to ‘coach’ welfare 
recipients in the values o f self-discipline and self-responsibility. For this reason, there is 
growing agreement with Mead’s suggestion that the success of welfare reform is 
contingent on the progress o f public administration. What has become an important 
‘trend* in social policy is the ‘attempt to reduce poverty and other social problems by 
directive and supervisory means’ (1997, p.2). To fulfil this end, welfare administration 
must no longer rely on administration for its success, but must itself become a technique 
that extends beyond the institutional space o f discipline:
traditionally, administration was considered a tool to deliver policies conceived in economic 
terms. Such are the problems o f  bureaucracy in America that som e economists have 
advocated that administration be minimised by delivering social benefits through voucher or 
market mechanisms. Paternalism gives up that strategy, for now not only the delivery o f  
benefits but po licy  itse lf  is administrative. The goal is to supervise behaviour, largely outside 
institutional walls, something that can only be done by routines where staff members check up 
on clients... The potential for paternalism rests on the progress o f  public administration 
(Mead, 1997, p.21).
Besides the implicit cynicism that recipients are unable or unwilling to act as ‘responsible 
adults', the new regime o f administration is structured around enforcing recipients to 
continually demonstrate that they are making progress toward taking and keeping paid 
employment instead o f relying on welfare as their primary source of income. A 
recipient's contact with welfare from beginning to end is now funnelled through this 
concern. It begins with assessment, continues with financial and employment planning, 
self-help facilities, intensifies with job search, and culminates in leaving welfare for paid 
employment outside the home. Recipients are continually being evaluated through all 
these activities as to whether or not they are, in the new lexicon of welfare reform, 'job 
ready' for ‘rapid attachment’ to the labour market (Schram, 2000, pp.86-7).
We can see this shift toward a more medicalised form of monitoring in case 
management approaches. For years, when caseworkers were assigned to welfare families, 
they made home visits, consulted with families regarding their needs, and wielded greater 
discretion over the extent to which the family received assistance. In America, by 1972. 
partly in response to litigation requiring the standardisation o f procedures to ensure 
fairness in the treatment o f families, the Federal government required states to separate 
income benefits determination and service provision. Welfare families no longer had
caseworkers. From the early 70’s until the late 80’s, in most states welfare administration 
intake procedures did not involve assessment o f applicant employability to any great 
extent. The Family Support Act o f 1988 changed this, reintroducing the role of the 
caseworker in income maintenance administration.
So too, in Australia, the case manager emerges as a new agent for the supervision of 
the unemployed. In the initiatives outlined in the 1994 White Paper, Working Nation, 
Keating announces the Government’s plans for the resourcing and training of personnel 
who would act as a relay between the unemployed, local employers and appropriate 
services and agencies. The case manager operates in much the same way as the pastoral 
role outlined by Foucault (1981, 1982, 1988b) which, again, signals the paternalistic 
direction taken by welfare reform. ‘Intensive’ case management focuses on working with 
recipients to plan their transition from welfare to paid employment. The 1997 legislation 
for mutual obligation increases the emphasis on intensive case management. Similarly, 
the 1996 legislation in the United States referred to caseworkers as 'employment 
counsellors' or ‘job coaches’ who no longer offered social service support for problems 
unrelated to finding and keeping employment, and who often were not even employees of 
the welfare agency but worked for private contractors. The assessment, diagnosis and 
treatment for physical and psychological conditions become an important component of
welfare administration. Helping people change their personal habits and cope with
88personal problems is central to helping recipients become job-ready .
Historically, the 'case record' has been central to welfare administration as it is to 
medical administration. Common to both, the case record functions to continuously 
register individual differences and similarities in relation to a field of structured norms: it 
translates spatial and pathological ‘events’ into a history of symptoms and diagnoses with 
which to reduce the uncertainty o f normalising intervention89. Among welfare systems.
88 ‘Counselling now surpasses training as the route to self-sufficiency. Building self-esteem takes priority 
over getting an education. Leaving welfare for paid employment is considered more a problem o f personal 
attributes than job skills. The development o f  soft skills in interpersonal relations is emphasised over the 
acquisition o f  hard skills in particular trades and professions’ (Schram, 2000, p.89).
8Q According to Rose, the medical record ‘meticulously inscribes the details o f  the individual history o f  the 
patient in a stable, transferable, comparable form, it renders the suffering o f  the sick person knowable in a
the case record traces a biography o f individual activity -  time spent in the labour market, 
time receiving income support -  but as Schram (2000) notes, case records are notoriously 
difficult to systematise in ways that constitute adequate forms of electronic surveillance90. 
The new paternalist emphasis upon ‘monitoring’ resolves this problem by conflating 
techniques of observation with a new kind o f medicalised care of welfare recipients: 
observation induces a climate in which the watched recipient feels obligated to modify 
their behaviour and demonstrate how they are responding to the care provided. The 
watched recipient is a clinically treated object who can be monitored in terms of their 
contractual compliance and, eventually, their departure from public aid. New reporting 
systems therefore resort to a practice o f ‘continuous monitoring’ whereby methods of 
case management, counselling and coaching elicit useful forms o f self-reliance (Bardach. 
1997).
But the induction o f medical knowledge extends not only to the individual relation of 
case manager and claim ant but draws from a collective medical perception of welfare 
populations. The rise o f calculative technologies like risk assessment, epidemiological 
screening and profiling tools, no longer treat poverty as collective phenomenon but a 
property o f individuals. Risk management systems now turn to more differentiated forms 
of targeting to manage ‘the riskiness o f the most risky’.
Risk government
In the new configuration o f control we find a whole array of control agents -  police, 
social workers, doctors, psychiatrists, case managers, mental health workers -  who are 
connected with one another ‘in circuits of surveillance and communication designed to
new way. in relation to the population o f  patients which he or she forms an element ... one could now. for 
the first time, observe the similarities and differences between symptoms in different individuals at any one 
time and over time. This provided the conditions for a statisticalisation and normalisation o f  diseases: a 
new classificatory system , which would reduce the uncertainty inherent in medical diagnosis by the 
location o f  the individual facts o f  any particular case within a field structured by norms' (Rose. 1994b.
p.60).
x’ In the American context where the medicalisation o f welfare administration is considerably more 
advanced, new methods o f  continuous surveillance and case management have called for new information 
systems to monitor the recipient’s transition from welfare to work. For instance, a 1998 report from the 
National Association o f  State Information Resource Executives (NASIRE) raises concerns regarding the 
‘lack o f  functioning monitoring system s for tracking welfare recipients and stresses the importance o f  
finding out what happens to recipients after they leave welfare as well as the critical role o f  monitoring 
recipient’s behaviour while on w elfare’ (Schram, 2000, p.89).
minimise the riskiness o f the most risky’ (Rose, 1999a, p.260). These new technologies 
for the calculation o f risk find their conditions o f existence among eighteenth and 
nineteenth century statistical surveys o f populations (Hacking, 1975, 1990), and later, 
among correlations between medical phenomena and social groups (Armstrong, 1983). 
Current technologies o f welfare administration resemble epidemiological techniques of 
calculation, which superimpose the probability o f ‘future deviation’ onto a grid of 
visibilities, thereby mapping and measuring the rate o f transmission and spatial 
distribution o f risky phenomena. Certainly Giddens’ vision of welfare accords well with 
new regimes of risk government, where epidemiological screening, risk assessment tools 
and profiling techniques enable more complex and targeted forms of intervention.
In contemporary welfare regimes, risk management plays an important role in 
collection, assessment and distribution o f information for rationalising resources for those 
most in need; modifying policies around different sectors and profiles o f risk; and. 
governing more intensely those who are at greater risk of overpayment. As Rose points 
out. the logics o f risk are 'driven by the technological imperative o f taming uncertainty 
and mastering hazard’ which has found its way in policy manuals for welfare agencies, 
among psychiatric and psychological practices, and the calculation o f medical risks and 
dangers to the community (1999a, p.260). Though Rose argues the logic of prediction has 
replaced the logic o f diagnosis, I think the turn to managing and predicting uncertainty 
has in fact accelerated the tendency to produce clinical diagnoses of abject populations.
The Australian social security system is distinct from other welfare regimes as it is 
not based on a social insurance scheme where risk is ‘socialised’, but consists of a range 
of means-tested benefits designed to alleviate the risk of poverty (benefits are funded 
from general revenue rather than hypothecated taxation or insurance contributions). This 
sy stem underwent change in 1994 when social policy improved targeting of assistance by 
tightening income and assets tests so that payment of benefits were allocated to those 
identified 'as most at risk o f poverty’ {Working Nation, 1994, p.7). Although poverty is 
traditionally viewed in terms o f societal risk, the more recent emphasis on self-reliance 
reinforces the message that poverty is now a property of individuals. These factors
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suggest that, in complete contrast to ‘insurantial’ risk, Australia’s social security system 
operates at the level of clinical risk. In other words, risk is individualised in the detection 
and treatment o f medical pathology, psychological disorder or criminality in individuals 
(Weir, 1996; O ’Malley, 1996; Petersen, 1997).
Since the mid 80’s, Australian social security policy intensified principles o f targeted 
support on the basis o f expanding coverage to those ‘most in need’ among different types 
o f households and clients. The poor are no longer equalised entities as scientific 
methodologies for the calculation o f risk employ more highly individualised means of 
distinguishing between the deserving and undeserving poor. The McClure report recently 
proposed a ‘participation payment’ based on a completely individualised assessment with 
various supplementary add-on payments, representing a more elaborately targeted 
support system. And while political and economic rationalities are no doubt central to the 
government o f risk, computer technology has played an important ‘technical' role in 
managing the complexity o f risk assessment. Computer modelling, for instance, has 
highlighted the need for policy changes through the calculation and prediction of ‘poverty 
traps'91, enabling policy makers to identify when and where income anomalies occur. The 
discovery of welfare dependency coincides with the differentiation o f micro-populations 
defined in terms o f their pathological characteristics, in which case clinical risk gives rise 
to more individualising strategies o f assessment and intervention.
As far back as 1987. the introduction of ‘a risk-based approach' was used in 
‘compliance technologies’ to identify overpayments and welfare fraud. New forms of 
‘profiling'92 ensured those with a greater risk of overpayment were more intensely 
governed than other clients (Australia, 1987, p.24). Targeted recipients were sent more
11 These occur are when combinations o f  income taxation, social security withdrawal rates, and tax rebates
lead to situations where increased private income results in fewer benefits to recipients. The calculation of
these anomalies has heightened awareness o f  the existence o f  long-term unemployment, thereby
precipitating and reinforcing discourses o f  welfare dependency.
Q: Profiled risk government is noted for its location o f risk among sub-populations, and well established
among policing practices for apprehending and questioning the 'usual suspects' (Novas & Rose, 2000).
Risky sub-populations are defined by characteristics o f  individuals -  sex, age. ethnicity, sexual orientation
-  thereby identifying those qualities, attributes or variables which have greater probability o f  danger than
the average population. Profiles are not indications o f danger or pathology but the increased chance of
(future) pathology (Henman, 2004).
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letters from social security departments to confirm their address, income, partnership 
status; they were more likely to have review teams examine their files internally, and be 
interviewed to check the accuracy o f their circumstances. Data-matching exercises and 
cross-sectional analyses -  correlating data from different government departments -  
identify ‘risky’ sub-populations or personalities: ‘detailed statistical analysis [constructs] 
profiles of ‘at risk’ client behaviours, which is then matched against total clients of the 
Department’ (Australia, 1987, p.24). Modem surveillance93 is now more than ever 
electronically facilitated through the intensification o f profiled risk in the government of 
risky sectors o f the welfare population.
The turn towards profiled risk in Australia is evidenced from the increased up-take of 
‘activation’ policies for recipients o f work-force age (OECD, 2001a). Though construed 
in different ways, these programmes aim to reduce the risk o f long-term disadvantage, 
poverty and/or dependence on social security by assisting the transition into paid work. In 
the mid 90’s under the Keating Government activation polices were expanded to include: 
significant investment in training programmes for the unemployed. Job Compacts 
between the unemployed and the then Department o f Social Security, and in-job wage 
subsidies for long-term unemployed persons (Dean 1995). In many respects these 
programmes operated at the level o f clinical risk in that they almost exclusively targeted 
the long-term unemployed. But further rationalisation o f these services would eventually 
raise the question: why wait for long-term unemployability to emerge when preventive 
measures can be introduced?
In 1993, the ‘Better early identification and assessment o f ‘at risk’ clients' initiative 
introduced a number of measures designed to establish a risk-based criteria for 
identifying and re-directing clients with ‘labour-market disadvantages’ for intensive case 
management and individually prepared ‘action plans’. Assessment tools were developed 
from administrative data that correlated personal attributes with greater probabilities of 
long-term unemployment. The initiative involved the identification o f ‘at risk’ individuals
Q3 I would even question the ‘new ness’ o f  this model o f  risk-surveillance. Profiled risk already bears a 
strong resemblance to Foucault’s ‘plague m odel’ o f  control and surveillance o f  social space (Foucault. 
1977: Elden, 2003).
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at the time they applied for unemployment benefits and provided them with access to 
more intensive, better funded labour market programmes than the rest of the welfare 
population. In terms o f treating the risk of dependency, this initiative involved a more 
decisive shift from clinical to profiled risk government.
Henman (2004) argues that since taking office in 1997, the Coalition Government has 
tended to eschew risk discourses, opting instead for paternalistic remoralisation. Evidence 
of this is found in mutual obligation-based policies that continue to individualise and 
contractualise social security services. And yet in addition to moralising discourses. I 
would contend that risk government remains a focus of current welfare policy. Reasons 
for this are clearly stated among recommendations o f the McClure report:
that more sophisticated assessm ent or profiling tools should be developed to assist in the 
assessment process, building on the current Job Seeker Classification Instrument (JSCI) and 
Work Ability Tables (W AT). Assessment tools need to take account o f  the risk factors 
associated with likely long-term reliance on income support payments in order to determine 
access to services (McClure, 2000, p. 12).
The Reference Group makes numerous references to ‘risk factors’ as ways of managing 
the complexity o f issues impacting on the assessment process. As rhetoric on 
individualised service delivery purports to provide the most cost effective and calibrated 
intervention for a diversity o f needs, arguably we find the conflation of risk technologies 
with discourses o f remoralisation94. Therefore, I think there are two ways of 
understanding mutual obligation in relation to risk government. Firstly, the obligation of 
government as service providers is to minimise risk by safeguarding financial capital 
through targeted intervention o f the most risky. On the other side o f mutual obligation, 
governments are tempted to re-individualise risk and responsibility by invoking the 
implicit 'social contract’ between citizen and government. In other words, the most risky 
are managed in terms o f increasingly differentiated, intensive and electronic modes of 
profiled assessment, while moral and contractual aspects o f service delivery ensure that 
recipients are increasingly responsible for managing their own risks.
14 The integration o f  risk assessment tools with paternalistic control o f  client behaviour is clearly evidenced 
in the McClure Report: 'A systematic assessment process will need to be developed to ensure that service 
delivery offers targeted assistance based on an individual’s needs, capacities and circumstances. The 
assessment model must include specification o f  the role o f  participation plans and incorporation o f  other 
aspects o f  the mutual obligations framework into service delivery system ’ (McClure, 2000, p. 12).
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Conclusion
By retracing the theme o f social medicine, I have tried to think of medicalisation not 
as a homogenous movement, but a heterogenous technology of the social body, an 
instrument that would find within the idea of population the basis of cultivating and 
maximising the forces o f the state by first disciplining medical knowledge to the 
administration o f life. To speak o f the development of social medicine is no less than 
tracing the key transformations o f alliances and complex linkages between medical and 
political rationalities. We can think o f these intersections between medical and political 
reason in terms o f bio-politics, in which case modem welfare emerges from the 
obligatory medical control o f poor populations. Nineteenth century medicalisation 
ensured the perpetual visibility and management o f poverty by acting on the character 
and conditions that created pauperism.
An investigation o f pre-liberal forms o f bio-politics, like eighteenth century 'medical 
police', provides new lines for thinking about the political functions of social medicine in 
nineteenth century Britain. Debates on pauperism were systematically grafted onto a 
moral topography o f miasma and epidemics, thereby linking pauperism to a science of 
prevention. The events preceding the Poor Law of 1834 established, albeit in a different 
liberal' form, a mode o f policing in which preventive medicine consisted of a number of 
functions out o f which an entirely novel idea of poverty would crystallise. Poverty was 
inscribed among the pauperising conditions of squalor, and linked to the moral and 
physical habits o f the poor. Free medical assistance for the destitute, a sanitary cordon 
established between rich and poor, and the development of medical instruments designed 
to reinsert the poor into the apparatus of production, would establish a new medical 
police of social spaces. Post-1834 policies ensured the security o f liberal society came 
under increasing medical and ‘public’ control.
Current welfare politics invoke the language of prevention and social contract to act 
upon the conditions and circumstances o f a very different domain. If the poor of the 
nineteenth century represented the threat o f epidemic phenomena, contemporary welfare 
dependency embodies the moral/psychological threat of market passivity. Like the
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pauper, the welfare dependent is the antithesis o f labour market activity and the blight of 
economic prosperity. A diagnosis o f the present begins by identifying at least three 
strategies for reforming the Australian social security system which find their antecedents 
among technologies o f social medicine: the language of prevention targets ‘at risk' 
populations for various strategies o f detection and early intervention; a medical form of 
‘continuous monitoring’ is installed within new circuits of assistance between service 
providers, case managers, and clients; and new profiling tools of assessment and 
electronic surveillance are employed to rationalise welfare services and implement more 
targeted forms o f intervention. By conflating the characteristics of the welfare dependent 
with that of the pauper, the new politics o f conduct mobilises a whole array of control 
technologies that have transformed social assistance into a highly differentiated and 
unequal distribution o f services based on the potential risks of subjectivity.
But medicine is not only remoralisation of a moral/pathological problem, but a 
technology engaged in the ethical reconstruction of subjects who, for one reason or 
another, remain excluded from labour and wealth. The fact that medical knowledge 
figures prominently among this new configuration of control is by no means incidental. 
Since the eighteenth century, the doctor has emerged as expert in the arts of the living, 
and medical values have become suffused among contemporary liberal practices of self­
formation. As ‘medical experts come to take up their role as masters o f lifestyle' (Rose. 
1994b. p.69), so too, the case manager and the job counsellor have emerged as experts in 
the arts o f participation. Under the formula o f advanced liberalism, society is to be active 
as individuals are obliged to choose, to consume, to work and to find within themselves 
solutions to the contemporary problems of freedom.
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4 Discourse of the poor
If contemporary welfare policies draw from moral, political and theoretical arguments to 
calculate the deservingness o f the poor then the present task is to retrace the emergence of 
a practical rationality and a moral-political framework for the government of the poor. 
This involves investigating a terrain o f poor administration which precedes the liberal 
constitution o f poverty. Indeed, genealogy fails to grasp the significance of the event of 
pauperism if it cannot render intelligible the field that was displaced by it. In this chapter, 
I explore a relatively stable distribution o f statements on poor-relief from the mid­
seventeenth to the late eighteenth century which together forms the ‘discourse of the 
poor'. An examination o f both primary and secondary material shows that the problem of 
the poor is neither reducible to moral nor (o)economic arguments, but the product of 
transformations among paternalistic and pre-liberal modes of government. Furthermore, 
this discourse was linked to a complex terrain in which it becomes neither clear nor self- 
evident that idleness was specific to vagrancy. Among eighteenth century arguments of 
poor-relief, idleness is diffused in terms o f those who not only refuse to work, but the 
sloth ingrained in the customs and habits o f the labouring poor. The problem of idleness 
emerges from a complex terrain o f exploitation, social custom and consumption: the 
idleness o f the poor is central to understanding mercantilist discussions of poor-relief. 
Lastly, the discourse o f the poor allows us to reassess present welfare policies which, in 
the name o f welfare dependency, seek to regulate ‘post-industrial' idleness by 
reconstructing the psychological capacities o f the poor.
As I have argued in previous chapters, present strategies of welfare reform signify the 
reactivation o f moral and ethical arguments that effectively de-emphasise the 'conditions 
of poverty' by focussing on the moral and ethical capacities of the poor to increase their 
participation in a global knowledge-economy. What are played down by such arguments 
are precisely the conditions that might otherwise contribute to a more complex and 
specific understanding o f poverty. The new anti-politics of welfare espoused by neo­
liberals. Third Way enthusiasts, neo-conservatives, communitarians, new paternalists, and
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the like, have the net effect o f deconstituting poverty as a legitimate site for reform -  
welfare is no longer an important site for staging antipoverty struggles.
In Australian welfare politics, the resurrection of moral distinctions between the 
deserving and the undeserving poor calculate the worthiness of claimants according to 
subjective conditions. Nineteenth century virtues of independence, self-responsibility and 
self-discipline are given a new ethical gloss: independent labour is said to foster self- 
respect and self-esteem, to restore confidence and identity. For instance, in her press 
conference on the future direction o f welfare reform in Australia, Senator Newman 
reiterates that employment itself is central to the ethical reconstruction of the dependent, 
while the moral conduct o f the unemployed becomes the proper target of intervention:
The most important thing we can do for the unemployed people is get them into jobs as 
quickly as possible. Nothing is more soul destroying, more likely to lead to hardship, than not 
having a jo b ... However, there are exam ples around Australia where job opportunities are 
available and our entrenched culture o f  welfare dependency has meant that certain members 
o f  our community are not only prepared, but feel entitled to exploit the social safety net 
instead. In doing so, they abuse the essential decency o f  the Australian community and 
undermine public confidence in the integrity o f  the social security system ... where there are 
jobs available even though they may fall short o f  the initial expectations o f  the jobseeker, it is 
neither fair nor moral to expect the hard working men and women o f  this country to 
underwrite what can only be described as a destructive and self-indulgent welfare mentality 
(Newman, 1999b, p.5).
No doubt, problematising the worthiness o f the poor is a politically expedient strategy: 
the image of wilful idleness and demoralisation still capture the imagination of public 
opinion. Welfare dependency invokes the commonsense appeal of weeding out welfare 
cheats, freeloaders, dole bludgers and teenage single mothers who abuse income support 
for their own selfish purposes. The image o f the pauper is still a potent reminder of the 
degraded and reactive character who feeds off the labour of the industrious and virtuous. 
Because o f their popular appeal such stereotypes of idleness tend to exaggerate public 
perceptions of fraud, and over-represent the number of idle and dishonest persons 
receiving income support. This strategy of stigmatisation has a twofold effect: it shifts 
responsibility for the breakdown of social welfare by placing the blame onto those who 
are commonly believed to be abusing the system (Ahmed, et al., 2001); but it also gives 
rise to divisions among citizens, and those within the stigmatised group o f welfare receipt 
(Braithwaite, et al., 2002).
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The problem of idleness and the kind of stigma its gives rise to is perhaps as old as 
poverty itself Arguably, the construction o f welfare dependency -  a group of statements 
that reactivate distinctions between the deserving and undeserving poor -  is invoked in 
the present context o f reform to emphasise the idleness of the poor who, it is believed, 
have degenerated into a state o f chronic indolence and passivity. Distinctions between the 
deserving and undeserving poor have a particular history that precedes the invention of 
poverty. This chapter endeavours to retrace such a history by examining how the poor 
were constituted as an object o f government. Before undertaking this history. I want to 
highlight some o f the differences between notions of ‘the Poor' and that of poverty.
Transform ation of the poor
In 1765, an English pamphlet, anonymously published under the title. Observations 
on the number and misery o f  the poor; on the heavy rates levied for their maintenance, 
and on the general causes o f  poverty , begins with an overview o f the industrious 
activities of the nation among which areas o f agriculture, manufactures and commerce are 
said to excel. But this is only a chimera o f prosperity as the author reveals an alternative 
thumbnail of civil society:
What would a stranger say, to find a people exhibiting such a distinguished external 
appearance o f  prosperity, yet, at the very same time, their streets swarming with wretched 
objects exposed to all the horrors o f  want and misery; their roads infested with lawless 
miscreants to the terror o f  innocent travellers; their parishes groaning under a burden o f  poor 
creatures crammed together in places m iscalled workhouses, where they linger out an indolent 
and nasty existence: their numbers increasing yearly to such a degree, that it has long engaged 
the attention o f  the legislature, and exercised the ingenuity o f  individuals, hitherto in vain, to 
find a remedy adequate to so decipherable a political disorder! (1765, p. 1).
Four decades later, the magistrate and proponent of the Metropolitan Police, Patrick 
Colquhoun, gives the following description o f poverty in A Treatise on Indigence (1806):
Poverty is that state and condition in society where the individual has no surplus labour in 
store, or, in other words, no property or means o f  subsistence but what is derived from the 
constant exercise o f  industry in the various occupations o f  life. Poverty is therefore a most 
necessary component o f  society without which nations and communities could not exist in a 
state o f  civilization. It is the lot o f  man. It is the source o f wealth, since without poverty there 
could be no riches, no refinement, no comfort, and no benefit to those who may be possessed 
o f  wealth, in as much as without a large proportion o f  poverty surplus could never be rendered 
productive in procuring either the conveniences or luxuries o f  life (1806, p.7).
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Between the shocking description o f our anonymous pamphlet and Colquhoun, who 
gives a rational, even optimistic, account o f poverty, the difference indicates a significant 
transformation o f poor-relief. The first author writes from a critical, moral discourse who 
must convert the poor into a deplorable object, the ‘wretched’ sight o f which is not only 
designed to move those who behold it, but symbolise a decisive critique of political 
authorities and existing methods o f relief. As much as this is a repulsive vignette of the 
condition of the poor, it also portrays a vision of civil society in the grips of political 
disorder. So what blocks a fully constituted concept of poverty from emerging in this 
account? We might say the problem is how the poor are conceived as a category, a blank 
object that can only be referred to in terms o f increasing numbers; poverty cannot be 
described as a particular condition arising from the general condition of population, 
capital and subsistence. For our eighteenth century writer, such statements were not yet 
formulated nor fixed to the problem o f the poor.
Colquhoun’s account o f poverty is unique, though in the next three decades it will 
become a more typical definition. Poverty is now displaced from the moving language of 
charity, and from mercantilist preoccupation with ‘the growing numbers o f the poor'. All 
these concerns are suddenly effaced as our second author announces the peculiar 
necessity o f poverty. Poverty is both natural and necessary for the source of wealth of the 
nation, and for the progress o f society. This configuration o f statements was perhaps 
incomprehensible to our eighteenth century author, and yet this definition of poverty is 
calmly poised in terms o f a property o f individuals, or more precisely, the lack of 
property and means o f subsistence o f individuals. Colquhoun's precocious account shows 
evidence o f statements that draw simultaneously from a discourse o f political economy. 
and a discourse that refers to the subsistence and inevitable scarcity o f the conditions that 
apply to a population. In this new theoretical formulation, poverty is understood as a 
natural condition that is at once the source of misery and the source of wealth.
To understand this discursive transformation, we must return to the discourse that 
governs the appearance o f statements of our first anonymous author. But rather than 
assume the inferiority o f a discourse that lacked a theoretical conception o f economy or a
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coherent theory o f ‘society’, it is necessary to investigate this discourse in terms of its 
own intrinsic rationality and coherence. The task is to grasp the style and systematicity of 
‘governing statements’ that comprise the form of the ‘discourse o f the poor’. We find two 
useful examples o f this in the first account. Firstly, the text makes reference to "poor 
creatures crammed together in places miscalled workhouses’, despite the moral overtones 
of this statement, what is revealed is a method of government which coincides with the 
practical problems o f transforming the poor into a useful labour force. By the seventeenth 
century, such statements signal a significant transformation of poor-relief, exemplifying a 
patriarchal form of governance whereby the appearance of workhouses were linked to 
pre-existing statements regarding the strength, wealth and greatness of the nation. But 
perhaps the most prominent feature o f the discourse of the poor is identified by the 
author’s reference to ‘numbers increasing yearly’ which, in the form of statistical 
observation, specifies a problematic category. The numbers o f the poor stressed a concern 
about notions o f ‘populaceness’ which, according to oeconomic conceptions of wealth, 
formed an index of the prosperity o f nations.
In this English context, the discourse of the poor would unite other discourses such as 
political oeconomy and political arithmetic, from William Petty to Adam Smith, where 
principles o f augmenting the population formed the basis of ‘wise administration'. The 
poor were constituted as objects o f maintenance and repression in the sense that they 
posed obstacles to the development of capital, the circulation o f wealth, and the 
expansion o f a productive population. Concepts of ‘oeconomy' and 'population' were 
therefore inseparable to those practices in which ‘the Poor' emerged as a problematic 
object of government: it was a practical knowledge of the poor that formed the locus of 
concerns regarding the good government of the nation. From the sixteenth to late 
eighteenth century the ‘problem o f the poor’ formed the inexorable target of various 
moral, oeconomic, statistical and medical programmes implemented by numerous 
political and local authorities, combining intellectual and institutional relations through a 
series of practical and prescriptive solutions. Our first task, then, is to show how the 
theme of 'numbers o f the poor’ was systematically linked to oeconomic conceptions of 
wealth.
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Numbers of the poor
So far, it has been argued that a discourse of the poor is intelligible in terms of its 
emphasis upon numbers o f  the poor -  a statement that draws on a particular conception of 
the relation between populousness and the wealth, strength and greatness of nations. We 
already know that the seventeenth century concept o f ‘population’ had become the object 
of a German science o f police (Polizeiwissenschaft), which formed the basis of 
mercantilist principles o f enrichment: the management o f populations became the 
essential component o f the strength, happiness and prosperity o f states. But a discourse of 
the poor problematises such concerns from the point o f view that the numbers of the poor 
undermined a formula o f  state prosperity. It is upon the basis o f their numbers, and their 
relation to disciplines o f political oeconomy and political arithmetic, that gave rise to an 
array of classifications in which the object o f ‘the Poor’ were linked to eighteenth century 
themes of'good administration’, and later, the ‘wealth of nations’93.
Unlike twentieth century formulations of poverty, the discourse of the poor does not 
ask ‘What is poverty and what are its social and economic conditions?’ but rather 'Who 
constitute the numbers o f the poor?’ This formulation is quite specific to the seventeenth 
and eighteenth century. There are three categories from which possible answers are 
based: the 'industrious Poor’, the ‘idle Poor’ and the ‘impotent Poor' -  those who are 
capable of labour, those who do not labour, and those who are unable to labour. This is 
the view put forward by the late seventeenth century author, Richard Dunning96, who 
applied such categories when defining the duties o f the parishes under the poor laws as:
work for those that w ill labour, punishment for those that will not, and bread  for those that 
cannot: and if  the two first parts o f  that law were duly observed, the Poor would not only be 
reduced to a small number, comparatively to what they now are, but there would be no such 
Poor as idle and wandering rogues and vagabonds, as the statute o f  the 29th o f  the same 
Queen shews there were before that time: and the punishment appointed for such loose 
persons being that they be whipt, and sent to the place o f  their birth, as an admonition to the
^ There are numerous examples o f  this linkage between population and prosperity o f  the nation, the most 
exemplary o f  which are found in William Petty and Adam Smith. For instance, in his Treatise o f  Taxes and  
Contributions (1662) Petty argues that: ‘Fewness o f  people is real poverty; a Nation wherein are Eight 
Millions o f  people is more than twice as rich as the same scope o f  land where are but Four’ (1963. p.34). 
Similarly, in the Wealth o f  Nations Smith (1789) observes that: ‘Whatever encourages the progress o f  
population and improvement, encourages that o f  real wealth and greatness’ (p.338).
Plain and easy M ethod showing how the office o f  Overseer o f  the Poor may be managed, 1st edition, 
1685.
inhabitants o f  that place to bring up their children (Dunning, 1685, cited in Eden, 1797. 
pp.225-6).
However, the numbers o f the poor is also a theme that begins to specify a moral grouping 
of the nation than simply enumerating the poor by virtue of their common condition. This 
is the view put forward by Daniel Defoe in his influential text Giving Alms No Charity 
(1704) where he states: ‘Tis the men that won’t work, not the men that can get no work, 
which makes the numbers of our poor’ (p.26). Thus, we might say the discourse of the 
poor is a relatively stable distribution o f statements insofar as it discriminates a course of 
action that would lead to the suppression o f idleness, the discouragement of beggary, and 
the legitimation o f work by either moral or economic means. But what constitutes the 
numbers o f the poor as a set of governing statements is the manner in which this 
discourse delineates part of the nation as a category o f governmental concern and 
therefore a target o f punishment and prescription.
This theme o f enumeration and prescription o f the poor is made clearer if we contrast 
it with that o f poverty. While the term ‘poverty’ appears among statements of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century, it fulfils only ‘a very narrow discursive function' 
(Dean. 1991. p.28). Unlike twentieth century notions, poverty does not refer to a common 
set of attributes that define a category o f the population, nor does it outline conditions 
that produce or, at least, contribute to the misery o f the poor. The poor are not constituted 
as a category afflicted by poverty — this attribution o f causal circumstances and 
conditions had not yet come into being -  but exist as a quantitative category that either 
undermines or complements the prosperity and well-being of the nation. There are two 
historical examples o f this debate, both o f which are made by advocates of the workhouse 
-  the entrepreneur Josiah Child and Chief Justice Matthew Hale -  for employing the 
numbers o f the poor to increase ‘the riches o f the nation’. For instance, in A New 
Discourse o f  Trade (1669) Child writes:
The riches o f  a City, as o f  a Nation, consists in the multitude o f  Inhabitants... and if a right 
course be taken for the Sustenation o f  the Poor, and setting them to Work, you need inv ent no 
stratagem to keep them out, but rather to bring them in. For the resort o f  the Poor to a City or 
Nation well managed, is in effect, the conflux o f  Riches to that City or Nation; and therefore 
the subtil Dutch receive, and relieve, or employ all that come to them, not enquiring what 
Nation, much less what Parish they are o f  (Child, 1669, p.64).
Rather than decrease the numbers o f the poor, as one might expect, Child advocates the 
reverse condition o f attracting the poor to a city so they might be usefully employed. 
‘Setting the Poor to work’ emerges as a practical solution for which the numbers of the 
poor are linked to a theme that is predominant among British mercantilism: the 
augmentation of wealth and strength of the nation.
There are, however, definite limits and exceptions to this formula of increasing 
national wealth by setting the poor to work as we see in the case of Matthew Hale's A 
Discourse Touching the Provision fo r  the Poor (1683). Here, the numbers of the poor 
does not automatically engender a real increase in the wealth and greatness of the nation, 
for where there is a lack o f provision o f employment, and where poor families resort to 
stealing and begging, the poor are neither capable of self-discipline nor suitable 
employment. On this matter Hale argues:
But in England, for want o f  a due regulation o f  things, the more populous we are the Poorer 
we are; so that, that wherein the Strength and Wealth o f  a Kingdom consists, render us the 
weaker and the poorer (Hale, 1683, Preface).
This mercantilist formula that asserts populaceness must coincide with wealth is 
presented with a number o f obstacles by the end o f the seventeenth century. The numbers 
of the poor are considered an index o f prosperity only insofar as sustenance is rendered 
efficient by profitable employments as opposed to begging and stealing. Hence, a 
prescriptive solution must proceed rather cautiously, that is, by increasing the numbers of 
the ‘industrious Poor’ without increasing the numbers of the ‘idle Poof. As we shall see. 
the problem of the poor will reside in the paradox of a nation that is both industrious and 
slothful.
Problem of idleness
To understand the distribution o f statements that make-up the discourse of the poor, it 
is necessary to grasp the conditions in which two themes become historically linked: the 
‘numbers of the poor’ and the ‘wealth of nations’. Both type o f statements converge 
around the problem o f poverty, not as a set of conditions common to the poor, but more 
in line with mercantilist principles o f ‘oeconomy’, wealth and prosperity from which the 
theme of ‘setting the poor to work’ appears. The problem is precisely one of transforming
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the idle poor into the industrious poor. But the manner in which the ‘workhouse’ appears 
as a solution to this problem is neither reducible to moral nor oeconomic statements, but 
must be located within a paternalistic mode of government that is anxious to link the poor 
to national goals.
Firstly, this association between numbers and wealth was instigated by means of 
discriminating certain habits and customs o f the poor. Distinctions between the idle and 
industrious poor were positively and negatively distributed in relation to 'profitable 
employment’. It is true that work became a technique for transforming the idle into the 
numbers of ‘useful labour’, but rather than moral reform of the poor we should think of 
this transformation as a strategy o f exploiting the nation’s most valuable resource, its 
population. Foucault makes a similar observation regarding the ‘Great Confinement' of
97the classical period . ‘Condemnation o f idleness’ was not primarily a moral concern, 
though the establishment o f houses o f correction assumed the ‘sloth o f idleness' may be 
transformed by way o f ethical transcendence or moral atonement. Nevertheless: i t  was in 
a certain experience o f labour that the indissociable economic and moral demand for 
confinement was formulated’ (Foucault, 1965, p.57). It is no accident, for instance, that 
the first houses o f confinement appear in the most industrialised parts o f England, where 
the imperative o f labour sequestered the numbers of the poor to provide cheap labour 
during periods o f full employment, and facilitate the reabsorption o f the idle for the 
protection of the city during periods o f unemployment. Thus, confinement played a 
double function: the obligation o f work ensured the prosperity o f all.
Dean (1991) also warns o f the probable misnomer of reducing this link between 
numbers of the poor and wealth o f the nation to the provision of labour as some kind of 
economic mobilisation o f a reserve labour force. Though the dual function of the 
workhouse may have embodied these effects, it is problematic to conceive the 
employment o f the poor as ‘a source of profit on capital outlays on the means of
Q7 “Before having the medical meaning we give it, or that at least we like to suppose it has. confinement was 
required by something quite different from any concern with curing the sick. What made it necessary was 
an imperative o f  labour. Our philanthropy prefers to recognise the signs o f  a benevolence towards sickness 
where there is only a condemnation o f  idleness’ (Foucault, 1965, p.46).
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production’ (1991, p.37). Rather, this linkage is understood in terms of the 'proper 
administration o f the poor’ which are vital to the welfare and security of the nation. This 
required a paternalistic system o f governance capable of consigning the poor to relations 
o f 'command and obedience’. In terms o f 'the relief of the Poor’, then, Matthew Hale 
argues:
Poverty in it se lf  is apt to Emasculate the minds o f  men, or at least it makes men tumultuous 
and unquiet. Where there are many very Poor, the Rich cannot long or safely continue such; 
Necessity renders men o f  Phlegmatick and dull natures stupid and indisciplinable; And men 
o f  more fiery or active institutions rapacious and desperate (1683, Preface).
In a climate where the numbers o f the poor were said to ‘overrun the country'98, work 
provided a cure for every form o f indigence. For the ‘sturdy beggar', the 'rogue and the 
vagabond’, the ‘lazy and thievish’ the experience of labour would promise a kind of 
physical and moral transformation. For the labouring classes, work was the positive 
attainment of salvation, for the poor it was the only means of escaping perdition.
Thus, the ameliorative effects o f work would come to justify ‘the proper employment' 
o f the poor, providing the relevant points o f connection between the numbers and wealth 
o f the nation. But if we think o f these statements as not only a set o f articulations, debates 
and propositions about the proper management o f the poor, but also a set of governing 
practices, then the discourse o f the poor is already a strategy by which the state takes 
charge of the ‘problem of idleness’. This was achieved in two ways: the provision of 
employment with or without confinement. In the case of the former, we should consult 
William Petty’s discussion regarding the notion o f ‘Publick Charge’ over which the state 
assigns responsibility to the parish for the care and employment of the poor as well as 
raising funds for the establishment o f a ‘parish stock’ (ie. flax, hemp, etc.)99. Webb and
Foucault (1965) cites a pamphlet attributed to Thomas Dekker, Grievous Groan for the Poor (1622), that 
captures this sense o f  growing alarm in which poverty was said to spread across the nation like a pestilence: 
‘Though the number o f  the poor do daily increase, all things yet worketh for the worst in their behalf ... 
many o f these parishes tumeth forth their poor, yea, and their lusty labourers that will not work ... to beg. 
filch and steal for their maintenance, so that the country is pitifully pestered with thenf (pp.49-50).
40 There are clear references to this in the Poor Law Act o f  1601: ‘Be it enacted by the authority o f this 
present parliament, that the churchwardens o f  every parish, and four, three, or two substantial householders 
there as shall be thought m eet... under the hand and seal o f  two or more justices o f  the peace in the same 
country... shall be called overseers o f  the poor... for setting to work all such persons married and 
unmarried having no means to maintain them, (or) use on ordinary or daily trade o f  life to get their living 
by; and also to raise weekly or otherwise, by taxation o f  every inhabitant, and... a convenient stock o f  flax.
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Webb also refer to intermittent parochial reports between 1601 and 1640 of ‘setting the 
Poor to work’ either in their homes or among local parishes, but in the case of some 
parishes the poor were ‘set on work’ even in the absence of a common parish stock. 
Indeed, there are strong parallels between our present ‘work for the dole’ schemes and 
what Petty proposes as the maintenance o f public employment which, apart from 
specifically targeting the able-bodied, and overcoming the problem of insufficient stock, 
would introduce new trades requiring ‘much labour and little art’ such as the cutting and 
scouring o f rivers, the planting o f trees, the making o f bridges and causeways, working in 
mines, quarries, and colleries, and the manufacturing o f iron (1963, pp.29-31).
These ‘innumerable experiments’, which surfaced in the first half o f the seventeenth 
century, were not merely a revival of earlier ideas to recruit the able-bodied poor100. 
Elizabethan legislation, whether for reasons attributed to the turmoil o f civil war. or the 
inaction of central government, was characterised by the authors o f the second half of the 
seventeenth century as having fallen into ‘remarkable neglect’ -  a neglect largely 
attributed to the ineffective organisation o f poor-relief by local parish authorities (Webb 
& Webb, 1963, pp. 101-2). Petty’s discussion exemplifies a somewhat new direction 
whereby the duty o f the state is to take charge o f the poor by prescribing public 
employment, but not because such an end is ‘useful’ or ‘profitable’. Rather, public 
employment o f any form should, above all, preoccupy and discipline the habits and 
morality o f the poor: that the poor should do something restrains disobedience and 
inculcates a sense o f routine that is amenable to work. It is for these reasons that Petty 
claims such works ‘would keep their minds to discipline and obedience, and their bodies 
to a patience of more profitable labour when the need shall requite it’ (Petty. 1963. p.31).
hemp, wool, thread, iron and other necessary ware and stuff to set the poor on work, and also competent 
sums o f  money for and towards the necessary relief o f  the lame, impotent, old, blind, and such other among 
them being poor and not able to w ork... And the said justices o f  peace or any o f  them to send to the house 
o f  correction or common goal such as shall not employ them selves to work, being appointed thereunto as 
aforesaid' (Statutes o f  the Realm , vol. iv, pt ii, 962-5).
100 Conventional history describes the old Poor Law Acts o f  1598 and 1601 as the establishment. b\ 
Parliament, a compulsory system o f  poor-relief that was administered and financed at the local parish level. 
The Elizabethan Poor Law was adopted largely in response to the dissolution o f  the monasteries, religious 
guilds, almshouses, and hospitals under Henry VIII, institutions that had previously provided charitable 
assistance to the poor. During the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the bulk o f  relief recipients 
were elderly, orphans, or widows with young children, the great majority o f  which were female (Webb & 
Webb, 1963).
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No doubt, it was this complex terrain o f new and recurrent arguments on moral and 
administrative failure, and the growing multiplication of ‘vagrancy and destitution' that 
led to the appearance o f the public workhouse in the mid-seventeenth century.
Despite attempts to establish a municipal system of poor-relief in London, the public 
workhouse did not make an appearance until after the civil war (1642-48). Matthew Hale 
describes the function o f the workhouse as placing its inhabitants ‘into a Regular. 
Orderly, and Industrious course o f life’, that is, within patriarchal relations of discipline, 
wherein the young are instructed, the sick provided for, and the idle corrected and 
prevented. As an advocate o f the workhouse, Hale frames an optimistic account in which 
such a scheme presents a remedy for the recurrent failures of Elizabethan poor law. The 
"course of life’ set by the workhouse was a ‘preventive' rather than punitive measure:
The prevention o f  poverty, idleness, and a loose and disorderly Education, even o f poor 
children, would do more good to this Kingdom than all the Gibbets, and Cauterizations, and 
Whipping Posts, and Jayls in this Kingdom, and would render these kinds o f  Disciplines less 
necessary and less frequent (Hale, 1683, p .l 1).
For Hale, the most serious deficiency o f the existing poor laws was the lack of a parish 
stock on which the poor can be set to work to raise "convenient support and provision'. 
As it stood, the law lacked compulsion in two respects: to compel those who were able to 
work but unwilling to do so; and to empower the Justice o f the Peace to compel Church 
Wardens and Overseers to enforce the law who, it was said, were unwilling to charge 
poor rates lest they ‘displease their neighbours’. But more serious than this was the matter 
of applying the ‘force o f law’ to unite neighbouring parishes to raise not only a common 
stock, but exercise more expedient measures to procure a common workhouse (1683.
pp.6-11).
Hale outlines a number o f propositions addressing each of the deficiencies he lays 
claim to: he does so not by refuting the basic precepts of the poor law, but by appealing to 
‘furnise a compulsary Law to inforce Idle Persons to work’. This would not only prevent 
the persistence o f beggary and idleness, but provide ‘convenient Imployment and Wages' 
wherein ‘the benefit o f Working would exceed the benefit of Begging’ (1683, p. 17). Such 
a plan can only be rendered into existence by first empowering the relevant authorities of
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the parish. On this point, Hale elaborates a set of procedures for empowering the Justice 
of the Peace to unite several local parishes in order to erect a common workhouse. 
Furthermore, each workhouse is to employ a Master who is assigned the authoritative 
role of keeping accounts o f a stock, and maintain regular supervision over their periodic 
delivery and dispatch. The most vigorous and consistent of Hale’s concerns, again, relate 
to the weak and ineffectual nature o f these laws. The successful transformation of 
idleness and beggary into ‘Industrious Imployments’ must, according to Hale, rest upon 
some necessary basis o f force, legal or otherwise: ‘if any person that is able to work, and 
not able to maintain himself, shall refuse to do so he may be forced thereunto by Warrant 
of two Justices o f the Peace by Imprisonment, and moderate correction in such Work- 
House' (p. 10).
As Webb and Webb observe, the theme o f ‘profitable employment’ of the poor 
became the ‘common panacea o f the economic writers of the last quarter of the 
seventeenth century, and it found a place in nearly every pamphlet on the commerce or 
industry o f the nation’ (1963, p. 105). The first workhouse experiments appeared in the 
decades after the proposals o f Child and Hale where, for instance, the ‘philanthropist' 
Thomas Firmin established a workhouse for the manufacture o f linen in 1665. This 
experiment continued from 1676 to 1697 wherein able-bodied trades-people were 
employed at low wages while children from the age of three, the aged and infirm could 
obtain subsistence. It was the conviction of Firmin’s lifelong experience that indentured 
work should abound all parishes as a means of ‘making actual profit out of the 
employment o f the poor’ (cited in Webb & Webb, 1963, p. 107).
Similarly. Richard Dunning argued in A Plain and East Method (1686) for procuring 
an actual balance o f profit out o f the employment of the poor by assigning them to 
undertakers or contractors who would set them to work, while those who refused were 
committed to the house o f correction. The legislation of 1696 established a new 
‘Corporation o f the Poor’ for the City o f Bristol to build a workhouse. The Act was based 
upon the ‘powerful and convincing’ pamphlet of John Cary who drew-up proposals for 
addressing the problems o f mendicancy and relief by contracting make-work schemes for
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the poor. The Bristol Workhouse became widely regarded as a ‘promising experiment', 
and over the next fifteen years influenced the application of similar Local Acts for the 
establishment o f workhouses across thirteen towns: ‘The idea underlying all these Acts 
was the desirability o f organising labour of the unemployed, with the double object of 
maintaining them without disorder and o f increasing the national wealth’ (cited in Webb 
& Webb. 1963, p. 120). In 1723 the passing o f Knatchbull’s Act (9 George I. c.7) enabled 
separate parishes to establish workhouses in a form that now recognised their ‘deterrent 
function’. Within a decade over a hundred workhouses were established under this Act.
If the workhouse emerged as a solution to the growing numbers of idle poor it was 
not because ‘setting the poor to work’ was the source of cheap labour and profits for 
mercantilists. Rather, the workhouse emerges as an institutional space for rendering the 
greatest numbers o f the poor self-sufficient, and thus no longer a drain on national 
resources. Despite linking the poor to the wealth of the nation through the institutional 
mechanism of the workhouse, by the mid-eighteenth century, these sanguine attitudes 
meet steady opposition. The ‘indolent and nasty existence’ of those ‘poor creatures 
crammed together in places miscalled workhouses’ will exemplify the kind of criticisms 
that demonstrate the recurrent problem of linking the poor to national goals. By the end 
of the eighteenth century, the paternalistic character of sovereign power and the national 
imperatives of mercantilist trade theory become increasingly problematised by moral and 
economic statements regarding the proper administration of the poor.
However, these solutions which sought to convert the ‘idle poor’ into the ‘industrious 
poor' through the workhouse apparatus assumed that poverty was a unilateral 
phenomenon, comprising mainly o f those whose conduct disqualified them from a 
‘regular and industrious course o f life’. In the next section, I examine an important 
counter-argument which provided an alternative account of processes that converted 
industry into idleness, a phenomenon known as the ‘taint of slothfulness'.
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Taint o f  slothfulness
There is one more problem that confronted the discourse of the poor -  a condition 
apparently reversing the transformative properties of the workhouse -  conversion of the 
industrious into the idle by what was known as the ‘taint of slothfulness’. The year 1704 
constitutes an event in which this problem intersects the theme of setting the poor to work 
where a Bill for the incorporation o f a body of ‘Guardians of the Poor' would establish 
'profitable employment’ o f the poor by means o f establishing in each parish various 
public workhouses, working schools, and for those who refused to work, houses of 
correction. In 1698 such a Bill was introduced into Parliament and made no progress, 
though the subject was vigorously debated in the House of Commons. By 1704, however, 
there were no fewer than four Bills in Parliament, one of which was introduced by the 
entrepreneur Sir Humphrey Mackworth and met with almost 'universal acceptance' 
(Webb & Webb, 1963, p.l 13). At the ‘eleventh hour’ this project was stopped dead in its 
tracks when Daniel Defoe addressed Parliament with his ‘cynical’ pamphlet entitled: 
Giving Alms no Charity, and employing the poor a grievance to the Nation. In 1705 the 
House of Commons consequently threw out Sir Humphrey Mackworth’s Bill 'and no 
similar measure has afterwards got anything near so close to success’ (1963, p.l 14).
Defoe’s pamphlet sharply argues against the public employment o f the poor, though 
not on moral grounds, but according to statements that were consistent with mercantilist 
domestic policy. For instance, he reproduces the principles of population and national 
policy, and its circulatory' conception o f wealth as dependent upon manufacturers and 
trade. Though the text is characteristic o f the discourse of the poor, with its emphasis 
upon sovereign power, population and mercantilist trade theory, it opposes the 
conclusions drawn by the advocates o f the workhouse without refuting the existing 
impulse of charity. It is precisely the notion of employment -  that ‘every Family might 
live upon their own Labour’ -  that remains the principle objective of policy, though the 
means by which this is argued provides the point of difference between Defoe and his 
contemporaries.
160
Firstly, Defoe’s argument should not be considered a defence of private 
manufacturers, but draws more from mercantilist concerns of the oeconomic organisation 
of the nation as systems o f circulation. For instance, Defoe provides a clear illustration of 
how setting the poor to work would damage the domestic production of private 
manufacturers:
The manufacture o f  making bays is now establish'd at Colchester in Essex, suppose it should 
be attempted to be erected in M iddlesex, as a certain worthy and wealthy gentleman near 
Hackney once propos'd, it may be suppos'd if  you will grant the skill in working the same, and 
the wages the same, that they must be made cheaper in Middlesex than in Essex, and 
cheapness certainly w ill make the merchant buy here rather than there, and so in time all the 
bay making at Colchester dyes, and the staple for that commodity is removed to London.
What must the poor o f  Colchester do, there they buy a parochial settlement, those that have 
numerous families cannot follow  the manufacture and come up to London, for our parochial 
laws impower the Church-wardens to refuse them a settlement, so that they are confin'd to 
their own countrey, and the bread taken out o f  their mouths, and all this to feed vagabonds, 
and to set them to work, who by their choice would be idle, and who merit the correction o f  
the law (1704, p. 15).
The establishment o f public manufacturers as a remedy for setting the poor to work only 
succeeds in displacing the ‘happily settled’ manufacturers o f one part of the kingdom by 
providing cheaper labour in another; in effect, placing a vagabond in an honest labourer's 
employment. This is not an argument for the free-market o f labour; it is not a defence of 
wage-labour as the best means o f administering the poor; nor does it favour private 
investment over public expenditure for the employment of the poor. Defoe's position 
serves as a warning against state interference among existing patterns of circulation and 
distribution o f manufacturers throughout the nation.
Defoe applies the mercantilist metaphor o f ‘circulation’ to present a context wherein 
the make-schemes o f the workhouse appear as an artificial edifice of manufactures, 
succeeding only in dislocating the established system of manufacturers within the nation. 
Furthermore, disrupting the natural ‘circulation of trade’ would cause a state of disorder 
by ruining the manufacturers, displacing the settlement and employment of families, 
making towns and cities dependent on one another, and redistributing poverty among the 
nation:
I think therefore, with submission, to erect manufactures in every town to transpose the 
manufactures from the settled places into private parishes and corporations, to parcel out our 
trade to every door, it must be ruinous to the manufacturers themselves, will turn thousands o f  
families out o f  their employments, and take the bread out o f the mouths o f  diligent and
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industrious families to feed vagrants, thieves and beggars, who ought much rather to be 
com pell’d, by legal methods, to seek that work which it is plain is to be had; and thus this Act 
will instead o f  setting and relieving the poor, encrease their number, and starve the best o f  
them (1704, p.23).
Defoe shifts his attack from the deleterious effects of workhouses on the established 
system of manufactures, to the apparent confusion of such schemes in targeting those 
who make up the numbers o f the poor. Given the high price of wages, and ‘the present 
difficulty of rising soldiers’, he proposes that there is more ‘labour than hands to employ 
it', and that English labourers currently enjoy an ‘easie, steady employment’. An 
observation o f ‘all these particulars, and innumerable unhappy instances' presents the 
following deduction on which the discourse of the poor must now stand: ‘the poverty of 
our people which is so burthensome, and increases upon us so much, does not arise from 
want of proper employments’ (1704, p.22). If there is already sufficient employment then 
the provision o f workhouses and parish stocks is not only harmful to the ‘Arcanas of 
Trade’, but also superfluous to the problem o f idleness. But Defoe only hints at possible 
alternatives101 which, given the apparent availability of work, would therefore demand 
methods of subjecting the poor to regulation and compulsion: ‘Tis a regulation of the 
poor that is wanted in England, not a setting them to work’ (p.7).
By refuting lack o f employment on which the category of ‘the Poor’ is said to exist. 
Defoe presents an alternative to the question of who makes up the numbers of the poor: 
‘Tis the Men that won't work, not the Men that can't get no work. which makes up the 
numbers of the Poor’ (1704, p.25. original emphasis). But this statement is not designed 
to target the sturdy beggar and the vagabond as blameworthy figures o f the debate, rather 
it distinguishes the ‘Poverty and Exigence o f the Poor’ as derived by either two causes: 
'Casualty' and ‘Crim e’ (p.23). Casualty defines those unable to work through infirmity, 
age. or physical constraints, and who should remain the legitimate objects of parochial 
relief. Crime, on the other hand, refers to the manner in which householding virtues of 
‘good husbandry’ are given over to luxury, sloth and pride; these are the ‘visible and 
direct fountains’ o f poverty. Defoe observes that financial prudence and responsibility -
101 *If... I am enquir'd o f  what this regulation should be, I am no more at a loss to lay it down than I am to 
affirm what is above; and shall always be ready, when call’d to it, to make such a proposal to this 
Honourable House, as with their concurrence shall for ever put a stop to poverty and beggery, parish 
charges, assessments and the like, in this nation’ (Defoe, 1704, pp.7-8).
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where a man commits his earnings to the management of his wife, or otherwise defers 
from spending it for the sake o f subsistence -  are peculiar to the English102. Hence, the 
crime that has become the most pervasive, indeed, ‘so general, so epidemick, and so 
deep-rooted in the nature and genius o f the English’ are what Defoe terms the 'general 
Taint of Slothfulness’: the burdensome nature of the poor is one of consigning their 
diligence to the pursuit o f idleness:
there is a general taint o f  slothfulness upon our poor, there’s nothing more frequent, than for 
an Englishman to work till he has got his pocket full o f  money, and then go and be idle, or 
perhaps drunk, till, tis all gone, and perhaps him self in debt; and ask him in his cups what 
he intends, he’ll tell you honestly, he’ll drink as long as it lasts, and then go to work for 
more (Defoe, 1704, p.24).
Arguably, what is unique to this discourse o f the poor is the way it introduces a new 
specificity to the problem o f idleness by exposing and then reworking a contradiction 
between the numbers o f the poor and the wealth o f the nation. Defoe’s argument is a case 
in point: to set the sturdy beggar and vagabond to work by artificially creating useful 
employment does not guarantee, nor automatically confer, an increase of the nation's 
wealth. Intervention must grasp not what it presumes to combine or ‘add’ to industry, but 
what it transposes and subtracts from a system o f existing flows and dependencies. To 
combine the poor in one space is to redistribute the poor in another. And given the 
assurances o f sufficient work, it makes no sense to create work for those without 
employment, especially when such schemes take work away from the happy settlements 
of those already employed. In this instance, the question o f who makes up the numbers of 
the poor now becomes a matter o f reformulation and precision. Where sixteenth and 
seventeenth century discourses proposed the theme of setting the poor to work, the sturdy 
beggar and vagabond became targets o f intervention only insofar as their idle existence 
were merely ‘effects’ o f poverty. As an effect, the poor possessed no identity other than 
different categories o f destitution, in which case their conditions of existence formed only 
a surface of singular and indefinite circumstances. A sense of how they became figures of
l0: It is the ‘sad truth’ o f  the poor that both single and family men drink their earnings away at the alehouse, 
to either find them selves a beggar when disaster or sickness falls, or worse, let their wives and children go 
begging in rags and wanting bread, who must then go seeking care from their parish: ‘This is the ruine o f  
our poor, the w ife mourns, the children starve, the husband has work before him, but lies at the ale-house, 
or otherwise idles away his time, and won’t work’ (p.25).
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idleness was unknown or unspecified, as if to say questions pertaining to this condition 
did not form part o f the solution.
In contrast, the poor o f the early eighteenth century no longer resemble figures of 
exaggeration. The problem of idleness would demand something more specific than vivid 
imagery and juridical classification. Even the most pervasive symbols of vagrancy -  the 
sturdy beggar and vagabond -  would become subject to parliamentary debates, disputing 
whether classic definitions o f ‘destitution’ indeed constitute proper objects of regulation. 
Effective intervention does not attach itself to the most obvious examples o f idleness, nor 
should idleness simply constitute the absence o f work. The problem of idleness is now 
linked to processes o f destitution. For instance, eighteenth century problematisations of 
the labouring poor reveal a much wider and more specific domain of circumstances: the 
poor now exist in relation to work, or their unwillingness to work, in a context of high 
wages and increasing applications for poor-relief. But more significantly, the poor 
constitute a linkage with other processes: the management of the family, the mechanism 
of the alehouse, and the slothfulness o f the nation. By the eighteenth century, we find a 
new knowledge o f processes by which the industrious poor are transformed, through their 
apparent indulgence or laziness, into idleness and beggary. It is not the idle that are 
converted into beggars, but that the idleness o f labourers are now linked to the beggary of 
families. The relationship between family and parish, between labourer and alehouse, 
provide a new diagram o f moral diagnosis for treating the authority and responsibility of 
the breadwinner as a problem of virtue and discipline.
In the next section, I examine how eighteenth century problematisations of work and 
leisure begin to specify a more complex terrain in which practices o f the ‘labouring poor' 
are converted into idleness and destitution. With the opening up of a more differentiated 
field of observations, a new preventive technology of 'police' regulations begin to 
identify not so much the idleness o f poor, but the very processes of that ‘great chain of 
misfortune' that exploited the uncertainties o f eighteenth century life.
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Regulation of idleness
The problem of idleness confronting the discourse of the poor during the eighteenth 
century constitutes a ‘double paradox’: idleness not only refers to those who refuse to 
work, but the sloth ingrained in the customs and habits of the labouring poor. It was this 
latter concern that gave rise to various strategies for regulating the conversion of the 
industrious poor into the idle poor. There are several authors who give accounts of the 
anti-recreational campaigns o f the eighteenth century that address the problem of work 
and leisure as one of irregularity, extravagance and luxury (E. P. Thompson. 1967: 
Appleby. 1978; George, 1965; Hatcher, 1998). For example, in ‘Time, Work-Discipline 
and Industrial Capitalism’ (1967) E. P. Thompson details the work patterns of the 
eighteenth century town and village labourer, marking out the ‘human rhythms’ of the 
working week which ‘was one o f alternate bouts of intense labour and of idleness, 
wherever men were in control o f their own working lives’ (p.73). In the seventeenth 
century, the irregularity o f labour patterns appears as moralists and mercantilists 
increasingly demand an orderly course o f employment. Citing John Houghton in 1681. 
we are given the resentful account:
When the framework knitters or makers o f  silk stockings had a great price for their work, they 
have been observed seldom to work on Mondays and Tuesdays but to spend most o f  their time 
at the ale-house or nine-pins... The weavers, 'tis common with them to be drunk on Monday, 
have their head-ache on Tuesday, and their tools out o f  order on Wednesday. As for the 
shoemakers, they’ll rather be hanged than not remember St. Crispin on Monday... and it 
commonly holds as long as they have a penny o f  money or pennyworth o f  credit (cited in E.
P. Thompson, 1967, p .72).
The frequency o f wakes, calendar festivals, and holy days composed a veritable ’table of 
idleness’ which formed the fabric o f English life: ‘common custom has established so 
many Holy-days. that few o f our manufacturing work-folks... are closely and regularly 
employed above two-third-parts o f their time’ (Rev. J. Clayton, 1755, cited in Fumiss. 
1957. pp.44-45).
It is difficult to say whether the increasing problematisation of work and leisure was 
the effect o f industrial labour closing around the older customs o f the poor, or whether 
religious (Puritan) intolerance continually exposed the morality of the poor to further 
condemnation, or whether forms o f recreation like drinking and gambling were indeed
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peculiar excesses o f the eighteenth century. George (1965) observes that ‘luxury and 
extravagance’ were common to all classes and not the exclusive vices of the poor, and 
that customs o f drinking and gambling were so widespread that the rhythms of leisure 
and work passed as the uncertainties o f life and trade, reflecting ‘that sense of instability, 
of liability to sudden ruin, which runs through so much eighteenth century literature' 
(p.265).
Beyond drinking and gambling, systems o f apprenticeship were also the means by 
which the young received a great part o f their education in community life. By the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the custom of taking apprentices was observed 
by some writers as one o f the causes o f decay of discipline among young people. 
Apprenticeship was thought to encourage idleness in at least three ways: the growing 
custom of taking outdoor apprentices, those o f whom were generally considered the most 
unruly, encouraged the relaxation o f discipline, whereby outdoor labour afforded more 
opportunities to evade the master’s disciplinary gaze; also, the custom of living under the 
master's roof, or suffering various forms o f mistreatment, exposed especially the poor 
boy to the dangers o f apprenticeship who might otherwise leave their masters to join the 
ranks of runaway apprentices, vagrants and delinquents; lastly, apprenticeship exposed 
the impressionable young man to the temptations o f the town, acquiring, among other 
things, an education in luxury and extravagance.
Though the old system of apprenticeship revealed the limitations of unrestrained 
paternalism, often granting too much license to the unscrupulous master, the generally 
accepted remedy for unruly apprentices was ‘wholesome’ discipline. Common 
expectations of paternal authority held the view that the master was indeed responsible 
for the proper discipline o f apprentices, but as Hanway writes in 1775, was not always 
willing to exercise this authority:
Do we not know that there is but a small number o f  masters in these days who can or will 
keep their apprentices within doors in the evening when their shops are shut. How they go 
abroad without money, and how they get money is the dark and mysterious part o f  the story 
(Hanway, 1755, cited in George, 1965, p.269).
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Whether these customs o f idleness were a new development, owing to an increasing 
failure of masters to control their apprentices, is speculative. George argues that the 
temptations o f the alehouse were inherent in the very practices of eighteenth century 
apprenticeship. Especially in London, the young apprentice had 'an almost unlimited 
freedom to spend his hours o f leisure as he pleased, and the custom was for the elder 
apprentices at least to spend them, like their masters, at the alehouse or the tavern' (1965, 
p.276). Though excessive drinking and gambling were shared and customary practices of 
the master-apprentice relation, at the other extreme, the demands of work induced 
conditions for producing leisure in the form of drinking.
It is interesting to note the complaints recorded by the Chamberlain’s Office -  the 
guardians o f the London apprentice -  where by the end of the eighteenth century the 
master seemed to exercise unlimited demands on the time and strength of the apprentice. 
The punishment for refusing to work beyond the usual time or declining to work the 
Sunday ranged from ordering the guilty apprentice home, to committing them to a house 
o f correction for short durations. Apprentices sent to Bridewell or the County House of 
Correction were sure to be ruined said live in 1757, speaking from his own experience in 
Clerkenwell: ‘It is o f no other use than to swell the profit o f the keeper and to benefit the 
tap' (p.33)10\  ‘Tap', o f  course, referred to the sale o f beer in prisons, a common practice 
by which the "keeper' o f  the public-house turned over a legitimate and tidy profit.
The alehouse was so embedded among the everyday practices o f English social life -  
upon which the transport system o f the entire country depended -  that a large number of 
trades treated the ‘public-house’ as an employment agency, particularly, in times of 
irregular work: ‘there were houses o f call in London for hatters, smiths, carpenters, 
weavers, boot- and shoe-makers, metal workers, bakers, tailors, plumbers, painters and 
glaziers, and book binders' (George, 1965, p.285). For instance, in 1732, William Glover, 
a hat-maker, claims to have kept a public house ‘where journeymen often resort to him in 
order to get work in the hat-making trades, he being one that helps journeymen to work in 
that business' (cited in George, pp.284-5). O f working tailors we are told that:
103 Reasons offered for the reform ation o f  the House o f  Correction at Clerkenwell. 1757.
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the house o f  call runs away with all their earnings and keeps them constantly in debt and 
want. The house o f  call is an alehouse where they generally use. the landlord knows where to 
find them, and masters go there to inquire when they want hands. Custom has established it 
into a kind o f  law that the house o f  call g ives them credit for victuals and drink when they are 
unemployed; this obliges the journeymen on the other hand to spend all the money they earn 
at this house alone. The landlord when once he has got them into his debt is sure to keep them 
so. and by that means binds the poor wretch to his house, who slaves only to enrich the 
publican (R. Campbell, The London Tradesm an , 1747, pp. 192-3).
By the second half o f the eighteenth century, the nefarious effects o f the alehouse, public- 
house and tavern had attracted greater concern from poor law reformers and magistrates. 
The growing tendency for publicans to act as middlemen and employers meant they 
could withhold payment, or induce their employees to take part o f their payment in drink, 
without fear o f impunity. For instance, Colquhoun (1800) cites the case o f coal-heavers 
who. by about 1750, made frequent petitions to Parliament regarding the power of 'coal 
undertakers' to charge the employed with arbitrary fees and wage deductions. Numerous 
attempts were made to eliminate or frustrate this process: the Act o f 1758 and the Act of 
1807 both failed to curtail these charges, though the latter resorted to more drastic 
measures o f registration and prohibition. It was not until the Act o f 1843 that legislation 
finally resolved this problem by fixing the undertaker's rate o f deductions104.
Central to the problem o f preventing the labouring poor from 'tippling in alehouses' 
was the custom o f paying wages on Saturday night in the alehouse. There were many 
disquieting accounts o f This disastrous system’ which often caught the attention of 
magistrates who described this method o f payment as the reason why London labourers 
were more 'idle, profligate, and debauched’ than other places. The early observations of 
John Fielding in 1761 are perhaps typical of the cause and effect language linking the 
practices of ‘pay-tables’ with the distress o f the family:
tradesmen paying their workmen at public-houses commonly called pay-tables are very 
injurious, as the men are often kept out o f  their money till late on Saturday night, out o f  
indulgence to the publican, by which means the mechanic goes home drunk and empty- 
handed to his family, where distress begets words then blows (Fielding. 1761. cited in George.
1965. p.287).
'4 We might also note the unusual persistence with which the Act o f  1807 and 1838 attempted to regulate 
the trading habits o f  the coal undertakes by forbidding publicans to act as undertakers, restricting 
deductions o f work im plem ents, and restricting payment o f  wages through the alehouse. Though the Act o f  
1807 was largely ineffectual, it constituted a curious piece o f  legislation that was contrary to the laissez- 
faire  principles o f  com petition, indicating the explicit attempts by government to intervene in the apparent 
inequities o f  the market and distress o f  the family.
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Various methods o f intervention were largely judicial attempts to check the practice o f 
pay-tables. At the Old Bailey, Mr Justice Buller advised in 1785 that he always 
recommended magistrates to confiscate licenses from those public-houses wherein wages 
were paid. Similarly, Thomas Gilbert in Plan for the better Relief and Employment o f  the 
Poor (1781) advocated the abolition o f alehouses in the country districts, except for the 
use of travellers, and the stricter supervision of such establishments in towns. 
Wilberforce's Proclamation Society took the matter up in 1789 and suggested to the 
Middlesex Sessions that the justices should require at the next Brewster Sessions that no 
pay-tables be allowed. It was one o f the licensing principles laid down by Colquhoun to 
grant no licence to any public-house where pay-tables were kept, and as he took a 
prominent part at Brewster sessions after 1792 in the Tower Hamlets, and after in 
W estminster, the practice gradually became less adopted.
Both Sir John Fielding and Colquhoun were prominent among those who pointed out 
the excesses o f the public-houses, and both urged that the remedy was the refusal of 
licenses. Colquhoun in particular recommended a policy o f refusing licences, not only to 
houses that were ill-conducted, but to those which were shown to be superfluous from the 
frequent failures or removals o f their occupants. However, such policies were met with 
their own resistance, firstly, on economic grounds, which stated that it was unfair to 
hinder a man from trying to earn a living, and, secondly, on administrative grounds that 
justices could not be trusted to act impartially. For instance. Smollet voices his resistance 
to the refusal o f licences for places o f amusement which followed the Act of 1752:
The suburbs o f  the metropolis abounded with an incredible number o f  publick houses 
continually resounded with the noise o f  riot and intemperance; they were the haunts o f  
idleness, fraud, and rapine, and the seminaries o f  drunkenness, debauchery, and 
extravagance, and every vice incident to human nature; yet the suppression o f  these 
receptacles o f  infamy was an inconvenience which in some cases arose even to a degree o f  
oppression... Many o f  the ju stic e s ... were men o f  profligate lives, needv. mean, ignorant, 
and rapacious, and often acted from the most scandalous principles o f  selfish avarice 
(Sm ollet. 1790, iii. pp.330-31).
Nevertheless, licensing policy had become stricter by the second half o f the eighteenth 
century; the number o f public-houses had decreased despite the growth o f population and 
trade. The Disorderly Houses Act o f 1752 (25 Geo. II. C. 36), probably the result of
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Henry Fielding’s treatise on crim e103 which specified that places of entertainment and 
music were required to have a justices’ licence, reinforced the Act o f 1751 against the 
gin-shop. In keeping with these judicial regulations o f idleness, George (1965) observes 
that one o f the most useful activities o f Wilberforce’s Proclamation Society was its 
propaganda for using the licensing powers o f the justices to combat social evils, namely, 
the payment o f wages in public-houses.
Thus, the increasingly problem o f  idleness during the eighteenth century revealed a 
diversity of convivial customs, the decadence o f which were not entirely specific to the 
poorer classes, but common to all those classes in which the uncertainties of life were 
interwoven. Nonetheless, it is true that the irregularities o f trade, the fluctuations of 
employment, and the temptations o f the town generated the most visible distress among 
the labouring population. The most familiar o f these vices — excessive drinking and 
passion for gambling -  were commonly attributed to the effects o f slothfulness, the decay 
o f discipline, and the new found extravagance and luxury o f the working poor. By the 
second half o f the century, the increasing regulations o f magistrates and justices of the 
peace identified the tavern, the club and the alehouse as links in a ‘great chain of 
misfortune'. It was the ubiquity o f  the latter that now came to be seen as not only housing 
the evils o f entertainment and prodigious consumption, but also exploiting the 
uncertainties o f trade, employment and apprenticeship. Indeed, 'the consumption of 
strong drink was connected with every phase o f life from apprenticeship to death and 
burial' (George. 1965. p.294). Anti-recreational campaigns therefore emerged as a 
strategy for checking the processes by which the excessive and competing number of 
alehouses, alongside the ingenious acts of inducement and coercion of publicans, 
transformed industry into destitution. These were not simply attempts to check 
consumption, as if luxury' and extravagance were merely distractions o f assiduous labour. 
Rather, legislation emerged from more complex observations regarding the capacity o f
l0' In An inquiry into the causes o f  the Late Increase o f  Robbers, etc. (1751). Fielding maintains the 
inseparable link between the idleness and drunkenness o f  the poor and the late increase o f  crime: "But the 
expense o f  money, and loss o f  tim e, with their certain consequences, are not the only evils which attend the 
luxury o f  the vulgar; drunkenness is almost inseparably annexed to the pleasures o f  such people. A vice by 
no means to be construed as a spiritual offence alone, since so many temporal m ischiefs arise from it; 
amongst which are very frequently robbery, and murder itse lf (p.4).
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public-houses to produce both opportunity and ruin, and aggravate the uncertainties of 
life that brought disaster to so many families.
Perhaps the cruellest and most infamous method of combating idleness was the 
moral-oeconomic tactic o f artificially lowering wages and raising the price of provisions. 
The war against idleness was waged by a mercantilist theory of labour that claimed 
poverty was a natural spur to industry. Arguably, current restrictions o f welfare eligibility 
and the progressive devaluation o f ‘allowances’ can be located among these seventeenth 
and eighteenth century statements on mercantilist labour reform. It is this matter to which 
I now turn.
Utility• ofpoverty>
Alongside these anti-recreational campaigns, there were numerous measures for 
inculcating and promoting work-discipline. For example, E. P. Thompson documents the 
proletarianisation o f the labouring classes: the division and supervision of labour in 
workshops and factories, the reduction o f activity to quantifiable labour time, the 
regularisation o f work through clocks, fines, bells and timetables, and the general moral 
preaching directed at the poor, were among the many measures employed to exact 
discipline from the labouring poor (1967, pp.79-90). But there was another, more 
pervasive, if not simple, solution to the problem of idleness coined by Furniss (1957) as 
the 'utility of poverty' or the 'doctrine o f low wages'.
The volume and coherence o f writings on the benefit of low wages, and the broad 
uniformity o f views which their authors expressed, has led to a belief that in the late 
seventeenth century a new kind o f mercantilist theory o f labour was formulated which 
stressed the 'utility o f poverty’ by holding that ‘the wealth of the country [was] based on 
the poverty o f the majority o f  its subjects’ (Furniss, 1957. pp. 117-156). Such doctrines 
proceeded by a series o f seemingly logical steps endorsing the wealth and strength of the 
nation, whereby workmen would be compelled to be industrious, the costs o f production 
would be suppressed and the resultant cheapness of English commodities would boost 
both the balance-of-trade and levels o f employment. The ideal state, in the words of Sir
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William Temple, consisted o f a ‘great multitude of people crowded into small compass of 
land, whereby all things necessary to life become dear, and all men who have possessions 
are induced to parsimony; but those who have none, are forced to industry and labour, or 
else to want' (1673, p. 118). Such beliefs, o f course, not only reflected the traditional 
values and priorities o f political and economic elites, but were also derived from the 
behaviour o f the labouring masses, namely, their preference for leisure over work and 
income (Gregory, 1921; Marshall, 1926; Coats, 1958; Wiles, 1968; Earl, 1976; Hatcher. 
1998).
From the complaints o f employers, the judgments o f justices, petitions to the crown 
and parliament, and from the great mass o f writings by political economists, partisan and 
polemical lobbyists, there was a broad consensus based upon the observation rather than 
theory that the higher the wages o f the labouring people the less they worked, and that 
while low wages spurred industry and diligence, high wages bred indolence, 
disorderliness and indulgence (Furniss, 1957). The following is just a small sample of 
statements: in 1664 Thomas Mun wrote that: ‘As plenty and power doe make a nation 
vicious and improvident, so penury and want doe make a people wise and industrious' 
(p.49): in 1669 Thomas Manley noted that English workmen 'work so much fewer days 
by how much more they exact in their wages' (cited in Furniss, p. 120): Roger Coke also 
observed in 1670 'when Corn and Provisions are cheap, they will not work for less wages 
than when they were dearer, so as it often happens that one days indifferent labour, shall 
maintain these persons three or four days after in Idleness’ (Part 1, Co. 3, An. 4): Sir 
Henry Pollexfen pronounced in 1697 that ‘the advances o f wages hath proved an 
inducement to idleness: for many are for being idle the oftener because they can get so 
much in a little time' (p.47); Bernard Mandeville was more frank in 1714: 'Every Body 
knows that there is a vast number o f  Joumey-men... who, if by Four Days Labour in a 
Week they can maintain themselves, will hardly be persuaded to work the fifth: and that 
there are Thousands o f labouring Men o f all sorts, who will... put themselves to fifty 
Inconveniences... to make Holiday’ (1924, p.509); and, finally, Arthur Young observed 
with colourful clarity: ‘Everyone but an idiot knows that the lower classes must be kept 
poor or they will never be industrious’ (1771, iv, p.361). It was assumed that the natural
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appeal o f leisure was linked to a kind o f ‘target consumption’ o f the poor, which fixed 
their horizons close to subsistence levels, enough so that the amount o f work they were 
prepared to undertake was capped at the amount of money required to satisfy a basket of 
basic provisions. Given the bulk o f expenditure of the poor comprised o f food, and since 
food prices were more volatile than money wages, the inverse relationship between the 
price of provisions and the desire for work was repeatedly stressed106 (Hatcher, 1998).
This uniform field o f observations on the universality of the relationship between 
increasing reward and decreasing effort does not of itself prove that such a relationship 
existed in practice. Indeed, this proposed continuity is susceptible to a number of 
disturbances. In his monumental study o f mercantilism. Heckscher (1931) argued 
precisely the opposite view, that higher wages were bound to produce a greater 
w illingness to work since ‘the wage level was not an effect, but a cause o f the size of the 
labour supply'. He found it strange that mercantilism sought this ‘connection in precisely 
the contrary direction'. For Heckscher, the error o f mercantilism107 stemmed in part from 
striving to invent a justification for 'keeping down the mass of the people by poverty in 
order to make them better beasts o f burden for the few', and in part from a failure to 
construct their system out o f knowledge o f the contemporary economic context (1931, 
pp. 165-6). This contradicted the pioneering work o f Furniss who drew an entirely
There are further accounts which linked the idleness o f  the poor to the scarcity o f  labour during periods 
o f  high wages and low cost. For instance. Sir Josiah Child wrote in 1694: ‘In a cheap year they will not 
w ork abov e two days in a week; their humour being such that they will not provide for a hard time; but just 
work so much and no more, as may maintain them in that mean condition to which they have been 
accustomed (pp. 15-16)'. It was self-evident to those who observed the labour market that ‘this habit o f  
idleness and sloth [was] contracted by plenty' (John Law. 1701, p.85). Indeed, so ubiquitous were the 
limited material horizons and love o f  leisure deemed to be that the proposition could be reversed to read: 
the poor do not labour upon average above four days in a week unless provisions happen to be very dear'. 
The analysis was taken a stage further by Sir William Petty when in 1690 he claimed that ‘it is observed by 
[those] who employ great numbers o f  poor people, that when Corn is extremely plentiful, that the Labour o f  
the poor is proportionately dear: And scarce to be had at all’ (cited in Hull. 1963, i, p.274).
This opposing view  was argued so vigorously that Hechscher (1931) cites what he ironically called the 
the deep-rooted belief in the utility o f  luxury and the evil o f  thrift. Thrift, in fact, was regarded as the cause 
o f unemployment for two reasons: firstly, real income was believed to diminish by the amount o f monev 
that did not enter into exchange, and secondly, saving was believed to withdraw money from circulation' 
(p.208). Similarly, Petty observed the merits o f ‘entertainments, magnificent shews, triumphal arches, etc.'. 
on the ground that their costs flowed back into the pockets o f  brewers, bakers, tailors, shoemakers and so 
forth (1662. cited in Hull, 1963); Barbon observed that ‘Prodigality is a vice that is prejudicial to the Man. 
but not to trade... Covetousness is a Vice, prejudicial both to Man and Trade' (1690, pp. 18-19); while John 
Cary also argued that i f  the nation increased its expenditure, all would obtain larger incomes ‘and might 
then live more plentifully’ (1695, cited in Heckscher, 1931, p.291).
different conclusion twenty-six years earlier. Given the irresistible continuity o f evidence 
for the utility o f poverty, it is not surprising that Furniss would pronounce with almost 
universal conviction that the fruits o f consumption diminished the industry o f labour108.
According to mercantilist labour theory, then, the ‘vicious cycle' of idleness revealed 
the scarcity, costliness and inefficiency o f labour. Rising wages encouraged immoral and 
disruptive pastimes that, in addition to drunkenness and debauchery, generated 
unrestrained independence among the poor. Moreover, excessive wages were likely to be 
spent on imports which harmed the balance-of-trade. on the purchase of unsuitable 
luxuries which formed ‘a perpetual restless ambition in each o f the inferior ranks to raise 
themselves to the level o f those immediately above them’ (Nathaniel Forster, 1767, p.41). 
The invention o f customs relating to dress and amusement, o f injurious practices such as 
gambling and gratuitous customs o f tea-drinking, were largely considered wasteful of 
time and destructive to industry. Idleness was detrimental to the ‘Industry of Trade', but 
only as a feature o f population upon which the wealth of the nation depended.
In quite a different sense, idleness seemed also rooted in human nature, and later 
became attached to the atomistic conceptions o f the problem of autonomy and discipline, 
out of which early liberal conceptions o f the state took form. Thomas Mun is exemplary 
o f this former view o f paternalistic authority which condemned idleness as vulgar 
obstacles to the Greatness o f  Trade: ‘the general leprosie o f our Piping, Potting. Feasting. 
Fashions, and mis-spending o f our time in Idleness and Pleasure (contrary to the Law of 
God. and the use o f other Nations) hath made us effeminate in our bodies, weak in our 
knowiedg. poor in our Treasure, declined in our Valour, unfortunate in our Enterprises, 
and contemned by our Enemies (1664, p.49). In the latter view, classical liberal 
arguments were formulated by Locke as the moral failure o f the poor to restrain their 
impulses or exercise judgm ent beyond their immediate circumstances: ‘The growth of the 
poor must therefore have some other cause, and it can be nothing else but the relaxation
1 s Furniss (1957) therefore concluded that ‘so many and so positive are the statements o f  this effect o f  high
wages that we are com pelled to admit their truth and conclude that the labour supply o f  England at this time
did not increase but decreased as w ages rose’ (p.l 18).
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of discipline and corruption o f manners; virtue and industry being as constant 
companions on the one side as vice and idleness are on the other’ (Locke. 1697, p. 184).
Whether idleness was a taint upon the morality o f the poor, or whether it constituted a 
defect of human nature, the problem o f idleness was in any case misleading, since it may 
take the form o f short and infrequent bursts o f industry or. given the necessity of 
procuring provisions, it may assume the form of unremitting labour. The curious link 
between low wages/high costs therefore related to the problem of establishing these 
conditions o f necessity by artificially raising the price of provisions of the labouring poor 
and lowering their wages. Thus, we find widespread support during the seventeenth 
century for mercantilist policies which placed excises upon foodstuffs, schemes for 
augmenting the numbers o f the population and the supply of labour, by stimulating 
immigration, passing naturalisation laws, and granting allowances for large families 
(Furniss. 1957).
By the end o f the eighteenth century, the mercantilist police of the poor failed to 
resolve the growing crisis o f poor-relief. The war against idleness was largely ineffective 
while the object o f paternalistic regulation relied on juridical categorisations of 'the 
Poor'. And while the workhouse and the doctrine of low wages emerged as moral- 
oeconomic solutions, under the discourse o f the poor these repressive and disciplinary 
measures failed to inculcate a life o f industry and frugality. Counter-statements of the 
period suggest that, if anything, these solutions simply multiplied and re-distributed the 
numbers o f the poor. As I will argue in Chapter 6, the 'liberal' solution was not the 
repressive remoralisation o f the poor, but the autonomisation o f a domain o f personal 
conduct that was fixed by the natural laws o f poverty. For now, I want to briefly illustrate 
the contrast between the discourse o f the poor and the kind of statements that were later 
embodied in the New Poor Law o f 1834.
Event o f  pauperism
These mercantilist policies in which are inscribed the statements that make up the 
discourse o f the poor bring us full circle to the period of reversal described earlier as the
'event o f pauperism’. Here, Dean (1991) cites the instance o f Ricardo’s commentary on 
William Pitt’s ill-fated Poor Bill (1796-7) wherein it was argued by the latter that 
allowances for large poor families should be made to augment the numbers of the 
population and thereby increase the supply o f labour109. This Bill was vigorously attacked 
by Bentham in his polemical ‘Observations on the Poor Bill' (1797/1838) on the basis 
that rewarding the poor for their fecundity would only increase the numbers of the poor 
and aggravate the conditions o f their distress. Dean explains the disparity o f these two 
views o f poor policy as follows: ‘For Ricardo, a policy based on the assertion that poor- 
relief should reward the poor for their fecundity appears not only backward and naive but 
as dangerous. The political economist of 1818 is separated from the statements of 1796 
by a gulf which renders the latter’s ‘sentiments’ almost incomprehensible' (p. 18). But 
this departure o f opinion from the position o f the younger William Pitt, which Ricardo 
was to find so incomprehensible, cannot be viewed as naive, or pre-scientific dogma, but 
as I have attempted to demonstrate in this chapter, was the means of assembling a 
coherent set o f statements and arguments by which the multitude of a century-and-a-half 
o f poor policy constructed its object, “the Poor’, to increase the wealth of the nation and 
procure the industry o f the poor.
By the end o f the eighteenth century we find something of an administrative crisis o f  
poor-relief. The swelling numbers o f the poor, the dramatic increase in local poor rates, 
coupled by numerous agrarian, rural and health crises, created not only a new urgency 
regarding the proper direction o f reform, but now raised the question of ineffective 
legislation o f the poor laws. Arguably, the discourse of poor was itself an obstacle to the 
kind o f reforms that were later embodied by the 1834 Poor Law. It was both the fate and 
the legacy o f the mercantilist police o f the poor that made a fundamental contribution to 
constituting the poor as an object o f knowledge; that is. by observing and assessing the 
mode o f life o f labourers and poor families in order to fix 'a  regular, industrious course o f  
life' to national goals (Dean, 1991, p.66). But this early, pre-liberal police rationality
k Ricardo cites William Pitt's Poor bill as follows: ‘Let us’ said he, ‘make relief in cases where there are a 
number o f  children a matter or right and honour, instead o f  a ground o f  opprobrium and contempt. This will 
make a large family a blessing, and not a curse; and this will draw a proper line o f  distinction between 
those who are able to provide for them selves by their labour, and those who after having enriched their 
country w ith a number o f  children, have a claim upon the assistance for support’ (Ricardo, 1818. Ch. V).
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never succeeded in fixing the poor to an independent domain o f personal conduct and 
familial responsibility which was crucial to the formation of a national labour market. 
The invention o f the latter would be the innovation of a new economic discourse that 
formed part o f the liberal revolution o f government. Furthermore, a mercantilist formula 
blocked the emergence o f arguments that would establish fundamental scarcity as an 
imminent threat to the welfare o f populations. By the early nineteenth century, it was no 
longer tenable to draw on mercantilist principles o f augmenting population without also 
disturbing the precarious balance between population growth and subsistence.
In summary, the discourse o f the poor specifies a terrain between the mid-seventeenth 
and late eighteenth century -  spanning the advocacy o f public works, the progenitors of 
the workhouse movement, the problem o f profitability and labour, and the relief o f large 
families -  upon which statements o f the administration and relief o f the poor yield an 
unusual degree of systematicity. The coherence of this discourse is realised by the 
statement ‘who make up the numbers o f the nation’s Poor?’ which were linked to 
recurrent themes o f ‘setting the Poor to work’ and the ‘problem of idleness', the possible 
responses to which make up the threefold system of classification o f the poor: the 
‘industrious’ poor, the ‘idle’ poor and the ‘impotent’ poor.
The problem of idleness remained a regular theme among seventeenth and eighteenth 
century problematisations o f  the poor, and later formed an important component of the 
new discourse o f poverty. The regulation of idleness not only followed a moral 
imperative to labour, but also an oeconomic tactic as we see among the various attempts 
to induce the rural poor to work through the doctrine of low wages. Among urban 
examples of idleness, particularly in London, we find a more complex field of 
observations and processes emerge. Idleness is not specific to the lot of the poor but 
endemic to all classes, and pertains to a diversity of circumstances that relate to the 
irregularities o f trade, the fluctuations of employment and the temptations of 
consumption. The ‘epidemic o f idleness’ is linked to the management o f the family, the 
convivial customs and habits o f the labouring poor, as well as the sloth endemic to a 
whole nation. By the beginning o f the nineteenth century, we find the emergence o f more
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effective measures o f regulation in countering the processes that converted industry, 
virtue and self-discipline into idleness, vice and destitution. The establishment of a 
‘preventive' police force -  with its ordinances, licensing policies and deterrent measures 
-  would eventually locate the poor within a complex field of circumstances and 
conditions that separated able-bodied males from wage-labour and familial responsibility.
In the next section, I want to trace the antecedents o f more recent problematisations of 
the poor by tracing mutations among discourses o f dependency from the early nineteenth 
century to the present. Here, I will argue that contemporary problematisations of idleness 
are now supported by psychological claims about the ‘behaviour' and lifestyle ' of the 
poor. The close links between new paternalism and psychology demonstrate the 
emergence o f new technologies for the reconstruction and remoralisation o f conduct.
Discourse of dependency
The 'problem o f idleness' continues to play an important role among contemporary 
politics o f welfare, though now it is refigured in the language of dependency to specify a 
new pathology o f the labour market. If indeed we can refer to a 'discourse' of 
dependency, then the object is to trace the formation o f statements that have come to 
transpose the problem o f idleness as the antithesis o f individual autonomy and labour- 
market activity. The origins o f the term ‘dependency’ are difficult to locate, but during 
the sixteenth century it came to denote a natural state o f servitude and subjection w ithin a 
paternal and hierarchical order o f social relations. Our interest here is to trace some of the 
processes by which this discourse mutated as a consequence of transformations within 
socio-legal. economic and political rationalities. For this task, I want to take a brief 
historical excursion by investigating more recent events in which dependency now 
specifies a condition o f 'postindustrial society’, that is, the current economic, political 
and socio-legal terrain whereby all forms o f dependency are viewed as blameworthy and 
pathological.
A significant effect o f the 1834 Poor Law was the juridical distinction between 
poverty as the state o f  having to labour to procure subsistence and pauperism or
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indigence as ‘the state o f him, who. being destitute of property... is at the same time, 
either unable to labour, or unable, even for labour, to procure the supply of which he 
happens thus to be in want’ (Bentham, 2001, p.3). With this pronouncement legislation 
directly adopted Bentham’s distinction between the independent and dependent poor, 
‘according as they depend or not for their subsistence upon public contributions. When 
the independent Poor become dependent, it can only be on the score of indigence. real or 
supposed' (Bentham, 2001, p.6). After the poor law report, relief excluded able-bodied 
males, wives and children since it was deemed natural for children and wives to be 
dependents o f the male wage-labourer, in which case the proscription o f relief defined the 
family as a natural sphere o f private economic responsibility. Bentham's principle of 
‘less eligibility' would consign the disreputable single mother and child to the 
workhouse, and discourage the able-bodied pauper from occupying it. Hence dependency 
became one o f two positions: the natural state o f dependants within the family, and the 
unnatural state o f a dependant outside the family. Unlike contemporary social security 
that defines a sphere o f state responsibility for all ‘single parents’, the poor law drew a 
line between those who could not be supported by a male breadwinner, and those who 
should be supported by an able-bodied male (Checkland & Checkland. 1974).
The historical transformation o f dependency corresponds to the creation of a sphere 
o f private economic responsibility and natural dependency. Through the juridical 
apparatus, the liberal state formulated a new field o f governance, ‘the worker' and its 
antithetical other ‘the pauper’, which reconfigured the age-old relation between 
independence and dependence: ‘As wage-labour became increasingly normative and 
increasingly definitive o f independence -  it was precisely those excluded from wage- 
labour who appeared to personify dependency’ (Fraser & Gordon, 1994. p .316). For early 
industrial capitalism, the figure o f the pauper not only threatened to undermine the wealth 
o f the nation, but also the ethos o f which independence embodied natural, religious and 
economic virtue. The position o f the pauper constituted more than a state of want and 
misery, but a defective and degraded character. Hence, the discourse o f dependency that 
begins to emerge from the ‘event o f pauperism’ is one that now specifies a chain of moral 
and behavioural characteristics.
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Benthamite principles for maximising the greatest happiness o f the greatest number 
would find, by the second half o f the nineteenth century, alternative means o f expression 
in the self-help movement. Drawing from the pre-psychological tenets of Bentham's 
utilitarian philosophy, it was Samuel Smiles who instigated a minor revolution in giving 
much publicity to the Victorian myth o f upward social mobility and extolling the virtues 
of the self-made man. While some read into this project a method o f 'seducing' the 
working class to middle class ideals (Hobsbawm, 1962) or the rejection o f materialism 
and the fear for the loss o f individuality (Fielden, 1968). Morris (1981) argues the self- 
help movement was linked in rather complex ways to the radicalism and utopianism of 
the petit bourgeoisie in 1840’s. This pre-psychological discourse of self-improvement 
sought to acquire through education, habit and training the kind of moral conduct that 
engendered 'higher modes o f learning’ (Smiles. 1868). Self-improvement would also find 
within the possibilities o f book-learning and the idea of ‘self culture’ a retreat from 
material difficulties and social pressures and the cultivation o f a subject capable of 
rational political action. This was more than cultivation o f good habits, self-respect and 
self-knowledge, but the expression o f a utopianism that was unable to reconcile, whether 
by patronage or by revolution, the massive class inequality o f industrial England110.
In the post-industrial era. psychological and moral attributes o f dependency have 
proliferated to the extent that all forms o f dependency are now construed as avoidable 
and blameworthy. Speaking from the American context. Fraser and Gordon suggest two 
broad influences on the increasing stigma of dependency. Firstly, a characteristic of post­
industrial society is the increasing democratisation o f all legal and political forms of 
dependency: 'Housewives, paupers, natives, and the descendents o f slaves are no longer 
formally excluded from most civil and political rights; neither their subsumption nor their
1 u While there is much to be gained from an analysis o f  the self-help movement in Britain such an analysis 
falls outside the current remit o f  the thesis. The genealogical work conducted here seeks to trace the liberal 
transformation o f  government known as the ‘event o f  pauperism'. The specific task is to explore the 
conditions out o f  which a definite conception o f  poverty emerged as something distinguishable from 
pauperism. Admittedly, however, there are aspects o f  Australian welfare reform that build on the idea o f  
self-help and self-reliance as strategies for the reconstruction o f  the working classes. I think future 
genealogical work would benefit from an analysis o f  how classical liberal discourses were linked to the 
utopianism o f  self-improvement.
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subjection is viewed as legitimate’. Secondly, the deindustrialisation of advanced 
capitalist economies has made the ideal o f the family wage economically untenable. The 
mass entry o f women in low-wage service work and the loss of higher wages for 
manufacturing labour has decentred the ideal of the family wage, altering the gender 
composition o f employment: ‘the family wage ideal is no longer hegemonic but competes 
with alternative gender norms, family norms, and economic arrangements. It no longer 
goes without saying that a woman should rely on a man for economic support, nor that 
mothers should not also be workers’. Together, these cultural shifts in the political and 
economic register o f post-industrial dependency have effectively erased all forms of 
'good* adult-dependency. All dependency is now regarded with suspicion, and measured 
against the norm o f wage-labour. Post-industrial society appears to have eliminated every 
social, legal and economic basis o f dependency, and whatever dependency remains is 
indiv idualised and feminised (1994, pp.322-3).
By the 1980's, American discourses o f dependency encompassed a whole range of 
social pathologies -  chemical, alcohol and drug dependency -  all o f which extended the 
discourses o f addiction. The pathological implications o f drug dependency were quickly 
transferred to welfare receipt thereby increasing stigmatisation. Rebecca Blank notes 
there is very little evidence ‘that welfare is ‘addictive', that is. that women who go on 
welfare lose all motivation to work’ (1997, p. 151); nonetheless, the 1996 welfare reform 
law in the US deployed the ‘welfare addiction' thesis, stating as if it were undisputed fact 
that daughters growing up in families that take welfare are three times as likely to receive 
welfare themselves as adults. Furthermore, Schram argues that the threat o f ‘the spread of 
welfare dependency' across generations, from mother to child, effectively pathologise 
poverty, ‘ignoring the possibility that the poverty suffered by families is very likely the 
primary reason why there is a correlation o f welfare use' (2000. p.85).
Fraser and Gordon note that the rise o f psychological dependency in America has 
particularly targeted the behaviour o f women, often diagnosing dependence as a form of 
immaturity among single mothers who are construed as the archetypal welfare dependent 
(Bartle. 1998). In a 1954 manual on illegitimate pregnancy, the author describes
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unmarried mothers as: ‘dependent, irresponsible, and unstable, they respond like small 
children to the immediate moment’ (Young, 1954, p.87). Psychological stereotypes of the 
American single mother were also racially inflected, white women were characterised as 
erring on the side o f excessive dependence, while black women were usually charged 
with excessive independence. In the 60’s and 70's the discourse of poverty placed black 
AFDC claimants in the double-bind o f being pathologically independent of men while 
pathologically dependent on welfare. By the 80’s, however, these positions shifted: 'The 
black welfare mother that haunted the white imagination ceased to be the powerful 
matriarch. Now the pre-eminent stereotype is the unmarried teenage mother caught in the 
'welfare trap' and rendered dronelike and passive’. In the 90’s, the discourse of 
dependency seems to absorb all these pathologised, racialised and feminised elements, an 
example o f which we find in Vice President Dan Quayle's comment on the May 1992 
Los Angeles riot: 'O ur inner cities are filled with children having children... with people 
who are dependent on drugs and on the narcotic o f welfare’ (Fraser & Gordon. 1994, 
pp.325-7).
In the 1980's the increased fear and mass production o f psychological dependency is 
testified in the psychiatric literature. In 1980 the American Psychiatric Association 
codified 'Dependent Personality Disorder’ (DPD) as an official psychopathology. By the 
1987 edition o f the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual o f  Disorders (DSM-II1-R) 
dependency specified a discrete pathology:
The essential feature o f  this disorder is a pervasive pattern o f  dependent and submissive 
behaviour beginning by early childhood... People with this disorder are unable to make 
every day decisions w ithout excessive amount o f  advice and reassurance from others, and will 
even allow others to make most o f  their important decisions... The disorder is apparently 
common and is diagnosed more frequently in females {American Psychiatric Association .
1987. p.353-54).
Since its elevation to the status o f an official psychopathology, dependency has become a 
refined diagnostic technique for problematising subjectivity in terms o f 'pathologies of 
will'. The 'moral hazard' economists speak of -  the burden o f welfare dependency on the 
taxpayer -  is specifically linked to problematisations of individual subjectivity (Rose. 
1999a). In this new configuration o f control, psychological knowledge provides a range 
o f highly transferable techniques for reconstructing the capacity o f individuals to accept
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responsibility for their own actions and choices. The sociolegal, political and economic 
relations o f subordination that once defined dependency have legally vanished under a 
new regime o f individualising and specifying practices of truth; all that remains of any 
legitimate space for dependency is now confined to a discrete pathological condition.
In the next section, I briefly examine how psychological knowledge is systematically 
linked to contemporary observations and assessment of the poor. Alongside medicine, 
psychological knowledge would emerge as a new participant in the politics of conduct.
Psychology o f  the poor
In the 60 's when psychology was still subordinate to medical and psychiatric 
disciplines, psychological understandings o f the poor derived mainly from 
epidemiological surveys o f  the population. Those clustered around the lowest socio­
economic status (SES) were often attributed with ‘psychotic reactions' while individuals 
o f the highest SES were found to respond with ‘neurotic reactions'. Under the rubric of 
‘mental health' a psychology o f  the poor was deployed as a means o f differentiating 
mental illness from poverty, working on the assumption that poverty and illness were 
causally related and, to some extent, mutually reinforcing (Shore, 1997). After freeing 
itself from medicine and psychiatry, psychology would become a new participant in the 
politics o f conduct. The new clinical assemblage o f psychology would retain some of its 
links with behaviourism, but also shed its negative and repressive techniques of 
conditioning. Instead, psychology would become ‘an emancipatory technology for re­
establishing the s e lf s  control over itse lf (Rose. 1999a, p.269). It is not for the 
psychologist to act indirectly on conduct, but that subjects are to act on themselves in the 
name o f freedom.
In the 1970's, personality studies attempted to link poverty to a cluster o f traits, some 
o f which suggested the poor had a shorter time perspective, were anchored to the present, 
and possessed little desire for achievement (Allen, 1970). Concern for the latter led to 
numerous techniques such as learned helplessness, self-esteem and self-control, which 
sought to align the outer world with an ‘internal locus of controf (Kane. 1987).
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Personality theories would supply a repertoire of tests and diagnostics, ranging from 
active-passive orientation, alienation, anomie and powerlessness, for differentiating the 
conduct of the poor. However, the official codification o f 'dependent personality' in the 
80's marks the emergence o f new technologies which seem to operate in terms o f the 
opposition o f dependence and passivity with autonomy and activity: 'Here, the social 
relations o f dependency disappear entirely into the personality o f the dependent. Overt 
moralism also disappears in the apparently neutral, scientific, medicalised formulation' 
(Fraser & Gordon, 1994, p.326).
In a major review o f the psychological literature on poverty, Robert Bornstein notes 
the major focus on cognitive processes in 'the genesis of dependency', replacing 
psychoanalytic and social learning theories111 (Bornstein, 1992). The innovation of more 
recent and popular strands o f cognitive theory is to convince individuals that if they seek 
to resolve their problems they must be prepared to work on themselves, after all. 
dependency results from how people think about their experiences. According to Miles 
Shore, an advocate o f M ead’s paternalism, ‘Seeing oneself as powerless to change or 
influence events is now believed to be crucial to the development of dependent 
relationships' (1997. p.316). Therapeutic methods such as Cognitive Behavioural 
Therapy (CBT) provided a range o f  techniques for managing irrational conduct, and 
producing affirmative self-control, all o f which are thought to build self-esteem and self- 
motivation. In other words, the strategy behind these new technologies of activity is to 
align people's understandings o f worldly events with personal power. On this point. Rose 
observes:
Autonomy is now represented in terms o f  personal power and the ability to accept 
responsibility -  not to blame others but to recognise your own collusion in that which 
prevents you from being yourself and, in doing so, to overcome it and achieve responsible 
autonomy and personal power. High esteem was linked to the power to plan one's life as an 
orderly enterprise and take responsibility for it course and outcome (Rose, 1999a, p.269).
111 Psychoanalytic theories postulated that dependency resulted from a failure o f  psychological 
development to progress beyond the stage o f  infantile dependency on the mother; the dependent's fixation' 
was attributed to experiences o f  excessive frustration or overgratification in the oral stage o f  development. 
Social learning theories argued that in providing biological and psychological gratification to the child, the 
mother becomes a ‘secondary reinforcer’ associated with pleasurable experiences. Dependency is therefore 
construed as a learned phenomenon w hose intensity is determined by the nature o f  the learning context 
(Shore, 1997, pp.314-5).
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Psychological studies explicitly focusing on welfare dependency now apply cognitive 
understandings o f personhood to problematise the ‘core motivation’ of dependent people 
(Bornstein, 1992). Thomas Kane reviewed the literature on poverty and motivation to 
link dependency with themes o f internal control and learned helplessness. The 
assumption is that people who fail to look for work reflect the expectation that the search 
will not be successful; to feel powerless to control external circumstances diminishes 
one's capacity to act autonomously. Kane noted that poverty is precipitated by loss of 
income and the restriction o f options and described two phases of response to 
uncontrollable circumstances: reactance and learned helplessness. The former describes 
aggressive attempts to regain control and mastery o f one’s environment based on prior 
expectations o f control, in the latter phase, a conviction o f helplessness erodes further 
attempts to regain control -  repeated experiences o f loss o f control lead to a state of 
learned helplessness that interferes with the ability to seek and make use of opportunities 
to exercise control (1987, pp.316-7). A psychology o f the poor diagnoses a persistent 
motivational deficit associated with resignation, dysthymic disorder and depression. 
Poverty is no longer a general condition of deprivation, but a contemptible behavioural 
sy ndrome. Nonetheless, these themes o f control and passivity o f the poor are not unlike 
nineteenth century moral formulations that preached the need for discipline and self­
responsibility among the lower classes. But psychology now introduces various ethical 
and tactical interventions for counteracting errant cognitive styles, improving options for 
the exercise o f choice and control, and creating opportunities for successful outcomes of 
individual actions.
Arguably, contemporary politics o f conduct now seek the ethical reconstruction of the 
poor, which illustrates the close links between paternalism and psychology. After all. 
Shore claims: ‘With paternalism comes a new emphasis on the psychology of welfare 
recipients: the assumption is that they can respond to a set o f expectations accompanied 
by consequences. This is in contrast to one of the traditional assumptions in social policy 
that welfare recipients are victims with few options’ (1997, p.305). Conservatives like 
George Gilder (1984) and Lawrence Mead (1986) argue that welfare explicitly causes 
moral/psychological dependency, which can only be remedied by eliminating welfare as
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an 'entitlement’ regardless o f the behaviour o f clients. There were two significant events 
in the 70's which facilitated the rise o f paternalism in the 80’s and 90’s. First was the 
discovery from census data and epidemiological surveys of a sector o f non-working but 
non-elderly poor who became a larger part o f the remaining poor population. Secondly, 
the discovery o f psychological techniques which purported to have access to the 
subjective conditions o f the ‘lifestyle’ o f the poor. In the 70’s, attempts were made to 
liberalise AFDC to cover working-aged poor more generously, but the lifestyle problems 
of this new sector raised questions o f the deservingness o f the poor, and were 
subsequently quashed by Congress. According to Mead, the originators of paternalism 
concluded that the lifestyle causes o f poverty had to be addressed on their own terms: 
'The implication was not necessarily that the poor were responsible for their own 
problems or that antipoverty programs had failed. It was rather that service and benefit 
programs alone could not defeat poverty when it was heavily linked to behaviour’ (Mead, 
1997. p.20).
Paternalism almost certainly rests on a psychological ontology of the poor. Mead, for 
instance, is critical o f Charles M urray’s homo economicus -  the model of rational 
maximisers who act to advance their own self-interest -  as it fails to account for the self- 
defeating aspects o f the poverty lifestyle. Lifestyle, after all. involves a more complex 
psychology o f individual capacities -  the ability to exercise self-control, to make sound 
and rational choices, to demonstrate the kind o f personality in which resilience and 
optimism creates enabling opportunities. Arguably, it is the imperative o f activity and an 
ethic of choice that now underwrite the policies that seek the ethical reconstruction of the 
poor. The revived discourse o f pauperism in the 80’s, o f which welfare dependency is a 
more recent cousin, is simply the reactivation o f strategies which seek to calculate the 
deservingness o f the poor, and distil the remaining poor population o f work-force age and 
capacity. In the new politics o f conduct, psychology offers numerous techniques for 
screening welfare populations in terms o f those that might be selected for early 
intervention and surveillance, while offering a veritable package o f therapeutic tactics 
and techniques for reintegrating the excluded. But it is now the lifestyle o f the poor that 
marks a new domain for ethical intervention. The poor must be supervised and directed.
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rewarded or punished, as a consequence o f their actions, and induced in such ways that 
will elicit the ethical capacities to make the most o f their freedom. But a psychology of 
the poor also creates its own double bind: while it absolves people for their lack of 
income, and gives insight into the subjective conditions o f poverty, it also reinscribes the 
idea that they are marginal and deficient. These are certainly not new themes: 
medicalising poverty becomes just another way o f  suggesting there is a ‘culture of 
poverty' at work in keeping ‘the underclass’ down. Rather than political-economic 
reform, medical surveillance and psychological diagnostics become the key to regulating 
the poverty o f poor populations.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I mainly set out to describe and demonstrate the existence of a 
relatively stable set o f statements that make up the ‘discourse o f the poor’ -  a terrain of 
poor administration preceding the revolution o f liberal government and the discovery o f 
poverty. This historical excursion is designed partly to remind us what the liberal 
constitution o f poverty displaced, but it also serves to show how governing statements 
were systematically linked to national goals regarding the wealth and greatness of the 
nation. In this classical discourse, ‘the Poor’ emerge in relation to a set o f practical 
problems and prescriptive solutions regarding the ‘wise administration’ o f the nation, the 
economic utility o f ‘setting the poor to work’, and the moral transformation of the idle. 
These debates are clearly embedded among mercantilist concerns for converting the idle 
poor into the industrious poor. The mechanism o f the workhouse is emblematic of a 
whole field of tactical interventions for inducing, as much as compelling, a continuous 
and regular course o f industry. The emergence o f themes relating to ‘profitability' and the 
‘regulation of idleness’ were perhaps the first tentative steps in transforming human 
labour into a commodity. But this mercantilist ‘police of the poor’ was nonetheless 
exhausted by its own empty, juridical classification o f the poor, and had not yet linked the 
general conditions o f poor individuals to a complex field o f processes and circumstances 
that converted the labouring poor into the idle and destitute.
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In terms o f present-day policies o f reform, the discourse o f the poor reminds us how. 
from the mid-seventeenth to the late eighteenth century, the problem of the poor was 
specifically linked to national prosperity and power. It was not so much that the problem 
of the poor had reached ‘epidemic' proportions but that their growing numbers signified 
the real poverty o f national wealth. And while compassionate and repressive solutions 
appeared in the form o f moral, paternalistic and oeconomic responses, these pre-liberal 
rationalisations were increasingly linked to notions o f wise administration and effective 
governance. Furthermore, the old edifice o f poor administration, though exhausted by its 
own conceptual limitations, had already laid down the foundations for nineteenth century 
politics o f conduct. The mode o f life o f the pauper, the labourer and poor families would 
be investigated at the intersection o f morality and economy, eventually transforming the 
domain o f responsibility and economic dependency.
In post-industrial society, this domain o f responsibility and economic dependency is 
not only preserved by neo-liberal rationalities, but consigned to an increasing untenable 
position. Where wage-labour is opened up to the apparent elasticity o f the market it is 
now difficult to think o f any ‘good’ forms o f dependency. Beyond the circuits of wage- 
labour and the virtues o f autonomy, the only dependency that remains is policed by 
advanced liberal technologies o f conduct. It is not surprising, for instance, that with 
increasing criticisms o f state welfare we find the parallel rise o f moral/psychological 
forms o f dependency. By the 80's, psychology would provide an ensemble of techniques 
and diagnostic instruments for transforming dependency into a discrete behavioural 
syndrome. A 'psychology o f  the p o o f ensures that recipients are no longer 'victims' of 
state welfare or products o f  a ‘client mentality', but can be linked in various ways to the 
personal power o f individuals. Arguably, welfare reform is underpinned by two control 
strategies: the imperative o f activity and the ethic of choice (Rose, 1999a).
Under the new therapeutic regime o f the post welfare state, practices of monitoring 
and contractual obligation ensure that welfare dependency is partly the burden and 
responsibility o f the recipients themselves. ‘Activation policies' seek to reintegrate and 
manage ‘the excluded' through continuous medical surveillance and differentiated
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techniques o f psychological assessment. The present reactivation of nineteenth century 
pauperism coincides with new methods o f screening and monitoring welfare populations, 
which tend to reinforce rather than diminish the increasing stigmatisation of receipt. And 
as the conditions o f poverty disappear into the ‘treatable’ pathology o f the dependent, it is 
the abject, marginal and excluded who are now the principle target of ethical and moral 
reconstruction.
Having traced out this field o f pre-liberal governance, the task o f the next chapter is 
to reconstitute the event o f pauperism and examine the kind of moral, economic and 
theoretical arguments that led to the conceptual elaboration o f poverty.
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5 Constitution of poverty
The constitution o f poverty traces the haphazard development of several themes as they 
form the point o f intersection out o f which a definite conception o f poverty emerges. 
Here, the task is to reconstitute Dean’s (1991) ‘event of pauperism’ if only for the 
purpose of understanding our position in the present more clearly; that is, by considering 
the present transformation o f citizenship, the invention of welfare dependency and the 
politics o f conduct in terms o f these early liberal discourses. But this chapter also serves 
another purpose: to test Polanyi's thesis that debates on pauperism were central to the 
creation o f the self-regulating market. The constitution o f poverty is crucial to this event 
since the discovery o f poverty prescribed the conditions of wage-labour as the 
cornerstone o f civil society, and established the means of inculcating self-sufficiency 
among the habits o f the labouring poor. Liberal administration had to first create the 
conditions o f the market by distilling poverty from pauperism, and holding the latter as a 
figure of universal aberration.
This chapter is both continuous with, and a departure from. Dean's (1991) genealogy 
of the government o f poverty. My purpose is to reconstitute the event o f pauperism by 
seeking out slightly different conceptual routes and historical resources to draw different 
conclusions about the present politics of Australian welfare reform. Following Polanyi 
(1957), the emergence o f  national markets was not a domain that became emancipated 
from governmental control, but was brutally and efficiently enforced by governing 
practices that denied the ‘right to life’ outside the market. For this reason, it is essential to 
retrace the birth o f political rationalities that gave rise to state welfare in order to better 
understand how present strategies of control are instrumental to creating ‘flexible' 
national labour markets in Australia. The ‘event of pauperism’ serves as a point of 
departure for understanding how political rationalities and practices have been called 
upon to both ‘sharpen and naturalise the divisions between the autonomous and the
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dependent, the contented and the discontented, the have and have nots’ (Rose, 1999a. 
p.254).
Analysis therefore traces key problematisations and transformations among debates 
on poor policy between the final decades of the eighteenth century and the Poor Law of 
1834. There are four main themes which are discussed: population, economy, poverty and 
police. These themes are o f particular historical interest because they mark a break with 
patriarchal relations o f political governance, with a mercantilist tradition of political 
oeconomy and, more importantly, with a discourse of the poor. By the final decade of the 
eighteenth century, we find problematisations o f poverty no longer refer to The Poor' as a 
target o f paternalistic and repressive regulation, but emerge with all the conceptual 
specificity that is necessary to a new liberal discourse on poverty. Before undertaking this 
analysis. I want to discuss a recent ‘event’ in Australian welfare politics that marks a 
transformation o f welfare and citizenship through the re-deployment o f these early liberal 
discourses. The sudden and increasing emphasis on ‘active society’ and ‘active 
citizenship’ serves as a point o f departure for exploring the historical conditions in which 
welfare is now recast as a conditional contract based on moral improvement. What I call 
the 'event o f conditionality’ is a portentous marker for establishing new and forgotten 
connections between past and present modes o f liberal government.
Event o f cond itionality
In the post-war period welfare states came to represent ideals o f social citizenship 
wherein all members o f society were to be assured a minimum standard of well-being and 
their recognition as equal worth and dignity. This, at least, was the vision held by T. H. 
Marshall who conceived social citizenship as ‘the whole range from right to a modicum 
of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and 
to live the life o f a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society' 
(1983. p.74). Modem entitlements o f the welfare state represented a new form of 'social 
rights' equivalent to civil and political rights. More recently, however, the politics of 
conduct, which have become so infused in the contemporary logics of welfare 
rationalities and practices, have transformed conceptions o f citizenship (Kerr and
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Savelsberg, 1999). Welfare no longer resembles the universal entitlements that once 
underpinned the sovereign rights o f Australian citizens. Instead, welfare is now a 
supervisory regime that renders citizenship conditional upon activity and participation. 1 
will give just brief survey o f the policies that maintained this shift from entitlements to 
conditionality.
New themes o f activity and participation began to emerge in discussions of welfare 
and social policy in the 1980’s. Following the lead o f the OECD (1988), it was argued 
that the income security system should be overhauled to promote active participation 
rather than passive entitlements. In the mid-80’s the Minister o f Social Security 
assembled a major review o f the social security system. O f the thirty-one Discussion 
Papers and six Issues Papers produced, it was Issues Paper No.4, Income Support fo r  the 
Unemployed in Australia: Towards a More Active System , that proposed a radical 
reorganisation o f administration to encourage a return to work, to minimise the erosion of 
self-esteem and reduce labour-market marginalisation (Cass, 1988). The Australian 
Social Security Review recommended restructuring unemployment assistance to make 
the system an active component o f a labour market strategy. Income support would have 
a dual role: supporting active job  search by facilitating flexibility o f the labour force to 
changed economic circumstances; and redistributing income to people with reduced 
labour force capacities and opportunities. Key aspects of the Issues Paper found their way 
into social security legislation in 1991. The central idea o f an ‘active system' was carried 
into the language o f  reforms replacing the old ‘work test' with an ‘activity test'. 
Unemployment benefits were replaced with a differentiated structure of ‘allowances' 
tailored to fit the particular requirements o f the unemployed. The central problematisation 
o f these reforms was those ‘at risk’ o f long-term unemployment and welfare dependency 
and the legislation o f 1991 attempted to resolve this by implementing two new 
programmes: Job Search and Newstart (Dean, 1995; Shaver. 2002).
Another instance o f  transformation is exemplified by the politics o f the contract. In 
1994 the Keating Labour Government released Working Nation, a White Paper 
introducing case-management approaches to unemployment, ‘reciprocal obligations' and
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coordinated access to job-search assistance, training, job-creation schemes and subsidised 
jobs. During this period, the language o f the 'job-seeker’ displaced the term 
‘unemployed’, and an active system of income support was held to displace the passive 
system o f benefits that encouraged welfare dependency. There was an expectation that in 
return for assistance there would be a ‘strengthened obligation on unemployed people to 
accept a reasonable job offer’ (Commonwealth o f Australia, 1994, p. 108). A new ‘Job 
Compact' offered targeted support for the long-term unemployed, but also ‘stronger 
penalties for job-seekers who do not meet their obligations under the Job Compact' 
(1994, p. 117). The contractual obligations that underpinned the Job Compact would have 
a future. The appearance o f case-managers, for instance, paralleled the transformation of 
the unemployed into ‘clients’ and ‘consumers’, and the language of enterprise culture 
would ensure that poverty was no longer a cornerstone o f civil rights conferred by the 
state, but that the poor would become new components within a quasi-public economy of 
labour marketisation112.
A year before the 1988 Cass Review, the deputy leader o f the Liberal Party submitted 
a proposal to discuss ‘Work for unemployment benefits’ as a matter of public importance 
before the House o f Representatives (House Hansard, 1 April 1987). In the following 
year. John Howard (then Leader o f the Opposition) released a statement to the media 
titled Working for Australia: An Active Approach to Unemployment, promising to 
establish a ‘Community Service Scheme’ if they assumed government. In Howard's 
words, the scheme was to ‘provide a real and genuine benefit to the unemployed through 
work experience and training; satisfy general community desire to see the unemployed 
have the benefits o f active work; reduce abuses in the payment of unemployed benefits 
and encourage the voluntarily unemployed to secure genuine employment' (Media 
Release N o.LI09/88). This vision would have to wait nine years before implementation. 
After the Howard Coalition government won office in 1996. the Social Security
112 The Howard Coalition government retained the language o f  the jobseeker, but in the name o f  
'enterprise', abolished the Commonwealth Employment Service (CES) and established a new statutory 
authority for those seeking access to public benefits and services (Commonwealth Service Deliver Agency. 
CSDA). Many o f  the functions o f  the old CES were managed by the ‘public employment placement 
enterprise’ (PEPE). a corporatised model that functioned according to the ‘competitive neutrality' o f  a 
market in employment placement services. The plan announced the decrease o f  public expenditure, and the 
finding o f ‘employment placement enterprises’ (Dean, 1998, pp.89-91).
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Legislation Amendment ( ‘work-for-the-dole’) Bill was introduced into the House of 
Representatives in March, 1997. The bill proposed to establish ‘pilot’ projects where 
younger unemployed people were required to work on ‘community projects’ at award 
rates o f pay up to the value o f unemployment. In his address to parliament. Howard 
argued 'it is not unfair in modern Australia to ask people, if they are able to do so. to 
undertake some work in return for the dole that they receive’ (Howard, 1997, p.466). By 
1998, the Howard government pursued similar reform strategies, introducing 'mutual 
obligation principles’ for the expansion o f the existing work-for-the-dole scheme.
The new imperative o f activity identifies citizenship less with membership of a social 
community than with participation in wage-labour. But participation also specifies a 
permanent mode o f ethical conduct which is expected to contribute to community in the 
form of paid or unpaid work. Under this new formula o f governance, citizenship is 
conceived as ‘work’ in the form o f any socially useful participation, whether voluntary or 
vocational. Both Senator Newman and the deliberations o f the Reference Group make it 
clear that dependence on benefits without some form of agreed participation is no longer 
an option for the majority o f working age claimants. New measures, we are told, will 
ensure that ‘support does not go unconditionally for long periods to people with the 
capacity to contribute to their own support and to the community’ (Newman, 1999a, p.6). 
When the McClure Report was first released in July 2000 it received wide support by all 
major political parties, business communities, the media, and numerous welfare 
organisations. Reactions from peak community representative groups -  ACOSS. 
Brotherhood o f St Laurence, Socialist Alliance, and members o f the academic community 
-  raised numerous concerns about the punitive and coercive implications o f the Report. 
However, an editorial in the Sydney Morning Herald on August 17th, 2000 encapsulated 
the dramatic shift that had taken place in Australian welfare policy: after praising the 
McClure Report as ‘sane and humane in principle', the author commented that its great 
contribution was to shift the focus o f the welfare ‘debate' and centre the 'discussion on 
responsibilities rather than rights’. Like nineteenth century social welfare, assistance was 
not a right but a conditional contract based on moral improvement.
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So. given the shift from entitlement to participation, from the passive citizen with 
rights to the active citizen who must continually demonstrate capacity to qualify for 
rights, how are we to diagnose this event? We could turn to economic globalisation, the 
rise of neo-liberal governance, or the recent transformation of state welfarism. All these 
possibilities are no doubt useful if  somewhat partial forms of diagnosis. The case 1 want 
to make here is that the invention o f poverty was integral to ascribing civil status to the 
nineteenth century ‘independent labourer’. In order to grasp current modes of liberal 
government it is necessary to revisit the birth of political rationalities and practices that 
gave shape to nineteenth century liberal administration. After all. it was the discovery of 
poverty as a natural condition for the production of wealth that transformed the 
propertyless, able-bodied poor into a national labour-market. But first it is necessary to 
contextualise the crisis from which a concept of poverty would emerge. In the next 
section. I trace three key problematisations which characterise the paralysis of eighteenth 
century poor policy.
Climate of problem atisation
The 1790's marks a period o f military conflict, agrarian scarcity, massive inflation of 
grain prices and almost universal criticism of the Elizabethan edifice o f the poor law. But 
it was also a period o f immense intellectual productivity, and numerous experiments 
combining relief with moral reform. This climate of problematisation which marks the 
birth o f poverty is a curious and complex admixture o f crisis and creativity11’. But there 
were other events which sharpened the focus on poor-relief. The French Revolution 
dramatically illustrated the potential o f the peasantry to rise against autocratic authority. 
This prompted Edmund Burke to denounce ‘abstract rights’, and remind the English 
peasantry that their lot was one o f obedience and unremitting toil. Recurrent agrarian 
scarcity also placed further burdens on poor-relief; the final decade was one of repeated 
rural distress, famine and intermittent revolt among the peasantry. Lastly, the collapse of 
the mercantilist police o f the poor meant that local and parochial authorities were unable 
to form an adequate response to these new challenges.
113 Following Poynter’s observation on the ‘years o f  scarcity’, Dean claims ‘the last decade o f  the 
eighteenth century was a peculiar combination o f  an outpouring o f  literature on poverty on the one hand, 
and legislative inaction and absence o f  reform on the other’ (1991, p. 138).
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If we had to cut through the immense complexity of this period, there were, upon 
closer examination, three key problematisations characterising the administrative 
paralysis of the second half o f the eighteenth century. Firstly, there were the increased 
popular and political reactions against the workhouse. Seventeenth century arguments 
that saw in the workhouse an institution of patriarchal discipline capable o f instructing an 
industrious mode o f life, and a system that incorporated the suppression o f vagrancy w ith 
the sanguine goal o f profitable employment, was, by the end of the eighteenth century, a 
symbol o f disapprobation and degeneracy. Jonas Hanway (1776) criticised the workhouse 
as the source o f physical and moral disease which, like the old hospital structures, were 
prone to high rates o f mortality and epidemic visitation. Webb and Webb also account for 
the increasing financial and moral burden of workhouses; they were invariably 
unprofitable, and steadily became ‘places o f horrible demoralisation and disorder'114 
(Webb and Webb, 1963, p. 142). By the 1780’s, the workhouse is effectively abandoned 
as an instrument for the able-bodied poor after the persistent attempts and somewhat 
partial success o f  the poor-law reformer, Thomas Gilbert. Gilbert’s objections seemed 
more driven by a humanitarian than an economic impulse. He vigorously argued that all 
institutional treatment should be restricted to the impotent (Poynter. 1969). The Gilbert's 
Act of 1782 succeeded in augmenting ‘powers to parishes to combine for the provision of 
institutions for the maintenance o f all classes o f the destitute except the able-bodied [and] 
to find employment for the able-bodied at wages, or else to give them relief in their own 
hom es'(Webb and Webb. 1963, p .151)"5.
!'4 Citing Webb and Webb further, one critic o f  1813 observed: ‘In whatever light these institutions are 
view ed... there is scarcely anything to be perceived but degeneracy and ultimate disappointment. Persons 
o f  judgment and deliberate reflection, who once thought favourably o f  them, now produce reasons for 
apostasy... both in point o f  expense, and the morals or the poor youth brought up there; as well as the 
unnatural state the old and inform are confined to, among strangers who cannot be supposed capable o f  
much sympathy. Experience also teaches us that the children brought up in such places, when grown up are 
fit only for a m anufactory... not for outdoor employments, except, indeed, the men become soldiers (such 
as thy be) and the fem ales... often have recourse to prostitution’ (1963, pp. 142-3).
I!’ Even Webb and Webb convey a sense o f  panic out o f  which the Gilbert Act emerged: ‘Such a policy o f  
virtually obligatory Outdoor R elief to the able-bodied labourers and their families, in addition to that 
customary for the sick and aged, developed, in the “double panic o f  famine and rebellion” that marked the 
closing years o f  the eighteenth century, into a regular system o f  relief in aid o f  w ages’ (1963, p. 151).
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Secondly, Poynter observes the emergence of various ‘contributory alternatives' in 
the form of insurance and annuity schemes, contributions to friendly societies, and the 
provision o f safe places o f deposit for savings, which begin to operate as alternatives to 
the poor law (1969, pp.35-44). While annuity schemes seem to derive from the common 
perception o f the ‘idleness and extravagance’ of the poor, the establishment o f friendly 
societies emerge as a genuinely popular form of self-help. Despite attempts to produce 
plans for poor law reform based on the principles of friendly societies, ensuing debates 
like those proposed by Howlett disputed the assumption that ‘the present earnings of the 
Poor, if properly managed are perfectly adequate for their comfortable management' 
(cited in Poynter. p.38). The outcome o f these debates was not a reform of the poor laws 
as such, but a somewhat cautious Friendly Societies Act of 1793 which merely 
encouraged clubs to offer privileges to its members in return for registration. There was a 
sharp increase in registrations among friendly societies which numbered 5,400 by 1801. 
even the great commentator o f the poor, F. M. Eden believed ‘one great and fundamental 
truth, that, with few exceptions, the people, under all circumstances, are, with good 
management, perfectly competent to provide for their own maintenance’ (cited in 
Poynter. 1969, pp.38). Champions o f the contributory schemes also formed the 
beginnings o f the abolitionist movement which carried the attack against existing 
methods o f poor-relief. The most vocal o f these were Rev. Thomas Alcock in 1752. and 
Rev. Joseph Townsend in 1786: their principle argument was the Poor Law caused the 
very indigence it was intended to relieve. Nonetheless, the principle of the ‘contributor) 
alternatives' put the legitimacy o f relief to the sick and aged on the agenda for the first 
time.
Lastly, and most importantly, the emergence o f philanthropy in the eighteenth century 
had steadily amassed its own independent organisation -  charity schools, hospitals, 
almshouses, and benevolent societies -  which come to represent an alternative system of 
moral relations to that o f the poor law. Between the arguments posed by Alcock and 
Eden, we discover a foundational morality as the basis for arguments concerning the
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‘rights o f the poor'. Citing the Bishop o f Cloyne, Dr. Woodward, Eden exemplifies the 
kind o f claims that insist the right to relief is a corollary to the rights o f property116:
If the poor man’s rich neighbours are not bound, injustice, to provide for him a competent 
maintenance, he demands, “by what right did they take upon them to enact certain law s... 
which compelled that man to becom e a member for their society; which precluded him from 
any share in the land where he was born, any use o f  it’s spontaneous fruits, or any dominion 
over the beasts o f  the field, on pain o f  stripes, imprisonment, or death? How can they justify 
their exclusive property in the com m on heritage  o f  mankind, unless they consent, in return, to 
provide for the subsistence o f  the Poor, who were excluded from those common rights by the 
laws o f  the Rich, to which they were never parties? (Eden, 1797, p.414).
A system of relief which attracts the idle prodigal man, but acts ‘with stoical indifference' 
to suppress our ‘instinct o f compassion' for no other purpose than to discourage idleness 
is a 'political evil' (cited in Eden, p.415). Eden, however, is more circumspect in his own 
position: although a foundational moral justice must exercise relief for the poor to correct 
the inherent inequities o f civil society, legal provision for the poor is nonetheless based 
on the ‘mistaken principle’ that relief should be exercised as an unconditional right. For 
Eden, the maladministration o f legal provision undermines the natural ties of civil 
society:
But a legal provision for the Poor, on the contrary, (it seem s to me,) checks that emulative 
spirit o f  exertion, which the want o f  necessaries, or the no less powerful demand for the 
superfluities, o f  life, g ives birth to: for it assures a man. that, whether he may have been 
indolent, improvident, prodigal, or vicious, he shall never suffer want: it weakens the 
strongest tie o f  civil society; the desire o f  acquiring property; for it declares, that, whether a 
man is industrious or idle, his most pressing difficulties, the necessity o f  food, lodging, and 
cloathing, shall be provided for (Eden, 1797, p.448).
Here, we glean the kind o f argument that will become more familiar in the nineteenth 
century: the legal provision o f poor-relief simply encouraged idleness and debauchery. 
But this is not to suggest that a moral philosophy underpinned the poor laws, rather, the 
essential moral relation between rich and poor, the right of subsistence, was invoked as a 
critique o f the poor laws (Dean, 1991). After all, a compulsory poor rate would, as 
Alcock believed, degrade the natural moral bond o f ‘social affection' and ‘harden the 
hearts' o f the rich, and the poor, who believe they have a right to relief, ‘will labour less 
and spend more: the very law that provides for the Poor, makes Poor' (cited in Poynter.
Ilt' The kind o f  arguments that hold a justification o f  the poor laws in terms o f  a moral philosophy are 
exem plified by such authors as Bishop Woodward in 1767, William Paley in 1786, T. Ruggles in 1793 and 
Sherer in 1797 who maintain the right o f  relief is both a Christian duty and a corollary o f  the right o f  
property (Poynter, 1969, pp.33-44; Dean, 1991, pp.l 17-9).
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9. Posipolio  s \ndrom e: connecting polio  and new sym ptoms
separated from the whole stories, in order to group a range o f symptoms together and 
clarify them for the reader. Most o f  these descriptions were not embedded in narratives, 
but developed from questioning. Several symptoms were described more eloquently in 
the questionnaire ("hot marshmallow") than in interviews and are therefore included 
below (Table 9.1).
Table 9.1 Symptom descriptions
Weakness and falling
Wendy: The turning point with the can't do things as when I couldn't get up off the floor, indoors the 
resolution to that is I have one of those alarm buttons. That's about 1990, probably. But that also means 
if I fall outdoors I'm completely dependent on someone picking me up. And that took some thinking 
through, because I can't put myself in a position where there are no people around.
Muscle fatigue
Helen: You know, so I was finding I was getting more tired, I was finding gradients more difficult, you 
know if I was walking uphill, that was more difficult.
Sarah (questionnaire): It feels like being in slow motion — I collide with walls as direction is lost. After 
a couple of days mild gardening, fatigue can last for days, as ankles and wrists feel like hot 
marshmallow, fasciculations increase. Brain fog more disturbing, cannot even think how to move at 
times. Once fell in supermarket, could not think how to get up again.
Michael (diary): Chronic fatigue develops in both legs after walking a few yards on my own and I am 
finding it increasingly difficult to maintain my balance unless the surface is completely level.
Michael: If I was tired and if I had got to a stage where fatigue was really creeping in, you do not need 
much of an uneven or an imbalance to your putting the weight down on that leg for you to completely 
give way altogether. You had to really concentrate on how you were going to apply that foot to the 
ground and how you were going to coordinate the next move with the body or the gait of the leg.
Interconnections of general, mental and muscle fatigue
Jennie (questionnaire): Any physical or mental activity starts it (fatigue) off... My brain 'turns off. It's 
as if something is not connecting.
Sarah (questionnaire): I find it difficult to differentiate between general and muscle fatigue.
Alex (questionnaire): Fatigue is like hitting the wall mentally and physically.
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liberal poor policy’ (1991, p.68). The innovative role played out among the policy 
implications o f M althus’ Essay was that o f prescribing a moral sphere o f conduct and 
responsibility which neatly coincided with liberal principles of limited government. The 
problem o f the poor was now located within the behaviours and moral education of the 
poorer classes; only "moral restraint’ ensured a level o f subsistence through the 
edification and independence o f the male breadwinner and his family.
In the Essay. Malthus signals a definite break with earlier conceptions of population. 
The concept o f population had long been the invention o f a police science found among 
German speaking countries in the seventeenth century. But an idea o f population does not 
emerge in relation to arguments o f ‘subsistence’ until a century later where it was taken 
up by utopian writers such as Condorcet, Montesquieu. Godwin and Wallace who 
believed that population size was the principle factor determining the wealth and 
greatness o f a nation. These optimistic accounts were mainly the product o f mercantilist 
views about human progress and perfectibility, wherein the relation between population 
and subsistence was conceived as an unstable, but self-adjusting, equilibrium. If there 
were any limits on population growth they would be established automatically by the 
normal functioning o f  the perfected human society.
The first writer to offer an extensive critique o f the poor laws using the concept of 
population was not Malthus, but Joseph Townsend (1787), who gives a pessimistic 
account o f the relation between population and subsistence. In fact, it was Townsend w ho 
popularised the notion o f population in his criticism of the poor laws by invoking a 
mercantilist account o f  the utility o f poverty, though not so much in terms of lowering 
wages but abolishing a poor rate that removed the spur o f industry and increased the 
numbers o f idle poor. Tow nsend's innovation was introducing into political discourse the 
idea o f a natural, biological model for the regulation o f population. This is the point made 
by Polanyi who claims that: By approaching human existence from the animal side. 
Townsend by-passed the supposedly unavoidable question as to the foundation of 
government and in doing so introduced a new concept of law into human affairs, that of 
the laws o f Nature' (1957, p. 114). The discovery of biological laws meant that 'the
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biological nature o f man appeared as the given foundation of a society that was not of a 
political order' (Polanyi, 1957, p. 115). In terms of poor policy, poverty and indigence 
was effectively removed from the responsibilities o f the state; poverty was a natural, 
ungovernable phenomenon created by hunger and want. For Townsend, it is the ratio 
between population and food supply that regulates the level of subsistence, and it is the 
necessary balance o f such a ratio that is disturbed by the artificial subsistence of the poor: 
'poverty and wretchedness have increased in exact proportion to the efforts which have 
been made for the comfortable subsistence o f the poor; and that wherever most is 
expanded for their support, there objects o f distress are most abundant' (Townsend. 1971.
p.20).
In line with mercantilist beliefs that hunger and want increased industry. Townsend 
argues that it is the lot o f the poor that hunger should compel them to labour. Hunger, 
after all. is not only ‘a peaceable, silent, unremitted pressure, but, as the most natural 
motive to industry and labour, it calls forth the most powerful exertions’ (p.24). The error 
o f the poor laws is to remove this natural spur for hunger and destroy the natural motive 
to 'labour and industry'. And yet the mechanism of hunger is more absolute and more 
efficient than that o f 'legal constraints’ which is accompanied by 'too much trouble, 
violence and noise'. The imperative to relieve the poor contradicts the objective of setting 
them to work if  it means circumventing the natural law o f want. Townsend summarises 
the problem of prov ision for the poor as thus:
Now a fixed, a certain, and a constant provision for the poor weakens this spring: it increases 
their improvidence, but does not promote their cheerful compliance with those demands, 
which the com m unity is obliged to make on the most indigent o f its members: it tends to 
destroy the harmony and beauty, the symmetry and order o f  that system, which God and 
nature have established in the world. The improvident among the poor have been advancing in 
their claims: they now  begin to understand that they have a legal right to all (1971, p.36).
That the provision o f the poor is an artificial disruption of the harmony and symmetry of 
natural order is a major advance on arguments derived from a foundational moralitv. a 
humanitarian impulse or a mercantilist doctrine of low wages. The policy implications of 
Townsend's argument are both decisive and damning. The poor laws artificially increase 
the numbers o f the poor without regard for a proportionate increase in the supply o f food. 
Nature has a tendency to strike a balance between food and numbers, but unnatural
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intervention only exacerbates the distress of the poor: ‘by establishing a permanent 
community o f goods, and neither increasing the quantity of food, nor limiting the number 
of those who are to share it, they divert the occasional surplus o f national wealth from the 
industrious to the lazy, they increase the number of unprofitable citizens, and sow the 
seeds o f misery for the whole community; increasing the general distress, and causing 
more to die for want, than if poverty had been left to find its proper channel' (1971, p.40).
Where Townsend introduces the possibility of bringing statements about population 
and subsistence together in the form o f a critique o f poor-relief, Malthus would radicalise 
this schema by inaugurating a fundamental disequilibrium at the heart o f the natural 
order. To put it simply, the Malthusian thesis claimed that the natural rate of increase of 
population was much greater than the highest conceivable rate o f increase in subsistence. 
His arithmetic and geometric ratios o f subsistence and population introduced a principle 
of scarcity that would not only overturn the utopian dreams o f Condorcet. Godwin and 
the philosophies o f perfectibility, but also uphold the abolition o f the poor law. There are 
three parts o f the Malthusian thesis. Firstly, population is considered to have the capacity 
to increase in geometrical ratio while subsistence is said to actually increase in no more 
than arithmetical ratio (Malthus, 1798, p. 14). The effect of the difference between the two 
rates o f increase establishes a tendency for population to outstrip the means o f subsistence 
which is necessary for its support. Secondly, given that such a tendency is constrained by 
practical circumstances, Malthus argues that some manner of checks exist which limit the 
increase in population approximately to the level o f subsistence. Thirdly, having 
established this tendency and the existence o f such checks, the final part o f his thesis is an 
inquiry into the nature o f the checks that ought to be practiced by mankind to avoid a 
situation of scarcity and misery.
Now, Malthus proposes two kind o f checks, preventive and positive, which I 
discussed briefly in Chapter 2. Positive checks are common to all ranks of society; 
however, it is the preventive kind that is said to operate mainly among the poor. In the 
later editions o f the Essay, Malthus would add a third check which he describes as ‘moral 
restraint'. This is not a new check but an elaboration o f the preventive kind, in which case
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misery and scarcity is remedied by the deferral o f marriage. Though Malthus never 
clearly specifies which sex this applies to. Dean (1991) argues that the practice o f moral 
restraint seems to implicitly focus on the actions o f men117. Though men o f all ranks are 
included within this schema -  men o f  liberal education, the sons o f tradesmen and 
farmers, the labourer earning eighteen pence a day, and the servants living in gentlemen's 
families -  as we might expect the calculative restraint to marriage assumes much greater 
urgency among the lower classes (1872, p.63-69). For instance, at the very lowest rank:
The labourer who earns eighteen pence a day. and lives with some degree o f  comfort as a 
single man, will hesitate a little before he divides that pittance among four or five, which 
seems to be but just sufficient for one. Harder fare and harder labour he would submit to for 
the sake o f  living with the woman that he loves but he must feel conscious, if  he thinks at all, 
should he have a large family, and any ill luck whatever, no degree o f  frugality, no possible 
exertion o f  his manual strength, could preserve him from the heart-rending sensation o f  seeing 
his children starv e, or o f  forfeiting his independence, and being obliged to the parish for their 
support (Malthus, 1798. p.67).
Malthus persistently underscores marriage as the institutional embodiment of an 
obligation o f the man to support his family. Moral restraint becomes the only acceptable 
alternative for the male who suspects he is unable to fulfil this obligation. For women, the 
prospect o f rearing a child outside o f wedlock receives the fullest condemnation of the 
society she has needlessly burdened.
The policy implications o f  M althus' thesis form a direct attack on the habits of the 
poor. In the first edition o f  the Essay\ he asserted that existing measures o f relief remove 
the ‘spirit o f independence', but according to his own thesis on the relation between 
population and subsistence, ‘no human ingenuity' could remove the distress of the lower 
classes, only positive checks and moral restraints could reverse the present crisis of the 
poor laws. Poynter observed three ‘palliative’ measures within Malthusian reform: firstly, 
the total abolition o f  all the present parish laws118; secondly, agriculture should be
: The fact that moral restraint is mainly the prerogative o f  men is clearly illustrated in the following
passage: ‘If he cannot support his children, they must starve; and if  he marry in the face o f  a fair probabi 1 it\ 
that he shall not be able to support his children he is guilty o f  all the evils which he brings upon himself, his 
wife and offspring. It is clearly his interest, and will tend greatly to promote his happiness, to defer 
marriage, til by industry and econom y he is in a capacity to support the children he may reasonably expect 
from his marriage' (M althus, 1872, p.404).
"s As an adjunct to parish law, Malthus argued that the repeal o f  the settlement laws would also be of  
particular benefit to the poor, allow ing them to obtain higher wages in a free labour market (Poynter, 1969, 
p. 156).
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encouraged 'above manufactures’ to increase the means o f subsistence; and finally, the 
establishment o f county workhouses ‘for cases o f extreme distress’, supported by a 
national rate (1969, pp. 155-6). Poynter makes the valid claim that despite his attack on 
the poor laws. 'Malthus did not in 1798 urge the abolition of the Poor law altogether, but 
the establishment o f a new national workhouse scheme' (Poynter. 1969, p. 156). By the 
second edition, he takes a more direct and draconian position in relation to the poor laws. 
In 1803, after reading Defoe’s lucid criticism of the workhouse scheme in Eden’s history 
o f the poor, Malthus discovers ‘the absurdity o f supposing that it is in the power of a 
government to find employment for all its subjects, however fast they may increase' 
(1803. pp.417-8). Upon abandoning the workhouse scheme, Malthus puts forward his 
famous plan for the gradual abolition o f the Poor Law. However, there emerges a new 
object in his renewed attack: now pauperism constituted the 'rapidly progressive canker' 
o f society. In short, the poor laws seem to deprive the poor o f the moral responsibility to 
improve their own conditions.
The mode o f government prescribed by Malthusianism is one that overturns the 
indulgence o f a paternalistic state that is unwilling to dispense with legal provision of the 
poor. At the heart o f this thesis is not an economic or demographic imperative, but the 
removal o f institutional barriers that interfere with the laws of nature. If the state is to 
have a role at all it is to ensure that patriarchy continues to preserve relations o f 
subordination within the family as a self-contained unit o f virtue and self-reliance. State 
intervention would play a pedagogic role o f moral and rational instruction, something 
approximating a national system of education. In keeping with the laws o f nature, then, 
the state would emulate the lessons o f nature wherein prudence, foresight and industry 
established their own reward through the happiness and subsistence it provided, and the 
mechanisms o f hunger, misery and vice would form an external limit that regulated the 
conduct o f the poor. The innovation o f Malthusian intervention is the replication of 
nature through the embodiment o f a rationality that prescribes a specific form of conduct 
for the propertyless male, and his dependent wife and children119.
° Dean is succinct in stating the effect the principle o f  population would have on the old Tudor system of  
police: ‘The government o f  poverty is no longer about creating a good police through strengthening 
patriarchal relations o f  authority and subordination within the nation’s household. It is about removing the
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So, what were the effects o f the Malthusian discourse? We know the Malthusian 
doctrine took the form o f prescription that sought to abolish the poor law on the basis that 
it robbed the poor o f their ‘spirit o f independence’, encouraged improvident conduct, 
possessed no educative means o f promoting self-restraint and self-reliance, and increased 
the numbers o f the poor to the point o f threatening the balance between subsistence and 
population. But if we were to imagine a poor law which, falling short of its own 
elimination, and yet preserving the Malthusian thesis o f possibilities, what would this 
edifice o f reform look like? Arguably, the 1834 Report from the Commissions for the 
Inquiry’ into the Poor Laws and its juridical realisation, the Poor Law Amendment Act of 
1834. were consistent with Malthusian principles in that they eliminated forms of relief 
that encouraged dependence upon the state, and by forcing a life of independence on 
poor, able-bodied males.
In From Pauperism to Poverty (1981), Karel Williams documents the transformation 
o f nineteenth century relief practice. His analysis o f official statistics suggests post-1834 
relief policy is rendered intelligible in terms o f a Malthusian strategy o f abolitionism and 
forced independence. The abolition o f relief o f both the able-bodied male and his 
dependents removed the barriers to the natural domain o f a man's economic 
responsibility for his wife and children. The official strategy of post-1834 relief embodied 
the twin objectives o f  excluding able-bodied men from relief, while maintaining those 
who were otherwise their natural dependents, mother and children, within the deterrent 
functions of the workhouse. These objectives are supported by William's analysis of the 
scant statistics on relief before and after the 1834 reform which shows that 'in the last 
thirty years o f the old poor law before 1834, able-bodied men were consistently included 
among the classed obtaining relief... under the new poor law after 1834. a line of 
exclusion was drawn so that from the 1840’s onwards able-bodied men did not receive 
relief in significant num bers’ (Williams, 1981, p.51).
institutional barriers to the natural laws which teach propertyless men the obligations attendant upon their 
own private exercise o f  patriarchal authority... The Malthusian prescription for the poor is about allowing 
those law s o f  nature to operate which bind the poor man to the yoke o f  wage-labour and the poor woman to 
the yoke o f  conjugal dependence’ (1991, p.85).
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Even parliamentary debates were structured by Malthusian statements about the 
artificial dependency produced by the poor laws. By absolving people o f the 
responsibility for providing for themselves, the poor laws reduced people’s incentives for 
self-reliance and weakened the spur to ‘sobriety and industry’. This was the view of Lord 
Henry Brougham who proclaimed in Parliament that as a result o f the poor laws 'all 
independent feelings, were at an end: and consequences most pernicious speedily 
followed to the community as well as the poor themselves’ (Hansard 1834, 25, p.216). He 
upheld the conviction that ‘able-bodied men prefer a small sum in idleness to a large sum 
in wages, attended wdth the condition o f earning those wages by labour'; recipients of 
parish relief ‘were generally better off. and in many instances, much better off. than the 
independent labourer’ (Hansard 1834, 25, p.226). But apart from diminishing the ‘spirit 
o f independence' that was so essential to the self-regulating market, we also find the 
Malthusian concern for the preservation and autonomy of the family. The classical 
economist Nassau Senior would overturn the logic o f relief that seemed so prudent to 
William Pitt some forty years earlier by stating that the poor law's resulted in ‘an 
encouragement to bastardy by dispensing relief to the mothers of illegitimate children' 
(Bow ley. 1949. p.298). Joseph Hume offered the following assessment o f the connection 
between the poor laws and unwed motherhood:
under the present system  o f  Poor-laws, som e women drove a regular trade in illegitimacy. If a 
woman got one bastard, it was well; she got an allowance for the support o f  the child, and she 
went on to increase her family and her means; and by the time she had furnished the parish 
with a half-a-dozen children, she had made quite a little fortune for herself (Hansard, 1834.
22. p.893).
Malthusian ideas were linked to the general breakdown of family relations among the 
poor. The poor laws, argued Brougham, had violated ‘the first and most sacred law of 
nature', the principal o f self-reliance (Hansard 1834, 25, p.229). The autonomisation of 
the family unit which centred on the wage-labour of the able-bodied male was almost 
certainly the strategy o f a Malthusian logic -  the creation o f a natural sphere of economic 
responsibility that was independent o f state responsibility.
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In sum. the Poor Law Amendment Act o f 1834 marks a transformation of relief by 
imposing a new line o f exclusion: the able-bodied male is systematically excluded from 
outdoor relief along with his dependent wife and children. This had the effect of 
transforming the relations between patriarchy and the marriage contract. Malthusianism 
sought to construct the adult male as breadwinners within a new economy o f moral 
restraint, economic responsibility and familial autonomy. The central presupposition was 
an ethical ideal in which a national labour market would come to emulate the laws of 
nature, leaving only the most wretched and dissolute, and those without the economic 
support o f an able-bodied male, as the sole objects of assistance. The 'New Poor Law' of 
1834 made independent labour a means o f salvation and moral self-improvement. This 
also established the conditions for the creation o f a national labour market based on 
principles o f self-regulation. As Polanyi demonstrated over a century later, the creation of 
this economic sphere o f conduct found within the Malthusian idea o f 'moral restraint' 
both the solution and the conditions for denying the ‘right to life' outside the market, 
since it was through the threat o f starvation that labour could be induced to offer it 
services in the market (Polanyi, 1957, p. 164).
Economy
In this section, the task is to establish the conceptual links between Malthus' principle 
o f population and the emergence o f a new economic discourse. These two events will 
become inevitably related but prior to the event o f pauperism they are held apart by the 
discourse o f the poor. Under the mercantilist formula o f wise administration, political 
oeconomy constitutes the problem o f the poor by linking statements on the wealth, 
greatness and populousness o f the nation with the practical problems of governing the 
numbers o f the poor. The eighteenth century problem o f 'th e  Poor' is still tied to a sy stem 
of juridical classification, a category differentiated according to moral capacity, 
deservingness, persistent idleness and degrees of abjection. But as an exaggerated 
category, poverty can only perform a limited discursive function insofar as it is capable of 
only speaking about the poverty o f a nation, a city, or even the common attributes o f the 
poor themselves. Within the discourse o f political oeconomy it is not yet possible to make
207
poverty a concept or theorise it in such a way that might assemble strategies for 
overcoming or eradicating the conditions that produce poverty.
Though Smith’s Wealth o f  Nations is, in some respects, continuous with eighteenth 
century discourses o f the poor, he offers a distinctive perspective on the labouring poor. 
Nowhere do we encounter within political oeconomy the possibility o f autonomising the 
domain o f exchange, where master and workingman meet as rough equals, than in the 
market o f self-interested individuals. Political oeconomy differed from this perspective 
inasmuch as it pertained to an art or a technique practiced by the head of the state or the 
head o f the family1-0. But essentially it was not a discourse about the autonomous reality 
o f 'the economy’ but the art o f wise administration o f the things and subjects within a 
state (Tribe. 1978). Political oeconomy is the discourse o f the statesman and the patriarch 
who confer knowledge upon the minutiae o f elements that compose the proper 
functioning and management o f the household, and the augmentation of the wealth of the 
nation.
In Smith's Wealth o f  Nations* we do not find an economic discourse in the modern 
sense, but a kind o f  'moral economy' between labourers and employers. The sphere of 
exchange coordinates the self-interested activities o f sympathetic individuals; the wealth 
o f nations presupposes a state o f  calculated happiness, elementary liberty and natural 
justice among individuals. The self-interested calculations of individuals made in the 
'higgling and bargaining' o f exchange establish an implicit and approximate principle of 
fairness or equity121. Sm ith’s ‘system o f natural liberty' posits a sphere o f ethical conduct
' In his text An Inquiry into the Principles o f  Political Oeconomy (1767), which predates Smith's by nine 
years. Steuart defines oeconom y as the ‘art o f  providing for all the wants o f  a family, with prudence and 
frugality' (1966. pp. 15-16). The essential difference between the statesman o f  the nation and the master o f  
the household is that former must respect the workings o f  a political oeconomy in terms o f  its existing 
mechanisms. Steuart em ploys the famous metaphor o f  a watch to convey the delicate precision with which 
statesman intervenes in the circumstances and conditions o f  oeconomy (Hirschman, 1977. pp.86-7): but 
intervention is limited in the sense that som e actions might actually frustrate or undermine their own ends.
In Smith's chapter on value and labour we are given some insight on the process o f  exchange which is 
based on the calculation o f  self-interest, and the allowance and adjustment made between the two parties: 
In exchanging indeed the different productions o f  different sorts o f  labour for one another, some allowance 
is commonly made for both. It is adjusted, however, not by any accurate measure, but by the higgling and 
bargaining o f  the market, according to that rough sort o f  equality which, though not exact, is sufficient for 
carry ing on the business o f  com m on life ’ (Smith, 1776,1.5.4).
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whereby exchange is said to operate without restriction, and in terms o f a morality in 
which the nature o f men are free to pursue one’s self-interest. This ethical framework of 
exchange would for the first time grant the poor labourer a ‘civil individuality’ by virtue 
o f their capacity to enter into the circuits o f exchange with the only commodity they 
legitimately possess, their labour.
In Smith’s chapter on wages we find the basic moral, political and legal conditions 
under which labourers and masters enter into the wage-contract, and the sanguine attempt 
to establish a 'liberal reward for labour’ as the cornerstone of national prosperity. Unlike 
the discourse o f classical political economy o f the nineteenth century, the value o f wages 
is not set by a specific mechanism o f distribution, but again rests upon the moral 
economy -  the natural equivalence o f efforts and rewards, the harmonisation of 
individual interests in exchange — that constitutes the wage-contract between masters and 
workers:
W hat are the com m on wages o f  labour, depends everywhere upon the contract usually made 
between those two parties, w hose interests are by no means the same. The workmen desire to 
get as much, the masters to give as little as possible. The former are disposed to combine in 
order to raise, the latter in order to lower the w ages o f  labour (Smith, 1785, 1.8.11).
Smith raises the problem o f ‘combination’ as the means by which the actual rate o f wages 
are set -  it is not the combination o f workingmen who set the level o f wages, but the 
combination o f masters who ‘are always and every where in a sort o f tacit, but constant 
and uniform combination, not to raise wages above their actual rate' (Smith. 1776. 
1.8.13). In this 'rough equality' o f exchange, it is the combination o f masters who 
command the advantage o f the wage-contract. But there are also circumstances where 
labourers might command such an advantage: when there is ‘scarcity o f hands' and 
competition between masters we find a breakdown of this tacit combination. Smith 
argues that it is only in the ‘progressive state’, then, that we find the conditions in which 
competition is plentiful and the labourer is privy to the fruits o f his own labour1-2. Of
i:: ‘It deserves to be remarked, perhaps, that it is in the progressive state, while the society is advancing to 
the further acquisition, rather than when it has acquired its full complement o f  riches, that the condition o f  
the labouring poor, o f  the great body o f  the people, seems to be the happiest and the most comfortable. It is 
hard in the stationary, and miserable in the declining state. The progressive state is in reality the cheerful 
and the hearty state to all the different orders o f  society. The stationary' is dull; the declining melancholy' 
(Smith. 1785. 1.8.41-2).
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course this vignette o f prosperity omits the relations of domination between employer and 
employee as Marx would later theorise, though this moral sphere o f exchange held the 
possibility for the poor to share in the ‘progress of opulence' by engaging in roughly 
equal exchange. The level o f wages and happiness of the labouring class are not solely 
dependent on their own toil, diligence and dexterity, but, as we see above, the growth of 
the riches o f the nation itse lf It is true, however, that Smith initiates a modern critique o f 
the wage-contract by examining the inequalities inherent within the relations of 
contractual exchange, but also resurrects the sanguine possibilities for the wage-contract 
to become both the trajectory and destiny o f ‘civil status’ accorded to the male, 
propertyless labourer (Dean, 1991, pp. 132-3).
In this moral economy the labouring poor are held to be the rational owners of their 
labour as they face other individuals as equals in the market. Smith's ‘liberal reward for 
labour' marks an important departure from the mercantilist doctrine of low wages. 
Labourers should be free to exchange their labour for the highest possible reward, to 
maximise their happiness and increase the wealth o f their families. There is no utility of 
poverty which, rather than being a spur to industry, is simply the catalyst o f sickness and 
torpor. Again, it is the progressive, liberal state which is the most just and most equitable, 
and the key to prosperity. Smith thus concludes by emphasising the possibilities of 
industry as the emergent factor o f  this liberal sphere o f exchange:
The liberal reward for o f  labour, as it encourages the propagation, so it increases the industry 
o f  the common people. The w ages o f  labour are the encouragement o f  industry, which, like 
e\ery other human quality, im proves in proportion to the encouragement it receives. A 
plentiful subsistence increases bodily strength o f  the labourer, and the comfortable hope o f  
bettering his condition and o f  ending his days perhaps in ease and plenty, animates him to 
exert that strength to the utmost. Where wages are high, accordingly, we shall always find the 
workmen most active, diligent and expeditious, than where they are low (Smith. 1776.
1.8.43).
This marks an important shift in the conception of the poor. They are no longer regarded 
as merely an aberration, or signifying the numbers of the population. Rather, the 
‘problem of the poor' has been transformed into labourers who, in this liberal sphere o f 
moral and ethical conduct, should be treated as rational subjects of exchange. They are no 
longer the subjects o f  wise administration, but the objects o f an atomistic civil society 
who, like others, are bearers o f property, and pursue their self interest. The Wealth o f
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Nations is thus a landmark in the creation o f civil society, where, free from the 
restrictions of settlement laws or mercantilist concerns about ‘the free circulation of 
labour', the poor are given access to a field o f exchange in which they are relatively free 
to enjoy the fruits o f their own industry.
Classical political economy
By the early nineteenth century we witness something of a transformation of 
economic discourse; this was partly the failure of Smith’s ‘moral economy' in 
establishing the ethical ideals for the new mode o f government, and partly the discovery 
o f specific mechanisms o f production and distribution. A connection between the ethical 
ideals of economic activity and a mode o f governance was made possible by integrating 
Ricardian economy with M althus’ principles o f population. If Smith annexed the sphere 
o f exchange from the political framework o f political oeconomy only to turn it into a 
morally founded order, classical political economy connects this sphere to the 
mechanisms o f production and distribution. It is within this new, albeit abstract, 
conception o f economy that we find the rational, even sombre, conditions for the 
conceptual elaboration o f  poverty. Under this new economic discourse, poverty is no 
longer a lamentable condition but a natural consequence o f the mechanism of scarcity.
Ricardo introduces a number o f interventions upon the Adamite economy ; the first 
had to overcome the sphere o f moral economy through a reanalysis o f the value o f labour. 
According to Smith, the liberal reward for labour was always proportionate to what he 
produced, that is, the quantity o f  labour expended in acquiring a commodity was equal to 
the quantity o f labour that object could purchase or command in the way o f exchanges1^ . 
But at very outset o f On the Principles o f  Political Economy and Taxation (1817). 
Ricardo disputes this proposition by invoking an additional mechanism that regulates the 
value o f labour:
if  the reward o f  the labourer were always in proportion to what he produced, the quantity o f  
labour bestowed on a com m odity, and the quantity o f  labour which that commodity would
1:3 ‘The real price o f  every th in g ... what every thing really costs to the man who wants to acquire it, is the 
toil and trouble o f  acquiring it. What every thing is really worth to it, or the man who has acquired it. and 
who wants to dispose o f  it, or exchange it for something else, is the toil and trouble which it can save to 
himself, and which it can im pose upon other people’ (Smith, 1776, 1.5.2).
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purchase, would be equal, and either might accurately measure the variations o f  other things: 
but they are not equal; the first is under many circumstances an invariable standard, indicating 
correctly the variations o f  other things; the latter is subject to as many fluctuations as the 
commodities compared with it ... Is not the value o f  labour equally variable; being not only 
affected, as all other things are, by the proportion between the supply and demand, which 
uniformly varies with every change in the condition o f  the community, but also by the vary ing 
price o f  food and other necessaries, on which the wages o f labour are expended? (Ricardo.
1821, p.4).
In Smith's analysis, labour was deployed as a concept capable o f establishing a ‘constant 
measure between the value o f things’ (Foucault, 1970, p.253), but Ricardo inverts this 
formulation by introducing the possibility that labour is ‘subject to as many fluctuations 
as the commodities compared with it’. As Foucault observes, Ricardo disrupts the unity 
o f labour by introducing an external economic domain of processes which also regulate 
the value o f labour. On the one hand, the quantity o f labour expended for the production 
o f a commodity regulates the value o f that commodity relative to the value of other 
commodities. On the other hand, labour itself has become a commodity, subject to the 
same regulation by the value o f commodities which are essential to its production, and to 
the same fluctuations o f  supply and demand. In other words, the price of labour -  the 
wage -  is subject to the same mechanisms which determine the price o f all other 
commodities (Foucault, 1970, pp.253-4).
The closest we come to an economic conception o f poverty is in theory of wages. 
Given that classical political economy now effects a bifurcation o f labour, it therefore has 
a 'natural price' and a ‘market price’ (1821. p.38). The natural price of labour 'is that 
which is necessary to enable the labourer... to subsist and to perpetuate their race 
w ithout, either increase or dim inution’ which depends not on the quantity of money he 
may receive in wages, but the quantity o f ‘food, necessaries and conveniences' that his 
money is capable o f purchasing. Under this schema, poverty is the condition in w hich the 
market price o f labour falls below its natural price; 'poverty deprives them of those 
comforts which custom renders absolute necessaries’ (p.38). Variations in the price of 
labour are said to be subject to two causes: the supply and demand o f labourers, and the 
price of the commodities on which the wages of the labour are expended. In Ricardo's 
Principles, we find a thoroughly ‘demoralised’ sphere o f economic activity which is no 
longer conditioned by the sphere o f exchange, the higgling and bargaining of workmen
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and masters, but a scientifically rendered domain governed by a distributional 
mechanism. The major modification here is that poverty ceases to be a moral, 
humanitarian or sentimental crisis o f relations between the rich and poor, but a logical 
and collective phenomenon; after all, the variations o f the natural price o f labour depends 
on ‘the habits and customs o f the people’ (p.40).
In Ricardo’s theory o f  wages, we find a convergence between a new economic 
rationality o f labour and Malthusian statements which hold that wage levels are 
dependent on the ratio o f  population to capital, capital being the means of employing 
labour. Ricardo invokes M althus’ geometric maxim to show that as population increases 
capital has a tendency o f increasing more rapidly, in which case ‘wages during the whole 
period would have a tendency to rise, because the demand for labour would increase still 
faster than the supply’ (1821. p.40). However, as population increases and land of worse 
quality is cultivated the tendency o f  capital diminishes since the productive powers of 
labour also decrease. Hence, there is a tendency for the rate o f growth of capital to 
decrease while the rate o f growth o f population remains constant: ‘under the most 
favourable circumstances, the power o f production is still greater than that of population, 
it will not long continue so; for the land being limited in quantity, and differing in quality, 
w ith every increased portion o f  capital employed on it, there will be a decreased rate of 
production, whilst the power o f  population continues always the same’ (Ricardo. 1821. 
P-41).
Consistent with M althusian themes, Ricardo introduces a natural tendency for the 
diminution o f production where the ratio o f population to capital is checked by the 
availability o f fertile land for cultivation. In countries where population ‘presses against 
the means o f subsistence’, and where there is already an abundance o f fertile land for 
cultivation, overcrowding is the result o f ‘bad government'. In rich countries with a large 
population already pressing against the means of subsistence and the fertile land already 
fully cultivated, the only remedy is to lower population to the level o f subsistence. Thus, 
in the Ricardian system where wage levels are dependent on the ratio o f population to 
capital, we find, as we do with Malthus, a fundamental situation o f scarcity. Scarcity
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would posit natural, biological and economic laws where life is perpetually faced with 
risk of death, and must find within the moral principles o f restraint and labour the only 
means of salvation124.
Like Malthus, Ricardo argues that the poor laws are in direct opposition to the 
principles o f political economy. Poor-relief diverts expenditure that might otherwise be 
used for capital investment; it reduces the growth of manufacturing production; it 
increases the numbers o f  the poor, and disturbs the fragile balance between population 
and subsistence. Lands o f  inferior quality are increasingly brought into cultivation to 
meet this growth o f population, causing the rate of profits to fall and the exhaustion of the 
essential dynamism o f  the economy. While the fund that maintains the poor is subject to 
interminable expenditure:
it is not. as the legislature benevolently intended, to amend the condition o f  the poor, but to 
deteriorate the condition o f  both poor and rich; instead o f  making the poor rich, they are 
calculated to make the rich poor; and whilst the present laws are in force, it is quite in the 
natural order o f  things that the fund for the maintenance o f  the poor should progressively 
increase, till it has absorbed all the net revenue o f  the country, or at least so much o f  it as the 
state shall leave to us, after satisfying its own never failing demands for the public 
expenditure' (Ricardo. 1821, pp.44-5).
But unlike Malthus. Ricardo advises a more cautious approach to poor management. 
Rather than outright abolition o f  expenditure, he prescribes gradual abolition, whereby 
poor-relief is replaced with an emulative and educative spirit that installs virtues of self- 
reliance among the poor: ‘By gradually contracting the sphere of the poor laws; by 
impressing on the poor the value o f independence, by teaching them that they must look 
not to systematic or casual charity, but to their own exertions for support, that prudence 
and forethought are neither unnecessary nor unprofitable virtues, we shall by degrees 
approach a sounder and more healthful state’ (Ricardo, 1821, p.45).
Under Smith's moral economy, we do not find a concept o f poverty only the 
possibility for the poor to enter the liberal sphere of exchange. Poverty is not a condition 
but simply a category that applies to the degree of happiness and wealth o f the nation. But
1:4 In the final analysis, the biological properties o f  human species are confronted with ‘the risk o f  not 
finding in their natural environment enough to ensure their existence... it designates in labour, and in the 
verv hardship o f  that labour, the only means o f  triumphing for an instant over death' (Foucault, 1970. 
p.257).
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by annexing this autonomous sphere o f exchange, Smith constitutes the civil status of 
liberty and justice that now applies to the labouring poor -  labour is an ethical activity 
wherein the poor benefit from the fruits of their labour. Under classical political 
economy, however, labour is the imperative of the ‘iron laws’ o f nature. The 
independence o f  the labourer is not derived from a moral philosophy which asserts liberty 
and equity as part o f the natural condition of humankind. By the nineteenth century, 
political economy will restrict this moral dimension to the character and conduct of the 
poor. The new economic discourse with its rational conception o f ‘economy’ -  a realm of 
independent mechanisms -  will ensure that poverty, not labour, is the natural condition o f 
humankind. For Ricardo, poverty is a biological and economic necessity for the 
adjustment o f population to the quantity o f capital available since the illimitable needs of 
humanity are always in excess o f the limited powers of production. In short, poverty is 
now a general condition that drives the economic mechanisms.
Poverty'
Dean makes the curious remark that the origins of poverty resemble ‘an invention 
without an inventor’ (1992. p.235). In the decade preceding the nineteenth century, the 
conceptual elaboration o f  poverty was anything but a smooth and gradual development of 
opinion, argumentation and prescription. In fact, the reverse is more apparent: it was the 
haphazard effect o f debate, legislative crisis and the intermingling of statements 
generated from both political and intellectual proponents. The task here is to briefly trace 
the major statements o f  the period that seem, at least, partially constitutive o f a concept 
that came to specify a condition arising from the natural, biological and economic forces 
o f population and subsistence. Before taking up the main lines that found their way in the 
1834 Poor Law Report, it is better to begin with the counter-effects and false starts out of 
w hich a definite concept o f poverty emerged.
The labouring poor
Though Adam Smith never asserted any clear policy in relation to the poor law, it 
would be remiss to suggest the Wealth o f  Nations did nothing to transform the status of 
the poor. From his break with mercantilism we begin to appreciate Smith's optimist 
account o f the condition o f  the poor who were not, after all, vicious, ignorant and idle.
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but differed in nature according to custom, habit and education123. To improve the 
condition of the poor should not be at the ‘inconveniency’ o f society; not only do they 
make up the largest numbers but determine the condition of the whole o f society. On this 
point Himmelfarb argues Smith’s critique o f mercantilism illustrated that labourers were 
at the greatest disadvantage under mercantilism126. Based on the equality o f the value of 
labour. Smith was able to assert that the lower classes were not innately 'low er'. but 
through the division o f  labour should receive the full complement of riches in the form of 
wages. The labouring poor were a legitimate partner in the economic enterprise since 
their labour was also a source o f value. The ‘patrimony' o f labour entitled the 
property less labourer to be considered equal beneficiaries in the ownership of property127.
Nevertheless, the legacy o f Smith’s ideas gave rise to some curious and dispersed 
effects, especially among those regarded as his ‘disciples’. O f this odd collection, 
Edmund Burke provides some interesting diversions from poverty. In his Thoughts and 
Details on Scarcity> (1795). Burke seemed in much agreement with laissez faire 
principles, especially in times o f scarcity where he argued the proper role of government 
was non-involvement. In the case o f  labour, however, he argued that if in times of 
scarcity and calamity the labourer could not be governed by the ‘rules o f commerce', then 
he came within the jurisdiction and mercy o f charity; after all, private charity was the 
duty and obligation o f all Christians which seemed not to interfere with economic law s. 
But a more interesting departure comes in the form of Burke's insistence for a distinction 
between the labourer' and the ‘poor'. In no uncertain terms, he states:
i:' On this point Smith argues: ‘The difference o f  natural talents in different men is, in reality, much less
than we are aware of; and the very different genius which appears to distinguish men o f  different
professions, when grown up to maturity, is not many occasions so much the cause, as the effect o f  the 
div ision o f  labour. The difference between the most dissimilar characters, seems to arise not so much from 
nature, as from habit, custom, and education... By nature a philosopher is not in genius and disposition half 
so different from a street porter, as a m astiff is from a greyhound’ (Smith, 1776, 1.2.4).
12c> ‘As consumers, they were ill served by a system that promoted high prices and discouraged imports; and 
as producers, by a system  that permitted their employers, by fair means or foul, to keep wages low and 
prices high. The poor, in short, were the ch ief victims o f  the existing system -  and would be the ch ief 
beneficiaries o f  the ‘natural’ system  proposed by Smith’ (Himmelfarb, 1984, p.51).
12 ‘The property which every man has in his own labour, as it the original foundation o f  all other property, 
so it is the most sacred and inviolable. The patrimony o f  a poor man lies in the strength and dexterity o f  his 
hands: and to hinder him from em ploying this strength and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper 
without injury to his neighbour is a plain violation o f  this most sacred property’ (Smith, 1776, 1.10.67).
2 1 6
Nothing can be so base and so wicked as the political canting language, ‘The Labouring  
poor.’ Let com passion be shown in action... but let there be no lamentation o f  their condition.
It is no relief to their miserable circumstances; it is only an insult to their miserable 
understandings... Patience, labour, sobriety, frugality, and religion should be recommended to 
them; all the rest is downright fraud  (Burke, cited in Poynter, 1969, p.53).
By imposing this distinction between the labourer and the poor and denouncing this 
‘puling jargon ' o f  the labouring poor, Burke insisted that the poor were those who cannot 
labour. They might indeed be miserable, but misery was inevitable to the condition of 
humanity and should not be mistaken by pity. Two years later he would add: ‘It is the 
common doom o f  man that he must eat his bread by the sweat of his brow, that is. by the 
sweat of his body, or the sweat o f his m ind... I do not call a healthy young man. cheerful 
in his mind, and vigorous in his arms, I cannot call such a man, poor' (Burke, cited in 
Himmelfarb, 1984. p.69).
Both Himmelfarb and Poynter suggest this refusal to define the labouring population 
poor was an attempt to discredit the ‘doomed paternalism' o f the Speenhamland 
allowance system o f 1795 -  the system o f regulating wages above the ‘natural' market 
price -  which seem to recognise that poverty was an institutional phenomenon. The 
argument against wage regulation maintained that an artificial rise in real wages would 
raise the price o f  provisions or reduce the demand for labour. To compel the farmer to 
pay higher wages was effectively a tax on agriculture that would ruin the already fragile 
fortunes o f farmers and traders. Burke was at pains to illustrate that the fortunes of both 
labourer and farmer were tied to the same fate rather than opposed to each other, and any 
attempt to interfere with the income o f labourers would almost certainly ruin agriculture. 
Thus, ‘the poor' should only refer to those unable to labour, for it was the lot of the ‘able- 
bodied' to see out scarcity through their own ‘industry, and frugality, and sobriety ' 
(Poynter. 1969. pp.53-4; Himmelfarb, 1984, p.54).
Another o f Sm ith's ‘disciples’ was F. M. Eden who also held economic liberty in 
high esteem though he differed with Smith’s criticism of the settlement laws which he 
thought were exaggerated. But Eden was much closer to Smith than many who spoke in 
his name. Even Marx conceded that Eden was ‘the only disciple o f Adam Smith during 
the eighteenth century that produced any work of importance’ (cited in Poynter. p.l 12).
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and ranks among the few to have dedicated a major and meticulous treatise on the history 
o f the labouring poor. Like Smith, Eden believed that individuals should be free to pursue 
their own interests, and it was undesirable for government to interfere in economic 
affairs. He criticised W hitbread’s wage regulation bill and Pitt’s relief Bill on the same 
grounds, which he claimed would undermine individual exertion, encourage idleness and 
usurp the proper role o f  charity (Eden, 1797, p.448, 478-90).
In The State o f  the Poor, Eden argued that the poor were not possible under 'a  state of 
servitude’ since they would always have recourse to their masters for support. But with 
’the introduction o f manufactures and the consequent emancipation o f those who were 
dismissed by their m asters’ there appeared a ‘new class o f men henceforth described by 
the Legislature under the denomination o f the P oor'n% (1797, p.57). Despite his extensive 
history. Eden could only advise minor administrative changes, certainly none that would 
have the effect o f Malthus. Without the connection between population and subsistence. 
Eden could only go so far as to prescribe partial abolition on the grounds of self- 
improvement; his major thesis was the insistence that only self-help could alleviate the 
misery o f the poor. Nonetheless, Eden’s massive treatise would give historical substance 
to 'the Poor', and signal the emergence o f a general domain o f ‘masterless men' whose 
only property was their labour. On the eve of Malthus’ Essay, Eden's history of poverty 
would strangely pre-figure M arx’s genealogy o f capitalism, marking out an historical 
process by which the producer was effectively divorced from the means o f production.
The pauper
Under the labouring poor we find the opening up of a new space of theorisation and 
debate in which ‘the Poor’ have given way to a set o f conditions relating to the division 
of labour, the real and market price o f labour, and the customs o f the labouring classes. 
What is missing from a fully constituted version of poverty, which is glimpsed among 
statements o f the labouring class, are specific links to subsistence, and a new^  
specification o f an individual who is deprived of the means o f subsistence, the pauper or
128 With the emergence o f  this ‘labouring class o f  men’, Eden conceives, the poor ‘to signify freemen, who. 
being either incapacitated by sickness, or old age, or prevented by other causes from getting work, were 
obliged, to have recourse to the assistance o f  the charitable for subsistence’ (Eden, 1797, p.57).
218
indigent. The new concept o f poverty can be instanced among the style o f statements that 
begin to integrate and systematise the links between nature, subsistence and labour. There 
are two examples o f this which come not from the Tories, but the Radicals whose reforms 
took a new footing: establishing a preventive science of police, on the one hand, and a 
domain o f administration for the practical inspection and rehabilitation o f the pauper, on 
the other.
Patrick Colquhoun’s Treatise on Indigence (1806) is a clear example o f the new 
concept o f poverty put to work on matters of reform. Poverty was the necessity o f 
working for a living, and indigence the inability to make a living even by working; it was 
therefore indigence and not poverty that became the specific object of administration and 
moral admonition:
Poverty• is that state and condition in society where the individual has no surplus labour in 
store, and, consequently, no property but what is derived from constant exercise o f  industry in 
the various occupations o f  life; or in other words, it is the state o f  every one who must labour 
for subsistence...
Indigence therefore, and not poverty', is the evil. It is that condition in society which implies 
want, mise/y. and distress. It is the state o f  any one who is destitute o f  the means o f  
subsistence, and is unable to labour or procure it to the extent nature requires. The natural 
source o f  subsistence is the labour o f  the individual; while that remains with him he is 
denominated poor, when it fails in w hole or in part he becomes indigent (Colquhoun, 1806, 
pp.7-8).
Colquhoun's innovation was to incorporate a ‘poverty theory o f labour' with a ‘labour 
theory o f value' (Dean. 1992. p.237), thereby linking the new' economic discourse to the 
administrative conditions for the operation o f a national labour market. Colquhoun's 
argument went beyond the ‘doctrine o f low wages’, characteristic o f eighteenth century 
mercantilist thought, by establishing poverty as a natural, general condition of humanity, 
both necessary to the production o f wealth and development o f civilisation. It was not the 
level of wages but the discovery o f an original state or condition o f natural poverty from 
which all o f humankind and civilisation was derived. ‘Civilisation', with its teleological 
sense o f progress, is the result o f a dialectical struggle between poverty and labour which 
arises from the natural scarcity o f the physical environment, the essential ‘poverty of 
nature'.
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But if the pauper was formulated to naturalise poverty and specify a new figure of 
aberration, it would also elaborate a new technology for the regulation o f the labour 
market and the development o f programmes for the prevention o f indigence. Colquhoun. 
for instance, was less concerned with relieving indigence, despite thinking the Poor Law 
was necessary for the relief o f ‘innocent indigence’, it was their detection and prevention 
that was his main concern. The Glasgow magistrate made his name not through 
intervention in poor law or economic policy, but the development o f an effective force for 
the prevention o f crime. Thus, Colquhoun’s proposal for the establishment o f a ‘Board of 
General and Internal Police’ was designed to make indigence the object of a new system 
o f intelligence and custodial agents for the regulation of crime129. If this new conception 
o f poverty created the possibility o f freeing poverty from the fixed category of the Poor, 
it also created a new object o f  knowledge: pauperism.
Bentham's elaborate definition o f poverty and indigence bears more than a strong 
resemblance to Colquhoun’s as we see in the following statement: ‘Poverty is the state of 
everyone who, in order to obtain subsistence, is forced to have recourse to labour. 
Indigence is the state o f him who, being destitute o f property... Is at the same time, either 
unable to labour. or unable even for labour, to procure the supply o f which he happens 
thus to be in want’ (Bentham, 2001, p.3). This exact distinction would be used in the 
1834 Poor Law Report to define indigence as the legitimate area of relief, and featured in 
the writings of its principal architect, Edwin Chadwick. But it was also Colquhoun’s 
invention o f a Metropolitan police o f the poor that would incite other Radical and Whig- 
liberals to elaborate new techniques for the liberal governance of poverty. Together. 
Colquhoun and Bentham developed links between the new economic logic and 
administrative rationality, thereby establishing two broad administrative strategies for the 
reform of the Poor Law: ‘The former presupposes a necessity binding poverty to labour: 
the latter targets an entity, pauperism, that is both cause and effect o f the transgression of 
the laws o f that necessity' (Dean, 1992, p.237). Pauperism was a constant transgression
i:v For Colquhoun, indigence and crime were two sides o f  the same coin, ‘since it is a state o f  indigence, 
fostered by idleness, which produces a disposition to moral and criminal offence, and they are so linked 
together that it will be found impracticable to ameliorate the condition o f  the poor without taking more 
effectual measures at the sam e tim e for the prevention o f  criminal offences’ (Colquhoun, 1806. p.48-9).
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o f the laws under which humanity is essentially placed. But we should note that 
pauperism is not opposed to labour as such, but the self-provision of subsistence afforded 
by labour. For Bentham, labour does not possess an intrinsic moral worth but is a form of 
economic activity that permits self-sufficiency; therefore, pauperism is not the opposite 
o f labour but the opposite o f the independent labourer.
As a natural condition o f environmental scarcity, poverty would recede from the 
terrain o f administrative concern leaving only two kinds o f person, the sturdy 
independent labourer and the nefarious pauper. Under this new gaze, the pauper is now 
the principal target o f reform, and becomes the object for producing an entire datum of 
that which lies outside o f  the life-conduct o f productive labour. The pauper is subject to a 
new kind o f moral classification using all the available techniques of the day; a new 
taxonomy o f abjection would cover a wide range o f cases from notions of ‘dependence*, 
‘pathology*, ‘criminality’, ‘dangerousness’, and ‘mendacity’. By the first two decades of 
the nineteenth century, pauperism presents itself to a whole array o f administrators, 
magistrates, philanthropists and medical practitioners as a corruption of the natural 
functioning o f the political and moral order. Bentham and Colquhoun. for instance, both 
produced ‘Tables o f  Pauperism’ specifying all the different cases and causes of pauper or 
indigent. The Table formed part o f a technique for bringing order and recognition to a 
domain o f the population concealed by obscurity and opacity. Colquhoun went so far as 
to produce some doubtful statistics regarding the estimated number o f indigents which he 
thought were increasing more rapidly than rates o f population b0. Bentham. on the other 
hand, compiled a ‘Map o f  Pauper-Land\ an exhaustive taxonomy which comprehends 
each specific case by virtue o f  the ‘efficient cause o f Indigence\ locating each case in 
respect o f ‘work-capacity’, and deducing the correct ‘mode and degree o f Relief or 
Prevention' (Bentham. 2001. lvii). But if Bentham’s Table o f Pauperism served to bring 
to light the various forms o f pauperism, his extraordinary administrative imagination
1,11 Poynter observes that Colquhoun’s alarming statistics on pauperism were based on the uncritical 
acceptance o f  relief figures which estimated one-seventh o f  the population were paupers as well as 
guessing the estimates o f  50 ,000 mendicants, 20,000 vagrants, 100,000 ‘lewd and immoral women', 10,000 
rogues and vagabonds, 80 ,000 ‘highway robbers, foot-pad robbers, burglars, house breakers, pick pockets, 
horse stealers, sheep stealers, stealers o f  hogs and cattle, deer stealers, common thieves, petty thieves, 
occasional thieves w ho cannot resist the temptation’, making up a grand total o f  1,320.716 (cited in 
Poynter, 1969, p.203).
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would also transpose this Table into a practical technology o f economical inspection and 
regulation. Ironically, the cruel and invasive illiberality o f Bentham’s pauper Utopia is a 
project o f total illumination, seeking to render into existence all the shadowy figures 
devoid o f the one rational action that defined ‘civil individuality', the exchange of labour.
Pauper administration
Bentham's vision o f pauper administration maintains a direct correspondence to his 
Table o f Pauperism. Where the Table sought to render the manifold and opaque field of 
pauperism intelligible, pauper management was the embodiment of such knowledge. For 
instance. Bentham's ‘industry houses’ were not merely sites of incarceration, but formed 
a 'net-work' o f visibilities extending across the kingdom, a series o f 'pauper 
Panopticons’, which retained the image o f the Table as it dissected the administrative 
domain via modes o f  segregation and aggregation. Paupers would be separated 
according to each specific case, and grouped together according to their common 
characteristics. The internal organisation o f the industry houses encompassed the totality 
of cases spread out across the image o f the Table. Placed at the centre o f this panoply of 
abjection was the ‘censorial eye’ o f the governor, the rational, omnipresent subject of 
knowledge.
Much has been said about Bentham’s Panopticon, particularly its application of 
power and efficient use o f surveillance. Foucault’s discussion of ‘Panopticisnf in 
Discipline and Punish is exemplary to this kind o f analysis, and well rehearsed in the 
secondary material. I will only give a cursory outline o f the main points. Firstly, the 
architectural features o f  Bentham’s workhouse incorporate the principle of ‘central 
inspection’ with 'total illumination’, that is, by arranging paupers in separate cells around 
the periphery o f a central tower. The central tower itself occupies a position of ‘axial 
visibility', a vantage point accessing multiple visibilities, while the position o f the cells 
imply a ‘lateral invisibility’, the inmate is separated from other inmates and continuously 
supervised by the anonymous gaze o f the governor. Foucault (1977) argues the 
innovative function o f the panopticon is the ability to individualise its inmates; chaos and 
contingency are transformed into an intelligible grid o f pauper cases and cells, and
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reassembled into ‘a multiplicity that can be numbered and supervised'. But the 
Panopticon is also a "marvellous machine’ for producing homogeneous effects o f power, 
whereby ‘a real subjection is born mechanically from a fictitious relation' (pp.201-2). 
That is to say. the implication o f being observed is enough for the inmate to observe 
oneself, in which case subjection is simultaneously an act o f self-formationljl.
So, Bentham’s ‘industry houses’ were not simply houses o f correction, but an 
ambitious assemblage o f modern and pre-modern discourses. They were organised 
around the same ‘rituals o f exclusion’ and methods o f ‘tactical partitioning’ characteristic 
o f the quarantine regulations during plagues and epidemics132 (Foucault 1977, pp. 195-9). 
The plague was at once a real and imaginary state o f disorder, and the pauper, a symbol 
of "pestilence' and ‘contagion’. A politico-medical organisation is put to work in the 
spatial management o f paupers; the separation and aggregation of individual cases are 
procedures of disciplinary partitioning. By treating paupers as ‘plague victims', the 
Panopticon operates as a normalising institution, concerned with individualising the 
excluded and universalising the mechanisms o f disciplinary control. If the plague-stricken 
town -  a space in the grips o f disciplinary power -  is the utopia of ‘the perfectly governed 
city', then pauper management is the ‘preventive utopia’ of removing all forms o f social 
danger from civil society.
Bentham took the Classical workhouse and transformed it into a utopian programme 
of self-improvement. The eighteenth century theme of "setting the Poor on work' would 
be expanded so every pauper establishment was a self-subsisting institution1” . The
11 ‘He who is subjected to a field o f  visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints 
o f  power: he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in him self the power relation in 
which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becom es the principle o f  his own subjection’ (Foucault. 1977. 
pp.202-3).
I3: On this point, Foucault argues that the origins o f  normalisation are found among plague regulations: 
‘The constant division between the normal and the abnormal, to which every individual is subjected, brings 
us back to our own time, by applying the binary branding and exile o f  the leper to quite different objects... 
All the mechanisms o f  power which, even today, are disposed around the abnormal individual, to brand 
him to alter him, are com posed o f  those two forms from which they distantly derive’ (Foucault, 1977. 
pp. 199-200).
133 Within the industry house ‘incapacity’ was a relative phenomenon; if  a pauper was impotent or useless 
then a useful occupation would be found for them. All paupers would have to work o ff  the value o f  their
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principles o f economy were designed into the functions of the industry house, ensuring 
every pauper, every procedure and regulation, operated with maximum efficiency. The 
conduct of the pauper is fixed to the value o f labour as subsistence becomes conditioned 
upon self-provision ("the Self Supply Principle’). The illiberal aspects o f the industry 
house are reconciled with its utopian programme of constructing the perfect disciplinary 
machine which can be implemented in hospitals, workshops, schools, prisons, etc. More 
than a place o f incarceration, the industry house was a ‘laboratory’ for conducting 
experiments on human conduct134 (Foucault, 1977). Repeating Malthus’ concern of 
improvident marriages, Bentham also included a study o f the effects of sexual relations 
upon the health and development o f  apprentices to discover at which age the 'comforts of 
matrimony* were most compatible with physical and intellectual maturation (Bahmueller. 
1981, pp. 171-4).
The industry house incorporated objectives that embodied Bentham*s plans of 
restoring the pauper to independence through practices o f behaviour modification. Under 
the Classical eighteenth schema it was thought the natural rhythms of industry would 
restore the habits o f work and remoralise the soul. But under Bentham‘s scheme, the 
autonomisation o f the pauper is finely calibrated and monitored by new theory and 
practice o f punishment. Punishment is now linked to prevention, the elimination of 
conduct that engenders a state o f indigence. Foucault traces this new technology of 
punishment to the eighteenth century writings on government and law. which begin to 
incorporate the principles o f  economy with the proportion o f punishment applied: 'One 
must punish exactly enough to prevent repetition’ (1977, p.93). Foucault calls this 
technology 'sem io-technique’135 where the penalty functions as a sign (1977. pp.93-103).
relief before leaving the house; children would be apprenticed o ff as earliest as possible; the blind giv en 
knitting and sewing; and duties would be found for the bed-ridden and insane.
14 In his analysis o f  Bentham's Panopitcon, Foucault draws the analogy between the industry house and the 
laboratory ; 'it could be used as a machine to carry out experiments, to alter behaviour, to train or correct 
individuals. To experim ent with medicine and monitor their effects. To try out different punishments on 
prisoners, according to their crimes and character, and seek the most efficient on es’ (Foucault, 1977. 
p.203).
1?5 In his analysis o f  the transformation o f  modes o f  punishment, he shows that eighteenth century 
punishment no longer exem plifies the crime by a ritual o f  sovereign power that must be seen to master it. 
like the spectacle o f  the gallow s, but rather we find in the case o f  Bentham that ritual is replaced by the sign  
that serves as an obstacle to crime and aberrant conduct.
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In the Benthamite pauper establishment, the penalty signifies the infraction in such a way 
as to direct each individual as a rational subject. This is done by associating the infraction 
with pain and the desired behaviour with happiness, or the avoidance of pain. The 
primary objective of the semio-technical system is the prevention or deterrence of 
pauperism136. The conditions o f relief must appear ‘less eligible’ than the conditions 
procured by independent labour.
Bentham’s scheme o f pauper management exemplifies the broad scope of early 
liberal administrative imagination. The multi-functional applications o f the industry 
house, for instance, were designed to create the conditions of wage-labour by two means: 
inserting the pauper into the disciplinary apparatus and inculcate at every point the virtues 
o f independent labour, and distributing penalties by way o f the sign; the abolition of out­
door relief would mean that the able-bodied poor would have to choose between a life of 
labour-for-subsistence. or the dreadful conditions o f the industry house -  relief acted as a 
deterrent to potential paupers. And while this may seem at odds with it liberal aspects, 
pauper management was a utopian programme for rendering pauperism visible and 
know able. Bentham’s Utopia offered a fantasy o f complete transparency and 
inspectability by bringing to light the ‘Abyss’ that lay outside the life-conduct of 
independent labour.
It is true, however, Bentham’s elaborate schemes were never fully realised. His ‘net­
work’ of ‘Pauper Panopticons’ did not so much as remotely effect the existing structure 
of workhouses which survived for another century. But he did succeed in making his 
system of pauper management consistent with the principles of liberal political economy, 
which would have a lasting effect after the 1834 Poor Law Report. To understand 
Bentham's intervention in the debate, we must return to Smith’s rational, self-interested 
agent, who. without property but for want o f wealth, happiness, and security, will happily 
exchange his labour as his only property. But Bentham recognised one set of
l3<' This principle is both internal and external to the industry house. Internally, every mundane activity 
operates on the condition that the pauper is constantly reminded that a quantum o f  labour is exchanged for a 
quantum o f  subsistence: paupers must work o ff  their relief before leaving the house (the 'S elf Liberation 
Principle*), and com pelled to work before eating (the ‘Earn First Principle’). Externally, the workhouse 
stood as a sign o f  prevention.
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circumstances in which it is possible for the propertyless to rationally choose not to 
exchange their labour. This exceptional set o f circumstances is outlined in the follow ing 
statement:
If the condition o f  individuals, maintained without property o f  their own, by the labour o f  
others, were rendered more elig ib le than that o f  persons maintained by their own labour, then, 
in proportion as the existence o f  this state o f  things were ascertained, indiv iduals destitute of 
property would be continually withdrawing them selves from the class o f  persons maintained 
by their own labour, to the class o f  persons maintained by the labour o f  others; and the sort o f  
idleness which at present is more or less confined to persons o f  independent fortunes, would 
thus extend itself, sooner or later, to every' individual o f  the number o f  those on whose labour 
the perpetual reproduction o f  the perpetually consum ing stock o f  subsistence depends: till at 
last there would be nobody left to labour at all, for any body (Bentham, 2001, p.39).
This statement would have an enormous impact on eligibility o f relief. For Smith, the 
labourer emerges as a rational subject o f  exchange who is thought to be autonomous in 
the capacity o f  improving his own circumstances. But Bentham raises the possibility for 
thinking that, as far as poor-relief is concerned, there is a relative difference o f eligibility 
o f conditions between the labourer and the pauper. This was the problem that would 
guide the conditions under which relief was later granted. If relief appeared too 
accessible, too comfortable, or too liberal, then the poor as rational subjects would 
naturally choose relief over labour. But if  one assumes labour as necessary to the creation 
o f subsistence, let alone wealth and civilisation, then it follow's that relief should only be 
granted on condition that it preserves the rational preference for labour. The solution, 
then, as Bentham would see it, was to grant relief to the poor in such a way that 
"pro\ision at the public expence should... appear less eligible to him than the provision 
resulting from the fruits o f  his own labour" (Bentham. 2001. p. 194). This became the 
cardinal principle o f  the reformed administration after 18341 ’7. a return to the workhouse 
as a sy stem o f relief w as invigorated by the principle o f deterrence that fixed the limits of 
relief upon this new distinction between poverty and indigence.
Betw een Benthamism and Malthusianism we find two modes o f administration w hich 
are both complementary' and antithetical: on the one side, we find an administrative
' The 1834 Poor Law Report would express this new principle in the follow ing terms: ‘The first and most 
essential o f  all conditions, a principle which w e find universally admitted, even by those who practice is at 
variance with it, is that his [the pauper's] situation on the whole shall not be made really or apparently so 
eligible as the situation o f  the independent labourer o f  the lowest class' (Checkland & Checkland. 1974. 
p.335).
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ensemble o f practical techniques for the delimitation and governance o f the pauper; on 
the other, we find the antecedence o f a governmental rationality which seeks to abolish 
the sphere o f state assistance altogether by prescribing the ethical ideals o f independent 
conduct. The antithetical themes o f total government and anti-government would together 
form the epistemological conditions o f a new economic liberalism. Common to both is an 
emergent technology o f prevention underpinned by the natural conditions o f scarcity , and 
the unnatural aberration o f  pauperism. Preserved within this new economic liberalism is 
the anti-administration and hyper-administration o f poverty. However, it is the practical 
sphere o f governance prescribed by Benthamism that reconciled these two poles, that is. 
by making ‘illiberalitv consistent with a liberal mode o f government' (Dean. 1992. 
p.240).
Police
Here we follow the last strand from which a definite conception o f poverty emerges. 
So far. the constitution o f  poverty has been linked to the problem of establishing the 
efficacy o f an administrative discourse on poor law reform. But in the early years o f the 
nineteenth century, the concept o f poverty also puts a ‘science o f police' on a new 
footing, certainly one that would give rise to a preventive technology for the reduction of 
pauperism. We owe the establishment o f this new mode o f prevention to Patrick 
Colquhoun who opened a new space o f investigation that was quickly filled by the likes 
of Edw in Chadwick. Jam es Kay and Southwood Smith. In Colquhoun's blue print for a 
police, we find the sam e field o f intervention could be employed to argue for the 
necessity o f administrative structures not directly connected to matters o f relief. The 
problem o f  pauperism is linked to a set o f conditions, ‘a chain o f effects', through w hich 
the labouring poor are rendered indigent. In Chapter 3. I discussed how police was linked 
to the public health movement, which viewed the conditions of the labouring classes as 
ha\ing deleterious, demoralising and pauperising effects. In this section. I examine how 
the new distinction between poverty and indigence formed part o f an ensemble o f 
preventive techniques for the liberal government o f poverty. If the concept o f poverty 
was responsible for exposing the conditions o f pauperism, then police technology 
embodied the field o f  political techniques for detecting and averting these conditions.
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Science o f  police
Although Bentham already elaborated the idea o f prevention as a principle o f pauper 
management. Colquhoun gave prevention a definite form; not in terms o f a hyper-vigilant 
or transformative enclosure, but a diffuse and systematic set o f techniques that were 
coextensive with the domain o f  administration. It is here that we instance the 
transformation in the discourse o f police which is no longer fixed to the old theme of 
'wise administration' or promoting the ‘wealth and happiness' o f the people, but linked to 
the precepts o f political economy. The beginnings o f this transformation are illustrated in 
Colquhoun s A treatise on Indigence (1806) and A Treatise on the Police o f  the 
Metropolis (1805) w herein the principles o f this new science o f police are developed.
Firstly. Colquhoun's model o f  police is contrasted with the arbitrary despotism of 
sovereign punishment by specifying the juridical rights o f the individual who begins to 
emerge as an agent o f  morally responsible conduct. Secondly, a technology of police is 
no longer tied to the positive conception o f ‘good administration', and the interminable 
regulations o f public tranquillity, but developed as a permanent administrative apparatus 
of detection and prevention. Thirdly, police begins to specify a particular domain o f life- 
conduct. a sector o f the population, w hereby pauperism is linked to manifestations o f vice 
and crime. Perhaps the most innovative invention o f this police rationality is the 
alignment between punishment and principles o f  limited governmentlj8. An effective 
form of promoting social order is one that begins to realise the futility o f 'too many 
regulations', and must discern between light and serious offences, for now punishment 
must be in proportion to crime. Though this new science o f police would preserve the 
older principles o f  promoting 'general happiness', it does so with the conception of the 
juridical rights o f individuality in mind. Hence, a technology o f police must preserv e the 
liberties and rights o f  indiv iduals by implementing the utilitarian principle of'conducting 
men to the maximum  o f  happiness and the minimum  o f misery' ( 1805. p.72).
For instance, it was Becarria w ho noted the futility and narrow-minded pursuit o f  the French system of  
police that sought to elim inate all forms o f  turbulence, irregularity and confusion among men 
(Radzinowicz, 1956. p.427). Colquhoun improved on this argument by admitting It w ill not be altogether 
possible, amid the various attractions o f  pleasure and pain, to reduce the tumultuous activity o f  mankind to 
absolute regularity: we can only hope for a considerable reduction o f  the evils that exist' (1805. p .73).
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For police to become a permanent field o f administration and a restricted strategy of 
prevention it must first install an operable programme that is independent o f the judicial 
powers o f the magistrate. In this respect, Colquhoun improved on Bentham 's ‘prevention 
of offences' by giving police a more narrow definition o f functions:
Police in this country may be considered as a new scien ce: the properties o f  which consist not 
in the Judicial Powers w hich lead to Punishm ent, and which belong to the Magistrates alone; 
but in the PREVENTION and DETECTION OF CRIMES, and in those other Functions 
which relate to INTERNAL REGULATION for the well-ordering and comfort o f  Civil 
Society (Colquhoun. 1805. preface, original emphasis).
This new science would form the basis o f  a liberal apparatus o f security by linking its 
functions to the causes o f  crime, the protection o f private and public property and, more 
importantly, the implementation o f measures to avert ‘dangers and crimes'. This 
formulation presupposes a realm o f  intervention that begins to assume the qualities and 
contours o f a quasi-autonomous reality to which political action is limited and 
conditioned to a permanent and vigilant technique o f security. But there is one final 
delimitation that is required in order to render this science effective, that is. by directing 
its measures and functions to a specific field o f problematisation. indigence.
Given that indigence now formed the field o f mendacity, vice, crime and moral 
pestilence, it is no surprise then that the problem o f pauperism should formulate the final 
delimitation o f police powers in the service o f averting danger and preserving the order 
and comfort o f civil society. Colquhoun's key rationale, no doubt a popular measure in 
the alleviation o f poor-relief, was the establishment o f a police force capable of averting 
the effects o f the descent o f poverty into pauperism. After all. the new formulation of 
poverty, which Colquhoun him self had help to popularise, would entail a new kind of 
div ision in the life-conduct o f  the poor by distinguishing the ‘useful Poor', who were the 
‘actual pillars o f the S tate ', from the ‘Gangrene', the seat o f ‘Moral Corruption', that 
specified the realm o f  dangerous degeneracy. It is the latter who 'merit the utmost 
attention o f all governments, with a direct and immediate view o f preventing their 
poverty descending unnecessarily into indigence' (1805. p.366). Though Colquhoun's 
argument for an independent apparatus o f security was a significant advance on 
Bentham's pauper management, it was principally this progressive descent o f poverty
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into indigence that ultimately defined the target and domain o f police intervention. 
Between Malthusianism that would naturalise the domain o f poverty as fundamental 
scarcity, and the Benthamite partitioning o f poverty and pauperism, we find Colquhoun's 
formulation o f police as the basis for sealing off poverty from the temptation o f crime. 
Police would effectively circumscribe a much narrower domain o f administration, a field 
of perpetual intelligence, supervision and tactical penetration, where it would intervene in 
the chain o f causes and effects that transformed poverty into the aberrant forms of life 
that threatened the security and tranquillity o f civil society.
The ‘preventive idea* that begins to take shape around the writings o f Bentham and 
Colquhoun. and which is systematically linked to the problem of pauperism and 
indigence, would find another influential admirer. It was Erwin Chadwick, the principle 
architect o f the 1834 Report, who reproduced the conceptual distinction between poverty 
and pauperism, and installed the notion o f  preventive police in the new administrative 
logic o f poor-relief.
Chadwick and re form
It was precisely the transformation o f police that elevated Chadwick's career in his 
influential and unsigned article on ‘Preventive Police’ in the London Review in 1829 
(Radzinow icz. 1956). In fact it was the writing o f this article that brought Chadwick in 
contact w ith Bentham. who was also an admirer o f Colquhoun. What is significant in the 
new approach to matters o f police is the development o f measures designed for a 
systematic, effective and economical strategy for the prevention of crime. Furthermore, 
the reform of police and the reform o f poor-relief were not only linked by their common 
strategy o f prevention, but through the application of this strategy to the common domain 
o f pauperism.
Though Chadwick is often associated with Benthamism, his own definition of poverty 
w as remarkably close to that o f  Colquhoun. For instance, he specifies poverty as not only 
the natural constant o f human hardship, but also, remarkably, the source of wealth -  an 
insurmountable mechanism that drives human industry:
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The com m issioners might have added that poverty... is the natural, the primitive, the general 
and the unchangeable state o f  man; that as labour is the source o f  wealth, so is poverty o f  
labour. Banish poverty, you banish wealth. Indigence, therefore, and not poverty is the evil, 
the removal o f  which is the proper object o f  the Poor Laws. Indigence may be provided for... 
but all attempts to extirpate poverty can have no effects but bad ones (Chadwick. 1837, p. 18).
This statement encapsulates the principal means by which the liberal government of 
poverty sought to frame the role o f the state in matters of poverty. In the same article. 
Chadwick defined more precisely this role: ‘Poverty was not the object of attack, but 
rather those circumstances in their environment that turn the poor into the indigent' 
(1837. p.42). This distinction between poverty and indigence closely resembles that of 
Bentham's formulation some forty years earlier139. Nonetheless, the administration of 
poverty during this period was founded upon the strategy of acting on those 
circumstances, conditions and behaviours o f the poor which constitute the origins of 
pauperism.
Chadwick, who was the principal architect o f the 1834 Report, would preserve 
Bentham's distinction between poverty and indigence whereby indigence (or pauperism) 
fell w ithin the province o f state administration, while poverty remained the ‘natural, the 
primitive, the general and unchangeable lot o f man' (Bentham, cited in Poynter, 1969. 
p. 119). More importantly, this was the precise distinction and conclusion reached in the 
1834 Report with regard to the peculiar position o f the English poor law. a position 
exemplified by the following statement:
In no part o f  Europe except England has it been thought fit that the provision, whether 
compulsory or voluntary, should be applied to more than the relief o f  indigence. the state o f  a 
person unable to labour, or unable to obtain, in return for labour, the means o f  subsistence. It 
has never been deem ed expedient that the provision should extend to the relief o f  poverty; that 
is the state o f  one, w ho in order to obtain a mere subsistence, is forced to have recourse to 
labour (Checkland & Checkland, 1974, p.334).
Preserved in the above is both the language o f Chadwick and Bentham. whose governing 
statements were used to frame the most comprehensive reform of the English sy stem of 
poor laws since its Tudor inception. The new administrative logic o f poor-relief was no
1'"i This resemblance is hardly surprising given the close association between the two men towards the end 
o f  Bentham’s life. Chadwick served as Bentham’s secretary while editing his Constitutional C ode . and 
appeared to be familiar with his writings on the subject o f  poverty and indigence. Furthermore, Chadwick's 
somewhat strained but long running relationship with Southwood Smith further consolidates these links 
with Bentham (Flinn, 1964).
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doubt derived from a critique o f  the relief o f poverty first enunciated by Malthus, and 
systematised under the scientific rationale o f political economy, only to assemble a 
rationality that bears the unmistakable imprint o f Bentham's pauper management. Under 
Chadwick we find, in connection with a medical discourse and a science of police, the 
elaboration o f a new preventive regime that would put Bentham's distinction between 
poverty and indigence to work by locating those conditions and behaviours that were 
thought to transform the natural state o f poverty into one o f indigence.
The liberal government o f poverty is therefore conceived as a series of preventive 
measures for creating a new sphere o f  'civil individuality' — it would fabricate a space of 
individual autonomy by incorporating self-responsibility and familial duty among the 
lives o f the propertyless population, and embody the minimisation o f state action 
according to principles o f police and political economy. But the new domain of state 
action is not one o f complete withdraw from matters o f relief. Liberal administration 
redefines the field o f state action according to the natural necessity of wage-labour, and 
the centralisation and bureaucratisation o f relief. These two axes o f liberal administration 
-  the centralisation o f  relief and the politics o f conduct -  were, by the early nineteenth 
century, implemented with brutal efficiency, giving birth to a legacy that is still evident 
among the reform strategies o f  'advanced' liberal government: regulating the conduct of 
the poor to meet the exigencies o f globally competitive labour markets.
Conclusion
To summarise the terrain covered so far: I began the chapter with a recent event in 
Australian welfare politics which marks a redefinition o f modern citizenship. The ‘event 
o f conditionality' signals a transformation from universal entitlements to a form of 
citizenship that is now conditional on participation. The relationship between this event 
and the one 1 have investigated in this chapter -  Dean's event of pauperism -  is not one 
o f resemblance but signals the tactical reactivation o f early liberal discourses which seek 
labour market reform by transforming the moral and ethical capacities o f poor citizens. 
The two events are linked to offer fresh perspectives on how advanced liberal rationalities 
address the crisis o f the welfare state: that is, by deploying a politics of conduct that
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confers to the poor a demoralised and pathological identity; by assembling a preventive 
regime of human technologies that seek to act on the character and conditions that 
produce idleness and dependency; and subsequently remoralise the poor by reinserting 
them into circuits o f flexible wage-labour. The conditions o f possibility for these 
contemporary strategies o f  welfare reform are located in the transformation of nineteenth 
century liberal government o f poverty.
The invention o f  poverty is located at the intersection of several emerging themes: the 
principles o f population prefigure the natural disequilibrium between population growth 
and subsistence; the transformation o f economic discourse effects a new link between 
wealth and the ‘iron law s’ o f nature and labour; the transformation of ‘the Poor' is now 
associated w ith a natural, general condition o f population, capital and subsistence; and 
lastly the collapse o f the mercantilist ‘police o f the poor’ leads to the emergence of a 
preventive regime for the liberal government o f poverty. An administrative discourse of 
poor law reform found within the idea o f poverty the practical and prescriptive means of 
relieving the crisis o f  poor-relief by combining two complementary and antithetical 
rationalities: the M althusian rationality o f anti-government and the total government of 
Benthamite administration. Together, these intellectual themes provided the 
epistemological conditions for the emergence o f economic liberalism.
The event o f pauperism confirms Polanyi’s observation that economic liberalism was 
not a gradual and spontaneous emancipation of the economic sphere from governmental 
control, but the active partitioning between poverty as a natural domain o f scarcity and 
pauperism as a field o f dangerous and degenerate behaviours. The Poor law of 1834 w as 
pivotal in operationalising this distinction. Bentham’s principle o f less eligibility and 
Malthus' thesis o f natural scarcity would reinvent the dual function o f the workhouse: on 
one hand, it became a technique o f relief for the impotent and destitute; on the other, it 
embodied a deterrent function for driving the able-bodied poor back into the sphere of 
independent labour. It was this conceptual separation between poverty and pauperism that 
successfully imposed the minimum conditions for wage-labour. After 1834, liberal 
government implemented new mechanisms with which to encourage an ethic of personal
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and familial responsibility. On one side, the workhouse was as a symbol o f punishment 
for those unable or unwilling to labour for their own subsistence; on the other, a new 
preventive police would seek to detect and avert the conditions in which poverty 
descended into pauperism. Under these new techniques o f security, the partition of 
pauperism and poverty is understood in more relative terms, in which case everything 
that amounts to an opposition to independent wage-labour is located among the complex 
conditions o f pauperism: the lives o f the labouring populations, their working and living 
conditions, their habits and domestic economy.
Here we face something o f a paradox o f liberalism. The principle o f minimum 
government and self-rule would seem to be at odds with the establishment o f a central 
apparatus o f state administration, and the assembling of a preventive police technology 
for the reduction o f  pauperism. Following Polanyi’s thesis, however, this apparent 
contradiction was reconciled by the installation of various mechanisms o f security and 
control, and the invention o f  certain limits of state assistance, that worked towards 
creating an administrable domain that was capable of self-regulation: the old structures 
and mechanisms o f paternalistic authority had to be removed or transformed before a 
domain o f self-regulation, autonomy and freedom could be installed.
The point o f this historical excursion is to revisit the terrain by which civil rights of 
the propertyless, independent labourer first emerged, if only to view the events of today 
from a different vantage point, to illustrate its peculiarity rather than its necessity. In the 
next chapter. 1 conclude my historical analysis o f Part I, and finalise a diagnosis o f the 
politics o f the present by revisiting some o f the implications o f this transformation of 
citizenship. This inevitably addresses an ethical question, one that asks: 'What kind of 
subjects are we required to become?'
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6 Politics of the present
In preceding chapters I traced some o f the linkages between recent Australian welfare 
politics and nineteenth century transformation of liberal government. The 'event of 
pauperism' does not signal an entirely discontinuous moment in the history o f poor-relief. 
but a reconfiguration o f older systems o f knowledge concerning the police o f the poor, 
political oeconomy. social medicine, population and paternalistic authority. What is 
assembled out o f this period o f legislative crisis and intellectual productivity is a new 
field o f action by the state. Poverty is constituted alongside the discovery o f society and 
the simultaneous withdraw o f state responsibility at which point a new figure of social 
responsibility emerges from the self-regulating market -  the life-conduct of the 
propertyless. independent labourer.
Genealogy illustrates not only the constitutive links between the event o f pauperism 
and the current politics o f welfare reform, but shows how a politics o f conduct reactivates 
and reconfigures early liberal arguments about the moral and social responsibility of 
citizens. Arguably, what the past offers as a tactic for governing the present is the 
development o f techniques for acting on the conduct o f citizens from a distance, that is. 
by constituting subjects as responsible, autonomous and free. The new conditionality of 
citizenship and the moral sectors o f  community are linked to a new ethical dimension of 
government where subjects are to work on themselves by actualising their capacities for 
self-management, self-fulfilment and self-maximisation. In this chapter, the task is to 
finalise some o f the links raised by a history of the present. But first I should rev iew the 
historical terrain covered so far.
H istorical overview
In Chapter 2. it was argued that ‘the crisis o f the welfare state’ is understood in terms 
o f recent transformations o f  liberal governance. Following the lead o f other advanced 
liberal democracies. Australian themes o f social participation and mutual obligation 
mark a shift from governing society to governing in terms o f 'community'. The task of
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genealogy is to trace the relationship between the liberal discovery o f society and the 
invention o f poverty as the proper objects o f state responsibility. Following the theme of 
the art o f government, early liberalism discovers within the very idea o f society an 
independent realm possessing its own naturalness and autonomy. Once confronted by this 
domain, and realising the futility o f policing every aspect o f it, liberalism emerges from a 
set of questions establishing the limits o f government. The concept o f 'population* is 
crucial to transforming political rationalities in terms of a biopolitical reality consigned to 
the administration o f life. Government emerges not from an idea o f how best to govern, 
but from the very field o f problematisations that demand intervention. Here pauperism 
becomes one o f the significant discoveries o f liberal society in that it represented 
everything that society was opposed to: anti-social, unnatural and chaotic conduct. 
Furthermore, pauperism begins to raise the ‘social question’, a question that would 
eventually be turned against political economy, while at the same time preserving the 
natural, economic necessity o f  poverty. It is not poverty that is the evil o f society, but the 
aberration o f life that derives its subsistence from the labour o f others. From the social 
analyses that begin to probe into the life o f the poor, distinguishing between poverty and 
artificial indigence, morality becomes linked to economic thought. Thus, it was the 
discovery o f a politics o f  poverty  that elaborated the project o f socialisation, and 
developed instruments for the constitution o f society.
In more recent debates the idea o f the ‘social bond’ is a new theme regarding the 
governability o f  liberal democracies. Neo-liberalism claims to resolve the problem of 
social fragmentation and welfare dependency caused by modern welfare systems, while 
its alternative, market individualism, is blamed for creating isolation and passivity in the 
West. The social bond re-emerges in the form of ‘community’, this time as a solution to 
both these crises by seeking to restore civic participation while fostering a new ethic of 
self-governance. The call to community governs by acting on existing local patterns and 
networks o f self-governance, but does so through the moral and nostalgic language of 
civic regeneration. In Australian welfare debates, principles o f moral obligation and 
ethical solidarity are combined in the concept o f ‘mutual obligation*. To reduce the 
vagaries o f this term, and assess its functions more clearly, the concept of risk is
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introduced to show how communitarian, associationalist and paternalist arguments work 
together to resolve the problem o f  enhancing security and liberty without at the same time 
increasing the powers o f the state. We might understand the call to community, then, as a 
strategy for re-distributing and re-individualising risk, and new paternalism as a strategy 
for managing the most risky through punitive and moralistic behavioural controls. The 
politics o f risk constitutes a new game o f political power operating on the field o f ethico- 
politics. In other words, the language o f community, participation and obligation are 
technical means o f acting on the self-techniques for responsible government, and the 
relations o f obligation between oneself and others.
In Chapter 3, I show how welfare dependency is linked a whole array o f pathologies 
ranging from chronic passivity to the transmittable qualities o f inter-generational 
dependency. The epidemiological distribution o f the latter is a calculated response for 
detecting and preventing the ‘spread o f welfare dependency'. The task is one of 
historically locating the conditions in which a form of ‘social medicine' became an 
instrument o f the state for the calculation, maintenance and protection o f the living. A 
discussion o f biopolitics demonstrates how political power sought a biological knowledge 
o f existence not to subjugate life but to increase its value and utility. We can trace the 
links between medical knowledge o f populations and the new administration o f life to a 
‘medicine o f epidem ics' in which a new gaze is linked to the medical control of 
populations. This required a ‘police' apparatus capable o f mediating and disciplining 
medical knowledge o f  the social body. Tracing the theme o f ‘medical police' identifies 
the inextricable links between medicine and government among the paternalistic regimes 
o f eighteenth century German states. By the nineteenth century, this theme is completely 
exhausted as it no longer provides an adequate response to poverty and rapid 
urbanisation.
The practice o f eighteenth century ‘noso-politics’ allows us to identify a specific form 
of medico-political activity which begins to problematise the sickness of the poor, 
marking a break from charitable aid for the ‘sick poor' to the deployment of a general 
police o f health. This police o f health would specify the final goal o f social medicine, the
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medicalisation o f the poor, a development that begins to coalesce in nineteenth century 
England. It was the development o f 4labour-force’ medicine that identified the sickness of 
the poor in the relationship o f the imperatives of labour to the needs o f production. The 
Poor Law o f 1834 essentially converted English medicine into a social medicine insofar 
as this law implied a medical control o f the destitute. The medicalisation o f the poor 
served two purposes: to augment the wealth o f the nation by optimising the health o f the 
labour force, but in another sense it guaranteed the poor would no longer constitute a 
medical danger to the rest o f the population. This was the objective o f the 'New Poor 
Law': medicalisation o f  the poor would enforce a system of obligatory medical controls 
in exchange for state assistance. The discovery o f pauperism is linked to "preventive 
medicine' which now seeks to act on the very conditions and circumstances that convert 
poverty into indigence. These are the major objectives o f the public health movement in 
mid-nineteenth century Britain: the elaboration o f an apparatus of security for 
augmenting the health and welfare o f the population, and subjecting the pauper to 
medical control and assistance.
The historical constitution o f  medical knowledge bears important implications for a 
diagnosis o f the present. Firstly, it illustrates the diverse and technical links between 
medicine and government: medicine is not only an instrument for the calculation and 
optimisation o f the social body, but constitutive o f the very idea o f society. Secondly, the 
discovery o f pauperism is inseparable from the medical activity that begins to inquire into 
the social, physical and moral conditions that give rise to pauperism. Today medical 
knowledge is employed as a preventive regime for the calculation, prevention and 
observation o f those who pose the greatest risk o f dependence. Just as nineteenth century 
noso-politics inscribed 'the sickness o f the poor’ in the imperative o f labour to the needs 
o f production, so too. a medical knowledge o f dependency specifies the conditions under 
which the 'active citizen' is transformed into the ‘welfare dependent'. But the picture 
today is diffuse and complex: medical discourses now circulate among supervisory 
regimes and psychological techniques for transforming dependency into active 
participation. New paternalist reforms explicitly draw from a psychological knowledge of 
the poor. The emergence o f  case management in the mid-90’s in Australia confirms this
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move with the installation o f pastoral techniques of observation, confession and advise- 
giving: a therapeutic model o f supervision acts on the behavioural and cognitive 
determinates o f dependency. Helping people change their personal habits and cope with 
personal problems is central to helping recipients become ‘job-ready’. As medical experts 
take up their role as masters o f lifestyle, the case-manager emerges as an expert in the arts 
of participation.
That post-welfare regimes turn to medicalising techniques o f observation and 
regulation is even more apparent in the contemporary management o f risk. New 
technologies for the calculation o f risk employ clinical and profiled  forms of assessment 
to isolate and target high-risk recipients among sub-populations. Accordingly, the poor 
are no longer equal entities, but subject to more elaborate and technical procedures for 
distinguishing the deserving from the undeserving. The rise o f computer modelling, for 
instance, seeks to identify ‘moral hazards’ and ‘poverty traps’ as welfare regimes employ 
more differentiated and rationalised forms o f targeted intervention. This cross­
fertilisation between medical discourse and risk management allows us to re-examine the 
concept 'mutual obligation’ in a new light. On one side, the obligation o f government as 
service providers is to minimise risk by safeguarding financial capital through targeted 
intervention o f the most risky; on the other side, governments are now tempted to re- 
individualise risk and responsibility by invoking the implicit social contract between 
citizen and government. In other words, the most risky are managed in terms of 
increasingly differentiated, intensive and electronic modes o f assessment (profiling), 
while the moral and contractual aspects o f service delivery ensure that recipients are 
increasingly responsible for managing their own risks (obligation).
In Chapter 4. I begin with the present problem of dependency as the calculation o f  the 
deservingness o f the poor. Arguably, present strategies o f welfare reform in Australia de- 
emphasise poverty as a legitimate site o f contestation and debate by focusing on the 
conduct o f recipients. For instance, the reactivation o f pauperism in the form of welfare 
dependency conjures powerful stereotypes o f an abject sector o f  the population 
comprised o f blameworthy citizens who deliberately and selfishly abuse the social
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security system. The historical move here is to revisit the ‘discourse o f the poor’ as a 
systematic distribution o f statements which sought to classify and link the poor to a set of 
practical solutions for the proper administration o f the nation. The administrative crisis of 
the late eighteenth century was exacerbated by this discourse of the poor, with its empty 
juridical taxonomy, and its mercantilist solutions for setting the poor to work. An 
important theme among these statements is the ‘problem of idleness’.
A more detailed examination o f idleness presents a number o f paradoxes. For 
instance, it is neither clear nor self-evident that it was exclusively the problem o f the 
poor; in fact various forms o f  idleness are identified among the customs of the wealthier 
classes, the inducements o f the alehouse, practices o f consumption and entertainment, as 
well as sharp fluctuations o f eighteenth century employment. Nonetheless, mercantilist 
problematisations o f the poor instigated various measures for fixing the poor to the 
apparatus o f production. Historical examination suggests that idleness was a diffuse and 
complex phenomenon, and not simply a matter o f converting idleness into industry, but. 
as Defoe observed, a matter o f regulating those processes that converted industry into 
idleness. The war against idleness is never resolved by a mercantilist police o f the poor. It 
is not until the emergence o f nineteenth century ‘preventive police', embodied in the 
regulations o f magistrates, justices o f  the peace and licensing laws, that modes of liberal 
government begin to act on the character and conditions that produce sloth and urban 
decay.
As analysis turns to the present, we find the problem o f idleness continues to play an 
important role among contemporary welfare debates. The recent appearance of 
dependency signals the entry o f moral/psychological technologies in the reconstruction of 
conduct. In America, dependency encompasses a whole range of pathologies linked to 
addiction. By the 1980’s it is enshrined as an official psychopathology, specifying a 
refined diagnostic tool for problematising subjectivity in terms o f pathologies o f will. The 
result is that all legal-political and economic relations of dependency now vanish in the 
conduct o f individuals. This new discourse o f dependency enters welfare debates in the 
80's and 90’s, where it is argued on psychological grounds that increased reliance on
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benefits and entitlements erodes motivation and self-esteem. The recent shift in debates 
confirms poverty is no longer a defensible, general condition o f deprivation, but 
overshadowed by a contemptible behavioural syndrome.
In Chapter 5, it was argued that a conception of poverty had to first displace the 
mercantilist 'discourse o f the poor'. The task is to reconstruct the transformation of 
liberal government out o f which a definite concept of poverty emerges. The 'event of 
pauperism' traces the intersecting themes o f population, economy, pauperism and police 
during a climate o f problematisation characterised by paralysis and creativity. The new 
conception o f poverty not only specifies a general condition of populations but fixes the 
conduct o f the propertyless, able-bodied male to the twin ideals of wage-labour and 
familial responsibility. This was the central objective o f the New Poor Law. abolishing 
out-door relief to able-bodied men signalled the state’s responsibility for assisting those 
legitimately excluded from wage-labour, namely, women and children. In support of 
Polanvi's thesis, then, economic liberalism establishes a national labour market by 
sealing o ff poverty (as the natural state o f labouring for subsistence) from pauperism (as 
the unnatural state o f  relying on the labour o f others for subsistence), to inscribe the 
ethical ideals by which a new form o f labourer would appear the nominal agent, the 
independent labourer. The possibility o f modem social welfare is located among those 
conditions in which pauperism plays a technical role in the re-formation o f wage-labour.
We are now in a position to recover an alternative reading o f contemporary welfare 
politics: the discovery o f welfare dependency draws from the respectability of 
psychological knowledge for re-circulating early liberal discourses o f pauperism. The 
political tactic is to visibilise this binary alignment between pathology and wage-labour 
and reactivate the collective memories and popular fears o f pauperism. The unique 
linkage made possible in the early nineteenth century is that pauperism is no longer 
simply a medical or moral threat to the collective, but a parasite that feeds off the 
collective fate o f a population: pauperism is the anti-thesis o f wage-labour, moral 
decency and social responsibility. In short, pauperism is an aberration to society. Before 
the innovations o f Smith, Ricardo, Malthus and Bentham only futile efforts had been
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made to fix the poor to the apparatus o f production, but the event o f pauperism reminds 
us. and shows us how , morality was systematically grafted onto a new economic domain. 
In Australia at present, we find a strengthening o f this alignment between pathology and 
work to execute two broad strategies: to create an 'active society' by removing the 
systemic passivity o f  income support, and inscribe the ethical ideals of self-government 
by reconstructing the psychological capacities o f recipients to engage in flexible wage- 
labour.
But a diagnosis o f  the politics of the present would be somewhat incomplete without 
asking ourselves what are the costs of our contemporary freedom? What is the price, and 
who pays the price, for failing to act as free, autonomous subjects? And what is the fate 
o f those who fail to comply with their contractual obligations? These questions have 
important implications for current debates between poverty and what has earlier been 
described as the politics o f  life, ethico-politics. Only very recently have these debates re- 
emerged in Australia to show how neo-liberal rationalities attempt to out-manoeuvre and 
out-flank traditional discourses o f relative and structural deprivation. As such, it has 
become more difficult to mobilise ‘the social’ as a critique o f political economy without 
also inferring an autonomous psychological agent who has been programmed into the 
very features o f this territory. Arguably, a neo-classical sociology and an individual 
social psychology are appropriated by advanced liberal rationalities in that they preserve 
a logical separation between ‘individual’ and ‘society'. This dualism not only underpins 
the logic o f contemporary citizenship, but acts as an obstacle for enhancing the 
contestability o f powers and judgements over the conducts and forms o f life. In the next 
section. I briefly examine how contemporary politics of conduct give rise to novel 
strategies o f control w hich seek to instrumentalise a new kind o f freedom.
Societies of control
In a short piece titled. Postscript on the Societies o f  Control, Deleuze outlines a series 
o f hypotheses for the transformation o f power which no longer inhere within the 
'environments o f enclosure’ analysed by Foucault -  family, factory, school, prison, 
hospital -  the spaces and forces composing the ‘disciplinary society' o f the eighteenth
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and nineteenth centuries. But since the twentieth century, and accelerating after the 
Second World War, we find a generalised crisis of these institutional spaces:
The administrations in charge never cease announcing supposedly necessary reforms: to 
reform schools, to reform industries, hospitals, the armed forces, prisons. But everyone knows 
that these institutions are finished, whatever the length o f  their expiration periods. It’s only a 
matter o f  administering their last rites and keeping people employed until the installation o f  
the new forces knocking at the door. These are the societies o f  control, which are in the 
process o f  replacing disciplinary societies (Deleuze, 1995, p. 178).
It would seem that new mechanisms o f control are required to address the breakdown of 
these institutions, the fragmentation o f  families, the failure of schools and hospitals, and 
to keep pace with, and in check of, societies which are ever increasingly described in 
terms o f change and changeability. The problem of the disciplinary societies is one of 
assembling forces and installing effective mechanisms o f control capable o f fixing itself 
to. or intervening in, an open environment o f continuous variation.
If disciplinary' societies confined the subjects o f institutions it was because power 
operated in such a way as to individualise and collectivise; the individual was constituted 
in terms o f his or her position within a mass -  the ‘worker’, the ‘mother’, the ‘doctor', the 
■patient’. But in societies o f  control one’s position within an enclosure or mass is not the 
only means o f constituting an individual, ‘what is important is no longer the signature or 
a number, but a code: the code is a password, while on the other hand disciplinary 
societies are regulated by watchwords... the numerical language o f control is made of 
codes that mark access to information, or reject it’ (Deleuze. 1995, p. 179). The ’man of 
control' is treated as a dynamic element passing through the free flowing nodes and 
circuits o f a continuous network. Within this new informational terrain o f forces, it no 
longer makes sense to simply ’regulate' conduct, as if conduct inhered in the spaces of a 
fixed mould or enclosure, but rather control is now immanent to all places through which 
conduct passes. Hence, control society is one o f constant modulation that inheres in the 
very practices and activities that shape human conduct. Modulation is like 'a  self­
deforming cast that will continuously change from one moment to the other' (Deleuze. 
p. 178), meaning, control is a metastable state coexisting within continuous practices of 
transformation. One is now expected to undergo perpetual training, lifelong learning.
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continuous self-assessment, constant incitement to self-improvement, and interminable 
risk management. In societies o f  control the subject is always an unfinished project.
In the disciplinary society it was the individual/mass couplet that formed the discrete 
targets o f power as it assembled an administrable domain around the family and the 
factory, and for those less fortunate, the workhouse. But Deleuze suggests that in 
societies o f control we are no longer even dealing with individuals with a fixed 
personality, or a definitive moral character, rather individuals have given way to 
‘dividuals’ defined in terms o f  their capacity to change or mutate into potential states o f  
being. The subject is no longer centralised or interiorised, but dispersed and coextensive 
with networks o f information — banking and credit records, loan histories, educational 
attainments, lifestyle preferences, future aspirations -  the subject is coded in terms of 
their access to information, and assessed in terms o f their ability to transform into future 
states o f marketability and creditability. As Deleuze observes, ‘control is short-term and 
o f rapid states o f turnover, but also continuous and without limit, while discipline was of 
long duration, infinite and discontinuous’. Among these unlimited circuits o f dispersion 
and transformation, the subject is ‘designed into’ new networks o f continuous control, 
monitoring and reciprocal obligation: ‘Man is no longer man enclosed, but a man in debt'
(p. 181).
But rather than take D eleuze's hypotheses as marking a distinct shift between old and 
new. we could think o f  these modifications of power as marking out possibilities for new 
kinds o f analysis. Recent discussions in cultural and social theory suggest the role o f 
“affective modulation’140 (Massumi, 1996, 1998, 2000) and continuous flows of 
consumption and interaction are symptoms of new strategies o f control (Hardt. 1998; 
Rose, 1999a). We are encouraged to look beyond the institutional space to understand 
how conduct is shaped via more affective networks o f control. The politics o f the present
140 In M assumi’s work cultural theory is engaged in rethinking the political in terms o f  the relational and 
affective dimension o f  collective belonging and becoming. ‘A ffect’ describes the way knowledge-practices 
becom e both materialized and effective through the body -  i.e. through intensity, emotionality, via an ethics 
o f  vitality. Massumi (2000) com bines the Deleuzian concepts o f  modulation and affect to engage in a 
political analysis that recognizes subjectivity as the empirical f ie ld  by which to gauge the effects o f  political 
power. ‘A ffective m odulation’ specifies the constitutive role o f  knowledge-practices via modification o f  
intensities o f  feelings, lending itse lf to an ecological conception o f  power relations.
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is not a new regime o f  power, but the reconfiguration o f old and new formations of 
control. The task is to apply such hypotheses to a diagnosis of post-welfare regimes. But 
inasmuch as this would entail a diagnosis o f the installation o f new technologies and 
programmes for the ‘conduct o f conduct’, our task is also to examine what kind of effects 
they produce. This is a matter o f subjectification: what new subjectivities, life-conducts 
and ethical practices o f  self-formation do these technologies give rise to? I will return to 
these issues later, but for the moment I want to examine the emergence o f both old and 
new 'control strategies’ as they converge around recent problematisations of social 
welfare.
Strategies o f exclusion
We can crudely distinguish between two kinds o f control strategies: those of inclusion 
and exclusion. It is particularly strategies o f the latter kind that apply to the governance of 
welfare systems as they attempt to manage the security o f excluded individuals and 
sectors. But following Rose’s (1999a) advice we can differentiate the control of exclusion 
further: on the one hand there are strategies which seek to reintegrate the excluded 
through the ethical principle o f ‘activity’, and, on the other, there are strategies which 
accept the inevitability o f  exclusion for certain individuals and groups, and manage 
problematic sectors and 'anti-citizens' through measures which seek to neutralise the 
danger or cost they pose to others.
In understanding contemporary politics o f exclusion we are reminded of Bentham's 
principles o f pauper management which attempted to illuminate a domain o f ‘moral 
abyss', to give form to the those ‘whose condition shuns the light'. But the Table o f 
Pauperism was not only an attempt to bring into view those degraded forms of life that 
made up the possible 'Cases Calling for R elief, but was, in representational form, an act 
o f force, a means o f  bringing-into-being the despicable, self-abasing forms of 
subjectivity. The Table was an act o f abjection141. By naming each pauper case, 
specifying their causes, their possible modes o f relief, Bentham effectively constituted an
141 Here I draw from R ose's use o f  the term ‘abjection’, who in turn adopts it from Judith Butler, to 
emphasise the performative function o f  language that designates and creates ‘those “unlivable" and 
“uninhabitable” zones o f  social life ’ (Rose, 1999a, p.253; Butler, 1993, p.3).
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extra-political zone o f  all the ‘unlivable’ forms existing outside the life-conduct of 
independent labour. This ‘tableau o f abjection' was not uncommon to the political 
rationalities o f early liberal government which negatively defined civil society by virtue 
o f  creating a sphere o f  life-conduct that was the anti-thesis o f its values. And it would 
seem that among all those attempts to invent ‘society’, and define the values and rights of 
universal citizenship, it was necessary to eliminate those who fail to qualify: the vagrant, 
the pauper, the woman, the Jew, the African, the Aboriginal, the unemployable, etc. One 
could say that since the nineteenth century there has always been an implicit moral 
contract granting privileges in return for the fulfilment o f obligations o f conduct. Those 
w ho failed to live up to these obligations through defects o f character or will were denied 
the rights o f citizenship. So. how might we understand the present in terms of these 
practices o f abjection?
In Chapters 3 and 4. I reviewed the debates over universal versus selective welfare 
benefits. The post-war welfare state established universal provisions, though an implicit 
expectation was that the disadvantaged would, by their own industry, make the best of 
this assistance by re-entering the world o f paid work. In Australia, this legacy of 
universal provision has been coined by Frank Castles (1985) as the 'wage earners' 
welfare state' to emphasise how welfare provision serves as a government reward offered 
in return for citizen 's participation in the labour market. But towards the close o f the 
tw entieth century w e find the rights and entitlements o f welfare are increasingly criticised 
in terms o f the systemic dependency they created. These arguments first emerged in the 
United States. In Losing Ground  Charles Murray (1984) argued that provision for the 
poor created the poor. The welfare dependent was, after all, a rational calculating subject 
who estimated that he or she was better o ff not working, an argument that is retained in 
Bentham's utilitarian justification for ‘less eligibility’. Lawrence Mead, on the other 
hand, argued that it was not benefits in themselves that created dependency, but the fact 
that they were framed as ‘entitlem ents', meaning, assistance was unconditional despite 
the behaviour o f the client. Where the former presupposes a rational, calculating subject, 
the latter posits a psychological mentality o f the poor. The systemic dependency of 
American welfare effectively stripped the poor o f their self-esteem, self-respect and self­
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reliance, creating a degraded underclass. Reminiscent o f Colquhoun's arguments linking 
pauperism to manifestations o f  crime and vice, the picture that begins to emerge from 
America in the late seventies and early eighties is one o f moral decay -  the wastelands, 
the ghetto, the underground economy, made up o f delinquents, local hoods, alcoholics, 
de-institutionalised psych patients and black single mothers.
Notions o f exclusion begin to consolidate among British and European rationalities in 
the mid-80‘s. In France, both Right and Communist opposition to the Socialist 
Government blamed rising unemployment and inequality on 'the new poverty*. In 
response to this opposition, the Government began to use the term 'exclusion’ to describe 
the growing instability o f  social bonds -  family instability, single-member households, 
social isolation and the decline o f  class solidarity based on unions, working-class 
neighbourhoods and social networks — equated with the breakdown o f social cohesion 
through market individualism, and the ‘social polyphony o f post-modern society* (Silver. 
1994. pp.532-35). In Britain the welfare state was subject to moral problematisation. 
specifying the failure o f  individual capacities to engage in responsible self-management 
(Rose. 1999a). Exclusion is the product o f both European and American 
problematisations relating to the breakdown o f traditional structures o f solidarity and 
sociality142. A solution would emerge somewhat spontaneously in the form of 'active* 
citizenship. The em erging rationalities o f European. American, Australian and New 
Zealand parties and institutions o f  the centre-left since the 80’s now promote the ethical 
language o f activity as a means o f  autonomising the domain o f government. On the one 
side we have activity, and on the other, exclusion.
!4: Levitas (1998) argues that ‘social exclu sion ’ is poised between two main discourses. The first 
em phasises the importance o f  moral integration and social cohesion, and regards the economy and the 
labour market as the m eans by w hich this is achieved. The second draws from American arguments that lay 
claim to the existence o f  an ‘underclass’, specifying the putative moral, cultural and behavioural 
deficiencies o f  the excluded, the likes o f  which strongly resemble Murray’s culture o f  dependency.
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Despite both its expansive and contradictory applications143, exclusion emerges as a 
surprisingly consistent object across the spectrum of political rationalities: abject sectors, 
groups or persons are now dispersed, fragmented and disconnected; they lack the means 
o f representing themselves, and comprise a marginalised body o f people who are unable 
or unwilling to manage themselves. Either way, welfare rationalities mark a shift from the 
analytics o f abjection to the language o f  exclusion (Rose, 1999a). Poverty is merely a 
single determinate among the multifarious dimensions o f social exclusion as new ways 
are sought to conceptualise the social ills o f market individualism and relative 
deprivation. Social problem s are now recast as the problems o f ‘the excluded'. The 
dominant solution is one o f  counteracting exclusion with strategies o f ‘inclusion'. These 
initiatives are particularly evident among Australian welfare politics. The McClure 
Report, for instance, cites ‘social and economic exclusion' as the central goal o f reform, 
whereby strategies o f  ‘social and economic participation’ emerge as the central strategy 
by which recipients are re-inserted into circuits o f activity and community (2000b, pp.4- 
5. 32.66).
Arguably, concepts o f  mutual obligation and participation ensure the excluded are. 
firstly, captured within the implicit demands o f  the social contract which impose a moral 
obligation to self-improvement: and. secondly, the excluded are reassembled in terms of 
their ethical capacities to engage in autonomous and enterprising conduct144. Outside 
these circuits o f inclusion lie alternative sectors o f abjection, territorialized in terms of 
their deviance from the values, norms and imperatives o f responsible, moral conduct. As 
Rose observes, the new imagination o f  these excluded spaces constitute ‘an array of
i4’ Given its relatively d iffuse definitional framework, the language o f  exclusion is amenable to different 
political uses. The lack o f  conceptual specificity  has generated som e concern among recent commentators 
(Levitas. 1996, 1998; Bow ring, 2000) w ho believe the expansive, dynamic and multi-dimensional 
framework o f ‘social exclusion ' is easily  appropriated by opposing political interests. An interpretation o f  
multiple hardships', for exam ple, m ight take unemployment, low levels o f  literacy and skill, poor health 
and povertv as indicators o f  moral failure; on the other hand, the focus on community disintegration, 
econom ic deprivation and labour-market fluctuations suggest more structural concerns.
44 These new ethical and moral them es o f  re-integration suggest the excluded are ‘re-unified ethically and 
spatially' (Rose. 1999a, p .259). That is to say, they are re-unified ethically in that they are accorded an 
active status in relation to them selves, and programmed with capacities necessary for achieving inclusion' 
through continuous self-m anagem ent. But they are also re-unified spatially by virtue o f  occupying a new 
marginalised territory o f  conduct, the sectors o f  moral and urban decay, o f  fragmented communities 
occupied by government housing, single-parent families and ethnic minorities.
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micro-sectors, micro-cultures o f non-citizens, failed citizens, anti-citizens, consisting of 
those who are unable or unwilling to enterprise their lives or manage their own risk, 
incapable o f exercising responsible self-government, attached either to no moral 
community or to a community o f anti-morality’ (1999a, p.259). In the next section, 1 
want to examine technologies that seek to re-integrate the excluded into circuits of 
activity and community.
C ontrol technologies
Among contemporary welfare politics, diverse micro-sectors o f abjection have 
appeared in terms o f  their exclusion from the moral and emotional networks of 
‘community’, and from the very kind o f ethical conduct required for ‘economic and 
social participation’. The reframing o f these sectors o f moral decay, worklessness, 
dependency and social fragmentation has given rise to a new territory of control that 
seeks to manage these micro-sectors through strategies o f inclusion. New technologies 
and agents are charged with the task o f returning these anti-citizens to the world of 
activity and community, and restoring full citizenship rights. What I call the 
‘medicalisation o f  welfare’ is a nominalistic perspective for describing a new 
configuration o f control which has emerged in the wake o f the post-war welfare state, 
constituting a diverse field o f technologies for governing the conduct of the excluded. 
There are two technologies I wish to briefly diagnose: ‘risk’ and ‘psychology’.
Risk
After the Poor Law o f 1834, the administration of poor-relief assembled a new terrain 
o f governance which became increasingly bureaucratised and accountable to central 
government. This new field o f governance required technologies for acting upon the 
relations by w'hich poverty was transformed into indigence, and required the appointment 
of a national board o f  commissioners, poor law officials, sanitary agents and new 
methods o f record keeping, for the detailed assessment o f the conditions of the poor. 
Though the concept o f risk had not yet emerged as a technique o f governance, the link 
between a central apparatus o f the state and the pauperising conditions and habits of the 
poor was a necessary condition for the ‘prevention and detection’ of pauperism. It is
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among these diverse conditions that we can place the birth of contemporary rationalities 
and practices o f social welfare.
Just as nineteenth technologies o f governance elicited a form of life compatible with 
independent labour, contemporary forms of governance also seek to induce active forms 
of participation by managing the risk o f those who fail to engage in autonomous conduct. 
What is common to both nineteenth century and present regimes of governance is the 
development o f strategies for the calculation and intervention of various abject sub­
populations. Post-welfare regimes are diagnosed in terms of a new configuration of 
control where a whole array o f agencies and technologies -  case managers, psychologists, 
social workers, policy-makers, administrators and computer technicians -  become 
connected through circuits o f surveillance and communication to minimise the riskiness 
of the excluded. Common to these strategies of control are methods of monitoring and 
screening to remove or minimise the pathologies of these abject sectors. Risk 
management opens up multiple points o f visibility for the mobilisation of more refined 
strategies o f intervention; it ensures that resources are rationalised for those most ‘in 
need', and that policies are modified and designed around different sectors and profiles of 
risk. As Rose argues, the logics o f risk are driven by the ‘technological imperative to 
tame uncertainty and master hazard’ (Rose, 1999a, p.260). In Australia, techniques of risk 
management have found their way into policy manuals for welfare agencies, among 
psychiatric and psychological practices, as well as the calculation of epidemiological risk 
of future deviance and pathologies (Dean, 1995; McDonald et. al., 2003; Henman & 
Adler, 2003).
Surveillance plays an important role among the new techniques for managing micro 
sectors o f risk. The collection, re-grouping, prioritisation and re-distribution of 
information relevant to risk-based assessment have become a key rationality of neo­
liberal welfare reform. In Chapter 3, I discussed how welfare programmes since the 80’s 
operated through modes o f ‘clinical’ risk government in targeting long-term 
unemployment. During the mid 80’s and late 90’s the dominant political discourse 
shaping social security policy was targeting those most in need, representing an
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intensification o f a clinical mode o f risk government. However, the introduction of 
advanced information and computer technologies has accelerated the tendency to 
calculate the complexity o f changes occurring throughout the life-course o f recipients. 
Furthermore, the emergence o f the ‘flexible labour market’ rendered manual 
administration prohibitive, resulting in the electronic management of case records and 
client histories o f  activity. Governmental rationalities and ICTs are said to be mutually 
constitutive in shaping the government o f welfare recipients which, in turn, have 
reinforced risk discourses (Henman & Adler, 2001).
These technological changes have led to the intensification o f ‘profiled’ risk through 
the implementation o f  complex statistical modelling and ‘accurate profiling tools' for the 
continuous management o f risky sub-populations. Computer technology facilitates a 
move away from rationalities which treat each individual o f the population equally, to 
more differentiated forms o f governance. Among profiled forms o f risk government, we 
find the inclusion o f more personal, psychological attributes o f long and short term 
unemployment to identify attributes involving greater probabilities o f dependency; ‘at 
risk' individuals are those with characteristics that have higher correlations with the 
behaviours o f long-term unemployment. Profiling techniques enable the identification of 
citizens who require more intensive management and support. Arguably, computer 
technology has facilitated the management o f increasingly complex forms of data, and the 
incorporation o f psychometric variables o f conduct, to calculate the riskiness of 
individuals across thresholds o f age, ethnicity, personality and activity.
More recently, governmental rationalities have sought to reorganise the field of 
welfare administration to make it more amenable to risk management. This is exemplified 
by the establishment o f the Job Network in 1998 which, in the language of government, 
was devised in order to provide better ‘labour market assistance’ (OECD, 2001b). The 
Job Network consists o f  an integrated information technology system linking Centrelink. 
the DEWR (Department o f Employment and Workplace Relations) and Job Network 
members. The complex administrative structure o f the Job Network provides three types 
of services to the unemployed with increasing levels of intensity; job matching, job
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search training and intensive assistance. New applicants are assessed in terms of the JSC I 
(Job Seeker Classification Instrument) by Centrelink officers and a set o f ‘best practice' 
protocols (standardised set o f questions) by which the claimant’s level of entitlement is 
calculated145. Successful applicants are then added to the Job Network caseload list which 
can be accessed by Job Network providers who can electronically request the Centrelink 
system to generate a letter to the unemployed person advising them of their assessment 
and o f several Job Network agencies in their local area.
Curiously, where risk-based assessment has led to more targeted forms of assistance 
there has also been a disproportionate rise in more punitive measures of control. One 
clear example is how current practices o f electronic surveillance have led to the massive 
increase in ‘breaching’ practices whereby recipients are penalised for failing to comply 
with their contractual obligations -  from failing to make a scheduled appointment with 
relevant authorities ( ‘activity test failure’) to committing acts o f ‘welfare fraud'. A joint 
research paper by the National Welfare Rights Network and ACOSS showed a dramatic 
increase in penalties by 250% (302,000) between 1997-2000, and an increase of Activity 
Test breaches by 291% for the same period. ‘Many penalties’, they claim, ‘are being 
imposed improperly or indiscriminately’ as evidenced by the fact that an additional 
172,000 penalties were issued by Centrelink and then later revoked (ACOSS, 2000, pp. 1 - 
2). The following year the situation had worsened: a 33% increase in breaches for the 8 
month period between July 2000 and February 2001 showed a further 232,400 penalties 
were imposed, representing a 189% increase over the past three years from June 1998 
(ACOSS, 2001, p. 1).
145 The JSCI incorporates risk-based rationalities by calculating a score in relation to 18 criteria o f  risk 
factors. Those assessed as Low risk are provided with job matching services, while those evaluated as 
Medium to High risk are provided with ‘intensive assistance’. In addition, the JCSI is supplemented by a 
secondary classification, a ‘special needs assessment’, which is usually undertaken by an occupational 
psychologist. In terms o f  the transformation o f  administrative practices, McDonald et al. (2003) argue that 
case-handling is increasingly managed at the level o f  information rather than subjective forms o f face-to- 
face assessment: ‘The JSCI application process, by being heavily proceduralized and automated, 
theoretically m inim ised the discretionary capacity on the part o f  Centrelink employees. Decisions are made 
on the basis o f  entering data into computer programmes. In this way, the traditional human service practice 
o f ‘street-level bureaucracy’ is partly transformed into ‘screen-level bureaucracy’, as infocratic means 
prevent bureaucrats from manipulating information streams between the organisation and client. The 
knowledge’ created by and represented in the JSCI, embedded in the software, is considered superior 
because it is based on ‘objective’ calculations rather than subjective assessments; indeed, minimising what 
is known as the ‘dead w eight costs” (2003, pp.507-8).
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Risk-based assessment would seem to be a more effective tool in distinguishing the 
deserving from the undeserving poor, an exercise that is not only morally praiseworthy 
but economically beneficial146. Those who represent the greatest risk and who receive the 
greatest number o f  breaches are also the most vulnerable. According to the National 
Welfare Rights Network (2002), young people under the age o f 25 represented 57% of all 
Activity Test breaches, while homeless people were ‘particularly affected' due to 
inconsistencies in receiving or delays in returning Centrelink or Job Network letters 
(ACOSS, 2000, p. 1). Kinnear (2002) argues the young are particularly vulnerable since 
they are perceived by the public as less deserving than mature-aged jobseekers who are 
'victims' o f hard times. At any rate, excessive breaching o f older unemployed people 
would undermine public support for mutual obligation principles. On the surface, 
managing the most risky is an effective way of removing incentives for those of whom 
receipt is a ‘lifestyle choice’ or a form o f ‘learned dependency’. What belies these 
commonsense strategies o f ‘tough love’, however, is an authoritarian dimension that 
punishes the most vulnerable sectors o f the population147. Claimants who fall under the 
ambit of'in tensive assistance’ are supervised more intensely, are discharged more letters 
electronically, required to attend more meetings and incur a higher risk o f breaching than 
claimants o f low to moderate risk.
In one sense, the reorganisation o f control strategies around rationalities o f risk seek 
to monitor, differentiate and prioritise sub-populations in order to rationalise service
146 ACOSS (2001) estimated that $258.8 million worth o f  penalties were inflicted during the 2000-2001 
financial year, delivering a windfall to the government at the expense o f  the unemployed and their 
dependants. Ferguson (2002) and Mendes (2001) argue that the 1.7 billion in gross funding allocated over 
four years would only equate to approx. $770 million after the Commonwealth recovered savings from the 
imposition o f  breaches.
147 ACOSS provide further details o f  people losing their cars, homes, families and even public transport 
concessions. In criminal cases, prosecutors must prove ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ that offences have been 
committed, yet the onus o f  proof falls upon the unemployed to convince agency officials that they have a 
“reasonable excuse’ for not com plying with a rule. By far the biggest increase in penalties came from 
recommendations made by Network agencies, charities and private companies with government contracts 
to administer the dole system , which now consists o f  closely monitoring the unemployed and pushing them 
into jobs, no matter how  poorly-paid, insecure, part-time or temporary. Under such contracts, it is further 
claimed that there are in fact incentives to breach clients who are difficult to place, removing them from the 
agency to make way for potentially more profitable referrals from Centrelink (NW RN, 2002; Kerr, et al., 
2002; Kerr & Savelsberg, 2003)
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delivery -  instruments like the JCSI exemplify strategies of risk-assessment which 
determine the kind o f eligibility o f services for those who are, after all, incapable of 
managing their own risk. The creation o f the Job Network not only presumably facilitates 
‘better' case management through profiling tools and individualised service delivery, but 
allows more effective and immediate forms o f electronic surveillance of client databases 
and caseloads. Surveillance, despite its invasive and totalitarian implications, is not itself 
an evil; the concern is how information is morally coded and then acted upon by central 
bureaucratic authorities. Implicit to these strategies o f exclusion is the moral assumption 
that the excluded are abject citizens who are potentially at risk o f defaulting on their 
contractual obligations. The category o f ‘high risk’ carries with it strong implications that 
subjects are unwilling or unable to manage their own risk, and capable o f pathological 
deviation from the norms o f  civility and activity.
This brings us to the darker side o f risk. Under this new regime of poor management, 
the risky subject is one who must continually demonstrate obedience to authority, who 
must not deviate or transgress the norms o f active conduct. The concept of risk already 
implies that assistance is more intensely governed according to calculations of potential 
abjection. Risk-as-pathology also invites new procedures o f discipline. ‘Breaching’ is 
certainly one example o f punishment that seeks to elicit desired forms of cooperation. But 
modern welfare is also a system o f modulation in the sense that advanced information 
systems are designed into the very networks of activity -  the identification of the 
potentially risky, the increasing emphasis upon contractual case management, 
electronically tracking behaviour, scheduling meetings and setting targets -  constitute a 
form of surveillance that continually signifies that assistance is conditional upon conduct. 
The curious effectivity o f risk is that it renders a kind of behaviourism automatic; it 
continually flags the conditional access to support, emphasising the precarious links 
between behaviour and assistance. By acting on these flows of information, the claimant 
must demonstrate the capacity to be rational, compliant, reflexive, prudential and 
enterprising. Behaviour must perpetually demonstrate the absence o f risk, or, at least, the 
capacity to manage one’s risk responsibly. Arguably, the logics o f risk are based on a 
new form of objective measurement for the continuous management o f the excluded.
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Psychology
In Bentham’s vision o f the Panopticon we are reminded of the automatic functioning 
o f power which, through the principle of central inspection, enabled the watched inmate 
to become the principle o f their own subjection. But how could power function 
automatically without relying on the architecture of the disciplinary enclosure? How 
might a principle o f ‘self-regulation’ exist independently of these institutional spaces? A 
solution emerges in the form o f a new discipline o f knowledge that would link a theory of 
the psyche to various patterns and disturbances o f conduct. Psychology was the discovery 
of late nineteenth century technologies of normalisation, but in the twentieth century, 
under the ambit o f behaviourism, we find the elaboration of new techniques for linking 
authority to the imperatives o f normative conduct. By the end o f the twentieth century, 
we find a reworking o f  these techniques of normalisation. After having freed itself from 
medicine and psychiatry, psychology would be linked to new behavioural and cognitive 
techniques for the personal reformation of conduct. In Chapter 4, I reviewed how a 
‘psychology o f the poor’ was responsible for elaborating techniques for accessing the 
autonomy of individuals in terms o f self-esteem, self-control and personal power 
alongside problematisations o f those whose dependency exemplified a deficit of personal 
control and responsibility. This new behavioural and cognitive psychology would be 
freed from specific institutional spaces, becoming a set o f highly transferable skills and 
techniques for acting on the conduct o f others.
Among Australian welfare rationalities we find a new problematics o f conduct which 
serves as the basis for ethically and morally reconstructing the capacities of the excluded. 
The deficiencies o f the welfare dependent are a reformulation of the imperative of 
activity. This imperative o f independent conduct is not entirely different from nineteenth 
century utilitarian liberalism which opted for state assistance, though it is clear that such 
assistance was not reserved for the able-bodied male. The new paternalism that currently 
informs welfare policies o f mutual obligation similarly reject conservative, pro-market 
recommendations for the abolition o f welfare but on rather different grounds of security. 
New paternalists reject the assumption that those who are dependent on welfare actually 
know how to be self-reliant, and argue on psychological grounds that individuals are not
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always capable o f exercising free choice in self-regarding and socially responsible ways. 
Society is expected to play some part in reconstructing the capacities o f the excluded on 
the grounds that fragmentation, disadvantage and poor education have diminished 
autonomous conduct. What is required is a kind of ‘moral education’ and psychological 
re-training so that individuals might acquire the capacities, skills and competencies to 
practice autonomy. Anna Yeatman argues that such arguments represent *a rediscovery of 
the social in the face o f the specific kind of market failure that occurs when, for whatever 
reason, individuals cannot choose in self-regarding and socially responsible ways’ (2000,
p. 160).
But what kind o f social is mobilised under the concept of mutual obligation? 
Arguably, this reformulation of the social is one that corresponds to a form of paternalism 
inspired by a neo-Durkheimian version o f Rousseau’s paradox: the necessity of ‘forcing 
individuals to be free’. Social life is conceived as the multiplicity of individual 
behaviours, motivations, competencies and skills, in which case individual choice is 
conceived as an unproblematic feature of individuality. It is not the case of 
problematising whether individuals are capable of exercising a preference or choice, but 
whether individuals are morally educated in ways that allow the exercise of choice to 
sustain oneself and society. The social is reformed as that o f community, but this 
reformulation carries with it a neo-Durkheimian component that is invoked under the 
conception o f mutual obligation. Durkheim argued that the voluntary dimension of the 
social contract functions in relation to, and behalf of, the social order, but only to the 
extent that it is composed o f a normative compliance to the behaviours on which the 
social depends. Under the guise o f  community, this reterritorialisation of the social is 
viewed as immanent in individuals; if  ‘society’ is reduced to an individual psychology it 
is because individual psychology itself has become imbued with the social. In other 
words, the good order and functioning of society is reducible to, and dependent on. the 
functioning o f individuals. It is for this reason that social intervention now targets
14Rindividuals’ conduct .
148 With the increasing salience o f  individual psychology, we find a corresponding retreat o f  the social 
which, as Yeatman argues, becom es increasingly more blurred and indistinct: ‘The institutional and 
corporate features o f  society are no longer assumed to have an existence independent o f  how individuals
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But Yeatman (2000) warns that the subject of mutual obligation and community 
remains shadowy. Arguably, the state is now ‘hollowed out’ because the social is 
radically individualised. The social becomes immanent in individual psychology but also 
the presence o f the state becomes relatively indistinct as welfare moves from a 
standardised, universal, bureaucratic approach to a client-centred approach where the 
excluded are treated as consumers. Welfare is mediated by agents who adopt a flexible 
and customised approach where clients will become more aware of the case manager's 
presence in the governance o f their participation than of the larger role of the state in 
framing the security o f life. It is for these reasons, then, that this nostalgic reinvention of 
community is mobilised to represent a somewhat nebulous sociality that makes 
individuality both necessary and possible. It is by appealing to individuals as discrete 
psychological entities -  subjects capable o f agency and choice -  that makes the obligation 
of what individuals owe to each other possible in the form of community.
So how do psychological discourses operate in the management of the excluded? We 
already know since the mid-90’s mutual obligation programmes installed circuits of 
pastor power which, in the name o f governing ‘what is best’ for the excluded, individuals 
are required to enter a therapeutic relationship with a new kind o f expert, the case 
manager. This is a reconfiguration o f nineteenth century utilitarian themes of governance 
where paternalism denoted a relationship of dependency for those who were, for reasons 
of sex, race or social station, deemed incapable o f exercising their contractual freedom. 
John Stuart Mill best exemplifies these kind of statements: ‘The lot of the poor, in all 
things which affect them collectively, should be regulated for them, not by them. They 
should not be required or encouraged to think for themselves, or give to their own 
reflection or forecast an influential voice in their own destiny. It is the duty of the higher 
classes to think for them ... The relation between rich and poor should be... affectionate 
tutelage on the one side, respectful and grateful deference on the other’ (cited in
think and behave. It is this radical individualisation o f  social life that explains the salience o f  the contract 
metaphor in contemporary rhetoric. Because how individuals think and behave are the driving forces of 
how their relationships, connections, interdependencies and institutional life operate, it becomes supremely 
important that individuals ‘contract into’ their social engagements and commitments’ (Yeatman, 2000, 
pp. 163-4).
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Yeatman, 2000, pp. 170-1). Among recent paternalistic statements, like those elaborated 
by Mead, we find the governance of the excluded is conflated with a psychological 
perception o f those obstacles, interpersonal, pathological or otherwise, which interfere 
with the recipient’s capacity for exercising autonomy. But beyond the political rhetoric 
that insists on conflating ‘close and constant monitoring’ with ‘care’ it is possible to 
identify a different practice emerging, one which constructs the individual’s riskiness as 
an inherent deficiency.
An example I wish to draw on relates to the supplementary use of the JSCI instrument 
to classify and force modes o f self-disclosure upon those who are assessed as ‘high risk’. 
Among current protocols o f assessment those who rate as Low risk are considered ‘job 
ready' and streamed into job search training, while those considered High risk are 
streamed into ‘intensive assistance’. The JSCI instrument is a ‘front line' assessment 
process given to all unemployed persons applying for assistance at Centrelink. For some 
unemployed people, the JSCI is supplemented by a secondary classification process 
known as a ‘special needs assessment’, usually undertaken by an occupational 
psychologist. A notable feature of secondary classification is the use of subjective 
evaluation triggered by the observations of Centrelink customer service staff, and guided 
by an inventory o f  possible observable behaviours149. The kind o f characteristics 
identified for secondary assessment include ‘motivation, self-confidence, self-esteem, 
presentation and psychological problems’ (McDonald et. al., 2003, p.515). Motivational 
deficits are given priority across a dimension o f ‘personal characteristics’, and considered 
to be causally related to a range o f factors such as age. duration of unemployment and 
intergenerational dependency. The purpose of this scale seeks to distinguish personal 
characteristics and motivational flaws from what might be considered non-psychological 
barriers to employment. The efficacy of psychological techniques is that they offer a set 
o f highly transferable psychometric tests and diagnostics employed by ‘non-specialists', 
and. at the very least, by trained personnel, to identify certain pathologies of will, the 
likes of which are thought to be real barriers to employment.
I4Q These include inappropriate eye contact, appearance not in keeping with their peers, inability to 
communicate effectively, obsessive behaviour, dependence on others, unusual dress, poor hygiene, 
inappropriate make-up application, etc. (McDonald et. al., 2003).
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According to The Job Seeker Classification Instrument Report (DEWRSB, 1998) 
other factors which are thought to adversely affect social and economic participation are 
the client’s presentation or appearance. Characteristics such as ‘poor hygiene, obesity, 
unusual physical aberrations, dental disfigurement, tattoos and non-conformist dress' are 
seen as prejudicial to securing employment (DEWRSB, 1998, p. 1003). Abjection is not 
simply an intrinsic pathology, but a series of signs emitted or conveyed by the body’s 
failure to engage in the demonstrations of normality and civility which are the 
cornerstone o f enterprising participation. It is certainly possible to read these 
discriminations o f character as class-based, gendered and eurocentric valuations of 
conduct (Demello. 2000; McDonald et. al., 2003), but the most difficult aberration, those 
which are ‘exceptionally difficult to place’, are discussed in the JSCI in terms of the 
client’s ‘lack o f  insight’. These techniques do more than simply classify and discriminate 
moral and ethical deficiencies of the client, they also deploy a reflexive, objectifying gaze 
which invite the client to act upon themselves in ways that are congruent with ‘skilled 
performance’ (Rose, 1999b). In other words, psychological discourses possess a 
therapeutic dimension whereby case manager’s are expected to work alongside clients by 
inviting them to overcome these ‘barriers’ or deficiencies of conduct.
So. what kind o f subjects are the excluded to become? A simple reversal of the 
observable deficiencies and pathologies of the JSCI instrument give a clear indication of 
the ideal job seeker -  subjects of active participation are those who are ‘congruent, 
focused, moderately spoken, stable, active, conservatively though stylishly dressed and 
with excellent personal hygiene’ (McDonald et. el., 2003, p.519). In striving to fashion 
oneself in the image o f normality and civility, the unemployed are encouraged to self- 
identify factors that ‘affect their ability to find and keep work’ (DEWRSB, 1998, p.45). 
Clients are encouraged to disclose information pertaining to socially delimiting 
characteristics such as drug or gambling addiction or prostitution, though it is not 
surprising that subjects would resist such forms of self-disclosure. Non-disclosure is 
anticipated as a problem by welfare authorities which leads to ‘classification error'. 
Nonetheless, these confessional techniques are part and parcel o f therapeutic strategies
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which seek to govern the excluded in terms of the information they are prepared to 
disclose as well as opening more intimate regions of personal and interpersonal life to the 
surveillance o f expert and normative judgements (Rose, 1999b, p.244).
Medicalisation o f  welfare
The task now is to ask ourselves what kind of configuration o f control is assembled 
here in the name o f producing active citizenship through the recent development of risk 
technologies, through the uptake of psychological programmes and techniques, which 
seek to integrate the excluded into circuits of activity and self-management. We have 
seen for instance how risk technologies open up a new grid of perception and evaluation 
that seek to divide welfare populations into those who are capable o f managing their own 
risk and those whose riskiness requires ‘intensive’ management. This new kind of 
management installs a pastoral relationship between experts and clients, employing 
psychological techniques for the further assessment and therapeutic reconstruction of the 
excluded. In this therapeutic relation between case-manager and job seeker, under the 
constant vigilance o f the former, the latter is to work on themselves, to identify the 
personal, subjective and performative deficiencies that justify their exclusion from the 
labour market. But this new paternalism is not precisely a coercive relation, though 
aspects o f it are certainly interpreted as a relationship between unequals (Yeatman, 2000). 
Rather, we should focus on how the excluded are ‘invited’ into a contract where 
recipients are to establish a new kind o f relation to self, one that does not necessarily 
bend to authority, but discovers under its watchful gaze the means of becoming free.
Our present strategies of control -  the regimes of therapeutic reconstruction, 
continuous risk assessment, electronic surveillance -  emerge from political rationalities 
which contain a critique of the welfare state. The imperative o f producing the 'active 
society' emerges from a particular formula of advanced or neo-liberal rationalities which, 
rather than interfere in the economic circuits of wealth production and growth, seek to 
assemble and manage a new terrain that is reconfigured in terms of an individual 
psychology. The utility of this kind of ‘social’ intervention is a matter of transforming 
subjectivity into rational, prudential and enterprising subjects capable of activity and
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choice. Strategies for the eradication of dependency and the integration of the excluded 
are a matter o f  governing subjectivity in terms o f freedom. Subjects are compelled to 
govern themselves by virtue o f managing their own risks, and engaging in an intensive 
work on the self. A diagnosis of the politics of the present has shown the birth of those 
political rationalities, and the establishment of social technologies, which enable this 
work on the self to be carried out and performed. In the nineteenth century it was the 
principle of ‘less eligibility’ and the production of a natural, moral sphere of poverty that 
drove the poor into circuits o f independent labour. In the present, it is the form of 
continuous surveillance and reformatory technologies that seek to ethically reconstruct 
the poor into free subjects, free to act rationally, responsibly and to exercise their choice- 
making capacities.
So what becomes o f those who fail to engage in these circuits o f activity, who fail to 
manage themselves rationally? It is precisely in terms of this failure that singles out the 
proper object o f problematisation. If I refer to the ‘medicalisation of welfare’ it is not to 
invoke a unitary or totalising apparatus of social control. Medicine is not the only kind of 
technology that governs in terms of increasing one’s freedom. A common element of this 
present configuration o f control is the desire to act upon a certain threat o f pathology that 
inheres in the conduct o f those who are unwilling or unable to manage themselves 
autonomously. Whether this recurrent form of abjection, deviance or recalcitrance is an 
unnatural or unfortunate condition o f life is certainly a matter decided and contested by 
our contemporary regimes o f truth. But a diagnosis would at the same time suggest that in 
the form o f pathology, life continues to disrupt this political project of freedom. In fact 
we can diagnose two poles of experience which form objects o f intense regulation and 
concern: the activity o f freedom  and the abjection of pathology. We might think of 
modern systems o f security and social protection as an attempt to increase the former 
while decreasing or containing the threat o f the latter. This is certainly one way of 
interpreting contemporary technologies of risk which aim to identify, calculate and 
eliminate the potential or virtual threat of pathology, while the rise of therapeutic and 
psychological techniques seek to transform pathology into normal and socially 
responsible forms o f life-conduct.
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But if there is a tendency to medicalise welfare, and by this I mean a tendency to 
individualise and internalise the reasons why recipients seek income support, then 
perhaps there is some merit in the argument that the medicalisation o f poverty reinforces 
the isolation, abjection and passivity of low-income persons and communities. In other 
words, the medicalisation o f poverty is a constitutive and self-legitimating phenomenon, 
ironically re-producing the very object that welfare authorities seek to eradicate. 
Potentially, this might be more dangerous than medicalising dependency as it creates the 
prospect of subordinating all low-income people to the terms and practices of expert 
discourses which treat joblessness as discrete pathologies. As such, the broader political- 
economic forces that produce these micro-sectors of exclusion and abjection are left to 
continue to work at will while low-income residents are called upon to change their 
behaviour, raise their self-esteem, acquire a more positive outlook, become more 
motivated, etc. In this event, the role of welfare authorities and experts becomes a self- 
defeating and impossible project of reform; welfare becomes a matter of reintegrating and 
reconstructing interminable sectors of excluded individuals. Perhaps a contemporary 
engagement o f  social policy must find new ways of confining, disrupting and contesting 
medicalisation than developing new ways of containing the social pathologies of welfare 
dependency.
Poverty’ versus ethico-politics
The question still remains: what happens to those who fail to meet their contractual 
obligations, who fail to comply with the norms of civility, participation and personal 
responsibility? Is it possible that welfare reform creates new zones o f exclusion, driving 
the poor into new circuits of insecurity (Wacquant, 1999, 2001), into permanently abject 
sectors o f marginality (Rose, 1999a)? Whether these are the ‘unintended effects' of neo­
liberal policy, or simply the unfortunate consequences of those unable or unwilling to 
reconstruct themselves as active participants is irrelevant to our inquiry. More 
importantly we should ask: what are the effects of welfare reform? Perhaps they produce 
a new territory o f abyss, one that no longer inspires the administrative imagination o f the 
nineteenth century, but are simply cast out and forgotten. These are the dangerous circuits
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that lay beyond ‘community’, beyond the reach of control experts and networks of 
surveillance. These are the zones that the virtuous and civilised want to keep out. a 
territory made-up o f failed citizens, pathological individuals, those too risky to form part 
of our ethical and moral regimes of freedom. Before concluding this section, I want to 
briefly test this hypothesis by examining more recent debates that bring the effectiveness 
of these reforms into question, and which certainly challenge the kind of social 
engineering these polices are attributed to.
In March 2004, the Senate Committee released a report bearing the curious title, A 
hand up not a hand out: Renewing the fight against poverty. Despite recycling a title that 
has become the slogan o f the ‘intelligent welfare state’, the similarity ends there. The 
argument developed in this report marks a decisive break from the kind of ethico-politics 
that now seek to re-integrate the excluded by accessing and utilising the self-regulating 
capacities o f the poor. Alternatively, we find the mobilisation of more traditional 
statements that locate poverty not in the behaviours of the unemployed, the idle and 
pathological, but in a broader context o f structural inequality and economic change. The 
Report invokes the language of ‘relative deprivation’ to explain the contradiction between 
two decades o f strong economic growth on one hand, and the alarming increase of 
poverty throughout the last decade on the other. The new statistics on poverty carry the 
challenge to the Federal government that recent initiatives have undermined the 
'Australian way o f life’ once modelled on welfare and prosperity for all. The 
conditionality o f  welfare support, for instance, has left many sectors o f the community 
wanting. Drawing from different poverty measurements and 'authoritative data', the 
Report claims that between 3.7 and 4.1 million Australians live in poverty (20.5-22.6% of 
the population); at least 1 million Australians live in poverty despite living in households 
with one or more employed adults; at least 700,000 children live in households where 
neither parent is employed; but perhaps the most striking indicator of endemic poverty is 
the finding that 21% of households, or 3.6 million Australians, live on less than $400 a 
week -  less than minimum wage (2004, xv-xvii)1*0.
130 Welfare reform seems to offer little in the way o f  supporting sectors o f  the population existing outside of 
family and work. For instance, the Report sows that unemployment benefits for single adults amount to just
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The redeployment o f the language of ‘relative deprivation’ diagnoses a new kind of 
poverty by resurrecting neo-classical analyses that combine statements of 'social 
exclusion' with 'social economy’. For the same reasons why community is posed as a 
vague solution to the problems of participation, and why alternative statements must 
examine conditions that exceed the deficiencies of individual autonomy, the Senate 
Report forecasts a ‘poverty o f participation’. Because incomes have failed to keep pace 
with the increased cost o f services, deprivation is conceived as a ‘growing inequality' 
emerging from the lack o f access to basic services and utilities. The general picture 
emerging from the Report is that the last decade has witnessed a rapid change in income 
inequality and wealth distribution creating widespread ‘financial stress' upon poor 
households, particularly in a climate where the cost of housing has disproportionately 
increased to the point where many families are spending over 30% of their incomes on 
either rent or mortgage repayments. The Report forecasts a new sector of insecurity and 
inequality emerging -  ‘the rise of the working poor’ -  constituting 'the new face of 
poverty in post-industrial Australia’ (2004, xviii). This argument questions the traditional 
assumption that joblessness is sufficient in explaining the presence of poverty, and 
attributes the rise o f the working poor to the prevalence o f low-wage employment. 
According to the Senate Committee, the processes driving this new kind of poverty are 
the rapid and widespread ‘casualisation of the workforce' in the last two decades, and a 
more recent ‘weakening o f the industrial relations systems’: ‘Between August 1988 and 
2002 total employment o f casual workers in Australia increased by 87.4% (141.6% for 
men and 56.8% for women). By August 2002, casual workers comprised 27.3% of all 
employees, an increase o f 7 percentage points since August 1991’ (2004, xviii).
To understand the tactics of this political debate between 'the rise of the working 
poor' on one hand, and ‘the problem of welfare dependency’ on the other, we should 
locate the historical antecedents of the former. In Chapter 5, I outlined the conditions of 
possibility for the constitution of poverty as a natural state of scarcity between population
78% o f  the poverty line, while government payments for single adult students amount to 63% o f the 
poverty line (2004, xx).
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and subsistence. Among these conditions it was Adam Smith’s ‘moral economy’ that 
provided the conditions for the poor to enter the market of exchange as free, responsible 
agents in possession o f their only property, their labour. It was the ‘disciples’ of Smith, 
namely F. M. Eden and Burke, who would reconfigure the statements of political 
economy in quite contradictory and unexpected ways. For instance, it was Burke who 
denounced the ‘puling jargon’ o f the labouring poor to dissociate the ‘poor' from the 
‘labouring class’ in order to show that the poor are those who cannot labour; after all, the 
poor might be miserable, but as Malthus showed, misery was an inevitable condition of 
humanity. Eden would take a different approach. His meticulous history attempted to 
give the juridical category o f ‘the poor’ historical content, and thereby illustrate the 
emergence o f the labouring poor as a new economic class o f subjects whose labour 
became a condition o f life after the breakdown o f feudal bondage. Indeed the notion of 
the labouring poor seem to recognise that poverty was an institutional phenomenon, but 
these observations were swept aside by the emergence of pauperism, and with it the idea 
of ‘moral responsibility’ that would deny a right to relief under a liberal mode of 
governance. The idea o f the labouring poor would have to wait over half a century before 
a discourse o f social economy developed by Marx, Rowntree, and Booth, would locate 
poverty among the inequality and alienation of wealth production, and among the circuits 
and conditions o f relative deprivation.
The idea o f the working poor is no doubt an early liberal invention, a reconfiguration 
o f nineteenth century arguments that would circumvent the naturalness of poverty, and 
assemble a different social terrain, a terrain that eschews solitary emphasis on the moral 
aberration o f individual conduct, but an artificial domain organised in terms of 
institutional and economic forces. We should not, however, confuse the working poor 
with the politics o f class which no longer holds a purchase over contemporary debates on 
poverty. Rather, it refers to the emergence o f a new sector of exclusion which is the 
artificial creation o f political economy. Tactically, the ‘working poor’ refuses to make a 
distinction between ‘the poor’ who cannot work, and the natural condition of labouring 
classes, but redefines poverty by conflating joblessness and the labour market with a new 
set of economic circumstances that render even the ethic of wage-labour an untenable
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formula for responsible participation. Indeed, more recent criticisms supporting the 
recommendations o f the Senate Report suggest that social and economic participation is 
not even a guarantee o f self-reliance. Research from the Australian National University’s 
Social Policy Evaluation Analysis and Research Centre recently showed that ‘simply 
engaging in social activity has no impact on work outcomes', and men who work casually 
while receiving unemployment benefits have a higher chance of returning to welfare (The 
Australian, 14 April, 2004).
These arguments suggest a reorganisation of welfare politics which might be 
described as the ‘return o f social economy’ -  a discourse that remains critical of the 
effects of political economy. Given this recent opposition to ethico-politics. I think an 
important counterpoint among these debates is the renewed position of social economy in 
disrupting the certainties o f  a politics of conduct, that is, by displacing the hegemony of 
medicalising approaches to welfare administration, and, at the very least, enhancing the 
contestability with which the government of conduct is cast as the only economic solution 
to poverty. I think the recent emergence o f these counter-arguments is capable of 
developing fruitful lines for disrupting the certainty of neo-liberal solutions to the ‘crisis 
of the welfare state’. And it remains the conviction of my own diagnosis that the policy 
directions o f the last twenty years are effectively producing a sector of the labouring 
population that is casualised, underprotected against risk, insecure and desocialised. It is 
not the task o f diagnosis to specify the superiority o f one set of statements over the 
inferiority o f another, diagnosis is not a referee of truth. But by opening up the politics of 
the present to an epistemological history, and to the kind of critical analysis sensitive to 
the procedures o f political power, genealogy endeavours to ask what price do our 
contemporary regimes o f truth exact from those who lack the resources to practice 
freedom. We should ask ourselves who and what are we required to become, under what 
authority and by what means are we to accept or contest it. There is no single answer to 
these questions but the current analysis dares to show the possibility o f asking them, and 
in doing so creating a space with which to generate new solutions to our contemporary 
problems of freedom.
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PART TWO
SUBJECTIFICATION
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Introduction: diagnosis and subjectification
In preceding chapters the work o f diagnosis has sketched out a field o f governmentality 
as a terrain o f political rationalities and technologies of rule. This kind of diagnosis 
engages the general interest o f power as a matter of policies, techniques and programmes 
which, according to a formula o f liberal government, act at a distance. But this is only a 
partial diagnosis o f the ethical substance that power seeks to reform and autonomise. 
Diagnosis must also risk the move from the general to the particular interests of another 
domain. We might call this domain the ‘field of subjectification', the circuits o f practice 
by which the self forms a relation with itself, makes an object o f itself, and works on the 
self according to certain ethical and moral ideals and objectives. Furthermore, this field 
occupies a spatio-temporal dimension, one that can be mapped onto, or aligned with, the 
very circuits o f control which govern the field o f possibilities o f life-conduct. In other 
words, subjectification as a condition o f  being a subject is investigated in terms of an 
experience that might be located within, or projected onto, a general field of power. This 
move completes the circuit between welfare administration (political power) and 
individual experience (subjectification). The task is to investigate the conditions 
immanent to experience, and show how the particularity o f self-formation is shaped by 
the politics o f the present.
Part II o f the thesis therefore marks a break with genealogy to extend diagnosis to an 
investigation o f narratives and statements generated by 12 interview participants who. 
according to official categories, are ‘at risk’ of welfare dependency. With such a small 
sample it is neither possible nor desirable to form a representative analysis of the 
Australian welfare population. Rather, the task is to explore the variability of statements 
linking welfare administration with individual experience. There are three broad themes 
of analysis and discussion: ‘Activity’, ‘Regulation’, and ‘Freedom’. Each theme specifies 
a particular grouping o f statements, and each grouping is discussed in terms of the work it 
performs in constructing a biographical or ‘personal trajectory’ o f experience. Interviews
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invite subjects to make an object o f themselves as stories about how they came to occupy 
their present position. The argument offered here is that these stories are culturally and 
historically located and encoded, and may be placed alongside the transformations of 
liberal government discussed in Part I.
But how do we link practices o f government to ethical self-formation? We might 
think of principles o f mutual obligation and the ethics of participation and community, as 
acting along dimensions o f ‘ethical government’. That is to say, governing practices 
actively seek to reform the capacities of individuals in order to engage in flexible wage- 
labour. Among these domains o f government, we find relays and linkages in which the 
locus o f agency or conduct remains indeterminate and ambiguous. Indeed Dean (1995) 
suggests a set o f ‘elastic boundaries’ in which processes o f self-formation occur, and 
suggests an analytics o f ‘governmental-ethical practices’ to understand the interface 
between welfare and self-formation (p.562). Drawing from Foucault’s (1997e) genealogy 
of ethics, we can construct a programmatic outline o f how ethical life ought to be 
governed by virtue o f  acting on the self-forming capacities of recipients. An ethical 
dimension o f government would encompass the key features of reform by asking the 
following questions:
Ontology>: ‘What is it that we seek to govern in ourselves and others’ (ie. what 
is the ethical substance?) The answer being ‘long-term unemployment', 
'joblessness' or ‘welfare dependency’.
Ascetics: ‘How are we to govern this substance’, or ‘What is this self-forming 
activity?’ The answer being therapeutic counselling, self-examination, an 
intensive work on the self, psychological and medical assessment.
Deontology. ‘What is the mode o f subjectification’, or ‘Why do we govern 
ourselves and others in this way?’ The answer being to produce the active and 
moral subject o f society and community.
Teleology: ‘What is the aim, end or goal of these practices’, or 'What is the 
mode o f being we hope to become?’ The answer being the enterprising self, 
members o f community, and subjects capable of managing their freedom.
Although these four ethical dimensions form a concise programmatic blue print for 
reform they are neither determinative nor totalising, but prone to their own unintended 
effects and to a whole array o f resistances. Arguably, what an analytics of government
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fails to adequately diagnose is the field of counter-normative practices and techniques, 
the sectors o f marginality and dislocation in which these ethical imperatives are both 
incorporated and resisted. Government is never a sure business: programmes designed to 
unite the bonds o f community produce anti-communities; programmes designed to 
contractualise and autonomise recipients produce anti-citizens who are unable or 
unwilling to meet their contractual obligations; policies which seek to enhance social 
security produce systems o f insecurity; policies designed to strengthen and consolidate 
the circuits o f normality and civility produce marginality and abjection. This is not to say 
neo-liberal reforms o f the Australian welfare system are a wholesale failure, but rather an 
analytics of the effectivity o f reform must show the points at which this ethical project of 
government breaks down. Moreover, at the level of subjectification we might glimpse 
different, hybrid practices o f self-formation in which individuals undertake their own 
projects o f freedom. Among these circuits of ‘self on se lf it is possible to recover 
different, more nuanced, accounts o f the success or failure of the post welfare regime.
In terms o f the object o f analysis, we depart from the conditions of possibility in Part 
I to examine the production of statements as stories we say about ourselves. Though these 
are different kinds o f statements -  everyday speech acts, descriptions and biographical 
accounts -  I propose to treat these in much the same way as one would analyse 
institutional statements. For instance, we should not think o f statements as expressions or 
manifestations o f  people’s thoughts and interiority, but as conditions o f exteriority that 
modulate the production o f statements. After all, we are bound by an imperative to 
engage in sense-making practices: ‘W h y ‘How ...?’, ‘ What do you mean... '?' And 
where statements are formed by our positions within discourse, the minimum conditions 
for making statements are immanent to experience -  the worker, the welfare recipient, the 
wife or husband, the member of family and community. All these positions are valid 
conditions from which participants construct stories about themselves. Unlike 
institutional discourses, participant statements are multiple and contradictory, hybridised 
and diffuse; they present a kind of engagement in this field of power -  the making of 
selves by the self and by others -  to which diagnosis now turns.
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7 ‘Activity’
The term 'activity' is drawn from governmental discourses that currently frame principles 
o f welfare reform. The promotion o f ‘Active society’ in the mid eighties constitutes the 
kind of policy direction that enjoins individuals to manage their freedom to ameliorate the 
institutional dependency created by welfare systems. In this context, activity refers to the 
kind of autonomous conduct and rational decision-making that lead to employment, 
education, independence, parenthood, social participation and full citizenship. Notions of 
autonomy, capacity, flexibility and resilience are raised to the order of individual virtues 
by which modern citizens engage in legitimate forms of labour-market participation.
To be clear, ‘activity’ is a historical category that groups participant statement in 
terms of the question 'how  does the subject come to occupy a welfare position'? It seeks 
to understand a personal history o f trajectory in terms of labour-market experiences, 
education, social and economic participation in such ways that resist readings of welfare 
dependency. By extending the argument developed at the end of Chapter 6, I want to test 
the hypothesis that welfare reform produces a sector of the labouring population that is 
casualised, low paid, under-protected from risk, insecure and desocialised. This 
hypothesis is investigated at the level o f subjectification under two broad themes: 
'circuits o f insecurity’ and ‘desocialisation’. The argument developed in this chapter tests 
the plausibility that neo-liberal reforms of the labour market produce new forms of 
marginality.
Circuits of insecurity
In the wake o f neo-liberal welfare reforms emerging from the mid to late 80's. I want 
to make the case that what has been effectively created is a ‘system of social insecurity' 
(Wacquant. 1999, 2001). By examining narratives o f ‘personal trajectory’ and 
experience, I want to show at the level of subjectification the kind of practices where 
individuals are enjoined to manage themselves within various circuits of insecurity. 
These circuits refer to the changing character of the Australian labour market from a
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regulated, predominantly full-time structure to an increasingly casualised and fragmented 
one (Jones, 1990; Rees et al., 1993; Healey, 1994; ACOSS, 1996; Gregory and Hunter. 
1996; Kerr and Savelsberg, 1999). An argument I want develop here is that neo-liberal 
reforms of welfare and the production o f ‘flexible’ labour markets are linked to new 
forms of marginality.
Worlds o f  work — 7 0 's
In this section, I examine the accounts o f four older participants, "Sam’, 'Jay'. 'Peter' 
and 'Richard’, whose first engagement in the labour market during the 70's assembles a 
different ‘world o f work’ to current practices of flexible wage-labour. The first strategy is 
to identify different relations o f subjectification, and show the presence and absence of 
insecurity as a set o f circumstances and conditions that impact on labour market 
trajectories. The second strategy is to demonstrate a transformation within the labour 
market by illustrating a different sense o f engagement in wage-labour during the 80's and 
90's. I will show how it is possible to recover a relatively consistent set of statements that 
illustrate a qualitatively different set o f relations o f subjectification between activity and 
security before and during neo-liberal reforms of the labour market. Among the 
statements o f a younger sample o f participants, namely, 'Con’, ‘Jabe’ and ‘Amber', and 
the accounts o f the older sample, it is possible to show that work, though apparently 
flexible, is increasingly risky and insecure, devalued and discontinuous and. in some 
cases, interrupted by events exceeding the rational decision-making capacities or 
presumed deficiencies o f individuals.
Perhaps the clearest indication o f work prior to the 80's is found among participant 
statements that refer to the industrialisation of wage-labour. Sam, a 45 year old single 
mother and disability pensioner, describes activity during the 70’s as part-time factory 
work during school holidays. In the account below, wage-labour is conveyed as an 
unproblematic option for girls who leave school at an early age. By today's standards we 
might consider the fourteen year old school-leaver an anathema to the modern career 
trajectory which now requires, at the very least, a Higher School Certificate to maintain a 
competitive edge in the labour market:
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I left school at fourteen and som e months, um and I went to work in factories first o f all [ ...]  1 
actually started working in factories during school holidays, over a period o f a couple o f  
years, use to do a bit o f  work for my dad as well, he was in the clothing industry 1 used to do a 
lot o f  sort o f  part-time holiday work [ ...]  Um, 1 worked in a whole string o f  factories, food 
factories clothing factories plastic factories, furniture factories huh, ... no actually mv first job 
was not in a factory it was in a clothing place across the lane from where my dad worked, and 
it was a really up-market clothing place and I became the personal assistant to the head o f  the, 
the design company the head designer woman [...]  and I just did that for a month and they 
really didn’t have anything for me to do and then they fired me, I was jus wandering around 
looking for things to do, I just talked them into giving me a job, but because I’ve always been 
around someone, working in the clothing industry after that job, and after the factory jobs I 
went back to working in the clothing industry, and I was Sales girl for a few years, in trendy 
shops in Melbourne, selling jeans and stuff like that
There are number o f narrative and grammatical features of the above account which 
encode a sense o f plenitude, an absence of insecurity, and a rapid interchange between 
factory work and the typically gendered spheres of activity, like sales and personal 
assistant work. Sam 's father, an Italian immigrant, is invoked as a point of entry into the 
labour market, and appears at different points of the narrative to indicate familial 
proximity and support around which circuits of activity are constructed. An interesting 
grammatical feature o f the above account is the use o f the conjunction "and to encode a 
chain of activity that suppresses the possibility of thinking these transitions were 
prolonged or problematic. Furthermore, the rapid up-take of work is conveyed by the 
rhetorical device, ‘a whole string o f  factories', which again implies the availability of 
work, that one could literally leave one’s job and find another within a short period of 
time. But an absence o f insecurity is also encoded by the way this account constructs a 
young, confident agent, capable o f ‘talking her way into positions’. In reading this 
account, I am reminded o f the cliches of an older generation of workers who conveyed a 
world replete with options, the "good ole days’, where work was easily recycled.
We might compare Sam’s account to Peter’s, a 45 year old disability pensioner, 
whose biography is interrupted at the outset by a discourse of juvenile delinquency. I will 
give only a brief sketch o f the events that led to his engagement in full-time, manual 
employment. At the age o f fifteen, Peter’s narrative encodes the familiar suffocation of 
living in a small country town, leaving both home and school to escape an authoritarian 
father, and to assert one’s independence. He moves to a larger country town in New 
South Wales to live with his eldest brother, and takes up an auto mechanic apprenticeship
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as a probable solution to his feelings of restlessness and defiance. The apprenticeship 
lasts all of three months and he applies for unemployment benefits the year Social 
Security was first introduced under a Whitlam government in 1973. As part of the 
contractual obligation o f the ‘Work Test’, Peter is compelled to accept a position as a 
farmhand which he emphatically describes as unsuitable. He lasts all of two days, and 
fabricates a story o f family crisis. The farmer contacts the Commonwealth Employment 
Services, who in turn contact his brother. Unable to explain his whereabouts, his brother 
contacts the police. He is taken into custody and charged with ‘vagrancy’, and consigned 
to the jurisdiction o f welfare authorities. The matter attracts the attention of the Sydney 
City Mission, a charitable authority, who successfully defends his case and place him in a 
refuge in North Sydney. After a three month probationary period, he soon finds work 
manufacturing seatbelts.
The point o f this sketch is to show how a biography of activity is only stabilised by 
the legal interventions o f a charitable institution. A space of paternalistic supervision 
provides the first transition to factory work in the city. But this progressive narrative of 
‘work-as-security’ is short-lived as the ‘political’ interrupts a stable trajectory of activity. 
While giving an account o f ‘my first jo b  in Sydney’ the following event unexpectedly 
emerges:
1 sort o f  got into a political thing there with a few o f  the other workers because we didn't have 
a union there they were a little bit disgruntled with the way they were being treated and the 
amount o f  m oney they were being paid and what not, and 1 thought ‘Well okay 1 will get into 
this union thing with them ’ and what not, and what a stupid mistake, well I thought 1 had 
better stand by them because they are my co-workers, I can’t sort o f  stand out alone and not 
support their cause or whatever, and they said ‘Well because you have come into it, we were 
offering you an extra wage supplement anyway, but you chose to stand beside your workers 
sorry, you lose your job. N o com e back’, and I looked at it and I thought ‘Yeah well 1 don't 
need that sort o f  shit', so that’s the way it worked out, and then 1 went and got a job in another 
factory building sew ing machines.
Despite Peter's extraordinarily diffuse work history, this is the only time unionism 
emerges as problem for activity, which is telling, though it is not the only time work is 
problematised by events which could well have transpired as a union issue. No doubt its 
absence within the flexible labour regime is a symptom of the erosion of trade unionism 
under neo-liberalism. But Peter’s involvement in worker solidarity and protests over 
working conditions are explained away as a rational miscalculation. ‘a mistake'. The
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issue of proper working conditions and adequate remuneration is reduced to a diminutive 
concern over some vague matter that the workers ‘were a little bit disgruntled with ' . 
while personal economic security is privileged over the fate of ‘my co-workers'. 
Arguably, this account can be interpreted in a number of ways, but the line I want to take 
up here is that it constitutes an implicit presupposition about the political context of the 
interview rather than the event it refers to. By this I mean the speaker encodes this 
'political thing’ in a pejorative way, as a mistaken course of action, because unionism no 
longer holds any appeal when ‘work-as-security’ has become a fragile condition of the 
present. Unlike the fragility o f the present, the innocuous conjunction ‘ancf reappears at 
the end of this account to add yet another chain in the possibility of manufacturing work.
Richard, a 43 year old AIDS patient and disability pensioner, also presents a case in 
which activity must first traverse the country/city division. But this transition is deferred 
for reasons o f ‘immaturity’, a sense o f insecurity inscribed in terms of psychological 
deficiency. Psychological lack is curiously linked to an educational history which is 
described as 'accelerated'. Having advanced beyond the norms of educational 
development, Richard attained his Higher School Certificate at the age of fifteen. From 
the outset, a narrative o f activity presents a psychological schism between cognitive 
achievement and emotional development, a contradiction which is left to do some of the 
work in explaining why an academically gifted person never entered higher education. 
Instead, we are left to imagine a fifteen year old who is ill-prepared for the emotional 
demands o f university and city life. This tension between being ‘too clever' and Too 
young' is a recurring theme throughout the narrative. We are told of instances of reaching 
the top of his profession as a salesperson in plumbing supplies at an age where rapid 
success seemed emptied o f any future challenge. As a result, professional achievement 
always seem to occur ‘too quickly’ or came ‘too easy’, stifling a sense of freedom that lie 
outside circuits o f work.
During the 70’s, Richard’s source o f insecurity is not linked to wage-labour but vague 
references o f ‘bad relationships'. At a rather unexpected point o f the interview he 
invokes a history o f  working as a male prostitute between the age o f 15 and 18 while
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living in Melbourne. And though this activity would seem to be driven by an economic 
purpose, the following statement suggests that prostitution was also a way of overcoming 
the loneliness and isolation o f homosexuality:
Oh. just I moved to Melbourne, loneliness, like kids in Sydney drift to Kings Cross ... in 
Melbourne they drift to St Kilda, meet som e people, started working, got introduced to some 
people, they, I was prepared to do what they were prepared to pay for, which was nothing 
except to get undressed, I made sure they were all old men who couldn’t get it up [ ...]  1 was 
getting paid to keep people company and the good thing about it was that I needed company 
too.
Among these circuits o f urban marginality, marginality itself is the only place that can 
accommodate those whose sexuality shuns the light. Before the legitimation of the 
’homosexual identity’ in the 80’s, an economy o f desire is consigned to the liminal zones 
of urban life. From the point o f view o f those offering their services, Richard's statement 
warns against reducing this kind o f exchange to a form of economic exploitation, or a 
gratuitous sexual act, but a kind o f social exchange -  a market-place for the gathering of 
lost and lonely souls.
Aside from the various narratives o f wage-labour set amongst the background of 
industrialisation and manufacturing, the 70’s also presents legitimate alternatives for 
women entering higher education. Jay, a 41 year old disability pensioner, entered 
university in New Zealand immediately after high school, but this transition was 
hampered by perceptions that university was exclusively a male domain. Jay’s family 
refused to support her on the grounds that higher education for women was a wasteful 
luxury. This refusal is not simply one o f economic redundancy, but the contradiction of 
abandoning a path o f traditional femininity:
1 went away to go to uni, u m ... I had to because um ‘If you go to university we are not 
supporting you ’ ...  no need for girls to have an education you see, so why waste money 
(chuckles) [So you had to support yourself?] Yup which was okay in those days cause um. 1 
think I got thirty two dollars a week, for, what they call bursary, um. but rent was four dollars 
a week (chuckles) this is a large town in N ew Zealand.
Despite receiving a government bursary, Jay’s trajectory of educational activity is 
abruptly halted by a discourse o f psychopathology. She employs a clinical language to 
diagnose the event o f her breakdown as ‘classic Anxiety Disorder’. This diagnostic and 
psychological relation to the self is often linked to fantasies of finishing a degree in
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psychology, not for the sake o f some well defined career trajectory, but simply because "I 
never wanted to do anything except learn'. Between these statements of familial 
disapprobation, unfulfilled desires o f completing higher education, and the psychological 
disorder that disrupted her plans, we are presented with a history of insecurity and 
dislocation which marks a painful departure from self-knowledge and personal growth 
‘and I  always thought I ’d  go back to it but I  never d id '. Forced to leave university. Jay's 
narrative is dominated by a position o f dependency: she moves back home to live with 
her mother, and receives treatment for a year as an outpatient in a psychiatric unit. The 
remainder of the 10's are blurred by indistinct references to ‘various jobs' as if barely 
worth remembering, only to recover a more coherent trajectory of activity during the 
80?s. Jay's story is one that is dominated by her present welfare position, a narrative 
peppered with physical, emotional and psychological distress and continuous moral 
management o f the painful stigma she feels as a disability pensioner. It is precisely the 
management o f an interminable position o f dependency that I will return to later in this 
chapter.
Worlds o f  work -  80 ’s & 90 ’s
The stories o f urban marginality among the younger sample, which are sharply 
instanced during the 80 's and 90’s, are difficult narratives to present since they are easily 
recuperated by. and vulnerable to, the present moralising discourses of dependency, 
idleness and deviance. The strategy is to show that marginality might be investigated 
according to alternative frameworks of intelligibility which entail practices and 
conditions immanent to subjectification. Rather than consign these stories to the abject 
sectors of failed anti-citizens, the strategy is to show how marginality is in fact 
propagated by the insecurity o f flexible wage-labour.
Consider the case o f Con, a 30 year old cleaner for the State Railway Authority, and 
the son o f Greek immigrants living in Sydney. After finishing his Higher School 
Certificate in 1986, his first engagement in the labour market was working as a clerical 
assistant for a large Sydney hospital. Despite the thrill of earning a full-time wage, he 
describes work as low paid and monotonous, and decides to leave after falling out with a
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senior co-worker. He finds similar work for another large hospital, but leaves after a year 
in search of more interesting work. After a series of short-term employments -  carpet- 
cutting, storeman in an art supplies warehouse -  he finds lucrative work through a friend 
on a building site:
So that was the first turning point where I actually got a job and got big money [How old were 
you?] Ah almost nineteen and um, do that for a year and it was back in ... yeah 89 it was, and 
everyone went broke y ’know so, and then 1 tried to get a job on the building- because I was 
use to the big money, couldn’t get it because like, there was no work going y ’know and um, 
and everyone was getting retrenched left right and centre and um, then I got a job in the 
factory because my olds got a place and um, and I had to help them pay it off, so I got a job in 
the factory ... they had a second house, ‘If  you help us with this w e’ll sign it over into your 
name when you’re older’, and I said ‘Y eah’, so I did it, worked- cause I started giving them 
money from the building site and then (coughs) the factory I worked for a year and half and it 
was just totally depressing.
Before 'the first turning p o in t\ Con invokes many o f the benefits of the flexible labour 
market: work was found easily enough through the paper, and served its purpose in the 
form of short to medium durations o f employment. Whether for reasons of boredom, 
workplace disputes, or upgrading one’s prospects, the flexibility o f the market allowed 
him to move through different sectors of employment. The turning point he speaks of 
constitutes a transition to the world o f ‘high paid’ manual labour. But flexibility seems to 
work both ways: not only does it provide opportunities for Con to ‘tack' his way through 
the labour market in search o f better conditions, it is also a source of insecurity. 1989 
marks the beginning o f the recession years under the Hawke government, and despite 
trying to find similar work in the building industry, no one is hiring during a recession. 
Prior to these events. Con is now committed to paying a mortgage, a joint venture made 
possible through his parents, which perhaps heightens the insecurity of retrenchment. His 
movement into factory work, then, is conveyed as ‘a necessary evil', the monotony of 
which he endures for the sake o f realising his fantasies of home ownership.
The task is to understand the next ‘turning point’ in Con's trajectory. Not long after 
working in the factory he discovers he has contracted Hepatitis C from a tattoo parlour. 
After recovering from fatigue and sickness while continuing to work, he describes the 
feeling of being trapped in the job. But this contradiction between an imperative of work, 
o f financial commitment and the loss o f freedom, is only resolved when he is finally 
retrenched from the factory. Rather than a setback he describes this event as ‘a blessing'-.
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The turning point came was when I left the factory and I got back on the dole and I thought 
‘Right, I’m gonna take this dole money and do something with it’, and um, yeah and then, 1 
got on the dole and by that stage, my best friend who I sort o f  been hanging out with, for three 
years, and he got on the dole, and... we never looked back really for a long time y ’know and 
then, me and him sort o f  teamed up and we started getting um, because he had a car we started 
going to garage sales and getting things and doing the markets.
This turning point marks the beginning of an eleven year position on unemployment 
benefits, a period that Con describes as "one o f  the best periods o f  my life \ Now we might 
be tempted to assume that what was auspicious about this existence was the freedom to 
revel in idleness at the expense o f the taxpayer. However, what is conveyed here is not a 
position o f dependency, but a position of ‘counter-activity’: work is reinscribed among 
the liminal circuits o f freelance trading, scoping garage sales, scouring garbage tips and 
selling collectable goods at local markets. In other words, what Con covets as an 
‘alternative lifestyle’, one that is partly financed by the state, is not a condition of idleness 
and passivity, but a discourse o f resistance.
Very early in the interview Con recounts a memory as a young child watching his 
father routinely go to work and stating to his mother one day that "I never want to do 
that\ This story works to encode a basic, fundamental rejection o f a world of work that is 
mundane, conventional and constraining. But this is not to say that Con rejects work 
altogether. A period o f ‘superficial dependency’ provides a space that would protect him 
from the insecurity o f work, and allows him to invent a marginal existence that brings 
work and freedom as close together as possible. For Con, the world of work exemplified 
by the activities o f the father, a hard working Greek immigrant, was never an adequate 
solution to the problem o f freedom. That freedom is attained through modes of industry is 
acknowledged throughout the narrative, but masquerading as the welfare dependent is 
perhaps a way o f managing the riskiness of a world of work that is, after all. fickle and 
insecure. The task becomes one o f inventing another world that directly engages in the 
project of freedom.
Where activity traces circuits of marginality, it is difficult to engage in practices of 
risk management, or extricate oneself from sectors of risk. In some cases even welfare is 
no longer a suitable insurance policy. Consider the case of Jabe, 28 years old, recently
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unemployed, and unable to resolve the ambivalence of her current welfare position. Jabe 
narrates a story that begins from the margins of civility and normality. Counter-familial 
statements describe a fragmented family life when she was removed from her mother's 
care by welfare authorities at the age of 7. Early family life is comprised of ‘lots o f 
different temporary care situations until I  was ten ... I  was passed around a lot’. She 
invokes the language o f delinquency to do some of the work of explaining the difficulties 
of placing a "problem child’ within the normal, moral circuits of family life. Later in the 
interview, she returns to counter-familial statements to convey her aloof detachment as a 
child "I didn ’t seem to want to be involved in fam ily life ... I  ju st wanted to be by m yself. 
This statement marks a transition from the good/bad families of foster care to a narrative 
o f independence and work.
A sense o f dislocation is embedded in Jabe’s first account of labour market activity 
when, at 17. she finds work as a receptionist in a medical practice. Work is roundly 
dismissed as boring and menial, but further problematised by the regime of the "split 
shift' which left her stranded for two hours each day 'in the middle o f  nowhere\  The 
disposability o f the ‘flexible’ employee is rendered indisposed by the isolation of work 
"so that was really difficult, nothing, ju st sat in the park and r e a d . At 19, a narrative of 
independence is more closely aligned with freedom when she moves to the city with 
friends, finds regular casual work as an art model, and additional employment as a cafe 
waitress among the ‘alternative’ circuits o f Sydney’s service industry. But rather than 
attribute this transition to personal agency or autonomy she describes a contingent state of 
freedom "I was really lucky ju s t to be myself and you know, I  was really happy to have a 
job and by that stage I  had moved to the city and I  was independent, I  had my own money 
and had everything sorted o u f . When asked why she thought she was ‘lucky', she 
continues "Yeah, I  d o n ’t know, I'm  not one o f  those people who gets employed really 
easily’. The constraint implicitly referred to is her physical appearance which is linked to 
a chronic condition known as Marfans Disease, the classic symptoms of which are 
abnormal height, elongated limbs and degenerative muscle disorder. And though 
pathology emerges as an implicit obstacle to employment ‘people say, ‘Oh you ’re really
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freaky looking”, it is relegated to a minor position. In Jabe’s case, the subject of 
pathology is an anathema to the subject of freedom.
For the flexible labourer o f these marginal circuits of activity, freedom is both an 
identity project and a problem. For instance, at 23, Jabe discovered sex work, initially in 
the form of full body erotic massage, and then later as a quasi-professional dominatrix. 
She started as an apprentice learning techniques of restraint and discipline, and how to 
manage herself as a resilient and flexible practitioner. This was an identity project 
inasmuch as it granted Jabe the freedom to explore a profession that ‘interested' her as 
well as constitute a particular stylisation o f femininity:
Something I really loved about it was that I met a lot o f  amazing women ... most o f the 
women that were working there were using it to earn money for studying, it is good money on 
a part-time basis and i f  it is som ething that you are interested in, I mean everyone looks for a 
job that they are interested in, you know ... A lot o f  really strong women, I learnt a lot about 
sexuality ... I felt more empowered doing it, I did have control, 1 did get to do stuff that was 
interesting, I didn't have to have, you know, sex was a very rare occurrence.
But freedom is also problematic when it is finally disrupted by industry 'burn out'. After 
working for five years without a holiday, Jabe describes a state of eventual decline and 
weariness ' /  ju s t found m yself going through the motions and not really being interested 
or into it, you know it was kind o f  like auto pilot, stagnating in your style ... and ah 
compromising m yself ... being told by someone what to do to them and at that time I 
didn 7 have enough flexibility to deal with it properly'. And after switching to receptionist 
work in the same house, the loss o f status, power and income proved to be only a 
temporary and precarious solution ‘/  needed a normal job, I  needed structure, to do 
something else to feel that I  was capable o f  doing something else ... /  just got sick o f  
being treated like shit by the girls that I  used to call my peers, and I  let them know and 
they didn 7 like it and they complained enough to management and you get sacked, and I 
dicT. One of the temptations o f the marginal, cash economy is continuing to claim 
unemployment benefits, which she did for the entire five year period, only to find that 
when she became genuinely unemployed she was penalised by Centrelink after 
submitting a tax file number a year earlier. She is currently receiving a reduction of 
benefits, paying back the government with their own money, leaving her $50 a week to 
live on.
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Jabe’s current position is one marked by a dreadful sense of insecurity and isolation 
where she finds herself caught between two irreconcilable positions: she blames herself 
for failing to manage her own risk, and faces an uncertain future as someone who is not 
easily employed. Though she wants to make a break from the sex industry she feels 
excluded from the normative sphere o f labour ‘' I ’ve had a lot o f  interviews, um, same 
work, I  mean I ’ve gone fo r  other jobs in the straight world which I  find very difficult 
because when someone says what was your last job ... what was the company and what 
were you doing? It is hard to kind o f  f lu f f . But even after numerous failed attempts to 
find receptionist work in the sex industry she feels incapable of reinventing herself and 
unsure of her next move. Alongside these feelings of self-blame and uncertainty, Jabe 
engages in an awkward kind o f moral management that comes as a reaction to a world of 
work she no longer feels apart o f ‘7 d o n ’t want to work in the sex industry, but once again 
everyone wants to fin d  a jo b  that they like and enjoy and are comfortable with and can 
do, like I  am prepared to, not have everything, I  know, but I ’m not going to stack shelves, 
can 7 lift, I  'm not going to be a checkout chick, too old, no, so it is difficult and I'm  a very 
capable person and what I  did makes me no less employable’. Desiring work that one 
‘likes' or ‘enjoys’ is no longer a sustainable fantasy. Even the flexibility of the black 
labour market provides even less guarantees of freedom and security, and, if anything, 
further marginalises Jabe from secure wage-labour.
To sharpen the distinction between a world of work before and during a period of 
neo-liberal government, I want to briefly return to the narratives of Sam and Peter to 
illustrate a contrast in work. For instance, after leaving school and working in factories as 
a young teenager, Sam describes the seduction of the counter-cultural movement in the 
70 's. An alternative for those who rejected the normative circuits of work, education and 
city life was to embrace the idealism and resistance of the hippie movement. The 
country/city binary is frequently invoked by Sam to specify the spaces of ethical activity 
with which a project o f freedom was aligned 7  left the city when I  was eighteen and I 
went to live in the country ... I  ran away to become a hippie (laughs) ... that was about 
73'. After numerous transitions between different communes, a sojourn overseas and
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returning to the city, the country remained a romantic opposition to city life. Sam 
describes the difficulty o f being a hippie mother during the seventies, having to conceal 
her identity as a single mother, but she also conveys the gradual erosion of the hippie 
lifestyle towards the end o f the 70’s. The period I want to focus on is precisely this 
transition between the late seventies and early eighties where Sam re-enters the 
workforce for the first time since the birth o f her daughter.
The first bit o f  work I remember getting after having the child, was, being a busker dressed as 
a clown in the main street o f  Mawoolumbah, but then I got fired by the council because 
people were complaining that I was disrupting the traffic, because people would drive by and 
see me and go ‘What the hell is that’ because this is y ’know w e’re talking redneck territory, 
there weren’t a lot o f  hippies there then, so w e’re still like the outcasts we weren’t the locals 
[ ...]  I was pretty flamboyant (laughs), I was fairly brave, and 1 guess, pretty restless and 
determined and I was stronger and healthier and, desperate enough to try just about anything
Even though the Australian bush was an exemplary sphere of counter-self-formation, it 
was also a contested space, occupied by the agrarian communities of the decent ’country 
folk', the hard working Australians around which much myth has been invented. In the 
above account we find an attempt to breach these differences in the form of community 
work that transforms the guitar playing hippie into the public entertainer, the 'clown'. The 
only position in which a project o f freedom and work can coincide is to present oneself as 
a spectacle of both worlds -  the worker/entertainer/hippie assemblage. And while she 
conveys this as a ‘brave’ attempt to bring these worlds together, it also exposes oneself as 
an aberration to those who constituted the moral majority. But the notion of bravery as 
the ability to bring these worlds together only tells part of the story of subject-formation. 
moments later a different account emerges ‘7 was pretty much all alone. a lot of it was 
really tough, y  'know and I  wasn 7 a really happy person either I  was a hit depressed and 
even though I  felt strong I  wasn 7 confident, I  was just, um... probably o ff the wall enough 
to be expressing my depression in some wav (chuckle) that might have seemed like 
confidence, but it w asn't it was ju s  me sort o f  going 7 have to do something". 
Psychological statements o f the self present a contradictory position of someone who 
presents oneself as confident, healthy and brave, only to belie another sense of self as one 
who is depressed, isolated and desperate.
During the 80’s we find another assemblage emerging, the busker/waitress, a 
possibility which is symptomatic o f the service industry reclaiming much of the field of 
low paid, casual work. During this phase of self-formation, we sense that practices of 
freedom are now stretched between two worlds: the hippie/busker is forced to engage in a 
project of self-invention now inscribed by the possibilities o f casualised labour:
I was waitress, a lot, huh... (chuckles) I was a waitress a lot, I’d go busking a bit y ’know just 
like by m yself if  I could get som eone to mind my daughter ... um, so I’d supplement my 
income that way and sort o f  meet a few  people as well and, waitressing was just really hard 
slog and then I... fell into secretarial work, I went up to the local, what was called the 
Community Youth Support Schem e, which later became CES, um in the old days they were 
really little centres and they were like in houses they weren't even in offices they were like in 
converted houses there was one in Chatswood, 1 lived on the North Shore for, about, three 
years when I first came to Sydney
In this account it is easy to see that casual labour was a main source of activity during the 
80's, but what abruptly emerges is a transition that would constitute a new form of 
activity in the 90’s. The invention o f the secretary and clerical assistant, the ‘office robot'. 
coincides with government retraining schemes that would seem to offer Sam new 
possibilities for financial security. By the end of the 80’s the hippie politics of the country 
had transformed, now centred around the politics of landownership as opposed to the 
kind of propertyless idealism o f the 70’s. No longer would the country represent a 
domain o f freedom, instead, by the 90’s, we find a complete reversal o f the project of 
freedom where the city now becomes a space of possibilities for the transformation of 
self. I will return to Sam ’s narrative later in the chapter.
Peter, who is similar in age to Sam, presents a trajectory comprised o f motorbikes and 
road trips, another preoccupation o f the 70’s. During the 80’s, he recounts travelling to 
Darwin with friends, and immediately finds work in the service industry. He works his 
way up to 'bar m anager  within a year, while his travelling companions returned to 
Sydney after failing to find work in their specific trade. In some ways this comparison 
reiterates a common theme throughout Peter’s narrative: the resourceful ‘jack o f  all 
trades and qualified in none’ who can turn his hand to anything but never commit to any 
given career. Alongside the pride with which he conveys his ability to adapt to market 
conditions, he would also often berate himself for not building the security he now covets 
7  couldn't be tied down ... stupid me like I  d o n ’t know'. After managing the bar, he
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worked in the spare parts industry, a field that seemed more closely aligned to a project of 
freedom ‘anything to do with cars, parts, bikes, whatever, I  loved it, it s a shame I didn t 
carry on and do an apprenticeship there then, I  would be right now, but footloose and 
fancy free . After two years in Darwin, Peter returns to Sydney and works as a barman in 
a local hotel, but bar work is associated with its own set o f risks. For instance, he often 
describes falling into the ‘wrong crow d \ and the restlessness he sometimes attributes to 
his movements in the labour market are also associated with attempts to escape drug-use. 
a theme that often disrupts a narrative o f security. In his descriptions of dhe pub game' 
we gain a sense o f how the buying and selling o f drugs are embedded in the very 
activities o f bar work 4People were selling it across the b a r\ To escape these risks, he 
resorts to selling his bike — a marker o f a previous mode o f freedom — and buying a 
courier van. which marks a new kind o f investment in the labour market. Despite 
attempts to escape drug-use he would fall into new patterns of use that were endemic to 
the driving industry. After a close call one night, sleeping behind the wheel, he sells the 
van and returns to bar work before finding more driving work for a record company. 
Eventually risk would catch up with Peter. In 1989, he describes a loading accident that 
shattered two disks in his back, leaving him out o f work for three years on Sickness 
Benefits. After a series o f  operations and without any recourse to worker's compensation 
he returns to work in 93.
From 1993 to 2000 Peter cites an astonishing array o f activity: handyman, bus driver, 
builder, contract driver, tow truck driver. Never staying any longer than two years in a 
single job, he conveys not only the extraordinary flexibility of the market but also the 
endless risk, insecurity and constant self-invention required to maintain a continuity of 
work. Irrespective o f whether we can attribute such a history o f ‘hyper-activity' to a 
faulty agent -  the failure to make rational choices or properly manage one’s risk -  the 
contemporary labour market, with its diffuse, low paid and temporary positions, suggests 
that increased flexibility increases risk, marginalisation and personal distress:
I’ve gone into tow truck driving. I’ve done ah, the tourism, the raw industry, that was a bit of 
a political thing, I helped build the bloody place, I helped run the place, I got paid shit money, 
all these other youngsters com ing in who got paid the same bloody money I was, and I 
thought that was an insult, that’s a bloody insult for the work I’ve done, and the standing that I 
was in the com pany, even the guy that owned the company, he had no say in what was paid, it
was his daughter’s part o f  it, um, I’ve got a g o lf  hat up there, its worth 30 something odd 
dollars from one o f  Greg Norm an’s little ... He gave it to me as a present to say thanks for 
helping the work I’d done ...  Um, and since I left there, they’ve since sold the bloody 
company to another mob.
Accounts like this suggest that something more than individual failure is required to 
explain the hyper-activity o f the 80’s and 90’s. What I think is conveyed here is the lack 
o f security in exchange for someone who is willing to looking for it; it might be 
forgivable that building a business and watching it grow is tantamount to the expectation 
of a ‘liberal reward’, but a $30 hat buys little security in the age of risk. And even if he 
stayed with the company there is little to suggest any guarantee of security. Since 
stopping work due to his spinal condition and receiving a Disability Pension, Peter is 
currently sitting on security courses and retraining for a career as a private investigator. In 
the age of insecurity the project o f  self is never complete.
Among this selection o f narratives it is possible to diagnose a period before the 80’s 
where insecurity did not centre on the conditions of work itself, especially when 
education was not mandatory for a secure position within the labour market. Before the 
80's. manufacturing work was a relatively secure vocation, the plenitude o f which formed 
a seemingly taken for granted backdrop o f activity while other instabilities are played out 
in the foreground. In Peter's account the possibility o f unionism emerges only briefly, 
never to appear again despite the hyper-activity o f the 80 ’s and 90’s. But the 70's was by 
no means a utopia. Despite the plenitude o f manufacturing work, we found the 
possibilities o f higher education for women were constrained by the moral expectations 
of family. But what is revealing is also what is abs ent among these narratives, the 
insecurity o f work itself, problematisations o f low paid, casualised employment. By the 
80's and 90's the language o f unionism is effaced by the seemingly endless possibilities 
of the market, only to find that the pursuit o f security is itself an endless enterprise. 
Among both the older and younger members o f the sample we find the 80’s and 90's are 
a period o f increasing flexibility that works both ways, while it grants the possibility for 
some to reinvent themselves in terms o f the market, the project o f freedom for others is 
rendered unstable, stressful and risky. For some, the solution is no longer the security of 
the labour market itself, but imitating a position o f dependency to invent alternative
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worlds of work and construct more enabling possibilities for freedom. And for those who 
are caught between risk and regulation, even a position of dependency is no longer a 
suitable insurance policy against the uncertainties of the market. In these cases, the 
project o f freedom goes underground, to circulate among liminal sectors o f the black 
market economy only to find that such spaces are subject to the same uncertainties as the 
normal, moral circuits o f activity. Psychological statements of the self, the locus of self­
blame, and techniques o f moral management, are just some of the strategies by which the 
self must engage in some project o f addressing the ambivalences propagated by the 
insecurities o f flexible wage-labour.
Desocialisation
One of the recent objectives o f welfare reform is to create new spaces o f governance 
called 'community'. These refer to the moral and ethical circuits of solidarity, spaces 
defined in terms o f their social responsibility and useful forms of association, capable of 
generating their own solutions to the problems of fragmentation and market 
individualism. In this section, I want to explore the kind o f accounts in which participants 
invoke a space o f activity, whether it be among the oppositions of community/city, 
urban/periphery, isolation/integration, to investigate spaces of subjectification. Through 
an examination o f participant statements, it is possible to show how participation in the 
flexible labour market and the strategies o f distancing we find among practices of moral 
management, produce new forms o f marginality that in some ways contradict solutions of 
community.
C o unter-comm unity
Amber and Kate are the youngest members of the sample, 19 and 24 years 
respectively; both are sisters who live in what might be considered an idyllic country 
community which, since the early 90’s, has become a popular tourist destination. Both 
speak of community in terms o f solidarity, close familial relations, and a unique sense of 
security and freedom. This story o f freedom is linked to a wave of counter-cultural 
migrations during the 70’s and 80’s. Families moved to Bellingen in search of an 
'alternative lifestyle\ the politics o f which formed not only a rejection of urban life, but 
also an affirmative project o f inventing new forms of community. Counter-culture would
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find among the circuits of country life, and among a state of ‘nature', a new kind of 
solution to the problems o f urban freedom. An important difference between the stories 
of Amber and Kate is the relationship between freedom and community. For Kate, 
community-as-freedom emerges in opposition to that of the city, but more affirmatively, 
it is a space of solidarity, identity and tolerance:
[Describe what it’s like to live in Bellingen?] Well to me, I love it, I love living in Bellingen. 1 
don’t like the big cities because it is just too hectic for me, and there is not enough 
friendliness and you are nobody there really, where here, everyone knows you, well not so 
much every one knows you, but you ’ve got your friends and a lot o f  them move away and a 
lot o f  them whinge about living in Bellingen, because it is a small town and all the crap that 
goes on with it, the gossiping and everything, but I think you just have to be happy with who 
you are and why you want to be here.
Community is not merely a relation between self and other, but a psychological relation 
with oneself. To be tolerant of the smallness and otherness of community derives from 
psychological security, an acceptance o f both the limiting and enabling conditions of 
solidarity. And where Amber is inclined to produce similar statements of solidarity, 
identity and freedom, there is a tendency for the problematic to disrupt these descriptions. 
For Amber, it would seem community is not coextensive with the project of freedom, but 
in various ways an obstacle to this project. Unlike the psychological security described by 
her sister, Amber invokes the language o f limited ‘opportunities' and disadvantage to 
describe contradictions between community life, education and personal autonomy.
To understand these contradictions, we have to set out a context of generational 
mobility among Higher School graduates who, each year, leave the community to attend 
university. Both Kate and Amber describe the gender differences of this migration as 
follows: girls would finish their Higher School Certificates and continue their education 
in the larger cities, while boys would either follow a similar educational trajectory or stay 
in Bellingen and find a trade. For the minority o f girls who did not pursue higher 
education, there were fewer options to find secure paid work within the community . Both 
Kate and Am ber's narratives mark a departure from these patterns of migration, having 
both left school at 16. And while, for Kate, this remained a relatively unproblematic 
transition, Amber invests considerably more work in justifying this departure. She
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describes the lack o f educational resources and the limited opportunities of the
community to convey this problem:
I left school when I was 16, I had done a term o f  Year 11 and 1 left because the school 1 went 
to- by the time I got to be a senior most o f  the kids in my year had left ... and so they cut back 
all the classes and you only got to choose certain subjects and the subjects they had 1 wouldn’t 
even be able to get into uni or get anything because I couldn’t do anything else, and I just 
didn't feel like I had that many opportunities and I felt like 1 was wasting my time so I left and 
moved to Sydney and worked instead ... I just w asn’t happy at school and wasn’t trying very 
hard and didn’t feel like that I was going to get anything out o f  it, so 1 finished ... And 1 
thought that it was just a better decision to work and have the experience o f  going out and 
working and having my own independence than sitting in Bellingen and wasting the time at 
school.
The language o f independence and ‘experience’ convey a new relation between the city 
and autonomy, a project that is more closely aligned with personal freedom. Amber 
moves to Sydney with friends, the four o f them living in a two bedroom apartment 'I  
slept on the lounge room floor on a mattress fo r  five  months ... in a dingy tiniest 
cockroach infested fla t in Marrickville, in our whole apartment, no one spoke English 
except fo r  u s \  The dilapidated and alienating conditions form a comical vignette of the 
4thrilV and adventure o f surviving the transition from small country town to the city. 
Within a week. Amber finds casual work in a call centre for a market research company, 
and despite disliking the work, describes the experience of earning an income as a kind of 
personal growth. Freedom is equated with not only an independent spirit of adventure, 
but the integration of adult responsibilities in a world of seemingly endless possibilities. 
But this narrative of work and freedom is short-lived:
It was fun, it was a real thrill, kind o f  like you felt really independent and you were all grown 
up. and living in this big city and earning money and like ... $600 in my bank account after I 
had been paid and w ow  if  I had have had that at home it would have been so much money, but 
after paying rent and bills and transport it just goes and it doesn’t seem like very much at all. 
yeah I did that for ages and eventually went back home [Why?] Well I moved in with a girl 
that 1 didn’t really like very much and we didn’t get along and I had had enough and 1 felt 
very lonely because the girls that I had lived with and my friends that were down there had 
moved back home, and so I was really lonely I wasn’t real happy and I just decided to pack up 
and go home
It is not the insecurity o f work that is the source o f fragmentation and isolation, but the 
urban circuits o f living itself, the new, unpredictable forms o f sociality that surround 
one's position in the labour market. For the 16 year old, whose transition to the city 
encodes an experience o f freedom and adventure, we also find a narrative unhinged by 
the departure o f  friends, the absence o f family, and the precarious circuits of shared
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accommodation. For the remainder o f Amber’s story we sense the deferral of freedom -  
returning home to Bellingen, finding herself dependent upon family, and readjusting to 
the small and highly competitive labour market o f the tourist-driven service industry. 
Here. Amber would engage in numerous forms o f casual, low paid, cash employment -  
nannying. cleaning, kitchen-handing, waitressing -  but aside from the constant 
management o f flexible work we also find the on-going management o f ambivalence, a 
desire that is torn between family and freedom, security and insecurity, integration and 
isolation.
C ounter-dependency
For Kate, the relationship between community and freedom is problematised in a 
different way. Community is a space o f freedom but not without having to perform an on­
going moral management o f her welfare position as a single mother. And even though her 
labour market experiences in Bellingen are not entirely different from her sister’s, her 
official position o f dependency is more permanent. Furthermore, this position is not a 
unique one. Alongside benign statements o f solidarity, identity and freedom, we also find 
moral/psychological statements o f delinquency, dereliction, welfare dependency and 
drug-use. This existence o f ‘counter-community’ is comprised o f aberrant dispositions 
and pathologies. In the following, Kate exemplifies how psychological techniques might 
be used to distinguish the deserving from the undeserving poor:
I think they should start doing psychiatric evaluations on people and realise where they’re at, 
a lot o f  people are on the dole, but are coping out and they’re the people that they have got to 
work on because people are very lazy around here, and they like to sit on the dole and, you 
know ‘Wait for my pay day every fortnight’, so I don’t mind the work for the dole thing in a 
way. I know that if  I was single and didn’t have a job I wouldn’t like it but that is the way it 
goes, you know you can’t, I don’t know, 1 didn’t like being single, by myself, young and on 
the dole but I always been since the age o f  18 on the dole.
The existence o f an abject class o f anti-citizens not only supports governmental policies 
such as ’work for the dole’ and ‘mutual obligation’, but provides Kate with the discursive 
resources to morally differentiate her own position from others. These examples of 
‘counter-dependency’ are not only practices of moral management which serve to 
distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ forms o f dependency, but also constitute 
‘distancing strategies’ which exacerbate divisions within the community. That is to say. 
far from rebuilding or uniting communities, discourses o f dependency further exacerbate
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sectors of marginality. Constituting idleness and dereliction as a psychological disorder 
allows welfare populations, like those found among small, country populations, to engage 
in practices o f moral discrimination. Ironically, governmental discourses of welfare 
dependency fragment and divide the very spaces of community they seek to integrate and 
revitalise.
Similar kinds o f statements appear in Peter’s narrative where the theme of ‘ethical 
conduct’ gives rise to an unexpected account of welfare dependency. After receiving a 
Disability Pension in 2000, he and his family were relocated from the North Shore (a 
traditionally affluent part o f Sydney) to the Western suburbs o f Sydney (heavily 
stereotyped as working class, disaffected and poor) to live in Housing Commission. In the 
following account he gives a vivid description of his neighbours, who exemplify a classic 
vignette of aboriginal dependency:
I have got som e real arsehole neighbours next door here, half-caste Aboriginals, I am not 
racist in any way but I am quickly becoming that way, given what’s living next door here, I 
have an aboriginal as a brother-in-law and he is an absolute gentleman, he works for the 
government, em ploym ent agency over in Perth, I respect him very much, and I respect a lot o f  
the people I grew up with out in the bush [So what do you think these people exemplify?] Get 
out and work, there is nothing wrong with them, why can’t they get out and work, there is 
nothing wrong with them, you can’t tell me that just because they are broke they can’t go out 
and get a job [Why aren’t they working?] They’re alcoholics, guaranteed, I am not nit picking, 
all she is, is a factory for pumping out kids, this is her ninth kid she is pregnant with right now 
and living in a three bedroom house, okay admittedly she has, what’s she got. four o f  them 
aren’t there, four o f  them have already been taken from her and put in welfare, and this is 
what sort o f  crap goes on and the government keeps giving them bloody money, and this is 
wrong, this thing with Amanda Vanstone at the moment that she wants to have this one off 
dole payment to w ipe the w hole system, it is a bloody good idea, okay for those that can’t 
support them selves, physically, mentally, or whatever the case may be, they need something 
there to support them, but those that can get o ff  their arse and do something yes, mate I'm. I 
have got physical things wrong with me, I have got medical things wrong with me. at least I 
am still out having a go.
This very managed but nonetheless racial account o f dependency bears the curious 
trademarks of the ‘black welfare mother’, a popular American stereotype of the 70's. This 
is worked up by numerous references to pathological conduct -  addiction and chronic 
idleness, excessive reproduction, moral impropriety and parental misconduct. But 
pathology is linked to a much wider problem. Welfare dependency is an institutional 
phenomenon, again, drawing from Anglo-American criticisms o f the welfare state: 
welfare provision simply produces dependency ‘They [The government] should have
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bloody knocked something like this on the head back in the 70s when they first set up the 
dole. They have made it too easy fo r  people to get on these benefits'. He proceeds to 
describe the Western Suburbs in terms of the erosion of moral decency, invoking the 
language o f 4slum ' and ‘ghetto’ to convey a socially engineered landscape of dependency 
*So around this area there is suburbs, suburbs on suburbs where there is nothing but 
welfare'.
Characteristic o f these statements of counter-dependency is the kind of moral work 
that differentiates between the deserving and undeserving poor. It serves to make a 
comment about Peter’s own integrity as someone who, despite his chronic incapacity, is 
still active in some moral capacity. This moral management of the self is a position of 
distancing oneself from others, a position which is seemingly exacerbated by having to 
live in close proximity to abjection and poverty. Towards the end of the narrative, Peter 
describes the fantasy o f becoming a respected member of community ‘7 just want to be 
recognised fo r  achieving something and have good standing in the community'. But given 
his material location within these urban sectors of marginality, Peter must engage in the 
kind of work that presents oneself as a member of a ‘transcendent’ moral community, 
someone ‘who does not really belong here’. Arguably, these statements of counter­
dependency serve to drive further divisions among the poor, creating feelings of isolation 
and insecurity rather than the kind o f solidarity and allegiance that one would expect to 
find among ideal community settings.
Jay invokes a position o f counter-dependency to articulate the problem of 
subjectification in a slightly different way, one which is certainly implicit among 
previous statements. As a New Zealander, she orients an account of being a foreign 
observer of the Australian welfare system, employing a kind of anthropological gaze to 
specify the feelings o f otherness produced by her permanent welfare position:
I think... in Australia because I’m not Australian I found it quite shocking the amount of 
people that are on welfare, and, the families that... they're on it, then their kids are on it and 
it's a way o f  life for them, and I... that was new to me, and I think because o f  that, and 
because there are people who their career is welfare, and then, there is so much publicity 
about, people who are rorting the system, I feel like it’s the biggest stigma to be on welfare, 
and it ju st... and it’s one reason I’m I’m not, I don’t really want to meet people, because I
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don’t want to tell th em ... I’m not much o f  a liar, but I don’t want to say, I’m not working, I’m 
on a pension, cause I feel a huge stigma, against it.
The prevalence o f welfare dependency is persuasively managed as a 'shocking' 
discovery, the extent o f which is conveyed by statements of 'intergenerational 
dependency'. That is to say. the phenomenon is endemic to a culture, a condition 
transmitted and reproduced by the family mechanism. But rather than an explicit 
pathology, dependency is worked up as a rational alternative to work, a statement that 
draws from utilitarian arguments o f homo economicus. To make a 'career' o f welfare is 
to specify the rational, choice-making capacities o f individuals who calculate a better life 
outside the circuits o f wage-labour. It is not the presumed or actual existence of the 
'welfare cheat' that is problematic, but the 4publicity' generated by the media that 
intensifies the public and moral salience o f welfare dependency. Subjectification for the 
Disability Pensioner is one that must engage in the continuous management of private 
shame and public stigma, to conceal or deflect one’s permanent welfare position. And 
whether we think o f stigma as ‘internalisation' or ‘self-management' o f an increasingly 
blameworthy position is perhaps less significant than gauging the social and individual 
consequences o f isolation. Statements o f dependency divide communities and pit the poor 
against themselves, the effects o f which not only produce a painful intensification of 
subjectivity, but enhance rather than reduce marginalisation.
A larginal i sat ion
For those who abandoned the city to search for their own solutions to the problem of 
freedom, the collapse o f hippie politics in the 80’s, the transformation of communal 
living, and the restricted labour market o f the country, would prove too much for some. 
In the case o f Sam. the country’ was no longer a viable space to realise a project of 
freedom. By the 90 's, it was the promise o f financial stability and the reconstruction of 
self through government retraining programmes that would replace the old idealism w ith 
a new sense o f labour market opportunity. She describes returning to the city in 94/95 
and. in the following vignette, offers a unique insight of broader social change:
I had a really hard tim e when 1 came back to Sydney because even though 1 was gone for two 
\ears. it seem ed like everybody had forgotten me, or that everybody’s life had become so 
stressful and. nobody had any room and, sort o f  the old days when you could camp in 
som eone's sunroom until you got your own place just weren’t happening anymore. I was
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stranded, it was m e and my bloody Kingswood with all twenty years o f  writing packed in the 
boot, the guitar and a couple o f  plants and some clothes, wandering around going "I'm so 
sorry for taking two inches o f  your lounge-room’ because nobody can afford spare rooms 
anymore because Sydney rents are really high, y ’know everyone’s a stress nut because they're 
all working their butts o f f  just to pay the friggen rent, y ’know so that was really hard, I ended 
up in a refuge for like three weeks, and 1 was so depressed, I had a massive breakdown while I 
was doing som e temp work, and I ended up wandering around the city one night, completely 
anxiety o f f  my head like just, didn’t know who I was just couldn’t handle anything jus froze 
on the street corner . . .  1 was working at the Commonwealth Bank up on the eleventh floor, I 
was doing the finance ...  and that was killing me that was physically really really difficult it 
was so painful, that’s when I knew that, RSI was becoming really serious, because what I 
could do before, keyboard robot, I couldn’t do anymore right, I was just seizing up, and I was 
having so much pain and then going home to this fuckin refuge, and I'm like I'm I'm I'm for 
godsake. I'm like 38 or som ething and I’m like homeless and I've got all these skills.
In this highly lucid account, Sam conveys the feeling of alienation and dislocation of 
being shut out o f an urban condition that is neither recognisable nor accommodating. The 
travelling ex-hippie with her life packed in a car returns to find herself at odds with a new 
space o f subjectification. one that has become literally constricted, as if space itself had 
now become a precious commodity by the mid 90's. The generality of Sam's 
observations convey something o f a new ethos o f urban life that has become increasingly 
compressed and desocialised. Her only recourse is to seek emergency accommodation in 
a refuge from which ensues a heightened sense o f marginalisation -  exhaustion, anxiety, 
isolation -  the project o f  freedom is unexpectedly derailed as the bio-mechanical 
assemblage o f self ’seizes’ up under the new conditions o f subjectification. But despite 
this painful, almost bewildering transition, activity persists in the form of low paid, casual 
employment. The tired services o f the ‘keyboard robot’ living out of car and refuge are 
the only remaining foothold with which to extricate oneself from the material and 
psychological conditions o f personal distress. In a rhetorical display of incredulity. Sam 
is left to ponder what went wrong. Despite reconstruction o f the self -  the endless 
retraining, the belief in a new project o f freedom, the personal transformation from 
busker/waitress to personal assistant -  she wonders how, by the age of 38. she became 
homeless and exhausted.
Conclusion
In this chapter. I tried to gain sense o f how participants have managed the changed 
conditions o f work since the 70’s up to the present. For those who first entered the labour 
market in the 70‘s we find it is not work itself that is the source o f insecurity but the
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management o f personal distress and freedom. Work is constructed as a taken-for-granted 
possibility -  easily recyclable and interchangeable -  while other personal and familial 
instabilities are played out in the foreground o f the narratives. The contrast 1 want to 
show, however, is how the nature o f work itself becomes the source o f insecurity as 
personal distress and continuous self-management become embedded among new 
problems o f finding and keeping secure and meaningful work.
By the 80's, flexibility o f work, particularly for younger participants, is constructed as 
both a source o f freedom — a means o f exploring better working conditions within the 
labour market, finding casual work that does not require specific educational attainments 
-  and a source o f  insecurity -  work is susceptible to retrenchment, is increasingly 
temporary and casualised and, for some, requires living in alienating and isolated 
conditions. For the participants who have had longer experiences in the labour market, 
insecurity is also associated with the mismanagement o f risk, the failure o f governing 
oneself rationally and responsibly. Among the more distressing examples, an acute sense 
o f ambivalence, self-blame and personal regret is associated with the failure to conduct 
oneself as rational, resilient and self-directing subjects, despite the narration o f personal 
trajectories that indicate high levels o f psycho-social distress, disadvantage and systemic 
marginality.
There is also evidence among participants in their late 20's and early 30's of 
experiences that seem to reject the normal, moral circuits of flexible wage-labour in order 
to engage in a kind o f  identity work that is linked with risky and liminal forms o f work 
within the black economy. These statements o f ‘counter-activity' -  forms of activity that 
masquerade as dependency and claim benefits as a way of managing the risk o f these 
liminal sectors o f work -  might be better understood as practices o f resistance rather than 
forms of immoral and aberrant conduct. In the case o f Jabe and Con, we might think of 
these marginal practices as examples in which practices o f freedom go ‘underground' to 
invent alternative solutions to the problems o f identity and autonomy. Rather than 
discourses o f dependency, I would suggest that contemporary forms o f marginality are 
also linked to the endless ethical work required to become flexible wage-labourers.
295
Lastly, there is evidence o f statements cited by both older and younger participants 
that spaces o f community are not necessarily a solution for integrating the marginalised 
and 'the excluded'. Indeed, discourses of dependency, idleness and pathology would 
seem to have the opposite effect o f revitalising and regenerating bonds of community. 
Discourses o f  ‘counter-dependency’ -  statements that distinguish the deserving from the 
undeserving poor -  and discourses o f ‘counter-community' -  statements that constitute an 
aberrant class o f  anti-citizens -  drive further divisions between the poor, and increase 
stigma and desocialisation. For those, like Pete, who place themselves within their own 
transcendent moral communities, constant moral management, the narration of virtue and 
strategies o f distancing are also methods o f managing ambivalence, uncertainty and self­
blame.
With the exception o f  Sam who employs a critical discourse o f work and welfare, a 
dominant tendency am ong participants is the use o f moral/psychological discourses to 
locate dependency within the misconduct o f individual behaviours. And what is generally 
missing is a political or structural context of deprivation which might otherwise locate 
marginalisation and vvorklessness among conditions o f inequality, insecurity, under­
employment. and various obstacles o f finding secure work in the labour market.
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8 ‘Regulation’
The theme ‘regulation' explores how contemporary apparatuses of government seek to 
fabricate an ‘active society’ by installing various technologies of control designed to 
reform subjectivity. The argument is made that while contemporary welfare 
administration adheres to disciplinary techniques of acting on the conduct of welfare 
recipients there is also evidence o f new techniques of control which are immanent to 
practices o f activity. That is to say, modern procedures o f power not only act directly on 
the conduct o f recipients, but on the networks and relations, the forces and capacities, in 
which they are enjoined to participate. The task is to diagnose a form of power that no 
longer simply adheres to the disciplinary space o f enclosures -  the dole office, the job 
centre -  but employs techniques o f  modulation -  continuous monitoring, perpetual 
training, psychological mentoring -  to reconfigure the capacities o f recipients within 
frameworks o f behavioural obligation. The transformation o f the latter is largely a 
technical revolution in the sense that information technology and electronic databases are 
increasingly used to m onitor and track the claimant’s position. The creation of job 
networks and the contractual management o f recipients are designed to calibrate and 
transform conduct in such ways as to maximise individual autonomy, and restore the kind 
o f self-regarding behaviour that has become synonymous with labour market activity.
To be clear, the principle o f regulation is understood as a productive phenomenon. 
The conditions according to which subjects are formulated refer to the kind of power that 
not only unilaterally acts on a given subject as a form of domination or repression, but 
also activates or forms the subject. Subjectification is a productive phenomenon 
inasmuch as it designates a restriction in the power of production. To understand this 
phenomenon it is necessary to show how political power specifically targets the ethical 
sphere of individual conduct. Rather than simple domination, power is understood as 
inserted within the very practices through which the self acts on the self, by which self 
comes to know  the self as a self. There are two broad themes in which I investigate this
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phenomenon: "from regulation to modulation’ traces the subtle operations o f power by 
examining the effects o f regulation/modulation upon subjectivity; and ‘self-management 
in the age o f activity" examines technologies o f the self in relation to medical and 
psychological surveillance, and continuous forms of obligation and training. Through the 
mediation o f medical, psychological, moral and other hybrid discourses, it becomes 
possible to show how modem technologies of government operate through the 
constriction and intensification o f ethical practices of freedom.
From regulation to modulation
In the age o f activity, neo-liberal rationalities of welfare reform seek to induce useful 
forms o f social and economic participation by targeting the ethical sphere of self­
formation. In this case, subjects are enjoined to think o f themselves as certain kinds of 
subjects, and manage themselves according to principles o f freedom and obligation. 
Among the following participant statements I want to recover a number of experiences 
which illustrate the difference between regulation and modulation and how both kinds of 
practices work to produce the very objects they seek to control. Across a range of 
different welfare positions, it is possible to show how control strategies are embedded 
among narratives o f  self-formation.
Surveillance
Mary is a 37yr old single mother receiving a pension and an education supplement 
while studying part-time at university; she works sporadically on community 
conservation projects, and for ten years has worked casually as a life model. In the 
follow ing account, M ary describes the experience of applying for the pension in 1992. an 
awkward event in which she must manage the position of ‘single mother" while also 
concealing the identity o f the father who requested he remain anonymous:
The first tim e I cam e back to Penrith, I caught a train for the first time, baby in a sling. I 
remember sitting in the guard’s carriage by m yself kind o f  you know, and caught a taxi up. 
and I had this terrible, terrible encounter, oh it was the first time 1 went to social security to do 
all the paper work ...  Mv God, well, I guess I looked the part, I had this huge old fashion 
pram, you know with a veil over it, I was on my own and I went down to go and do my 
paperwork and the questions, because Mark had clearly stated to me that he didn't want to be 
identified and I had to answer the questions right, and there was this bloke on the other side o f  
the counter, saying ‘What, father unknown? What do you mean father unknown? Like what 
does that m ean?', you know, ‘Does that mean you were shagging more than one guy at once?'
... and I'm like- wounded my God, and mv hackles were up, I was furious, but I was crushed.
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you know, mortified and yeah that was horrible, and 1 couldn’t do the paperwork. 1 fell apart 
at the seams, took my big pram back to my little house ... 1 had to go back to sanctuary, you 
know, safe haven.
It is noteworthy how an abject relation to the self is produced within the institutional 
space o f the dole office, a space in which the moral gaze o f the male public servant 
intensifies a position o f sexual misconduct, and the embarrassment of claiming support. 
The statement 'I  fell apart at the seams' suggests the dissolution o f self and the painful 
loss o f composure. Collapsed and demoralised, Mary returns to the private space of 
security only to later return with the support o f a male friend. Strident and prepared, she 
returns to the dole office to complete her application ‘And we got it sorted and it was 
okay, but I  needed that moral support, to actually to be there on my own, because I  was 
out on a limb having this baby in the first place because you know, I  got the thumbs down 
from Caesar, Caesar sa id  ‘No ’, but I  was lucky ... I  strongly felt that it was the right 
thing to do ' .
I want to contrast this event with another that occurred just a week before the 
interview, some 11 years later, to illustrate how welfare authorities induce a very 
different, albeit subtle, relation to the self. In the following account. Mary presents a 
narrative o f progress marked by seasonal change and nostalgic affection for her daughter. 
The tone and direction o f  the narration conveys a secluded and intimate bond between 
mother and daughter set amongst the background o f natural processes and physical 
growth. But the contiguous themes o f ‘progress' and ‘single parent pension' form a 
tenuous relation, the former is disrupted by a recent ‘hiccup' wherein Mary is forced to 
engage in the m anagement o f her welfare position:
And we are just com ing into spring, the peach blossom flowers for the first time since being 
here, and when this tree com es out it is total complete immersion in this deep pink and it 
happens the month o f  my birthday and all the symbols were strong, like all spring, I’ve got a 
photo o f  her in this old wheelbarrow ... and she is throwing leaves everywhere and she's this 
tiny little thing, and you know, she is covered in jasmine and I’m just piling the jasmine on 
top o f  her and you know, w e had a really amazing time and we played, and Mark was on the 
other side o f  the world and I would sit at night and diligently write. ‘Oh she's so beautiful, 
she's so am azing’, you know, ‘She is so like you and she’s ’ you know, and I processed a lot 
just by writing it down that way, and yeah, and things have just progressed. I have been on the 
single parent pension the whole time, had a little hiccup last week actually, that made me feel 
like ‘Oh I am so over being dependent’.
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The anomaly she refers to occurred when her male flatmate applied for unemployment 
benefits some weeks earlier. She describes receiving ‘this big heavy letter' and invokes 
the administrative language ‘our cross referencing has indicated..." to convey the sudden 
interrogation o f her welfare position. Cross referencing suggests that because a male of 
the same address was applying for benefits, Mary’s conditions of eligibility had possibly 
changed; the implication being that single mother and male lodger were partners and 
fraudulently claiming benefits. This instance of control is markedly different to Mary's 
first encounter in the dole office. Electronic management o f client databases effectively 
operate at a distance, casting an omnipresent form of surveillance. What is striking is the 
efficacy o f surveillance in reactivating a position of dependency rendering ’progress' 
provisional and insecure: ‘and I  suddenly got all uppity and precious about my benefit 
you know, and I  m thinking this is no good to be like this, um but all he 'd  done was 
lodged forms because his work was erratic". Modulation is not simply monitoring the 
poor, but inserts monitoring within the very practices by which the self forms a relation 
with itself. Mary is thus reminded that a position o f dependency is contractual, 
provisional, and even inferior to the state o f freedom and security derived by one's own 
labour.
Perpetual training
Sam cites the institutional space o f the ‘dole office" at a time when social security was 
expanded under a Whitlam Government in 1973. She narrates an account of intense 
resistance after being denied benefits on the grounds of moving from an area of high 
employment (city) to one o f low employment (country). It is interesting to note how a 
psychological subject o f  ‘hysteria’ emerges within the institutional space. But rather than 
the production o f the psychological subject some thirty years ago, I think this story 
conveys a more recent production, in which case the language of 'fatigue' and 
'depression' has become a recent condition of assistance, and an interminable position 
from which past relations o f  the self are reassembled:
In those days you  didn’t have a security guard like, like I, realised a few years ago when did 
they appear in dole offices and we didn’t notice them appearing and suddenly now they're 
always there, like I can remember the days when we got our dole in a cheque (laughs) um. 
anyway, sooo  yeah the dole office was in Bega, I chucked a wobbly and started becoming 
hysterical and abusing them and yelling at them, and crying all at the same time, and saying
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If you guys had an apple between you you wouldn’t know how to divide it, you don't have 
any idea what your talking about’ blah blah blah I was jus completely ranting and raving and 
hysterical, and then it was like ‘Calm down madam and come and sit down and I’ll give you a 
cup o f  tea', right, and that’s how I got the d ole... cause I chucked a wobbly in the dole office 
in front o f  everybody who was standing in the queue, and no one had done this before, it 
wasn't usual, now it’s usual you could go down to Redfem and see an argument in the dole 
office every other day.
In the institutional space where rational discourses discriminate the deservingness o f the 
poor. Sam must present herself as an irrational subject, the pathological woman of 
hysteria, to subvert rational criteria of eligibility. But 1 think the appearance of the 
irrational, psychological subject signifies her present welfare position as someone who 
must actively assemble oneself as psychologically or medically flawed in order to align 
herself with current regimes o f eligibility. This is not to say subjects intentionally 
fabricate a position o f  pathology as a tactic o f resistance. Rather, it illustrates a 
correspondence between neo-liberal discourses that produce pathological subjects, and 
w elfare recipients who must assume, for one reason or another, a position o f pathology in 
order to obtain benefits. The recent appearance of the ‘security guard' is also a timely 
reminder that irrational conduct is no longer a viable tactic for obtaining benefits; the 
'cup o f  tea' has been supplanted by physical removal from the institutional space.
Again. I want to contrast the institutional regulation of the dole office w ith another 
event some 19 years later. 1992 marks a context o f underemployment and economic 
scarcity -  the recession years under a Keating Labour Government -  where the new 
language o f ’unemployability" begins to signal the shift of responsibility from the state to 
the individual. Under the new implicit social contract of the early 90's, welfare recipients 
are expected to take on as much o f the responsibility to transform themselves into active 
participants o f the labour market. This tactical reformation of the poor corresponds to an 
explosion o f government retraining schemes during this period:
I spent most o f  1992 ...  looking for a job, and that was that terrible recession we weren’t 
having according to Paul Keating, and I was going for job interviews where 200 people were 
applying for the sam e jo b ... and there was just no way you were going to get to the short list 
o f  the interviews, and if  you did you still didn’t get the job. and it was unbelievable ... by then 
Y'know, w e 'v e  got things like JET Schemes coming into the y'know we don't have the JET 
centres anym ore w hich were like small and friendly and taught you how to make jewellery 
(sarcasm), w e ’ve got . . .  to do these computer courses and we y ’know ‘W e’re going to give  
you this benefit only i f  you do six weeks worth o f  training in that period o f  time', so we've  
got to get all the single mothers back out into the workforce scheme, hit that market, and so I
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was getting calls and letters and stuff by then from CES people sort o f  y ’know Mary so and so 
who was in charge o f  this programme and that programme, it’s all designed to sort o f  
rehabilitate m e back into the workforce, y ’know and that was OK and ... now managing the 
pension was much harder because they were really pushing m e... like the funny thing was 
they were trying to get me trained but 1 was overqualified for their courses, and I’d go to their 
friggen stupid courses, and w e’d have, 12 women in a class and one guy learning ‘How to 
m ove the cursor around the screen’, and I could ... format a 60 page document in an hour, 
y'know  that's like som eone’s thesis or something.
In the above account, control operates via more ‘active’ welfare policies designed to elicit 
an enterprising relation to self. For instance, we notice a shift from the institutional space 
o f ‘office counter’ regulation to the active reconstruction and reskilling of single mothers 
to return to wage-labour. The skills privileged by the new labour market o f the 90’s no 
longer require the quaint ‘arts and craft’ activities of the 80’s, but are specifically geared 
to a new industry whereby single mothers are ‘pushed’ into low paid, white collar clerical 
work. But the old vestiges o f  paternalistic authority are also encoded in the pedagogical 
context o f retraining ‘and  we ’d  have 12 women in a class and one guy learning...' There 
is something both patronising and redundant in the way these programmes are designed 
to 'rehabilitate' women whose integration in the workforce is tantamount to a recovery 
from some long-term illness. In Sam ’s case, strategies o f modulation would seek to 
reconstruct relations o f self on self by aligning computer literacy with the promise of 
autonomy. But the clear signs o f resistance encoded in this account suggest the 
imperative o f perpetual training was, if anything, a precursor to physical breakdown and 
exhaustion '[Do you  feel the system let you down?] Abso-friszen-lutelv. Totally 1- look 
they were the one s that pushed me into secretarial work, and they pushed, and I wasn 7 
one o f  those people who sa id  ‘I 'll ju s t do your course to keep you happy', I was one o f  
those people who rocked up earlier and said ‘Show me. sive me the knowledge. I 'm 
hungry for it and then went back six months later and said 7 want to teach the course ', 
y'know I wasn t one o f  those people who just sat in on the computer course, I just think 
all my energy went on working for people'.
Rehabilitation
Another characteristic o f modulation is not simply that subjectification is intensified 
or enjoined to obligations o f activity, but that continuous monitoring has become a 
condition o f welfare receipt. This is painfully conveyed in Jay’s narrative who explains
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the ordeal o f applying for Sickness Benefits in 1995. Her ‘official’ diagnosis of Chronic 
Fatigue Syndrome specifies a somewhat nebulous medical category for a cluster of 
chronic pathologies ranging from physical exhaustion, depression, hormonal imbalance, 
hyper sensitivity and mental fog. But what is well-established among the literature and 
among the experiences o f those suffering from CFS is the difficulty o f convincing the 
medical profession o f its legitimacy. Jay’s narrative was at times very painful for her to 
tell, especially at one point when she describes being ‘abused’ by one Sydney Doctor 
who accused her o f  ‘malingering' before ejecting her from the surgery. In the following 
account she describes having to deal with ‘Social Security Doctors’ every six months to 
reinstate her benefits:
.. .but then you have to deal with social security doctors, huh the first one hadn’t even heard o f  
it (incredulous) [Social Security have their own doctors?] Y eah... um and I still have to deal 
with them occasion a lly ... and they don’t know, they have no idea, they just assess you, but I 
think, they look at you and they try and work out if  you’re genuine or not, y ’know but (sniff)
... um. you do have to go, 1 think when you’re on sickness benefits, you have to see. get a 
new certificate every six  months I think it is. I’m not sure, but that’s about that... so you have 
to go through it again every six  m onths... um, which I think is fair enough, in most cases but 
when you ’ve got som ething that people don’t know what it is, and there’s no test for it... 
that’s what they h ate ... there’s n o ... they can’t do a blood test, and say ‘You-have-got-this’, 
um. it makes it. awful, y ’know it’s your- it’s your word against, theirs’ sort o f  thing.
The difficulty is not merely that one must continually present oneself as the subject of 
pathology -  the flawed psychological subject, the subject o f physical exhaustion -  but 
that one's welfare position is continuously provisional. The medical gaze must remain 
objectively naive o f one’s medical history in order to iterate a consistent diagnosis. There 
is something about the repetition o f this procedure which reinforces and reproduces the 
medical/psychological subject. But in addition to medical regulation and endless 
reassessment, the medical encounter intensifies the experience o f being a pathological 
object, it enhances the uncertainty with which it forces one to engage in a relation to self 
as an anomaly; after all, it is Jay’s word against the word of the medical profession, and it 
is the objectivity o f  the ‘medical test’ upon which one’s welfare position is either 
conferred or revoked.
In the year the Howard Government assumed office, 1997, Jay reiterates the difficult 
transition from Sickness Benefits to Disability Pension at a time when control strategies 
sought to rehabilitate the unemployable by inserting them into circuits o f work and
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activity. In the following account we find not only evidence o f the 4huge pressure' with 
which the incapacitated are redirected into ‘'work programmes', but we notice a relation 
to self that actively seeks and desires the possibilities of reformation. For the subject of 
pathology, rehabilitation presents ‘real hopes' o f reformation, that is, to transform one's 
remaining capacities into useful forms of activity and autonomy:
[How did you get the pension?] That’s that’s quite a thing it’s um ... you can’t stay on 
Sickness Benefit for more than two years ... so at that point Social Security tried to get 
every body back to work, there was huge pressure on you to get you back to work ... 1 did see. 
Comm onwealth Rehabilitation people, um which is ... they try to get you o ff  sickness, or 
pension, and onto, som e sort o f  work programme, that was unbelievable huh (incredulous) 
[Why?] I had real hopes for that because I thought ‘Well, surely I can do something, they can 
retrain me to do, som ething. I’ve still got a bit o f  a brain left and I can still walk around’, but 
they- they're set up to do the sheltered workshop thing for people who are um... 
developm entally delayed, that’s one end o f  it, and then there’s the other end o f  it for people, 
who might have had an accident or, or in a wheel chair or something, they had nothing, for 
people with long-term illness, it’s not just what I’ve got there’s lots o f  things um ... so they 
don’t deal w ith that, that’s not their department, so that was a waste o f  time, and that's all 
there is . ..  I was supposed to miraculously get better, I think, or go away or something, so I 
had to go through the Social Security doctors ... and that’s when I got the one w ho’d never 
heard o f  it. an d ... I think they had to report it so, he jus, put the OK stamp on it because he 
didn't know, suspected that I might be genuine, and he didn’t know ...  and then I was on the 
pension [H ow  did you feel about that?] Written o ff  basically.
In this account modulation constitutes a form o f training that is expected to reform the 
incapacitated. Here, I am reminded o f the administrative vision o f Bentham's Pauper 
establishment, where even the most impotent or ‘useless’ pauper is rendered expedient. 
According to Bentham ’s principle o f ‘Self Provision’ every pauper was thought to 
possess some utility, some capacity to labour, up to the level o f their subsistence. I think a 
similar principle is preserved under contemporary programmes o f "rehabilitation, though 
we are no longer dealing with the space o f internment, nor the kind of self-provision 
connected to institutional subsistence. Via the therapeutic circuits of rehabilitation, the 
subject is to work on themselves under the paternalistic guidance of the health 
professional, to recover as much capacity as possible to thereby minimise or dissolve 
their dependency upon the state. But Jay encodes a critical account o f someone who 
neither falls w ithin a position o f psychological deficiency, the 'developmentally delayed . 
nor a position o f  physical incapacity, ‘people who might have had an accident'. The 
chronically ill subject is relegated to a hopeless position, left to ponder whether there is 
anything left o f  the self that is capable o f work ‘I ’ve still got a bit o f  a brain left and I  can 
still walk a ro u n d . The transition to the ‘pension’ is not a victory, but an abject position
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of endless regulation; it confirms a relation to self as one that is permanently outcast from 
the world o f autonomy and activity.
Breaching practices
Under the present regime o f control strategies, even a temporary welfare position is 
no longer a secure space for the management o f freedom. Consider the case of Pete, a 33 
\ear old PhD student, who worked as a full-time Youth Worker for ten years before 
reinventing him self as a promising researcher and academic. Before working for the 
Department o f  Community Services, Pete cites numerous occasions of claiming 
unemployment benefits over short durations. Among these instances of assistance, 
welfare is conveyed as a kind o f ‘stop-gap’, a hiatus, between transitions in the labour- 
market. By 1999. and with only two subjects needed to complete his degree, he describes 
having to apply for unemployment benefits after the Government Education Allowance. 
Austudy. ceased payments on the grounds that his workload had dropped below full-time 
study. In the following account. Pete conveys the on-going difficulties of managing a 
w elfare position w hile completing the final year o f his degree:
I experienced lots o f  problem s with them, you know, they wanted me to fill diaries out and ...
I can remember ringing up and making an arrangement with someone at Centrelink and then 
getting a letter to say that I’d been docked because I hadn’t done something that I was meant 
to do. but I had actually already arranged with somebody else that it was okay to do that, and 
there was another tim e where they said that I had to bring in my diary, I didn’t have a diary, I 
didn't bother filling one out, but I just- but they told me I could do it on a piece o f  paper, so I 
did it on a piece o f  paper, brought it in and showed it to them and they said ‘No worries’, um. 
rubber stamped it, and then I got sent another letter to say they'd docked my pay because I 
hadn't brought in the diary, when I actually had, and that took quite a bit o f  talking around to 
get them to believe m e that I’d actually done that, I had to bring it in again, then I got another 
letter to say that the first semester w hile I’d been on Austudy, um, that I hadn’t been entitled 
to that Austudy because I w asn’t a full-time student at the time because they’d done cross 
referenced database check on the student records, and I duly informed them that I definitely 
had been a full-tim e student, that I’d done three subjects that put me into that category. I'd 
brought in the paper work to verify that which I had gotten from administration at university, 
and that wasn't good enough, they needed a particular type o f  paper that had a particular 
number on it to satisfy their criteria, so eventually I got that after lots and lots o f  arguing w ith 
them and lots and lots o f  drama after them then telling me I owed them $3,000 or $4,000 and 
they w ere taking the m oney out o f  my bloody dole.
Here we find numerous statements that exemplify the kind o f control strategies which are 
now characteristic o f  the post welfare regime. For instance, the administrative 
requirements o f  the ‘job diary’ attempt to access the ethical life o f the ‘jobseeker' by 
manufacturing an ascetic relation to self. By ‘asceticism’, I mean the fashioning of a
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subject who is no longer merely a passive beneficiary o f the state, but more an 
enterprising consumer capable o f exercising the best possible choices for effective 
participation. In terms o f  this new administrative logic, the job diary serves two purposes: 
on the one hand, it induces a relation to self as a reflexive, autonomous subject, a ‘client' 
who is expected to master the capacities and competencies that lead to enterprising 
conduct; on the other, the diary renders this mode of self-reflection transparent to welfare 
authorities; it serves as proof o f ethical engagement, as well as a test of one's active 
obligations. But what is striking about Pete’s account is the continuous management 
required to maintain this position as the apparent jobseeker, a position that is incongruous 
with his own expectations o f activity. ‘ They docked my pay ’ exemplifies the disciplinary 
technique o f breaching practices for eliciting compliance, and ‘cross referenced database 
check on the student records' illustrates the use of electronic surveillance to monitor the 
honesty or progress o f  claimants. In either case, the claimant must continually 
demonstrate their contractual obligations as a rational, enterprising agent.
According to Pete, however, intensity of regulation corresponds to certain 
distributions o f risk, in which case areas o f high unemployment or poverty are inclined to 
attract more severe penalties and increased demonstrations o f compliance:
[Why do you think you  were getting such a hard time?] Oh there’s a few reasons, one is 
because um. it is in the outer Western suburbs o f  Sydney ... being employed in a place like 
that would be very very difficult and I think it would be very easy to com e to think o f  the 
customer as the enem y, um, I did notice a huge difference in the attitude between St Mary's 
Centrelink and K atoom ba Centrelink, Katoomba Centrelink was very nice, they were very 
helpful, they're not there to try and um, prove you wrong basically, they are there to help 
[W hy do you think there is such a contrast between St Mary 's and Katoomba?] Well I guess 
because it's got som ething to do with socio-econom ic differences, the high levels o f  poverty 
and stuff down there, it is just concentrated poverty in St Mary’s and Penrith ... There seemed 
to be a lot o f  resentment towards the customer and as soon as you got in there they were 
looking down their nose and they were automatically on the defensive ... I mean to be fair 
they were probably getting a lot o f  angry, disgruntled customers in their office, huge long 
lines o f  them, day in day out and they just became defensive, and um may even be attacking, 
the opposite, they w ere attacking their customers, they automatically assumed you to be in the 
wrong and you were guilty until proven innocent, that happened to me a number o f  times. I 
had to prove my innocence.
The language o f  'custom er  confirms that welfare is no longer an unconditional right of 
the citizen, but an economic and contractual obligation o f the consumer. But what seems 
to defy the mutuality between service provider and consumer is that some customers.
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depending on which sector o f risk they occupy, are required to demonstrate more 
obligation than those residing among less riskier sectors. The relational binary of 
‘attacking’ and 4defensive’ conveys an antagonistic and combative relationship between 
consumer and service provider. Statements such as these suggest that while policy itself 
might be neutral and objective, the personnel who inhabit and implement it are perhaps 
susceptible to the same kind o f biases implied by the logic of welfare dependency. In 
other words, it has become commonplace to associate poverty with a culture of ‘dole 
bludgers'. Pete touches on the same point when saying ‘They are trying to make an 
example o f  people who are over claiming benefits but it is also a vote winner. I mean, 
nobody likes a dole bludger ’. Thus, the continuous management o f the jobseeker is also 
sustained by the presumption o f guilt, that is. certain areas of risk are conflated with 
increased expectations o f  idleness and fraud.
Among this small selection o f narratives and statements it is possible to demonstrate a 
shift between strategies o f regulation and more contemporary techniques of modulation. 
Each kind o f control strategy, whether by including or excluding the poor, seek to elicit a 
particular relation to self. Among the accounts given, we might think of disciplinary 
techniques as practices which function within the institutional space o f the dole office, a 
site o f intensification in which claimants are to engage in a moral and rational relation to 
the self. Regulation adheres to a simple binary logic: eligible v ineligible, deserving v 
undeserving, healthy v unhealthy. Among more recent events, however, it is possible to 
recover a number o f  experiences in which welfare authorities seek to insert within 
experience itself a relation to self that renders control efficient and automatic. The 
omnipresence o f continuous surveillance, perpetual training, rehabilitation programmes 
and breaching practices seek to ethically reform subjectivity, which characterise just 
some o f the practices by which subjectification has become an instrument of governance. 
In each o f these cases, acting upon the relations by which the self maintains a relation to 
itself has become a novel technique for seducing or compelling subjects to engage in their 
freedom as active, rational, enterprising beings who must continually demonstrate their 
capacity for freedom. But given the many kinds o f resistance encoded in each of these 
accounts, this normative project is subject to so many local failures and challenges.
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Self-management in the age o f activity
In the age o f activity the management of self -  whether in the name o f freedom, 
health or prosperity -  is a project we are all enjoined to. To manage one's finances, one's 
health, one's career, or lifestyle, are symptoms of a regime in which individual conduct is 
increasingly called upon to manage the project o f self as a responsible and autonomous 
enterprise. That is to say, the language o f ‘the se lf  has become central to contemporary 
rationalities and discourses that seek to align the capacities o f individuals with the 
possibilities o f  flexible wage-labour. In the previous section, I demonstrated how this call 
to 'manage ourselves’ responsibly and autonomously is inserted within ethical practices 
to activate capacities that dissolve a relation o f dependency. In the following series of 
vignettes. I want to show how various technologies o f self-management are immanent to 
practices o f subjectification. Among local, specific and hybrid regimes o f everyday truth, 
people live and transform their lives according to specific demands, ideals and objectives.
Managing confidence
I want to begin with the youngest member o f the sample, Amber, to show how self­
management is not only tied to activity, but must overcome the psychological and local 
conditions that constrain it. Again, she invokes the theme o f relative deprivation and 
disadvantage to describe a small community that is unable to deliver its younger members 
adequate opportunities for economic participation. Despite these constraints. Amber 
draws on a psychological solution: young people should be encouraged to participate in 
'courses' which develop a 'work e th ic \ as if  to say ethical restoration will motivate the 
self to transcend the material obstacles o f community. In fact, there is a striking 
homology between A m ber's account, and current neo-liberal solutions that seek to 
promote a psychological relation to self by raising motivation, self-esteem, confidence 
and self-control to overcome problems o f youth dependency:
[What difficulties do people your age have to face] Um, there is not much in the way o f  
people, young kids I think that they should encourage, like do courses through school or 
som ething that encourages kids to work for or having that sense o f  work ethic, it is really 
like... most o f  my friends have all moved away ... but there are still the few that are hanging 
around town and doing the same thing and just not much, there is just not much opportunity, 
and it is quite hard to get that confidence up to move away.
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But even this account fails to resolve the ambivalence between programmes designed to 
restore confidence and build self-esteem, and wider structural problems of deprivation. 
Furthermore, it is interesting that programmes designed to ‘encourage' confidence are 
not presented as a solution to problems o f community itself, but psychological issues that 
inhibit young people from leaving community. And while Amber would seem to be 
referring to her peers, I think this account reflects her own problems of forming a 
psychological relation with oneself to ‘'get that confidence up to move aw ay'. For Amber, 
the solution to the problem o f freedom lies beyond the spaces of community.
When asked to describe her ‘lifestyle' Amber was ashamed of her current position 
' Well at the moment it's  not much, and I  am not real happy ... I  don 7 really do m uch'. 
She described the embarrassing contrast between her boyfriend, a carpenter, who wakes 
up at 6.30am to go to work, and herself who wakes at 10.00am. She hinted at the 
relational tension between activity and inactivity, and proceeded to describe a domestic 
space in which the se lf struggles for clarity:
[Does he put a little bit o f  pressure on you to be independent or something?] Yeah, not 
really independent, pressure on me because he doesn’t like seeing me not doing anything 
and 1 am not happy doing it and that is why he pushes me a lot more ... and I have got mum 
doing it as w ell, ringing up and saying ‘Have you applied for that job yet Amber? Make 
sure you ring them ’, so yeah, it helps me keep up ... push me along [Why do you need to be 
pushed?] Because it is so easy to sit back and just let everything flow by and you know day 
to day life . ..  and potter around the house and do the washing and stuff, it is so easy to 
forget ... and you lose that kind o f  confidence in going and asking people for a job and after 
while you think ‘1 don ’t even know i f  I can do it and not good enough, and haven’t worked 
for ages' and yeah it does, you need somebody to give you a bit o f  a kick.
The self engaged in mundane activity is projected into a vague and listless space, as if it 
were an object at risk o f  disappearing in the ‘flow ' o f ‘day to day life '. But it is interesting 
how a form o f paternalism -  the ‘push' o f her boyfriend and the phone calls from her 
mother -  seems to prevent this slide into dissolution. Paternalism figures as an external 
force that acts at a distance by encouraging and inducing the psychological restoration of 
one's powers to engage in enterprising activities that lead to employment. In this account, 
we are reminded o f  how paternalism reinstates a psychological relation to oneself as the 
proper locus o f  control.
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Managing unemployment
Jabe narrates a difficult transition to welfare, an experience that is conflicted by 
feelings o f depression and constant incitement by welfare authorities to find work. Her 
official position o f ‘intensive support’ is one besieged by paternalistic monitoring and 
coercion: 'now you get a letter every week. go and do that, go and do this, go and do that, 
and go and do this, go and see these people, you must do this, you have a meeting with 
this, you have these form s to f i l l  in, you know, you cannot avoid i f . For Jabe it is not a 
question o f whether a psychological relation to self emerges -  given her extreme position 
it w ould seem unavoidable -  it is more a matter o f what kind o f psychological subject is 
capable o f managing both depression and coercion:
When I got sacked, I got really really depressed and I’ve only just started to come out o f  it 
because 1 am the kind o f  person, I can’t be depressed for too long, if  you let yourself spiral, 
you'll let you rself spiral and I don’t see that as healthy and it is, yeah it is hard to maintain a 
positive attitude, but it is som ething that you’ve got to do, you know, a like a lot o f  options 
available to you, so  at the moment, I buy newspapers, 1 go to Centrelink and look for jobs. I 
do all my Centrelink stuff, I bitch and whinge about being poor and not having a job and how 
it sucks, but no one w ill em ploy me when I’m capable.
In the above account we are told the ‘depressed' self is not the 'kind o f  person' capable of 
finding work. The solution is to reassemble oneself in terms o f a conception of 
personhood that eschews depression as a negative and unhealthy reaction to 
unemployment. Though depression might be an understandable or even typical reaction 
to job-loss. the psychological language o f ’attitudes' re-establishes a locus of personal 
power: on e must establish a positive ’frame o f mind' and reconstruct oneself as an 
autonomous, rational jobseeker. Whatever regime of self she invokes, Jabe is forced to 
maintain an alignment between personal control and imperatives o f activity. But even the 
fabrication o f self as ‘resilient' is strained under the compulsion o f seeking work over and 
above the material constraints o f poverty and unemployability. This project is rendered 
all the more precarious if we consider the lingering symptoms o f pathology which 
threaten to constrain her ability to engage in competitive freedom ’/  knew I  could do them 
[those jobs], hut I  ju s t d id n ’t get them, and I  don 7 know why, I  think, sometimes, is it 
because I m too tall, particularly with a straight job, or do I  ju s t come across as being 
not the right kind o f  person?'
310
Managing exclusion
An obvious condition o f poverty is the risk of social isolation and marginalisation. 
This is certainly well established among ‘exclusion’ and ‘participation' discourses 
whereby economic activity is presented as a solution to poverty. But for someone like 
Jay. a permanent welfare position is a double bind: Chronic Fatigue is a disease of 
activity, and welfare is a position o f institutionalised poverty. Marginalisation is 
multiplied by a condition o f  physical incapacity and a position o f economic scarcity. The 
logic o f self-management, then, is to overcome marginalisation by engaging in social and 
economic participation, but this is almost the reverse o f the neo-liberal project of 
freedom. Rather than participation being the practice o f managing freedom, in Jay’s case 
participation is also the practice o f escaping the imminent threat of social exclusion:
[Describe your lifestyle at the present] ... um, almost a recluse... I don't have enough money 
to. go out very often, um m m ... I have a part-time job cleaning which I do on my own, that's 
just two two or three hours a week ... and I'm actually thinking I just have to get a job where, 
there's p eo p le ... because I’m getting, too, I got too used to being on my own and... I'm 
getting to the point where I’m going to be, an eccentric old um ... hermit, if  I don’t, have 
something to drag m e out, more often, um ... [Do you see work as offering you opportunities 
to get out?] Yeah just um, being sociable on a everyday level rather than go out... to, a party 
or something w h ich ... is probably not very good for me it costs too much but... still try and 
get. dressed up and, take m yself out for one o f  the big parties every year [What sort o f  parties 
do you go to?] U m m , just the big leather party, what’s it called Inquisition ... [Are you into 
fetish?] Yeah w ell I w as, you can’t be when you’re poor I gave it up, you can’t be a poor 
fetishist, but yeah I use to love all the, the clothes and things ... it’s putting on another 
persona... um. but I think I’m past it (questioningly).
Beyond work and disability, self-formation is also the exploration o f other possible 
identities. For instance, the big fetish parties allows Jay to explore different circuits of 
being and becoming which perhaps transcend the closed identity o f the disability 
pensioner, but even this project is constrained by the material limits of poverty. In any 
case, sociality is both an affirmation o f producing other selves and a negation of the 
permanent welfare position which she feels closing around her. Together, scarcity and 
identity requires constant management, and by the end o f her narrative we are left 
uncertain as to whether the physical constraints of her condition are capable o f managing 
the threat o f permanent marginalisation.
Managing masculinity
For some, the self becomes the focal activity to reconstruct autonomy and regain a 
sense o f self-control. It is not benefits o f wage-labour that is tied to the possibility o f 
freedom, but a constant work on the self as the locus of personal power. In other words, 
freedom is tied to a project o f self-improvement. This is the kind o f story narrated by 
Con. who. after contracting Hepatitis C, rejected biomedical treatment to engage in his 
own project o f  self-management. He describes ‘discovering T ao \ ‘meditating' and 
'reading books' as examples o f more active solutions than accepting the passive and 
uncertain trajectory o f  chronic illness. Drawing from a broad range of different 
technologies -  Eastern mysticism, popular psychology, self-help literature and dietetic 
regimens -  Con describes the ability to regulate and minimise the symptoms of illness 
which, in his case, entail the management o f fatigue and severe digestive problems 
(bowel pain and diarrhoea). A relation to self emerges in the form of a body that demands 
continuous 'responsible' management, and to which a project o f self mastery is practiced. 
But this theme o f  self-mastery takes on a new significance as Con describes the end of his 
eleven year welfare position. By 1998, the statement ‘they really started hassling people' 
confirms how. under a Howard Government, welfare is no longer a tenable position for 
the management o f  freedom: ‘they cracked down on a lot things ... being on the dole 
wasn't as much fun ... the cost o f  living got higher’. In 2001, Con reluctantly accepts a 
position as a cleaner for the State Rail Authority and is forced to rework a masculinity 
which seems at odds with a brave new world o f menial, unskilled labour.
In the following account, Con is describing the sexual advantages o f Tao and the 
sense o f resilience and male pride it gives him to know that he has a skill o f which other 
men are ignorant. What is interesting about this account is the way notions of self- 
improvement and self-mastery compensate for a world o f work that seems to undermine 
masculinity:
[But it's about being a man isn ’t it?] Not only that it’s like y ’know people look down on you 
status w ise, even where I work now I’m a cleaner, people look down on that y ’know ... I'm 
not proud o f  being a cleaner I’m jus, it doesn’t matter because ... I know that I’m definitely 
experiencing stu ff that people aren’t ... even though people are making a hundred grand a 
year it d oesn ’t matter because like w e’re all the same ... but I'm proud o f  the fact that like I 
aot o ff  me arse and, I don’t know if  it was whether y ’know some people go 'Oh, it was God'
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whatever but ... the information they should have taught us at school they didn't, and now 
I'm learning stuff like y ’know that Tao book alone is better than all my years at school [I'm 
getting a very strong sense that Tao made a very significant impact on your life, it's improved 
the quality o f  your life . . .  and it’s helped you to manage pain] And confidence and o f  course 
being a man and confidence and, y ’know like it- some people get depressed- like I know a lot 
o f  people who at the m oment drugs and depression but ... it's very hard for me to get 
depressed because 1 know that um, I get shit money but I can turn that m oney into more 
money, and umm, y'know  I got a girl that 1 really like and, I can make her happy 1 can make 
m eself happy, and um I’m working out and ... because um, before I use to meditate I use to 
feel good, but with the gym  y ’know for me, doing all this shit it's ... not shit but I mean like, I 
use to look down on that stu ff y ’know it’s a wank but for me it's a new meditation, at the 
same time I’m getting stronger and healthier, and um, y ’know jus, being able to have energy 
levels that I didn't have as a teenager even y ’know, and I'm thirty three now.
Outside the world o f menial labour, the project of self becomes a means o f reclaiming 
self-pride, psychological security, and physical health and strength. A loss of status and 
income -  the price paid by C on’s transition from welfare to work -  is compensated by a 
relation to self that has becomes the locus o f personal power and self-control. The ability 
to work on the self, to make oneself happy, to enhance one's powers, is conveyed as the 
great leveller o f class and status. In the absence of financial control, or esteemed 
employment, morality and power are collapsed into the self as the only space or activity 
that can be controlled through technologies o f self-improvement. The locus o f freedom is 
not tied to the domain o f  wage-labour, but reworked in terms of enhancing the physical 
and psychological capacities o f the self.
Managing rationality'
One o f the effects o f  welfare reform, especially the more punitive measures o f 
control, is to produce a relation to self as an agent capable o f making rational choices. 
This is exemplified by Pete who narrates the events o f 2001-2 at a time when Centrelink 
had launched an aggressive campaign against recipients who were over-claiming benefits 
7  had been inform ed that Centrelink were prosecuting people ... they were scoring 
political brownie points by prosecuting people fo r  claiming m oney'. Sometime later Pete 
received a letter from Centrelink stating that cross-checking database records confirmed 
he had received unemployment benefits while working part-time, and had accrued a 
$5000 debt. After consulting with a solicitor, Pete was advised to immediately pay back 
the money, which he borrowed from his brother, hoping the matter would end there. The 
solicitor gave some assurance that Centrelink were more interested in targeting serious 
cases o f fraud where recipients had been claiming benefits 4under multiple identities'
over many years, in which case 4they are probably not going to be wasting their time with 
somebody' like y o u '. Two days later Pete received another letter from Centrelink stating 
they may prosecute. Pete responded by writing a letter of apology ‘/  have made a stupid 
though unintentional m istake', he thanked them for their support over the years, and 
hinted that he was currently working for ‘a government institution ... which was 
implicitly saying that i f  they went ahead and prosecuted me and I  received a criminal 
record that I  w ould be back on unemployment benefits, anyway they decided to charge 
me, so I  received a summons and had to go to court'.
Pete describes a *very turbulent and traumatic' period o f facing the prospect of a 
conviction that 'w ould  have pu t a big dampener on all the work I  have done at university 
because it would have made it so difficult to get a position'. Out o f this intense position 
o f subjectification. the rational subject must assess the legal possibilities, manage fear 
and uncertainty, and ‘choose’ the best possible course of action to evade conviction:
What I was concerned about at that time was trying to build a case, I wasn’t sure whether to 
plead guilty or not guilty, when you look at the wording o f  the Act it actually says the charge 
was that three counts o f  knowingly receiving money that I was entitled to all o f  um and then if 
you look at the fine print o f  the Act it says that full liability applied which means that whether 
you knew or not it is still considered to be knowingly, even if  you didn’t know you can still be 
charged for know ingly doing it, so you are expected to know, you must know that, the onus is 
on you to make you rse lf aware o f  the Act and o f  the laws pertaining to that Act even if  you 
don't know that is not an excuse ...  you must avail yourself, you must know the law.
After speaking to numerous solicitors and a barrister, Pete faced the awkward decision of 
pay ing a large sum o f  money for good legal representation, even when there was little 
guarantee he would escape without conviction: 'I 'd found  out that people were appearing 
in Penrith Court for sim ilar sorts o f  incidents and some o f  them were actually being 
jailed on the firs t offence ... all the solicitors I  spoke to except fo r  the guy that was going 
to charge me five grand, said that [no conviction] would be very very very difficult to 
achieve, if not impossible and that it would cost money to do that'. But a solution would 
emerge not through formal consultation with the legal profession, but an informal 
connection through his wife, a solicitor who advised that it might be advantageous to 
represent himself: ‘he was the firs t one to suggest to me that there might be a certain 
advantage in representing m yself as I  am reasonably articulate, I  have got my story 
straight and I  could  represent m yself fa irly  well'. The prospect o f self-representation.
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though the cheaper option, entails the management o f an acute sense o f risk and 
uncertainty 'I  fe lt  I  was taking a risk, the night before the court case I  had two lots o f  
solicitors ring me up to make sure that I  d idn’t want their help and one o f  them more or 
less told me that I  was a big show o f  going to ja il i f  I  d idn ’t get m yself proper legal 
representation, m y interpretation o f  it was he was trying to scare me into ... he wanted 
the business, and  it scared me a bit but I  knew what I  was doing and at the end o f  the day 
I pleaded gu ilty '.
After weighing the risks and assessing his legal options, Pete pleaded 'knowingly' 
guilty d  offered the argument that I  was under the impression that you were allowed to 
earn up to S5000 and  all the rest o f  it and the magistrate accepted my story and released 
me with no conviction on a 12 month b o n d . Legally defending oneself and successfully 
evading conviction requires a particular kind of rational subject, a subject capable of 
presenting oneself as rational under stressful circumstances. But despite one's educational 
background and knowledge o f institutional processes, Pete still invokes chance as a factor 
o f success:
I think that um having som e sort o f  a background, institutional knowledge, working in 
institutions, w orking for the government, going to university, being reasonably articulate, 
educated. 1 w as able to negotiate the system in such a way to get a favourable outcome which 
even for me w as a very, very difficult thing to do, there was a lot o f  uncertainty and fear and 
still at the end o f  the day it could have gone either way, I could have got a bad magistrate, 
w hatever, he asked m e questions, he wanted to see if  my story was consistent, if  I would trip 
m yself up. the prosecutor, when I said I was under the impression that I could earn up to 
$5,000, the prosecutor actually stood up and said ‘Well in his favour your Worship, that was 
the case when I w as at university’, so I even had the prosecution on my side, I could have had 
a bad prosecutor, I could  have had a really hard core magistrate which they have in most court 
houses, it is usually like Russian roulette the magistrate that you get. so I think it was a 
combination o f  skill and luck.
Given the complexity o f these circumstances, it seems unlikely that many welfare 
recipients would have the same access to education, knowledge and good fortune, unless 
o f course they are prepared to minimise their risks by hiring expensive legal 
representation. At any rate. Pete's story conveys the extraordinary lengths one must go to. 
both emotionally and rationally, to evade the punitive measures o f welfare authorities 
who now prosecute the more vulnerable sectors of the population. In the following 
statement. Pete gives a concise overview o f the current direction o f welfare reform, a
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regime o f continuous monitoring and coercion designed to induce a rational relation to 
self:
They are trying to make an exam ple o f  people who are um over claiming benefits but it is also 
a vote winner, 1 mean, nobody likes a dole bludger, no, you see if  you have statistical proof 
that all the people w ho have been prosecuted, that makes the government that is implementing 
that programme look good ...  and I guess the other thing is to keep people in line ... and 1 
think another really big thing is with Centrelink their strategies at the moment are trying to get 
people o ff  benefits bv m aking their life as difficult as possible, they have breaches, you have 
got to turn up for all these ridiculous interviews and courses and you have got to prove that 
you have gone for so m any jobs every fortnight and you are interrogated all the time about 
how many jobs you have gone for, where you have gone for them, what are the phone 
numbers o f  the em ployers and all that sort o f  stuff, they are trying to intimidate people to get 
them o ff  unem ploym ent benefits.
Conclusion
In this chapter. I explored participants’ encounters with welfare authorities to 
demonstrate a clear shift in the use o f control technologies which seek to maximise 
participation in the labour market, and reduce passive reliance on welfare benefits. 
Participant narratives reveal a shift from the disciplinary regulation o f institutional spaces 
to the use o f more subtle practices o f modulation which operate increasingly at a distance. 
These new forms o f  ‘ethical government’ employ a range o f techniques and strategies -  
continuous monitoring, perpetual training, rehabilitation programmes, the use of 
electronic databases and cross-referencing tools -  for eliciting the self-governing 
capacities o f individuals. Participant testimonies confirm the existence of both 
disciplinary and ethical techniques which intensify the call to manage ourselves 
responsibly and autonomously.
Practices o f  self-management reveal a broad range of subject positions in which 
participants are expected to engage in the rational reconstruction o f conduct. Some of 
these positions are complex and uncertain -  managing the enterprising jobseeker, the 
unskilled labourer, the chronically ill and excluded, the poor and legally prosecuted -  
each o f these positions demonstrate the available human technologies we apply to 
ourselves for the calculated management of fear and uncertainty, autonomy and self- 
mastery. happiness and fulfilment. In many of these cases the language of psychology is a 
key resource for re-establishing ‘the se lf  as the site o f personal power and the proper 
locus o f control. But psychological discourses, I think, also work to conceal some of the
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material difficulties and structural obstacles that also pose problems for the management 
o f self and identity. On occasions, evidence of marginality according to pathology, 
education or community are silenced or relegated to a minor role in participants' 
narratives as explanations tend to focus on rebuilding the capacities o f a psychologically 
autonomous agent.
Pete's final statement reminds us that welfare is no longer a position where 
individuals can take ‘time out’ to compose or reorient themselves in relation to the labour 
market: it no longer rests on the implicit faith o f the ‘wage earners welfare state'; and for 
those unable or unwilling to activate themselves in responsible ways, welfare is no longer 
‘free insurance' against marginality and insecurity. Instead, welfare is fast becoming the 
only space for ‘housing’ the impotent and deficient. But even this final bastion of 
assistance -  where subjects are left to continuously rehearse stories of pathology and 
failure -  the impotent and incapacitated are expected to engage in some form of 
rehabilitation for the market. In the attempt to weed out ‘dole bludgers' and ‘welfare 
cheats', welfare is now increasingly provisional and cast with a presumption of suspicion. 
The self-managing capacities o f the poor, the young, the sick and the idle are intensified 
through techniques that seek to elicit continuous demonstrations of autonomy, rationality 
and responsibility. In the next chapter, I discuss the final theme o f diagnosis -  to examine 
how freedom itself has become central to practices of self-formation.
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9 "Freedom’
In this chapter, the category o f freedom applies to a set o f ethical statements about certain 
conditions, practices and possibilities o f self-formation. I treat these ethical statements 
not as the anti-thesis o f  government -  a state freedom beyond repression and subjugation 
-  but as the ‘ontological condition’ o f ethical self-government (Foucault. 1997a). 
Freedom is not the opposite or ‘lack’ o f power but a necessary condition for its exercise 
and operation. I am therefore interested in how ethical statements o f welfare recipients 
suggest we are both governed and govern ourselves precisely in terms of our freedom.
Under ‘advanced liberalism ’ the freedom of subjects is central to understanding 
procedures and strategies o f  contemporary o f power. Subjects are now impelled to think 
of themselves in the vocabularies and mentalities that optimise our capacities for 
practicing freedom. Expert discourses increasingly address individuals as active subjects 
by acting upon the technologies by which individuals engage in ethical activity. 
Psychological knowledge is arguably a key technology in the government of self as we 
become enjoined to think o f ourselves in the language o f self-realisation and self- 
fulfilment. ‘The s e lf  has become the site for maximising personal power, and 
transforming ourselves in ways that increase happiness, autonomy, confidence and self- 
control. As psychological subjects, we are required to render our lives meaningful by 
actualising ourselves, and by engaging in the personal choices that enhance our freedom. 
In the following vignettes, I will show how psychological technologies o f freedom -  the 
ethics o f subjectivity -  are coextensive with modem forms of government.
There are two kinds o f ethical questions I ask in relation to the corpus: ‘what ethical 
work is being conducted on the self?’ and ‘what kind of ethical subject do we aspire to 
become?' There are two positions I wish to explore in relation to the kind of ethical 
projects emerging from the corpus; the first being evidence o f how subjects apply 
psychological knowledge as a work o f self; and the second being the ethical activity
arising from the subject o f pathology. The former examines how psychological 
knowledge is integral to the project of freedom, and the latter examines how 
pathologising discourses intensify the ambivalence o f freedom. Both psychological and 
pathological discourses raise important implications for thinking how the government of 
welfare recipients operate through the open possibilities o f self-formation and the 
continuous moral management o f marginality.
Psychology: ethics o f personal power
In this section. I explore four accounts ranging from Amber, the youngest participant 
(19yrs). to Mike, the oldest participant (50yrs), all of which encompass a broad variation 
o f positions from age, gender, geography, from single mother to unemployed 
professional. In each account, I investigate how psychological discourses assemble 
ethical agents who engage in their own unique practices of freedom. At the level of 
subjectification. psychological knowledge is a key technology for governing at a distance, 
that is. by conferring to an ideal agent the capacities to govern oneself as responsible and 
free.
Amber
For Amber, the fantasy o f freedom is not a space outside the labour market, but the 
locus of two modes o f  activity: lifestyle and flexible labour. Beyond the limited 
possibilities o f community and her current welfare position. Amber describes freedom in 
terms o f mobility -  the mobility o f a lifestyle conjoined with the possibilities of flexible 
labour -  'I  have w anted for ages to travel around and ju st have like experience, think 
different lifestyle and  different people and do different things rather than being stuck in 
the same job or just doing the same thing for the rest o f  my life, or just having this one 
career that limits me to certain things'. Under present conditions o f labour market 
activity it is no longer reasonable nor possible to demand a ‘job for life': and it has 
become a normative condition o f the present that younger members o f the labour force 
seek flexibility on the basis o f constructing the self as flexible, mobile and
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heterogeneous151. For Amber, the ethics o f freedom is not connected to professionalism, 
skill development or career ascendancy, instead, the flexibility o f wage-labour facilitates 
the maximisation o f 4experience’ by fostering personal growth and promoting the active 
construction o f lifestyle. Freedom is a practice o f self-formation that is both distinguished 
from, and dependent on, the flexibility o f the labour market.
Like so many times in Am ber’s narrative the problem of freedom is never fully 
reconciled. In the following account all the familiar devices are present: the small country 
community bereft o f ‘opportunities' and the present constraints o f her welfare position. 
But the construction o f  a world o f possibilities beyond welfare and community begins 
with a psychological relation to self. For instance, after returning to Bellingen and 
refusing to engage in any kind o f work perceived as backward or menial (the degrading 
position o f the supermarket checkout girl is invoked as a familiar example). Amber 
explains the realisation that *money is money and work is w o r k as if to say the 
constraints o f one’s freedom are merely moral and psychological rather than material and 
structural:
I think that there is a lot more choices elsewhere, like when I moved back from Sydney and I 
said to mum 'I am never going to work in a supermarket, I am not going to do this and I am 
not going to do that', and then after about a year I asked mum 'I wonder if  they have got any 
jobs at the ch eckout’ . ..  I don’t know it is just the situation I am in and I am not happy and I 
am starting to realise that you can’t be too choosy and money is money and work is work and 
you have to do the shitty jobs som etim es to move on and do something better, that's how it 
goes, you can’t just jum p into the right job straight away and expect that that is going to be it. 
then um the fact that I am open minded about it all rather than ‘I am only going to do this’, 
especially in town where there are not that many opportunities, or that many different kind o f  
jobs ... everyone has so many options, it is only limited by what they think is, the limits 
around them, but 1 mean like if  I really wanted to I could get up and leave, I mean I have done 
it before on less than what I’ve got now and did it, so it is just m yself that is making it a 
problem ...  so in that sense that is where my freedom if  you like is a little bit limited ... it is a 
lot harder to do it. but like really I have got nothing holding me back. I can go and do 
whatever I want.
In the space o f  a year Amber describes something of an ‘attitudinal’ change in relation to 
the limited possibilities o f the work. Despite the material constraints of "just the situation 
I am in' and various 'shitty jo b s ' , it is primarily self-realisation that establishes a new 
ethical relation to work. Flexible labour is desirable only if one is free to construct
1:11 This statement also reminds me o f  the ‘reversibility’ o f  power under neo-liberal government; by this I 
mean, before flexible w age labour became associated with insecurity, casualisation and fragmentation, it 
was the workers who first demanded flexibility o f  work (Buchanan, 2003).
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oneself as a heterogeneous agent o f experience, but it forms a recurring problem  where 
flexible labour is relatively constrained, insecure, low-paid and homogeneous. In the 
absence o f any real change in the material circumstances o f community, it is primarily a 
psychological relation to self that emerges as a new valuation o f work: the “shitty 
checkout jo b ' is transposed into a lucrative possibility, not because material 
circumstances demand any  form of paid work, but because self-realisation view s menial, 
casual labour as a moral transformation o f self.
I am reminded o f recent discourses which, in the absence of any genuine flexibility o f 
the market, maintain that individuals must take on any kind of work. For exam ple, the 
former Minister o f  Employment Services, Tony Abbott, is reported saying that the “picky 
unemployed' must take whatever work is available (Sydney Morning Herald. 12 August 
2000. p.9). Discourses o f  the ‘job snob’ exemplify the kind o f moralising arguments 
designed to disparage those who would expect better opportunities from the labour 
market, not because there are apparent deficiencies in the labour market, but deficiencies 
among those who would expect better opportunities from the market. Taking pride in 
oneself as “open-m inded' is the only recourse for avoiding the title o f  jo b  snob. In 
Amber's account a critical discourse o f deprivation and inequality is subverted by a 
psychological subject that transcends material limitations. It is not one's environm ent that 
must change in relation to self, but the self in relation to one's environment. The logical 
extension o f this argum ent is that ‘everyone has so many’ options. it is on ly  lim ited by 
w hat they think is. the limits around them ’. The world is in fact replete with options and 
that any feeling or perception o f limitation is willed away as idle pessimism. W hat I think 
also belies A m ber's account is that these opportunities do not reside within the 
community she speaks of, but requires that she again brace herself to leave community 
and embrace the world o f flexibility. A psychological discourse facilitates ethical 
reconstruction o f  the self, to fashion oneself as active, mobile and resilient. It is by 
turning to “the s e lf  that Amber believes she can locate the personal resources to 
overcome her ‘irrational’ fears o f the market.
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Kate
For some who occupy relatively long-term welfare positions, themes of self­
management emerge as actual or possible solutions for enhancing freedom through 
practices o f autonomisation. For Kate, unlike her sister Amber, the possibilities for 
practicing freedom are more embedded among responsibilities o f family and security of 
community life. Kate does not invoke her sister’s discourse o f deprivation to describe 
limited labour-market opportunities, but indicates a different kind o f struggle as single 
mother. She employs a psychological language to describe the difficulties of inventing 
oneself independently o f  motherhood. In the following, the statement 'I  hold myself hack 
more than I  have to ’ suggests self-restraint is based on the irrational fear of temporarily 
leaving her two-year old son with carers:
Well I reckon 1 hold m yself back more than I have to, I want to go out and do some like sports 
and that, but I panic about asking som eone to mind Lou and I panic just about leaving him 
and if  he is going to cry, I can get my sister to mind him and she will. But 1 am holding it 
back. I mean I am the one that is freaking out about it, but I kind o f  need to get out and do it 
... I want to do like yoga and Thai-bo and all those kind o f  things, just to kind o f  like, work 
on m yself for a bit because I am really stressed at the moment with the whole kid thing. 1 
mean it is fun, but it is stressful because they rely on you every day, and 1 don’t know a lot o f 
women take it a lot easier than I do ... [Do you reckon your attitude about work has 
changed?] Yeah, totally, I want to go and work, I want to try new things and I want to get 
more confident where I was too scared to before [Why?] Because I am not, I felt I wasn’t the 
brightest person, and I didn’t want to look like an idiot when someone was trying to teach me 
something and I d idn’t get it and it is just kind o f  a big se lf  esteem thing, but now I think 
being a mum you get a new se lf  esteem and I want to go out and I want to learn things and I 
w ant to get a job  and I want to be a stronger person and I want to kind o f  earn money
Here Kate describes two contradictory positions: ‘single-mother' and 'worker'. The 
former constitutes the moral/irrational position o f the worried mother who must manage 
independence carefully and dutifully. The latter constitutes the superior moral/rational 
position o f the psychologically autonomous worker. The management o f these positions 
entail two different kinds o f work: the first is specifically ascetic -  activities of 'yoga' 
and 'Thai ho' literally constitute a physical work on the self to alleviate the irrational and 
'stressful' conditions o f  sole-parenting; the second constitutes the psychological benefits 
o f work itself. The old discourse of ‘moral and ethical transcendence’ o f work is 
reworked to express a psychological relation to oneself -  work is an ethical practice 
through which psychological barriers of dependency are dissolved. Freedom is therefore 
the integration o f  these two positions which, for the moment, seem dislocated and
unresolved. Kate can only assert a psychological solution to integrating ‘irrational 
mother' with ‘rational w orker’ -  ie. motherhood raises self-esteem, and self-esteem is a 
factor o f work -  but she gives very little sense o f the structural difficulties o f how she 
might integrate child care with casual, low-paid employment, and the complex forms of 
self-management this would entail. Perhaps it is ironic that Kate’s hope o f 'becoming a 
child-care worker' is also a fantasy o f combining child-care with secure employment.
Mary
Mary, who is thirteen years older than Kate, occupies a similar position as single 
mother receiving parenting pension. But there are important differences as well. From 
Mary's narrative we gain a stronger sense that the world offers more possibilities for 
single mothers, possibilities which are more well-defined than in Kate's narrative. The 
key difference is education. In M ary’s narrative education plays a more important role in 
the formative years before motherhood. She lived in the suburbs of Sydney, attended 
private school, and was constantly surrounded by educational influences in the family 
setting. I am reluctant to suggest that Mary’s background is ‘middle class’ only because 
she lived in a poorer part o f  western Sydney, and both her mother and father commanded 
a meagre income. But as an only child we sense a great deal was invested in Mary's 
education. These influences are almost entirely absent in Kate’s narrative where 
education did not play an important role in her upbringing. While university life was 
always an expectation for Mary, for Kate leaving school at sixteen is narrated as a 
personal choice. As we saw in the previous vignette, Kate narrates a story in which a 
‘stronger' psychological subject is required to engage in the possibilities of self­
formation. though the emphasis lies more heavily in becoming a certain kind of subject 
rather than engaging in any specific kind o f self-forming activity. Mary’s position, on the 
other hand, appears to offer more possibilities for personal transformation given her 
educational background and her physical location within a network o f employment and 
higher education.
An important m otif in M ary’s narrative is the notion o f progress. Since enrolling in a 
social ecology degree four years earlier, Mary successfully managed the roles o f single-
mother and student to reach a point where self-belief is tied to a sense o f personal growth 
and social responsibility: ‘I  feel like I ’ve got the capacity to make a contribution, I  feel 
quite um, called to, like I ’ve got beliefs but I  think that i f  I  don t act on them I'm  letting 
m yself down, I  could languish around but I  feel a very acute sense o f  opportunity and 
need to do som ething'. Freedom is an ethical project o f self-knowledge and self-growth 
that is tied to an ethos o f civic participation and environmental change. For Mary, 
progress is not only autonomy to transcend her welfare position through education, but to 
use her education to give something back to community.
Towards the end o f  M ary’s narrative a sense o f progress brings her to the intersection 
o f two possibilities: to either embrace the mobility o f career and take her transferable 
skills ' e lsew here\ or buy the house she is currently renting and consolidate a position of 
stability. It is interesting how an ethical project is constructed in terms o f the possibilities 
o f life beyond a permanent welfare position, a vision that is not altogether clear in Kate's 
narrative. In the following testimony, Mary outlines the openness o f a future in which 
ethical self-formation stands at the intersection o f security and changeability:
So I'm going to be directing a bushcare group for here whether we get the grant or not. yeah 
and hopefully m y plan is the evolution o f  this project to be able to put this into place will 
equip me with the skills to do that elsewhere, I feel like partly, I would love to just buy this 
house and just stay forever and a day, but also as you get older som etim es this I think ‘My 
God what am I doing with my life, there is places to see and things to do and got to do it. got 
to do it', so I don't know  I feel like if  I establish this park good thing. I will actually be free to 
leave, which w ill be a sad day but it has been a great time, it's been ten years ... In the past 
I've put a lot o f  concerted energy into that not happening, but I'm over that, like you go 
through a lot o f  processing in ten years and um, now I am at the point where ‘Hey man. 
nothing lasts forever, it is all transitory’, you can’t hang on to anything longer than it is meant 
to and there is other things to do, and I’ll actually be qualified, like before I've taken it 
relatively steadily I w ill be finished the degree when Christina finishes primary school, she is 
now in fourth grade, sh e’ll finish in another two years, so it is a four year degree, fingers 
crossed I w ill be able to do it in five, yeah, and then, like she’ll be free and I'll be free, and I 
was thinking the other day if  I buy the house, you know, don't close yourself o ff to 
possibilities, but how  would I buy the house, ‘Good question', you may ask. well you know, 
as I said before, you know [If you can pay rent, maybe you can pay a mortgage?] Exactly and 
it's getting easier and easier with possibilities [It is getting easier is it?] Well I guess in my 
mental attitude it is, you know, and it is partly how you perceive things.
Together tertiary education and a discourse o f participation constructs a world of 
possibilities beyond M ary's present welfare position, a position we already know she is 
happy to leave behind ' I ’m sick o f  being so dependent'. But the above account indicates 
that a great deal o f  work and self-management is required to bring these possibilities into
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fruition. In the past, Mary narrated a life where the position o f single mother disrupted a 
trajectory o f higher education, and the need for stability came at the price o f having to 
negotiate the morally tenuous terrain of welfare mother. But the fantasy o f opportunity, 
afforded by her educational background and her interests in conservation, assembles a 
psychological agent who admits that the possibility of financial and intellectual autonomy 
is a work o f thought: one must believe that life is ‘'getting easier’ despite the work ahead. 
I think M ary's position demonstrates that for one to escape a life o f welfare dependency 
one must believe that constant self-management and educational attainment offer genuine 
possibilities for social and economic participation. A psychological discourse is integral 
to making these possibilities thinkable.
Mike
Before turning to those whose practices o f self-formation are dominated by discourses 
of pathology. I want to discuss one more story. Mike is a 50 year old unemployed 
professional, who has enjoyed a distinguished and celebrated career as a journalist for the 
Sydney Morning Herald. Between 1999 and 2001, he twice received the highest award 
for Australian journalism , and describes himself as "the most experienced journalist left 
in Australian music j o u r n a l i s m By July 2001 he took 'voluntary' redundancy amid 
company cut backs, and has failed to find regular work since. Mike's story is both 
striking and disturbing. We are used to thinking of unemployability as those affecting the 
'bottom-end' o f  the labour market, those who lack proper education, skills or training. 
But in M ike's case we are presented with an extremely well-qualified professional who 
also describes him self as ‘unemployable '. At the 'higher-end' o f the labour market 
worklessness is endemic to "the modern e c o n o m y ‘that is the really interesting and 
significant thing because there are a lot o f  professional people now who are becoming 
retrenched, especially in the last two or three years with the failure o f  a lot o f  IT  and so 
forth, who are just unemployable really, nobody wants them, and these guys have 
incredible records, but it doesn 7 matter a damn because they are worth way too much 
money and nobody wants to employ them \
One o f the requirements o f  the flexible labour market is to meet the rapidly changing 
demands o f post-industrial society. In the age of organisational change and economic 
rationalisation, the term ‘voluntary redundancy’ has become a euphemism for company 
cut backs, downsizing and retrenchment. Even professional spheres of employment are 
susceptible to the exigencies o f the new economy. In Mike's narrative the unemployed 
professional is an anomaly to both welfare services and employment agencies. He claims 
that welfare services are geared towards the ‘lowest common denominator in that they 
supply the high demand for low-skilled labour. On the other hand, employment agencies 
now include very narrow specifications for whom they wish to hire. The most debilitating 
requirement is age. Mike cites ‘ageism ’ as the single biggest obstacle to finding work in 
his field:
There is total ageism , there is no doubt about it, I mean I went to an interview recently for a 
job which I was incredibly w ell qualified for and it was through an employment agency. I sat 
down with this wom an w ho was really interesting to talk to, and she said ... T will send this 
across and they are go in g  to tell me you are over qualified for what they want, because’ she 
said these days em ployers say I want a woman or a man between the age o f  30 and 35 with 
blond hair w h o’s 5 foot 6 inches tall’ ... and they demand exactly those things, and because 
employers these days want to pay less and less and less, the whole magazine industry is 
largely based around paying people between the age o f  25 and 35 low amounts o f  money to 
do a lot o f  work, so that is the m odem  economy for you
This kind o f bias towards hiring the younger professional has it own economic logic, a 
logic that would seem to contradict the protective policies o f anti-discrimination laws. 
The modern economy is, according to Mike, an enterprise that seeks to extract the 
maximum output o f labour for the lowest possible overheads, in which case it is older 
professional whose experience is made redundant under the ambiguous term ‘over- 
qualified'. In the context o f M ike’s narrative ‘over-qualified’ can represent any number 
of barriers to secure employment: one does not meet the preferred age specifications for 
employment: the younger employer is reluctant to take on someone whose work 
experience might be perceived as a threat to their own job security; but even the culture 
of professional work itself has shifted towards a more youthful image ‘everything is mm' 
pointed at youth culture and the workplace is also pointed at the youth culture in the 
same sense and you  reach 35 you are virtually over the h ilT . The aging professional is 
just as much a causality o f the flexible labour market as those to which welfare policy 
habitually refer, the poor.
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So how does the aging professional maintain a project o f ethical self-formation? What 
kinds o f practices o f self are required to keep a project of freedom in motion? In the 
following testimony a psychological discourse assembles one o f two positions: a 
'pathology o f w ill5 on the one side, and a ‘psychologically robust agent5 on the other. The 
language o f the latter foregrounds an enterprising subject capable o f reorienting self to 
the professional labour market.
[What hope do you have for the future?] I am just going to go on taking it day by day and 
seeing where it goes. I mean I can re-apply to the Sydney Morning Herald in July next year. If 
they aren't hiring then I will probably go back to Perth because 1 can go back to the West 
Australian in Perth probably [So there are prospects?] Oh look there are prospects, there is 
always prospects, you keep on doing what you can do but it is certainly difficult, it is certainly 
very hard and it is certainly not a place where anybody with a weak w ill would want to be, I 
mean I have, I know people who are going through the same thing and who find it absolutely 
devastating, and who are really developing serious psychological problems from that [Can 
you g ive m e an example?] Yeah, just cases where people are developing problems, lack o f  
se lf  esteem , lack o f  s e lf  worth, feel like they are failures, all that kind o f  stuff, and it is very 
easy to do that, you know, i f  you are not strong minded and if  you can’t convince yourself that 
just because som ebody doesn’t want to employ you doesn’t actually reflect on your own 
individuality, your ow n personality or anything else, you can really be under-whelmed by it 
and if  you are sensitive to all the things you are exposed to as people in these situations have 
to do. then it is a very demeaning process as well
A pathology o f 'w eak w ill' does some work to describe the psychological failure of those 
unable to compete in the professional labour market. Though Mike concedes it is easy for 
the dispirited jobseeker to become anxious, self-defeated and depressed, the adaptive 
professional is one whose persistence stems from some internal unity or resilience. 
Psychology goes a long way in making these ethical practices a natural and normative 
expectation o f the new economy: ‘my accountant lost his job  last year, he is older than 
me, he is 52, it took him 68 applications before he got a job, he got one in the end, it took 
him 68, the other 67 he was ideal for but too old, but he found someone who wanted an 
older, experienced man who could do a professional jo b \  The dangers of fabricating a 
psychologically robust agent is that anything short of flexibility is subject to a similar 
kind of moral/psychological scrutiny -  depression and pathology are reduced to an 
aberration o f will rather than a legitimate contradiction of the labour market.
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Ethics and autonomy
In the four accounts presented here I have tried to assess how psychological 
discourses assemble different kinds of ethical subjects: the psychological subject of 
choice i  can do what I ever I choose to do’; the psychological subject of asceticism i  
can overcome my fears by working on m yself; the psychological subject of optimism 
'Life is getting easier because I need to believe it is’; and the psychological subject of 
stoicism 'In my industry only the strong survive’. Each of these statements invoke an 
ethical relation to self as the locus o f personal power. The psychological reconstruction of 
the self deflects the ‘friction’ between practice and materiality as genuine obstacles to 
work. But a more negative application is its moral rather than ethical dimension, in which 
case the self becomes the target o f self-blame, self-defeat and abjection. The reason why 
full participation and independence is unobtainable for some is attributed to some 
internal, moral deficiency rather than a complex ensemble of material processes.
At the level o f subjectification, it becomes easier to grasp why a psychological 
discourse is such a useful technology o f government. The solution to the problems of 
flexible, equitable or secure labour resides among these ethical relations of self on s e lf -  
the solution to the difficulties o f freedom are transposed into personal difficulties. 
Psychological knowledge has become an expedient source o f political arguments 
maintaining that freedom is the moral responsibility o f a psychologically autonomous 
agent. But what disappears from view, or at least remains unresolved, are the kind of 
arguments that address the structural and material contradictions o f labour market 
flexibility.
Pathology’: ethics of exclusion
In this section. I examine how exclusion from the labour market is constituted as a 
position o f pathology. The term ‘pathology’ is taken to mean the set o f practices and 
techniques responsible for constituting an object in terms o f bio- or psychological 
deviation from a given norm. In terms of governing the free, pathology signifies a 
departure from full participation; all projects are altered or suspended as one becomes 
transformed by illness or abjection. Modem welfare provides a precarious liminal space
of assistance for the incapacitated and chronically ill especially when the ‘disability 
pensioner' is still haunted by its bad double ‘the pauper’ and the ‘benefit cheat'. In the 
following four accounts, I examine how pathologising discourses assemble different 
kinds o f ethical subjects whose exclusion from work is also a practice o f freedom, albeit 
consigned to a life o f constant self-management and welfare regulation.
Sam
In Sam's narrative freedom is not liberation from participation or welfare regulation 
but linked to the fantasy o f secure, full-time employment. Given a complex history of 
negotiating the exigencies o f  ‘single mother’, ‘hitchhiking hippie’, the transition from 
‘busker-waitress\ and finally ‘office robot\ one would think that persistent self-invention 
would be tantamount to a liberal reward of financial security. But Sam's 'great 
permanent jo b ' emerges as an unobtainable fiction. More painful, however, is the claim 
that she willingly participated in job-retraining programmes, thinking one day she would 
acquire the skills to secure full-time employment. In the following testimony, a detailed 
account of self-formation emerges when I ask Sam why she ignored symptoms of chronic 
arm pain and fatigue for so long. Resisting a medical diagnosis for three years reveals a 
strong and protracted sense o f ambivalence, torn between fantasises o f autonomy and the 
painful admission o f  pathology. The following is worth quoting in full:
[So why so long?] because I was doing what I’ve always done um Michael, I I put one foot in 
front o f  the other because I had no choice, I had to survive, so I work- I had worked through 
pain. I've alway s had back pain because I have lower back problems when I was younger, but 
... going through birth and thirty one hours labour just didn’t help, y ’know and then all the 
hitchhiking around the country carrying the guitar the kid and the nappies didn't help either, 
did I mention that I used to hitchhike a lot [Yeah], Yeah, um, so, my lifestyle and living in the 
bush and carrying shit around and all that stuff, that didn’t help um ... but. it was sitting at the 
desk and doing that sort o f  sitting in one position and going di di di de office robot y'know 
keyboard m ania, because everybody wants everything yesterday, and so. basically yeah . . . it 
did creep up on m e slow ly, and so even after when I came back from living on the North 
C oast... and I signed onto a few  temp agencies ... while I was looking around for somewhere 
to live and once I got somewhere to live and got a little bit more settled 1 could look for my 
great permanent job  that I had now spent many years gathering my clerical skills, and honing 
my. personal assistant charm or whatever (sarcasm) to um to get me y ’know a 45K a year 
package which I bloody well worked for- y ’know come from busker-waitress to there and. it 
was a pretty long journey and 1 reckon I deserve something good at the end o f  that yeah 
(laughs) and did 1 get it ‘N o ’ (laughs) oh dear oh dear... [Does that frustrate you?] Oh shit 
yeah, you bet ya, 1 did all their damn courses, 1 did every single one o f  their damn courses, I 
did so many courses, they steered me in that direction, they- all they ever had to offer me was 
office courses, and they still- they would still now be offering me office courses, they even a 
few vears ago when I went to do this- the Commonwealth Rehabilitation Service ah- course, 
programme, whatever that is, you get a case manager w ho’s like fourteen years old, and
329
doesn't know what to do with you (laughs), my work history is longer than their whole life, 
and um, anyway they offered me computer courses, 1 said ‘Which part o f  my file did you not 
read that said I have RSI, and arthritis because o f  doing secretarial work, that’s what got me 
into this m ess and why I’m here now talking to you, why are you giving me office work 
courses, hello bells and whistles, red flag’ ... They do not know what to do with me. I've 
always fallen through all o f  their nets, I’ve never fit into any o f  their categories... Over 
qualified for a lot o f  their assistance (laughs) which is really funny (sarcasm)
This rich account documents the transition from work to welfare despite an enterprise of 
autonomy and security. Freedom is the practice of on-going management via numerous 
attempts to ethically reconstruct the self as a flexible wage earner ‘'busker-waitress'. 
'office robot' and ‘personal assistant’. Sam gives an exasperated account o f why she 
ignored the symptoms o f illness and exhaustion. Because life was not a journey 
consisting o f simple rational choices, nor one that was entirely free of pain and material 
hardship. The theme o f ‘survival' lies at the complex intersection of lifestyle (counter- 
cultural practices o f self-formation), geography (limited employment opportunities of the 
country), single mother (sole and primary care-giver), and casual worker (flexible wage- 
labourer). Set amongst this background o f scarcity, survival is taken to mean that one has 
'no choice' but to 4work through the p a in \  conceding to illness would only guarantee 
further descent into poverty.
In the second half o f  the account, Sam gives an illustration o f the ethical activity o f 
the flexible worker. The transition from the ‘'North Coast’ to Sydney can be read as a 
story o f labour market reattachment, the first port of call being "temp agencies'. and then 
'somewhere to l ir e '. The ethical construction of the flexible worker is cy nically stated as 
the accumulation and refinement o f technical and interpersonal skills, now made 
redundant by her permanent welfare position. The presumed telos o f this ethical work is 
the putative promise o f  financial autonomy and security. Sam’s sarcasm embodies the 
disappointment and frustration that there are no guarantees playing the game of 
competitive freedom. Sam constructs an account o f exclusion from the market in the 
language o f the deserving poor, ‘y'know come from busker-waitress to there and, it was a 
pretty long journey and I  reckon I  deserve something good at the end of that yeah '. Sam's 
account gives a sense o f the tiredness of constantly re-inventing oneself, that even the 
demands o f low paid, clerical work outstrip the capacities o f the flexible worker "but, it
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was sitting at the desk and doing that sort o f  sitting in one position and going di di di de 
office robot y  'know keyboard mania, because everybody wants everything yesterday'.
Towards the end o f her account, Sam conveys the frustration o f complying with work 
programmes which seemed intent on ethically reconstructing women o f work-force age 
into clerical workers, a project which was more directive than based on free choice ‘they 
steered me in that direction, they- all they ever had to offer me was office courses'. Given 
the flexibility o f the market one might think that work programmes would provide more 
variable skills rather than highly gendered forms of clerical labour. Either way these 
paternalistic programmes reconstruct the capacities of the excluded by offering highly 
transferable market skills which attract low paid, casualised and intensely menial forms 
o f wage-labour. Sam ’s account invites us to think that paternalistic supervisor falls short 
o f individualised service delivery, in vyhich case she is still being offered clerical work 
even though a medical discourse confirms that RSI and arthritis are industry-related 
illnesses. Her account o f the 14 year old ‘case manager’ works to undermine the 
credibility o f paternalistic authority by suggesting public servants are incapable of 
understanding the exigencies o f unemployability. The statement 'They do not know what 
do with me' is a testimony o f governmental-ethical programmes failing to address the 
unique circumstances o f  the client.
Exclusion from the labour market on medical grounds is an alienating experience. In 
Sam 's case, being granted a disability pension is a not a victory, and certainly not the 
means by which one engages in a new career of dependency. A position of pathology is 
frequently circumscribed and disrupted by the very medical and psychological discourses 
that produce the pathological subject. Below. Sam illustrates that a position of pathology 
is not simply a discrete condition that excludes one from work, but an ethical activity in 
which one's whole life is reconstituted in terms of multiple deficiencies that prohibit full 
participation:
...despite the fact that I’d been a long term depression sufferer since I was ten despite the fact 
that I have chronic fatigue syndrome since 1987, so by the time I went for the pension I had 
depression, asthma, um, I had something akin to either having an ulcer or irritable bowel 
syndrome, but none o f  that’s been properly diagnosed (humour), um so I've had like daily 
abdomen discom fort one o f  my last serious jobs I had my employ er complained continuously
that I spent to much time in the bathroom... pff could I help it no (humour) huh... I have 
constant nausea, I have migraines, did 1 mention depression, I have back problems, I have RSI 
in both my arms hands fingers wrists elbows, above and below the elbows, and ahhhh, what’s 
the other thing I have arthritis in my neck, that was diagnosed in 2000.
The way Sam takes comfort in extending the list of pathologies suggests that ethical work 
is not only a kind o f moral management of the self ‘I am the deserving poor', but an 
activity o f self-formation that further excludes oneself from the world o f work. Unable to 
engage in a normative project o f competitive freedom, pathology marks out a dreadful 
position o f marginalisation. And the longer one spends out o f the labour market, the more 
one feels that the world o f work has left them behind -  the result is an acute experience of 
self-defeat and dislocation:
uni. I’m sick o f  just feeling useless, like I don’t fit anywhere anymore 1 can't do normal jobs 
because, my em ployers don’t understand i f  1 take too long in the bathroom or. I mean y'know  
because they’re more on that than the fact that my work is always done, and that I'm very 
very good at what I do when I can I can focus on it, at the moment I don’t feel I can focus on 
it, I don't feel I can focus on fucken anything, nothing, I’m just numb, I feel the world and I 
are quite separate at the moment, and um, but y ’know that com es and goes and then I have 
bursts when I’m really motivated and I start looking for things ... the hardest thing now is that 
I been out o f  the workforce long enough to be really out o f  sink, and not up to speed with 
skills and the computer stuff is passing me by and ... anyway even if  I was up to speed with 
the computer stuff, I simply can’t sit there the way that you need to be able to put in the 
physical um effort, o f  getting jobs done in the way that other workers can, and at the end o f  
the day em ployers are going to hire som eone who can get the job done without having all 
these health problem s...
Pathology is not necessarily a closed position. Sam still fantasises about activity but 
given the constraints o f her illness it is unlikely she will ever find secure, permanent 
work. So how does one practice freedom when chronic illness demands constant self­
management? The active policies of the new welfare means that even the chronically ill 
are still encouraged to think of themselves as active, enterprising agents, still capable of 
securing some kind of work. It is quite astonishing, however, that despite the links 
between pathology and her work history, Sam still speaks o f computer courses and 
clerical work, as if there were no other positions for Sam to reinvent herself as a quasi- 
autonomous worker. The problem remains that the ethical imperative o f rehabilitation 
programmes is to reintegrate the excluded through social and economic participation. But 
how does one reconstruct autonomy when the only options for self-invention is the 
competitive market o f menial, semi-skilled labour? These contradictions seem unresolved 
towards the end o f  Sam’s account: pathology simply means that there are increasingly
limited opportunities for market participation, especially when employers are more 
inclined to privilege the young and healthy. The practice o f freedom remains largely 
ambivalent: ethical self-formation is divided by a project of autonomy and a project of 
endless self-management. As practices of freedom in the labour market and those of 
chronic illness become increasingly polarised experiences, how can we expect the 
chronically ill to compete in the flexible labour market when they lack the resources to 
practice freedom? ‘'The hardest thing now is that I  have been out o f  the workforce long 
enough to be really out o f  sink, and not up to speed with skills and the computer stuff is 
passing me b y \  Under present neo-liberal forms of government, it seems the only way of 
closing this gap between autonomy and pathology is to continue reskilling the excluded 
in semi-skilled, flexible wage-labour.
Jay
In the previous chapter. I discussed how Jay's narrative conveys an ethical trajectory 
that must address the encroaching threat of social exclusion by engaging in part-time 
work. Again, there is nothing in this narrative to suggest a life of dependency is a 
conscious project o f self-formation, if anything dependency guarantees a life of further 
exclusion:
[...w hat do you fantasise about?] Huh ... a clean place to live, away from noise and dirt, 
cause I'm allergic to traffic fiimes, so just a quiet, clean place to live, but then. I guesss I 
should include in that, som eone to share it with because, all my life I've always thought I just 
want to be left alone I jus want a quiet place on my ow n... get away from here (feigned 
desperation), and I’ve got that, and I thought ‘Oh, hold on’ ah heh (chuckles) yeah, and it- it's 
just not human to survive on your own, it’s it’s y ’know I can do it but, I don’t think any 
human really, wants to ...and I always thought I’d have kids but um that’s not going to 
happen now [You don’t think so?] I’m too old now... and sick (upset)... [What would you 
like to be doing?] U h h ... a normal sort o f  life I guess, working, going out, no I never, wanted, 
anything, um concrete particularly, I don’t fantasise about having lots o f  money or, or that all 
I ever wanted was to keep learning and I think that distracted me from practical things a bit. 
y'know  I never thought about a career or, the marriage and kids thing because that's not what 
I was focused on, it’s not practical, but I actually use it sometimes heh (chuckle).
Jay fantasises about a space o f security and stability ‘a quiet, clean, place to live', and 
then proceeds to give an explanation why such a space is better shared with someone 
else. The point o f whether it is ‘human to survive on your own' is an important one since 
it works to counter the prospect of becoming ‘a hermit'. a lingering theme raised in the 
last chapter. The ethical activity o f auto-didacticism ‘all I  ever wanted was to keep
learning’ is perhaps the one kind o f practice o f self which kdistracted ' Jay from the 
normative possibilities o f companionship and family. But aside from career expectation 
and family, an ethical project o f freedom is more engaged in maintaining a sustainable 
level o f social and economic participation.
Similar to Sam 's account, Jay engages in educational practices of re-training with the 
hope that one day she will reach a position o f self-sufficiency. Education is subsidised by 
the government so that disability pensioners engage in active as opposed to passive 
welfare receipt. The 4education allowance' is a powerful incentive to encourage those at 
risk o f social exclusion to engage in the ethics o f participation. In the following account. 
Jay's experience demonstrates that governmental strategies are effective in instilling the 
self-belief that ‘computer courses' will lead to regular work:
At one point after GST came in, I was struggling to actually just survive, um, and I started 
worrying about housing you never know what ... but. I don’t know somehow things have 
eased a bit, when I’m going to TAFE and when you do that you get education allowance, and 
that helps ... At the moment I’m doing, Desk Top Publishing, learning Photoshop and 
Pagemaker. all that sort o f  stuff [What prompted you to do that?] ... ah I had this fantasy that 
one day I'd be able to support m yself again, u m ... I've been doing TAFE courses for the last 
couple o f  years, partly to get my education allowance, because that helps me to survive, but it 
makes me get out o f  the house um, my brain can cope with that level o f  education, and it 
might lead to som e work [What sort o f  courses have you done in the past?] Mostly computer 
courses um ... computer accounting [Why those courses?] U m ... they’re the sort o f  thing I 
think I might be able to get some work in eventually, um, that's what I'm looking at, and if I 
can never go out to work again, then maybe I can work from home ...it's  just getting the, 
practice, before you can get the work.
Despite the transferability o f computer skills, again we can wonder whether flexibility of 
the market is a plausible solution to the ethical reconstruction o f the chronically ill. It 
does mean that flexibility entitles one to participate according to the limits of their 
capacity , even the possibility o f working from home, but it also means the chronically ill 
must compete in the market place without guarantees o f security against discrimination 
and retrenchment. Though flexibility may provide some possibilities o f participation, it is 
doubtful whether those who occupy a permanent position o f pathology have the resources 
to continually compete in the labour market.
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Jabe
So far, I have examined the experience o f two women in their mid 40’s for whom a 
permanent position o f pathology has become a relatively recent transformation of self. In 
these two cases, pathology constitutes a position in which ethical practices are engaged in 
the management o f  stigma, dislocation and chronic illness. But management also entails 
the reconstruction o f  self in the form of an agent still capable o f flexible participation. 
The following testimony differs from these two experiences in the sense that pathology is 
constituted as a congenital condition. How does pathology in this sense impact on the 
practices by which subjects constitute themselves as free individuals?
Having lived with Marfan’s Disease all her life, Jabe’s narrative marks out a 
trajectory where the possibilities of self-formation are already limited by the medical 
prognosis o f 'a  shorter life span\ in which case there is little or no conception o f a 
'future' self. This absence of an ‘ethical telos’ signifies a departure from the 
contemporary rational project of self-formation, where enterprising subjects construct a 
biography o f self on the basis of some planned or anticipated project o f self-formation. 
For Jabe. the ethics o f pathology is exclusion from a normative project of freedom, in 
which case employability fails to emerge as a rational enterprise or long-term 
expectation. But having lived beyond her medical expiry date, she finds herself ill- 
prepared for the ethical requirements o f economic participation:
[Where do you think you will be ten years from now] Dead, ha yeah, dead, I will be really 
surprised if  I am alive [Why?] I don’t know, the thing about always knowing is that you have 
a shorter life span you never plan, 1 never plan for the future, I never plan for the future. I 
think I should have studied or did som ething while 1 had the time and the chance and the 
money, you know, um, I didn’t expect to be alive, you know, 21 was like 'W ow', like and 
now I am 28. and not only do 1 feel like 1 am getting older you know, it is weird being older 
because I never expected to feel older, and I never thought about it that it would be um a 
factor against me, my age, I never thought about it [You think age is working against you?]
Ah well yeah, people want younger people to work for them, you know, everybody loves a 
young person, and I don’t think I am that old, I really don't think 28 is old at all but as 
opposed to 20 you know, more often than not they are going to hire som eone younger.
Jabe's account reminds us that not everyone engages in an ethical project based on the 
normative aspirations o f personal development and employability. The statement 'I  never 
plan for the future' is arguably a symptom of the ethics o f pathology, after all, planning is 
for the ‘living and healthy’, but it also signifies an awkward relation to the present.
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Having exceeded the limits prescribed by medicine, Jabe conveys her exclusion from the 
labour market precisely because she never expected to have a future to plan for ‘7 think I 
should have studied or did something while I  had the time and the chance and the 
money'. But one can only regret these things retrospectively. At the age of 28, Jabe 
describes the anomaly o f ‘getting older' as an unexpected development, and as a ‘factor' 
that now works against a project o f self-formation. The peculiarity o f growing old is 
compounded by the dearth o f resources to engage in competitive freedom. Jabe invokes 
the young  person ' as the kind o f emblematic worker who is more able, more qualified, 
and subsequently more employable than herself, after all ‘everybody loves a young 
person '. Whether the latter is true or not is unimportant, the statement functions as true 
for a subject whose exclusion from the labour market is recognised as the incomplete 
w ork o f freedom.
The ethics o f pathology invoke a difficult trajectory o f employability where 
competitive freedom is not a level playing field, but fraught with material obstacles of 
deprivation and marginality. These difficulties are exemplified by a statement already 
discussed in a previous chapter, one that encodes a profound sense of ambivalence 
regarding Jabe’s prospects o f employability: d ’m not one o f  those people who gets 
employed really easily ... 7 don 7 know, I  think its because I ’m so tall and I  don 7 know i f  
that's an excuse or a real reason'. Jabe is left to ponder whether labour market exclusion 
is linked to chronic pathology -  a condition she is unable to change -  or whether 
pathology is an imagined obstacle to autonomisation. Either way the possibilities for 
governing oneself as responsible and free are conflicted and unresolved.
Con
In the name o f  ‘lifestyle’, the subject o f chronic pathology sometimes retreats from 
the conventional labour market and takes up a marginal position in which a very different 
project o f freedom is constructed. In the following case, freedom constitutes the work of 
counter-normative practices o f self-formation. For Con, it was not the rejection of work 
that produced an eleven year welfare position, but the rejection o f the regime of work, the 
'nine to f iv e ' , that formed a space with which to integrate the ethics o f lifestyle with the
336
promise o f security. But under the post-welfare regime, this position o f “counter-activity' 
(activity that masquerades as dependency) becomes an untenable project. The 
intensification o f welfare regulation succeeds in producing the autonomous worker who 
is forced to engage in a new ethical relation to self. Towards the end of Con's narrative, a 
discourse o f pathology remains largely submerged as practices o f freedom are 
transformed by the forced re-entry into the low-skilled labour market. It is not pathology 
that dominates the trajectory o f  self-formation (the management o f Hepatitis C), but the 
complex intersection o f practices o f self-mastery, the project o f an “alternative lifestyle' . 
and the constitution o f the full-time worker. The limitations o f pathology are implicit, 
while the relation between “lifestyle’ and ‘work’ form new contradictions as well as new 
possibilities for self-formation.
In the following account, Con gives a thumbnail o f life on the dole, a project that now 
seems a distant, nostalgic fantasy. Here I want to show how freedom is aligned with 
counter-normative practices o f an “alternative lifestyle’, that is, engaging in quasi- 
entrepreneurial activities o f ‘scam m ing’ (selling collectables and music for a profit), as 
well as ethical activities o f consumption, sociality and mobility. Con emphasises the 
present contradiction that secure, full-time work does not afford the same possibilities of 
freedom as the life he previously enjoyed on the dole. Instead, he invokes a discourse of 
the ‘working poor’ to support his conviction that the nine-to-five regime of labour is not a 
solution to the problem o f freedom, but a kind o f subordination to a moral project of 
responsibility:
[So where were you living?] Ohh, I’ve always lived in Fivedock. but I mean like I started 
hanging out in N ew tow n, and ummm, from hanging around people there, that’s when you 
discover like a lot o f  things, but its all things that you know ... you want an alternative 
lifestyle, you want, you want freedom, you want to fucken scam whatever you can. y'know. 
and um (coughs), but not bad things, just things to help you out financially and um, just things 
to keep you out o f  the nine to five and, 1 knew one day I'd have to do nine to five, but I was 
gonna, try as hard as 1 can, to keep out o f  it y'know, because um. like now I work nine to five, 
and y'know like I pay tax, and 1 pay my rent, I pay my bills and pay food, and I've got no 
money, whereas before I was going to fucken restaurants, I was going out every day and every 
night, m eanwhile m aybe w e’d go out like um, we both had girl friends who were friends and 
like. M onday, no one’s working ‘OK let’s drive to the Blue Mountains’ umm ‘Let's find those 
underground bunkers in the m ovie Stone, and like take photos’ ... ‘There’s a fucken mad 
m ovie playing at som e Chinese theatre let’s go see that’, ahhhh ... we used to go see some 
theatre, we used to um, y ’know som e m ate’d m ove out to Gosford I was like ‘Fuck let's drive 
there, and stay there for a couple o f  days’, y ’know and um, we did a lot o f  good things.
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For Con. the ethics o f counter-activity and the project of lifestyle are a work of freedom 
by virtue o f resisting the world o f low-skilled labour. The practice o f freedom is a line of 
flight from conventional work, but only a temporary one. The production of the 
autonomous worker is an inevitable consequence of a much wider field of governance 
where there are fewer and fewer spaces to escape the flexible labour market 'I  knew one 
day I d  have to do nine to five . but I  was gonna, try as hard as I  can, to keep out o f it 
y  know'.
To understand the intensity o f  this resistance we have to resist the temptation of 
viewing Con’s position as a simple moral deficiency and more a rational rejection o f the 
'wage slave'. Resistance reveals not so much as an aberrant activity, but a mode of life 
shaped by the rejection o f menial wage-labour. In the following account. Con describes a 
period of intense welfare regulation where he is directly confronted by the possibilities of 
life revolving entirely around a menial wage, not the least o f which is an anathema to 
freedom:
Towards the end they did when [Social Security] changed ... after 98. it was a bit o f  a hassle 
y'know and um. but y 'know  they- they want you to fucken go two and half hours, and I'd be 
like T 've got hepatitis I can't travel two and half hours' y ’know like um ... [So. when you say 
they hassled you, how did they hassle?] Oh. y ’know like ah, you want to go to this job two 
and half hours away, and it’s like y ’know, I’m not gonna go, work for three hundred dollars a 
week and travel two and half- two hours to work, and two hours back, y'know I might as well 
fucken be dead y ’know, like ... for m e, that’s what it was- that’s how strongly I felt y'know, 
and plus, because I w as fucken making all this cash y ’know like there was um ... there was no 
reason to y ’know
A discourse o f pathology emerges as a counter-argument, a tactic by which to parry a 
mode of existence that is closer to death than life. ' /  might as well fucken be dead' is a 
powerful reminder that for some the problem of freedom carries with it a great 
investment. The prospect o f spending four to five hours travelling for a menial job that 
pays only $300 a week is not a solution to the apparent dependency of the welfare 
recipient, but a sentence to a life o f subordination. The moral imperative of work is an 
anathema to a rational agent, homo economicus, who calculates a better life by adhering 
to counter-principles o f self-formation. To use Con’s words, ' there was no reason' 
sufficient enough to lure the welfare recipient into a life o f menial, low skilled labour: the
ethical formation o f lifestyle far out weighs the moral imperative o f work for its own 
sake.
Towards the end o f the narrative. Con describes the forced transition to work, a 
period that coincides with the new reforms o f welfare. The production of the autonomous 
worker, albeit in secure, full-time work, entails a new relation to self as an ethical agent. 
In the following account, Con describes his present trajectory as a cleaner for the State 
Rail Authority, a government position offering security in menial, low-skilled labour. 
What is interesting is how Con weighs the possibilities o f promotion with the demands of 
shift work. The lure o f  earning good money is the only incentive for moral reformation. 
But even this project is tentative and provisional:
[And you reckon there’s room to m ove in State Rail?] Yeah well cleaners are y ’know there's 
security guards there they that’s the shittest job but um, then there’s cleaner and um now I’m 
gonna be on the stations and then from the stations I can go to either Station Master which is 
good m oney there or you go to Train Guard, and a train guard you can earn, up to eighty 
grand a year [You're kidding me] N o if  you put in the hours you can but usually y'know  
they're like on seventy grand a year [Y ou’re kidding me for a train guard?] Y'know Stand 
clear doors closin g', and the only reason they get the money is because, they do the shift 
work, som e nights you m ight have to start at one and finish at eight y ’know or finish at seven 
... It will be shit but it’s but as long as like, y ’know I I would try that out for a year or two, 
depends what it does to my health, but i f  it doesn’t do nothing to me health I’ll stick to it 
because with hours, y ’know sleeping hours I can do things I can sleep for five minutes and 
recharge for a couple o f  hours y ’know, but um yeah it’s not it wouldn’t be a good job but 
y'know like for fucken up to eighty grand a year I’M do it, and then you can become ah a 
driver, a driver's on, like twenty five bucks an hour but as soon as you work weekends and 
after six and all that, they’re on a lot o f  money
Again, a discourse o f pathology emerges as a kind of limit-experience 'depends what it 
does to my health' which is a timely reminder that the demands o f shift work may have 
an adverse effect on the capacities o f the new ethical agent. Con is mindful of the 
potential contradiction between the economic imperative o f earning "a lot o f  money'. and 
the health risks o f an agent who must manage the exigencies o f chronic illness. But Con 
has recourse to an earlier discourse discussed in the previous chapter, ' /  can do things 1 
can sleep for five minutes and recharge fo r  a couple o f  hours' which, again, assembles a 
self-regulating agent, capable o f mastering oneself through various dietetic, psychological 
and Eastern technologies o f self. It would seem that between the reconstruction o f the 
new ethical, low-skilled worker and the subject o f pathology, we find a self-regulating 
masculinity, driven by economic incentive, as integral to the project of freedom. Practices
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of freedom are neither repressed nor reduced but transformed into the self-governing 
agent who is enjoined to an ethical project of autonomy and responsibility.
Conclusion
In the first section o f this chapter I examined different ethical projects in which 
welfare recipients narrate complex forms of self-management. Narratives of self­
management reveal desires and aspirations to become autonomous, flexible and 
responsible subjects. In the case o f Amber, the youngest participant, we find evidence of 
discourses which construct the sphere of flexible wage-labour as maximising the personal 
powers, choices and experiences o f selfhood. For those who occupy the more permanent 
welfare position o f single-mother, we find evidence of complex and, in some cases, 
unresolved forms o f self-management. For Kate, it is the narration of asceticism and 
overcoming psychological barriers o f dependency to explore forms of independence 
compatible with motherhood. Mary, who is 13 years older than Kate, narrates a story of 
progressive autonomy in which education and discourses o f social responsibility play a 
much larger role in the autonomisation o f self. Lastly, Mike, the oldest participant, 
narrates a story in which possibilities o f freedom are blocked by ageism within the 
professional labour market. Freedom is equated with survival by virtue o f assembling a 
robust psychological agent. In all these cases, psychological discourses seek to enhance 
freedom by constituting the self as the locus of control and responsible self-management.
In the second section. I examined the kind of narratives in which exclusion from the 
labour market is constituted as a work of freedom. Narratives o f chronic pathology and 
self-management reveal ambivalent and unresolved positions in which a return to work is 
by no means certain or possible. In Sam’s case narratives o f autonomy are linked to 
governmental objectives to transform single mothers into flexible wage-labourers. 
Despite constant self-management and transformation o f the self, the emergence of 
illness painfully ends her fantasies o f permanent and secure work. The multiple 
pathologies o f her narrative mark out the permanence of her welfare position in which 
pathology is the only position from which to constitute oneself as a moral agent. For Jay. 
pathology is more strongly linked to the threat o f social exclusion. Fantasises o f
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autonomy and security are linked to the management of marginality and the desire to live 
in clean, affordable housing. Jay confirms that economic participation in low paid, casual 
work and perpetual training are governmental solutions to combating marginality. Jabe's 
narrative shows that a life o f marginality and chronic pathology produces a precarious 
biography, one that fails to imagine or project an enterprising future o f cumulative 
development. Having been told by medical experts that she would not live to see her 21st 
birthday, at the age o f  27 she finds herself jobless, insecure and ill-prepared for the 
labour-market. Lastly, C on’s narrative shows how control strategies successfully 
transform resistance to wage-labour into active forms o f citizenship. The management of 
pathology becomes a means o f fashioning a new project of self which, at the same time, 
is a psychological escape from menial, low paid labour. Practices of self-mastery and the 
lure o f economic incentives are provisional solutions for the reconstruction of freedom.
Given the increasing demands to manage ourselves as rational, enterprising agents, it 
is not surprising that The s e lf  emerges as the locus o f personal power. Participant 
statements confirm that contradictions o f the labour market are ethically managed 
through the construction o f psychological agency. For those occupying a welfare 
position, we find that material contradictions pertaining to political economy, community 
and employability are transposed into personal difficulties. Governmental ethical 
practices act ‘at a distance’ by virtue o f assembling a rational, self-directing agent who is 
called upon to manage the self as responsible and free. It has become a condition of 
governing the labour market that subjects increasingly think o f their freedom in terms of 
the conditions o f  flexible wage-labour. For some of the interviewed recipients -  those 
who cannot participate in this putative project o f freedom -  are consigned to institutional 
abjection -  the endless regulation and moral management of marginality.
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Conclusion
In the preceding chapters I have explored the possibilities o f reconstructing the politics of 
the present by combining three techniques o f diagnosis: genealogical investigation of 
contemporary welfare reform in Australia, an ‘analytics o f government’ that attends to 
the complex ensemble o f power/knowledge relations pertaining to political rule, and an 
‘analytics of subjectification' to inquire into the effects of welfare reform on subjectivity 
and experience. The general aim is to show that welfare reform can be reassembled in 
terms of a conception o f  political power that is productive, complex, heterogeneous and 
effective. The work o f  diagnosis offers up a kind o f snap-shot o f the present by showing 
that current solutions to ‘the crisis o f the welfare state' are not natural, normal and self- 
evident. but can be reconstructed in such ways as to show their contingent, historical and 
discursive character. The utility o f this approach is one that strives to increase the 
contestability with which we accept these problematisations of welfare and experience as 
something beyond critique because o f their apparently putative and normative character. 
Most important is that o f establishing the possibilities o f mounting a challenge to neo­
liberal rationalities which, in the name o f certain rational, economic and moral 
discourses, fabricate a ‘pathology o f experience’ as a solution to our contemporary 
problems o f freedom. Before reaching a conclusion for this investigation, I want to give 
an overview o f the argument developed so far.
Overview
In Chapter 2. I argued that themes o f mutual obligation and social participation in the 
McClure Report can be understood in terms o f governing through a certain conception of 
space to which political rule applies. Following Rose (1996c, 1999a), I show that recent 
reforms o f Australian social security no longer govern in terms o f ‘society' but the self- 
governing capacities and sectors o f ‘community’. To understand this shift, and its relation 
to social welfare. I retrace Foucauldian themes on the art o f government to show how the 
very idea o f society was the discovery o f early liberal political thought. Based on the idea 
o f population, the ‘social’ emerges out o f new concerns about the limitations of
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government and the emergence o f a domain possessing its own complex, independent 
reality. From this field o f problematisations it becomes possible to situate nineteenth 
century debates on pauperism in terms o f an aberration o f conduct that represented the 
anti-thesis o f this new project o f socialisation. By drawing on Procacci's (1991) analysis 
of social economy, 1 show how the discovery o f a politics of poverty poses the ‘social 
question' in an entirely new way by probing into the moral habits and circumstances of 
the poor. The innovation o f  Malthusianism, for instance, was that o f successfully linking 
the behaviours o f the poor with imperatives of the new economic order -  self-restraint, 
autonomy, economic responsibility. Pauperism and dependency would come to signify 
zones of disorder, moral abyss, symptoms o f social and physical pathology, which served 
to not only develop instruments o f socialisation, but formed sites of investigation for the 
production of wealth. In this sense a discourse of poverty and a discourse of wealth were 
mutually determining factors in the constitution o f society.
In returning to the politics o f the present, we find calls to ‘community’ signal new 
strategies in the liberal government o f poverty. Principles of mutual obligation and social 
participation distance themselves from poverty as a social and structural phenomenon by 
constituting spaces o f  community to foster an ethic o f self-governance. Arguments of 
welfare dependency succeed in justifying the minimisation of ‘state responsibility' and 
the autonomisation o f domains in terms o f micro-sectors capable of generating their own 
solutions to the moral and systemic decline o f self-responsibility and civic participation. 
But aside from their rhetorical and emotional appeal, we might think o f these solutions to 
the welfare state in terms o f ‘ethico-politics’ (Rose, 1999a). The language of community, 
participation and obligation are reactivations o f earlier nineteenth century arguments 
which seek to manage risk in a new way. The re-invention of community is a technique 
for re-distributing and re-individualising risk, while more authoritarian solutions, like 
M ead's new paternalism, signal the responsibility o f governmental authorities in 
managing the most risky through programmes o f remoralisation and supervision. Ethico- 
politics is a new game o f political power that acts on the self-governing capacities of 
individuals and sectors o f the population by fostering new relations o f obligation to 
oneself and others.
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In Chapter 3, I show how problematisations o f welfare dependency fabricate a 
veritable field o f social and individual pathologies which are systematically linked to 
control technologies. The psychological and epidemiological characteristics of 
dependency warrant new strategies for the calculated management, detection and 
prevention o f the ‘spread o f welfare dependency’. But this preventive regime has a 
particular history, one that can be traced in terms of what Foucault (2000d) calls the 
‘birth of social medicine’. By tracing a history o f bio-politics, I argue that political power 
has. since the seventeenth century, sought a biological knowledge o f populations -  not to 
subjugate or repress life but to increase its value and utility (Foucault, 1979). The 
emergence o f ‘medical police’, for example, identifies the linkages between medical and 
political rationalities, and how these enabled medical knowledge, by the eighteenth 
century, to problematise the sickness o f the poor through the deployment o f a general 
police o f heath. These themes are important for understanding processes by which the 
poor formed objects o f medicalisation in nineteenth century Britain. The Poor Law Act of 
1834 essentially converted English medicine into a social medicine insofar as this law 
implied a compulsory medical control o f the destitute. Medicalisation of the poor served 
two main purposes: to augment the wealth o f the nation by optimising the health of the 
labour force, while guaranteeing the poor would no longer constitute a medical danger to 
the rest o f society.
These historical themes, I think, increase the intelligibility o f welfare reform in our 
own period. Implicit to the post-welfare regime is a collective medical perception of 
populations, a field o f visibilities, techniques and apparatuses for investigating the 
complex conditions in which active forms of citizenship are transformed into 
dependency, idleness and demoralisation. More precisely, the up-take of new paternalist 
solutions in Australia since the mid 90’s explicitly draw on a psychological knowledge of 
the poor. The emergence o f therapeutic models and pastoral techniques of case- 
management resort to supervision, confession and advice-giving in order to change the 
personal habits o f  the poor and help welfare recipients fit into the social relations of 
work. But medicalised forms o f continuous observation have, more recently, been
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accelerated through the use o f computer mediated technologies which resort to 
medicalised forms o f  m onitoring to isolate and target risky sub-populations. For instance, 
the application o f  clinical and profiled risk and the use of computer-modelling, allow 
social security system s to provide more differentiated and rationalised forms of 
intervention. A rguably , the poor are no longer treated as equalised entities, but subject to 
more elaborate techn iques for distinguishing the deserving and undeserving poor. Mutual 
obligation policies m inim ise the riskiness o f moral behaviours and re-individualise risk 
by resurrecting the im plicit social contract between citizen and government. On one side, 
the most risky are subjected to continuous and intensive assessment, while on the other, 
recipients are increasingly  held responsible for managing their own risk.
In Chapter 4, I argue that discourses of dependency reactivate much older claims 
about the presum ed idleness o f the poor, in which case contemporary solutions seek to 
calculate and d iscrim inate  the deservingness of the poor. The historical task here is 
twofold: to locate th e  conditions out o f which a discourse of the poor applied to practical 
solutions for the p ro p e r administration of the nation, while gaining a sense of what the 
discovery o f poverty  had previously displaced by the nineteenth century. Arguably, 
problematisations o f  idleness and labour were, during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, endem ic to  a mercantilist police of the poor -  a combination of moral- 
oeconomic statem ents that located idleness and labour shortages among the customs and 
habits o f the labouring  population. But mercantilist solutions, with their empty juridical 
taxonomy and th e ir  them es o f setting the poor to work, failed to examine the complex 
and diffuse cond itions in which industry was transformed into idleness. Suffice to say. 
paternalistic and repressive regulations never succeeded in resolving the escalating crisis 
o f poor adm inistration by the end o f the eighteenth century.
In returning to  th e  present, the problem of idleness continues to play an important and 
popular role am ong contemporary welfare debates. The reactivation of distinctions that 
calculate the deservingness o f the poor and the shrinking of any acceptable forms of 
dependency are strengthened by moral/psychological technologies that seek solutions 
through rem oralisation and reconstruction o f conduct. The recent discovery o f welfare
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dependency in Australia is directly related to American problematisations of welfare, in 
which case dependency has emerged as a specific psychopathology, a contemptible 
behavioural syndrome for problematising subjectivity in terms of pathologies of will. 
Psychological explanations encode individual attributes o f ‘post-industrial' idleness 
whereby increased reliance on benefits are thought to erode motivation and self-esteem. 
Arguably, the utility o f these arguments is to deflect concern away from the structural and 
economic conditions o f relative deprivation by locating problems o f worklessness among 
specific behaviours o f individuals, families and demoralised communities.
In Chapter 5, I revisit Dean’s (1991) ‘event of pauperism’ to reconstruct the 
transformation o f liberal government out o f which a definite concept o f poverty emerges. 
By tracing the intersection o f several themes -  population, economy, poverty and police -  
I show the political, intellectual and administrative conditions whereby poverty begins to 
specify a natural, general condition o f population and subsistence. As poverty becomes a 
natural lamentable consequence o f the imbalance between population and subsistence, 
pauperism emerges as the proper target o f reform. Indeed, the central objective of the 
New Poor Law would effectively abolish out-door relief for able-bodied men and redraw 
boundaries o f state responsibility; denying the right to life outside the market meant that 
only women and children remained legitimate objects o f assistance. By retracing the 
constitution o f poverty in terms o f ‘government’, we find support for Polanyi's thesis that 
economic liberalism was not incommensurate with interventionism, but illustrates to what 
extent liberal authoritarianism was a factor in the creation o f a national labour market; 
that is. by sealing o ff poverty from pauperism to constitute the ethical ideals of 
independent labour. Thus, the possibility o f modern welfare and the conditions out of 
which it becomes possible to produce a pathology outside the market, is located among 
those conditions in which pauperism plays a technical role in the reformation of wage- 
labour.
In Chapter 6, I suggested a diagnosis o f political power can no longer inhere within 
the spaces o f enclosure characteristic o f nineteenth century institutions. Following 
Deleuze (1995), it is necessary to understand how contemporary mechanisms of control
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operate beyond the forces composing ‘disciplinary society’, that is, by keeping pace w ith  
the increasing changeability o f society. Among ‘societies of control' it is not m erelv 
regulation o f conduct that is important, but constant modulation in the way control is 
designed into the very networks, practices and spaces that shape human conduct: control 
is now continuous, variable and capable o f acting more efficiently from a distance. T his 
hypothesis o f power provides new lines for thinking about the government o f  
contemporary welfare systems. Australian welfare administration reveals at least tw o  
kinds o f control technologies that characterise novel forms of governing ‘the excluded* 
via circuits o f  information, continuous monitoring, reciprocal obligation and self- 
improvement. In the name o f promoting ‘active society’ and fostering useful forms o f  
‘social and economic participation’, technologies of risk management and psychological 
reconstruction are instrumental to a new politics o f conduct.
What I call the medicalisation o f welfare refers to this complex configuration o f  
control that bears on the behaviour o f welfare recipients: the new welfare not on ly  
problematises subjectivity in terms o f discrete, individual deficiencies, but seeks to  
resolve these deficiencies through therapeutic assessment and reconstruction of conduct. 
This is evident among ‘activation’ policies which, since the mid 80’s, have installed a 
variety o f techniques ranging from case-management, medicalised monitoring, training o f  
‘soft-skills’. and the use o f psychological instruments for assessing risks o f new clients. 
Such policies have found their purchase by constructing a pathology o f behaviours 
outside the labour market, and like nineteenth century techniques o f com bating 
pauperism, are designed to play a technical role in the reformation of flexible w age- 
labour.
But aside from intensive and continuous control o f the poor there is a much darker 
side o f reform. If the medicalisation o f poverty succeeds in constituting dependency as a 
treatable pathology, there is the greater concern o f subordinating the poor to the term s 
and practices o f expert discourses while the broader political-economic forces tha t 
produce marginality are left to continue their work. Despite global transformations o f  
work, the increasing individualisation o f risk and the fragmentation o f social life, the poor
3 4 7
are called upon to change their behaviours, raise their self-esteem, acquire a more 
positive outlook, become more motivated, and manage themselves responsibly. The 
hypothesis I therefore develop at the end of Part I is that neo-liberal welfare reforms 
produce sectors o f the labouring population that are casualised, underprotected from risk, 
insecure and desocialised.
The new diagram o f  ‘advanced marginality’ that begins to emerge is linked to more 
recent problematisations o f neo-liberal utopia by diagnosing patterns of insecurity and 
under-employment (W acquant, 1996, 1999). The re-emergence o f the 'working poor' is a 
recent sy mptom o f the decline o f stable and protected employment which gives existence 
to a new kind o f poverty that is social rather than individual, and economic rather than 
moral. Arguments related to under-employment, the instability of flexible wage-labour 
and the rising costs o f  living are amenable to a critical investigation of the kinds of self­
management required to sustain this project of mandatory autonomy and continuous 
flexibility. This is as much a problem of subjectification as it is government. The task of 
Part II. then, is to diagnose practices o f subjectification among welfare recipients to 
recover explanations o f worklessness and insecurity that might otherwise decompose 
claims o f welfare dependency.
In Chapter 7, I offer a detailed understanding o f the technologies by which subjects 
engage in the management o f subjectivity and freedom. Subjectification reveals the 
variability o f statements and practices in which welfare recipients engage in constant 
ethical work. In the current climate o f reform where distinctions between the deserving 
and undeserving are re-inscribed and intensified, experiences o f recipients are caught up 
in a position that is frequently intersected by ambivalence, contradiction and continuous 
moral management. Among the younger sample there are clear indications that welfare 
positions are managed in terms o f moral/psychological discourses which are consistent 
with neo-liberal strategies o f autonomisation and responsibilisation (Rose, 1996b). The 
experience o f younger participants confirms the effectivity o f neo-liberal strategies in 
fabricating a psychological agent who engages in the management of autonomy, 
flexibility and resilience which are now key virtues o f labour market participation. The
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increasing stigma o f welfare receipt explains the heightened form of moral management 
which not only seek to evade the moral positioning o f idleness and dependency, but 
employ distancing strategies ( ‘I ’m not one of them’) which reactivate moral/ 
psychological pathologies o f conduct. The curious effect of these paternalistic discourses 
is that rather than promote moral and benign circuits o f community, they tend to 
desocialise the very sectors o f marginality in which the poor are concentrated.
In Chapter 8, I show how welfare administration increasingly targets the ethical 
sphere o f conduct by creating a welfare position that emphasises freedom and obligation. 
The shift from ‘office-counter’ regulation to more subtle practices of modulation 
demonstrate the way surveillance has become more anonymous, ubiquitous and efficient. 
The constant incitement to manage oneself responsibly is linked to the management of 
electronic databases which, for the monitored client, intensifies the insecure and 
provisional position o f income support. Among other statements, it is clear techniques of 
modulation embody programmes designed to ‘rehabilitate’ individuals through perpetual 
training. For some, these courses offer the putative promise o f financial autonomy 
through the reconstruction o f conduct, but, as we see in the case o f Sam. the endless 
management o f  casual labour provides very little guarantee o f such promises. 
Furthermore, it is not just welfare mothers and the long-term unemployed who are 
targeted, but also the chronically ill who must demonstrate some capacity to engage in 
quasi-autonomous conduct. Where pathology of worklessness is a target of control 
strategies, physical incapacity is no longer a secure position for relief, but subject to 
continuous medical monitoring and constant pressure to participate in work programmes.
For those who treat welfare as a hiatus from work, to recompose oneself before re­
entering the labour-market, Pete’s experience sharply demonstrates how perceived non- 
compliance is penalised through ‘breaching’ claimants and prosecuting those suspected 
o f ‘welfare fraud'. The modern welfare position is one that must be carefully and 
rationally managed in such ways that continually demonstrate one’s responsibility to find 
and keep w'ork. Pete’s narrative conveys the extraordinary lengths one must go to in order 
to evade prosecution and manage security. New measures of ‘cracking down on welfare
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cheats’ seem to be more intensely regulated among marginal communities where 
stereotypes o f idleness and dependency are concentrated. Pete offers a concise overview 
of the current direction of reform: ‘They are try in g  to make an example o f  people who are 
over claiming benefits but it is also a vote w inner, I mean nobody likes a dole-bludger ... 
I think another really big thing is with Centrelink their strategies at the moment are 
trying to get people o ff  benefits by making th e ir  life as difficult as possible’. Arguably, 
techniques o f continuous monitoring, perpetual training, electronic surveillance, 
breaching and legal prosecution are designed to  transform ethical practices through the 
intensification o f calls to manage ourselves responsibly and autonomously.
In Chapter 9, I explore the ethical statem ents o f welfare recipients who engage in 
complex forms o f self-management. Among younger participants we find evidence that 
maintaining a psychological relation to self is key to constructing expectations and 
fantasies o f autonomy and financial security. Practices o f freedom are tied to an ‘ethics of 
personal power' whereby self emerges as th e  locus of control and the key site for 
personal transformation. Contradictions within the domain o f wage-labour are not linked 
to marginality, education or resource allocation, but transposed into personal difficulties. 
Barriers to employment are located among practices in which subjects are required to 
engage in ethical work on the self: asceticism , stoicism, self-affirmation, confidence- 
building. etc. The underside o f such discourses is that ‘the se lf is also an object of blame, 
ambivalence and constant moral management. Ethical work is an endless enterprise as the 
materiality o f deprivation, inequality and insecurity disappear into the self. What remains 
more distinct than a milieu o f constraints is a psychological agent who is solely 
responsible for the management o f autonomy.
While the optimistic and generally uncritical accounts of younger participants place 
more emphasis on possibilities o f personal transformation, pathology becomes a more 
dominant position among older participants. F o r  those excluded from permanent, or even 
flexible, wage-labour we find stronger evidence o f an ‘ethics o f pathology', that is, 
subjects who, for medical or psychological reasons, are unable to participate in work, but 
continue to engage in practices o f freedom. T h e  only recourse for freedom is to constitute
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oneself as a medically or psychologically flawed subject in order to exonerate oneself 
from discourses o f dependency. But rather than think of these subjects as the products of 
a welfare system that created dependency, we find among personal histories o f work and 
freedom numerous and deliberate attempts to constitute oneself as autonomous wage­
workers. For those who failed to find financial security in the flexible labour market, 
transformations o f self are linked to government retraining programmes seeking to 
reconstruct the behaviours o f single mothers and disability pensioners to participate in 
low skilled labour. In most cases, however, even the promise o f autonomy is not a 
sufficient guarantee for security, and fails to resolve the contradictions o f the competitive 
game of freedom. Nonetheless, the necessity o f ethical reconstruction is designed into the 
meagre conditions o f  welfare assistance, in which case we find strong evidence of 
ambivalence among those who are compelled to find low-paid, casual work to stave off 
the threat o f permanent exclusion.
Diagnosis
Having restated the arguments o f each chapter, we are now in a position to diagnose 
the politics o f the present by combining two ethical domains: the domain of “government' 
and the domain o f ‘subjectification’. In Australia, policies o f mutual obligation, social 
and economic participation and community regeneration, have recently emerged as 
putative solutions to the crisis o f social welfare, that is, by problematising the latter in 
terms of the systemic passivity and dependency it has created. The work of genealogy 
seeks to locate the conditions o f possibility by which neo-liberal solutions re-activate 
collective memories o f pauperism to transform welfare from an income redistribution 
scheme to a behaviour modification regime.
Among nineteenth century debates on pauperism, poverty was constituted as a natural 
and unfortunate imbalance between population and subsistence, while pauperism 
emerged with all the clarity o f specifying a form of life-conduct that was unnatural, 
immoral and anti-social. That is to say, pauperism formed the negative conditions for 
positing the rational, moral and economic values o f ‘society’. More positively, however, 
pauperism also served as the multiplicity o f domains, problems and reflections for the
development of instruments by which to carry out the new project o f socialisation. 
Without succumbing to resemblance, it is possible to rethink policies o f the present in 
terms of the construction o f new a kind pathology that lies beyond the wealth and virtue 
o f wage-labour. Welfare dependency draws from the respectability o f psychological 
knowledge and from the moral memories of Bentham’s abyss to posit the values of a 
society that is ‘active’, and o f a conception o f citizenship that embodies an ethic of 
autonomy and self-governance. These are not new discoveries or solutions. But in 
Australia, at present, we find a strengthening of this alignment between pathology and 
work to execute two broad strategies: to remove the systemic passivity created by 
universal welfare entitlements, and to inscribe the ethical ideals of self-governance and 
social obligation through the reformation of flexible wage-labour. The more recent 
sentiments o f the McClure Report would further suggest the expansion of mutual 
obligation no longer finds within the role o f society guarantor of freedom, security and 
progress, but that the moral, ethical and emotional spaces of ‘community'' are posed as 
quasi-autonomous sectors to shoulder some of the burden of self-governance. Following 
Rose (1999a). we might describe these recent transformations of government and 
citizenship in terms o f ‘ethico-politics’ -  the politics of life itself has become immanent 
to contemporary technologies o f government.
But the call to govern ourselves rationally and responsibly only forms part of the 
story of welfare reform: strategies o f control and practices o f subjectification tell another. 
The recent introduction o f American ‘paternalist’ solutions would suggest that advanced 
liberal government also retains an authoritarian dimension. This is certainly the view of 
Polanyi (1957) who argued that liberalism and brutal interventionism were not mutually 
exclusive realities. In fact, the new conditionality of Australian welfare reveals a whole 
array o f control strategies designed to produce rational, self-governing subjects. 
Technologies o f risk management and psychological reconstruction reinstate a new social 
contract which, as Yeatman (2000) points out, is certainly not a relationship between 
equals. The failure to comply with contractual obligations, to manage ourselves rationally 
and responsibly, reveals, in the form of breaching policies and legal campaigns against 
‘welfare cheats’, the illiberal aspects o f advanced liberal government. Under the new
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conditionality o f welfare and social citizenship ‘beyond entitlements', it seems some risks 
are not worth managing, and the failure o f moral improvement are, after all, failures of 
the undeserving.
The old and compelling stories o f wilful idleness and dissolute conduct, those without 
regard or obligation for the hard working and virtuous, are expedient strategies for 
reactivating the collective fears and memories of those unfit to take part in society. But 
what these popular moral statements displace is a history of the poor whose numbers 
were so widespread and endemic to a nation that ‘poverty’ had to be naturalised in order 
to invent wage-labour as the only means of salvation. A history of under-employment, 
over-population, economic scarcity and political mismanagement are conveniently 
eclipsed in order to produce as well as impose the moral and economic necessity of 
unremitting toil. Alongside these memories of monstrosity, it is possible to recover 
alternative stories that, in contrast to dependency, show the insecurity of flexible wage- 
labour and the increasing stigmatisation of welfare. These are certainly the stories borne 
out among the participants o f this study.
Personal histories o f subjectification reveal among the older participants that the 
nature o f work has transformed in several ways: with the gradual disappearance of 
manufacturing, we sense an erosion o f protected labour, and the increasing casualisation 
o f unskilled work. While welfare assistance during the 70’s and 80’s remained relatively 
secure and unproblematic, older participants relate stories of personal mobility in which 
possibilities o f self-formation are intertwined with unskilled labour. By the late 80"s and 
90's, working experiences are more diffuse and short-term as participants begin to narrate 
stories o f ‘recession’, increasing obligation to take part in ‘work programmes' and having 
to comply with ‘activity tests’. By the mid 90’s, older female participants narrate 
experiences o f exhaustion alongside expectant fantasies of financial autonomy; circuits of 
sociality are frequently disrupted by transitions in the casual/temporary labour market: 
and for those who struggled to stay in casual labour due to illness, there is a growing 
sense o f marginality and stigmatisation o f welfare receipt. Currently their welfare 
positions are strikingly similar: while taking part in some form of further education or
training, nearly all the older participants, now in their mid to late 40’s, suffer from 
chronic illness; nearly all convey a deep regret that previous labouring experiences never 
transpired into permanent or secure work; and, especially the older women, now abandon 
any kind o f hope o f achieving full-participation. The constant rehearsal o f medical and 
psychological pathologies seem to anchor a position in which meaningful, secure work is 
completely unobtainable.
In contrast, the two youngest (female) participants narrate stories o f labour market 
opportunity despite numerous references to under-employment, poor wages and highly 
competitive local labour markets. In the case of Amber, who left the comfortable but 
limited circuits o f rural community, the transition to a large city is narrated in terms o f  a 
growing sense o f maturity and personal autonomy. Fantasies o f urban life are short-lived, 
however, as friends begin to migrate to other cities, and the precarious circuits of shared 
accommodation raise feelings o f isolation despite regular casual work in a call centre. 
The return to community is narrated as a painful loss of autonomy, coupled with the 
sense o f closure that characterises her current welfare position. A sense of self struggles 
to emerge with any clarity as she tries to supplement her income with sporadic, casual 
work in the local service industry. But despite the constraints of welfare and work. 
Amber narrates an acute sense of psychological agency -  one is only confined by one's 
ability to make choices -  exemplifying the kind of resilience and fantasy of flexibility 
that has become a condition of modern wage-labour. For the young female w orker there 
is no sense o f work offering long-term security other than forming a transient relay in the 
maximisation o f  experience and the on-going construction o f an individual biography. 
Amber's narrative. I think, exemplifies the kind of psychological autonomy that younger 
generations o f workers are now enjoined to think as desirable possibilities for the active 
construction o f identity and lifestyle through the fantasy o f unlimited choice.
Among narratives o f participants in their late 20's and early 30's, there is a stronger 
sense o f ambivalence and resistance to the normal, moral circuits of flexible wage-labour. 
For those who occupy a long-term welfare position while continuing to collect benefits, 
there is a belief that endless flexibility in low skilled or casual employment are not
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adequate solutions to the problems o f freedom and identity. It is as if identity work is 
defined by its opposition to the regime of wage-labour, in which case participants narrate 
counter-discourses o f work by engaging in marginal, liminal and risky forms of activity, 
ranging from freelance trading, sex work and other forms o f black employment. These 
counter-normative practices o f work are understood not as examples o f moral aberration, 
dependency or fraud, but acts o f resistance where marginality engages in alternative 
projects of self-formation; it is not the absence of work that define these positions but that 
work itself is more closely aligned with the ethical work of freedom. In Jabe's case it is 
not the rejection o f normal wage-labour that defines her welfare position, but that her 
own history o f marginality warrants automatic exclusion from ordinary employment. 
Con, on the other hand, rejects the insecurity and meaningless-ness o f conventional 
wage-labour, in which case ‘masquerading as dependency’ is itself a strategy for 
managing the risks o f  marginal self-employment.
One o f the symptoms o f marginality and insecurity is that welfare recipients must 
engage in complex forms o f self-management. For instance, participant narratives reveal 
two distinct, but overlapping, poles o f experience: ‘pathology’ and ‘freedom'. In the case 
o f pathology, recipients invariably present themselves as the deserving poor through 
constant rehearsal o f medical and psychological discourses. Among older participants, 
pathology signifies partial or total exclusion from wage-labour, in which case a sense of 
profound ambivalence and dislocation are constant markers of self-formation. Some 
participants, like Jabe, refuse a pathological identity but at times is uncertain whether 
pathology is a genuine explanation for unemployment or a method of deflecting self­
blame. Vacillation between self-blame and moral vindication is indicative of how some 
recipients are unable to resolve the sense of ambivalence and division arising from 
physical marginalisation and moral atonement. For others, like Sam and Jay, discourses 
o f pathology are the only means o f recovering a sense of self inevitably excluded from 
secure or regular work. In Jay’s case, the only recourse for managing marginalisation is 
working a few hours a week as a casual cleaner to counter the encroaching threat of 
isolation.
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In the case o f freedom, self-management entails the kind o f ethical work in which 
recipients are expected to discover within themselves the personal resources for active 
participation. The difficulties o f self-management, however, reside within the respective 
positions in which welfare recipients are expected to overcome a number o f material 
barriers o f participation. In the absence o f any real labour market opportunities for 
younger people living in small rural communities, the difficulty o f participation is 
sometimes resolved by an ‘open-minded’ acceptance of the realities o f employment. For 
instance, having returned to her family after working in the city, Amber narrates self- 
realisation as a kind o f personal adjustment to the inflexible conditions of the local 
labour-market. For those o f whom a welfare position actually excludes ful 1-participation, 
like single mothers, the difficulties o f practicing autonomy are less easily resolved. In 
Kate's case, it is an ascetic relation o f ‘working on the se lf  that must somehow overcome 
the stress o f sole-parenting while building self-esteem to face her fears of the labour 
market. In a more striking example, we are told by the oldest participant, Mike, that 
barriers to professional employment such as ageism and redundancy, though very real 
industry-related constraints, requires personal resilience to overcome obstacles of active 
participation. Common to all these accounts is the narration of psychological discourses 
that maintain an ethical relation o f self-belief, asceticism, stoicism and optimism. 
Arguably, psychological relations o f ‘responsibilising the se lf  are key factors in the 
management o f  freedom even when the material limitations and inequities of labour 
markets remain problematic and unresolved.
Future implications
Finally, I want to consider some future directions for research by elaborating some of 
the implications raised in the thesis. The future of welfare envisaged by the Coalition 
Government, with its language o f participation, community and mutual obligation, 
actively produces a new plane o f political thought and action, one that has been described 
here as ‘ethico-politics'. Ethico-politics responds to neo-liberal problematisations o f the 
welfare state by transforming welfare into a new kind of preventive regime that imposes 
‘work for the dole’ policies on the young and maintains unacceptably low rates of 
allowance through delayed and meagre indexation o f payments. Whether deliberate or
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not, these strategies have the effect o f making allowances for the unemployed, 
particularly Youth Allowances, substantially lower than the Henderson Poverty Line 
(approx. $320 per week). Furthermore, increased supervision of claimants, the threat of 
breaches and coercive techniques o f increasing ‘participation rates’ have, I would argue, 
transformed welfare into a system o f social /'^security. But these ‘reforms’ of welfare 
have not gone unnoticed or uncontested.
Indicative o f the Senate Report (2004) findings on ‘Poverty and financial hardship' 
and the sustained commitment o f organisations like ACOSS in developing ‘Anti-Poverty 
Plans'. I think the future o f left critique on matters of social security, social inequality, 
long-term unemployment, under-employment, financial hardship and the rising cost of 
living and housing, should renew attempts to examine the realities of a ‘poverty of 
participation’ in Australia today. The possibility that deprivation and disadvantage have 
actually increased to alarming levels would render the Howard Government's policies 
based around welfare dependency, mutual obligation and participation unconscionable 
and dangerously ineffective. Attempts to quickly recycle the poor by driving them into 
flexible wage-labour may have all the effect o f exacerbating the current mechanisms that 
produce ‘advanced’ forms o f marginality.
At the level o f applied research, I think it is essential that social investigations 
continue to examine the complex social and economic conditions o f inequality and 
understand how people manage long-term unemployment. Further, I am not convinced 
that poverty should or can be restricted to analyses o f those who cannot or will not work, 
but that deprivation and hardship are conditions associated with those who do work. 
Rather than focus energy and resources into demonising welfare dependency. I think 
there are very strong grounds for examining the lives o f ‘the working poor'. Focus on the 
latter might render visible and thinkable the complex conditions in which standards of 
living, quality o f life, poverty o f consumption, poor health and access to basic services 
and even the insecurity o f participation, have become lived, multiple and entrenched 
realities.
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At the level o f theoretical research, I think the work of left critique must continue to 
disrupt and decompose the certainties o f ethico-politics vis-a-vis social welfare. Where 
the current work applies history, policy and subjectivity as counterpoints for discussion, 
recent claims about ‘the rise o f the working poor are also important for increasing the 
contestability and intelligibility o f discussions pertaining to the future o f welfare politics. 
One direction for research, and by no means a new one, is to assemble appropriate 
theoretical tools with which ‘social economy’ might continue to disrupt the certainties of 
a politics o f conduct and displace medicalising approaches to welfare administration. 
This, however, would require careful reformulation of what we mean by ‘the social'.
In Australian politics, formulations of the social carry with it neo-Durheimian 
assumptions invoked by principles of obligation, participation and community. Indeed. 
Durkheim argued that the voluntary dimension of the social contract implicit to these 
policies function in relation to, and on behalf of, the social order, but only to the extent 
that it is composed o f a normative compliance o f the behaviours on which the social 
depends. As it currently stands, the reterritorialisation of the social is viewed as immanent 
in individuals; the idea o f ‘society’ is reduced to an individual psychology that sustains a 
normative dualism between ‘individual’ and ‘society’, explaining why social intervention 
often targets individual conduct. But if we take social economy to mean the forms of 
reflection and activity that are critical o f political economy -  a means of testing and 
verifying it -  then a critical reworking o f this project would eschew temptations of 
thinking 'the social’ as an abstract or independent domain o f norms, processes and 
conducts. Rather, the task o f a renewed and critical focus on social economy would 
endeavour to explore the social in terms of its technical, discursive and immanent 
character. In arguing for a ‘return’ o f social economy, the task is to assemble a plane of 
thought and action out o f which new problematisations, new control strategies and new 
subjects o f control emerge. This approach, among many others, is perhaps essential to 
maintaining a critical vigilance o f advanced forms of liberal government.
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